A PHILOSOPHIC INVESTIGATION OF THE *CH'ENG WEI-SHIH LUN*: VASUBANDHU, HSÜAN TSANG AND THE TRANSMISSION OF VIJÑAPTI-MĀTRA (YOGĀCĀRA) FROM INDIA TO CHINA

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CHAPTER ONE

Buddhism and Phenomenology

Buddhist phenomenology reached its peak in the Yogācāra school. They scrutinized the structure and function of cognition from epistemological, logical, psychological, ethical and soteric perspectives, and saw cognition as the realm in which the key problematic diagnosed by Buddhist thought was situated, that problematic being the karmic economy driven by appropriational habits.

In the seventh century a Buddhist pilgrim from China came to India to find what was missing in the Chinese Buddhism of his day. The predominant Buddhist school in both India and China at that time wasYogācāra. It was also the preferred doctrine at Nālandā University, the central seat of Buddhist learning in the world. The pilgrim Hsüan-tsang studied with all the contemporary Indian masters, and became renowned at Nālandā for his debating skills. After almost twenty years he returned to China with loads of Sanskrit texts, and spent the rest of his life producing seventy-four translations and a travelogue of his journey that to this day remains a classic. One of his translations, the only one in fact which is not a translation, but rather a compendium gloss of ten separate texts, is the ***Ch'eng wei-shih lun***.

The ***Ch'eng wei-shih lun*** has become synonymous with the school that founded itself on Hsüan-tsang's teaching. It is a translation from Sanskrit into Chinese of a root Yogācāra text by Vasubandhu called ***Triṃśikā*** (Thirty Verses), integrated with the ten commentaries. Though he originally planned to translate each of the ten commentaries separately, at the insistent request of his

major disciple, K'uei-chi, he edited and fused them together. The ten original commentators were Dharmapāla, Sthiramati, Nanda, Citrabhānu, Guṇamati, Jinamitra, Jñānacandra, Bandhuśrī, Śuddhacandra and Jinaputra. Of these only the first two are especially important for the development of Buddhist thought. Of the ten commentaries, only Sthiramati's survives today in Sanskrit.[1]

I - What is *Yogācāra* ?

What is Yogācāra? It has generally been mislabelled as 'idealism.' And many scholars, including D.T. Suzuki, Edward Conze and others have constructed elaborate interpretations of its supposed idealistic premises: One mind tending and creating the whole world, the flat denial that anything whatsoever exists outside the mind, an ālaya-vijñāna which functions like Jung's collective unconscious, etc. However, when one actually reads Yogācāric texts, a different impression emerges. They are neither metaphysical nor ontological idealists, though, like phenomenologists and critical realists such as Kant, they could be called epistemological idealists.[2] They have suspended the ontological query which leads either to idealism or materialism. They are interested instead in uncovering why it is that we generate and attach to those positions. Insofar as either position might lead to attachment, they clearly and forthrightly reject both of them. Chapter Five especially will delve into this further.

If they are not idealists, what are they? What do they posit as real, if anything? This, too, will be explored fully in the later chapters.

Another charge brought against Yogācāra, usually in East Asian circles, is that Yogācāra is quasi-Hinayāna, i.e., it hasn't matured into a full-fledged Mahāyāna position. We hope to dispel this slander in the following pages. In India there were only two Mahāyāna schools, Mādhyamika and

Yogācāra. Thus great pains have been taken to show where these schools agree and where they do not. It will be clear that they are firmly in agreement about almost all basic things, and that where they differ the Mahāyānic status of either school is not in question.

As to the 'identity' of Yogācāra, like the self and the dharmas which they deconstruct, the Yogācāric identity displays an alterity. No single monolithic doctrinal system can univocally answer, by itself, to the name Yogācāra. Many texts and doctrinal positions, in a number of cultures, identified themselves or may be identified by us as Yogācāric or Yogācāra-influenced. The fictitious 'origins of Yogācāra' story relayed by tradition that traces its origins to two half-brothers, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, and the former's 'teacher', Maitreya,[3] does not explain the existence of texts such as the Saṅdhinirmocana Sūtra, Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, certain Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras, etc., which already centuries before these two half-brothers lived were circulating all the 'characteristic' Yogācāra doctrines. To assume a conceptual continuity between Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, much less between either or both of them and their later commentators and interpreters (Sthiramati, Dharmapāla, Hsüan-tsang, etc.) is to risk egregiously misunderstanding one or all of them.

When the ***Ch'eng wei-shih lun*** appeared, a number of competing Yogācāric schools in China were battling out doctrines based on what Hsüan-tsang rightly considered deficient and misleading translations. For example, the type of Yogācāra which arose from Paramārtha's translations and the works that emerged from his school, such as the ***Awakening of Faith,*** attempted to blend Yogācāric notions such as the ***ālaya-vijñāna*** (warehouse consciousness) with the ***tathāgata-garbha*** (matrix [womb, embryo] of the Tathāgata) thought; but the ***Ch'eng wei-shih lun*** is unconcerned with the latter

notion.[4] The ***Ch'eng wei-shih lun*** is only one of the seventy four texts Hsüan-tsang translated to rectify the situation.[5] It thus is part of a plurality of texts by Hsüan-tsang and, in a larger scope, part of large body of Yogācāric Chinese texts produced over a number of centuries. In an even larger scope, it is one text amongst a large number of texts in a variety of languages, which appeared from the third or fourth century until today, which may be called Yogācāra. No single text would or should pretend to speak for all of them. Many directly confront and oppose the stated positions of other Yogācāra texts. One may even argue that the ***Ch'eng wei-shih lun*** is not definitive for Hsüan-tsang's own thought, that other texts, for instance the Yogācārabhūmi or Prajñāpāramitā texts, were much closer to his heart and his way of thinking.[6]

Yogācāra is Buddhist phenomenology. Husserl defined his phenomenology as a transcendental idealism, a term Kant had applied to his own philosophy. It meant a critical concern with epistemological issues, a recognition that knowledge comes through cognition, but not necessarily a metaphysical statement about the nature of reality as dependent on or created by mind. Yogācāra shares this concern with epistemology and the cognitive roots of knowledge and ignorance, as should any Buddhist. But they do not rule out the existence of rūpa, for instance, as Chapter Five will show, which, if they were thoroughgoing idealists they should.

The reader will discover phenomenological and deconstructive terminology liberally spread throughout this work. In fact, a number of key Yogācāra terms have been rendered into the vocabulary of Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and Derrida. A few words of explanation and caution are thus necessary if the reader is to avoid misunderstanding the purpose of this terminological 'conversion.'

These 'translations' or 'substitutions' should not be taken as a claim that Yogācāra as such and Phenomenology (or Deconstruction, etc.) are interchangeable or neatly reducible to each other, such that one entire system, or even a constellation of concepts and terms from one system can be carried over into the other painlessly and without shedding a drop of doctrinal blood. Husserl is Husserl and Yogācāra is Yogācāra. But 'identity' does not operate that simply. "Husserl" (1859–1938) is a name, a heuristic concatenation, a prajñapti, for a stream of writings and formulations, the majority of which remain unpublished, that emerged as a distinct philosophical position (and subsequently a school) around the year 1900 with the publication of the *Logical Investigations,* and continues through his death and post-humous publications, from the extensive Husserlian archives at Louvain to the appropriations and disseminations of his thoughts and formulations by his 'successors,' from Heidegger, Fink, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty to the undergraduate reading "Husserl" for the first time. The specific ideas which he advanced altered as he reflected on them – and in Husserl's case in particular his virtual neurosis for rewriting and re-editing make it a marvel that he managed to publish at all; he would continue to revise even his published pieces. Thus, despite a general continuity of concerns and a certain continuity of methodology, the term or name "Husserl" does not refer to a monolithic, stable set of propositions or positions, but rather denotes a trajectory within which certain 'characteristic' moves occur; and these characteristics may temporally and/or logically oppose each other. We 'know' Husserl precisely to the degree that we can recite these characteristics.

Since Husserl is not even self-identical with himself, i.e., what it is that he thought changed, how much less could Yogācāra be self-identical to Husserl? Nonetheless Yogācāra *is a form of phenomenology,* with affinities to

Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, etc., if not identities. Similarities and differences will be pointed out in the text as occasion for explication arises. For now a few of the crucial terms from Husserl, et al., that will be used need to be explained, especially as to the sense(s) in which I use them.

II – The Hyle

As Husserl says at the very beginning of *The Idea of Phenomenology*[7]

> *Natural thinking* in science and everyday life is untroubled by the difficulties concerning the possibility of cognition. *Philosophical thinking* is circumscribed by one's position toward the problems concerning the possibility of cognition.

To get to the essence of the 'real' (*reeller*) components of cognition, Husserl proposes a series of 'reductions,' whose nature and relationship constitutes one of the variables in the durational alterations known by the name "Husserl." In *Ideas I*, revising his earlier formulations in the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl offers a number of cognitive elements in a less than crystal clear manner. Noesis becomes his term for the psyche, i.e., mentation whose essence is intentionality.[8] In secs. 85, 86, 97 and 98 of *Ideas I* he paints the following picture: Following the notion of Form and Matter, noesis gives ("animates," "bestows") meaning to raw sensate material (e.g., colors, texture, sounds, etc.), called hyle. The hyle, he says, is *not* intentional. Intentionality constitutes or appropriates what is non-intentional, and thereby imbues it with 'meaning' (*Sinn*). The noetic constitution or appropriation of 'hyletic data' is what produces the noema, or the object *qua* cognized. On the one hand he seems to treat the hyle as something objective, something which in itself contributes its essence to an instance of cognition.[9] On the other hand, he declares it a part of the noetic side of

cognition.

His discussion of the hyle has frustrated virtually every commentator, and many applaud his abandonment of the term in his later writings. Though the word 'hyle' disappears, the problematic remained in nearly the same language, indicating it expressed a problem that his phenomenology couldn't 'think' without.[10] For our purposes we will briefly examine its treatment in earlier works.

In the *Idea of Phenomenology*,[11] a series of lectures he gave in 1907 which previewed some of what was to appear in 1913 in *Ideas I* as his revised phenomenology, he states succinctly the issue within which the problem of the hyle arises, in language similar to that which he will use in *Ideas I* when beginning his discussion of the hyle there:[12]

> ...the phenomena of sound perception, even as evident and reduced, demands within the immanent a distinction between ***appearance*** and ***that which appears***. We thus have two absolute data, the givenness of the appearing and the givenness of the object; and the object within this immanence is not immanent in the sense of genuine immanence; it is not a concrete part (*Stück*) of the appearance, i.e., the past phases of the enduring sound are now still objective and yet they are not genuinely contained in the present moment of the appearance. Therefore, we also find in the case of the phenomenon of perception what we found in the case of consciousness of universals, namely, that it is a consciousness which constitutes something self-given which is not contained within what is occurring [in the world] and is not at all found as *cogitatio*.

The hyle would be, for Husserl, a present object; thus he is here involving something else as well. The object that gives itself to cognition, in "immanence," does not give all of itself. The object is not exhausted by its appearance; in-itself 'that which appears' is not the same as the 'appearance,' "it is not a concrete part of the appearance."

The example Husserl offers here of a non-genuine cognitive object, namely a 'past' object, is strikingly Yogācāric. For Yogācāra, too, only a present

object is genuine, real. Objects from the past and future are never immediately given, or even remotely given; they are, according to Yogācāra, cognitive constructions (***parikalpita***).

Now in *Ideas I* the hyle is described as[13]

> unitary *"sensile"* experiences, *"sensory contents"* such as the data of color, touch, sound, and the like, which we shall no longer confuse with the appearing phases of things, their colour-quality, their roughness, and so forth...

A few pages later Husserl offers the following paragraphs, the first which is entirely in italics:[14]

> *The stream of phenomenological being has a twofold bed: a material and a noetic.*
>
> Phenomenological reflexions and analyses which specifically concern the material may be called ***hyletically phenomenological,*** as, on the other side, those that relate to noetic phases may be referred to as ***noetically phenomenological.*** The incomparably more important and fruitful analyses belong to the noetical side.

Yet Solomon observes, in parentheses:[15]

> (It is important to stress, even though it is not our topic, that the sensory matter or "hyletic data" of perception are not introduced on the noematic side of the act but rather in the noesis itself. The purpose of this move is precisely to avoid making the sensory into an object.)

Even though this seems to fly in the face of the passage just quoted from Husserl, a case can be made for it; though obviously an opposing case could be made as well.[16]

In part, what Solomon contends could be true because, for Husserl, it would be impossible for the noema to ground the hyle, since the hyle and the noesis are 'real' (*reelles*), whereas the noema is the unreal byproduct of their interaction (*Ideas I,* sec. 97). Thus the opposition hyle/noesis is primary to the opposition noesis/noema. But this would still be far less than saying that the

hyle is *in* the noetic; it seems that for Husserl this would be too reductionistic.

We needn't wade any further into this hermeneutic morass, since our purpose is an exposition of Yogācāra and not to take sides in controversies over interpretations of Husserlian ideas. But this obvious conflict was introduced to highlight the problems of the hyle. When arriving at the hyle, many commentators suddenly feel that this is their opportunity to decry whatever they see as fundamentally lacking or unsatisfactory in Husserl's thought in general. The hyle becomes their occasion to complain. For instance, while discussing Husserl's notions of 'filling,' self-evidence and time-consciousness, Miller complains:[17]

> The trouble is that Husserl himself does not pursue the notion of "filling" very far. He seems to be, simply, more comfortable discussing the difference between memory (retention), perception (primal-impression), and anticipation (protention) in terms of the difference in their strength of "self-evidence," or its absence altogether. This is a pity. The connection between Husserl's notion of "hyle" and sensory "filling," on the one hand, and the *experience of causation* (in the primitive, pre-theoretical sense of the latter), on the other, is strong. Pursuing that connection might have yielded a better explication of the notions "hyle" and "filling," notions which still remain for the most part obscure. Perhaps even more importantly, it might have yielded a *phenomenological* account of our experience of causation, an account which is sorely missing in Husserl's theory of our empirical experience.

Rather than perform his own phenomenological investigation of 'causality,' Miller bemoans its conspicuous absence in Husserlian thought because of the strong "connection between" the hyle and our basic sense of cause and effect. Of course, Miller speaks here as a realist, or at least as one addressing the cognitive sphere in which naive realism emerges.

We turn to Donn Welton for another example of such complaints:[18]

> As long as the coincidence between *Darstellungsinhalt* [presentational contents] and the given was *adequate* and as long as meaning, logically characterized, was considered symmetrical with the unmodalized [i.e.,

> athetic, not thetic: thetic = species of cognition, e.g., perceiving, willing, believing, remembering, etc.] perceptual object fulfilling or ratifying it, Husserl had no reason to be concerned with the unique structure of the perceptual object. But once it is seen as inadequate, even for the immanent sphere, we are left with a nasty split between intentional and perceptual object, between "mental" object and concrete object. And second, rather than giving full range to the unique and different way in which a perceptual noema functions, the sense is still characterized as that which the act must animate and bestow [i.e., the noema acts as 'form' to the non-intentional 'matter;' it in-forms it].[19] And as a result we are left with the puzzling problem of how that which we do not directly intend is nevertheless seen and how it can itself initiate a perceptual act. [square brackets mine]

In other words, if Husserl is an ontological dualist, such that an irremediable rift separates the object as I experience it from the object itself, then a number of familiar philosophical problems emerge, beginning with the Kantian in-itself that forever remains noumenous and hence finally unknowable. Husserl's project of 'returning to the things themselves,' his promise of disclosing and recovering 'essences' would be completely thwarted. Other incoherencies intrude into his formulations. If 'knowing' is grounded in a consciousness whose immediate experience is essentially intentional (i.e., consciousness of), how do non-intentional things announce themselves, and in what way are they given or give themselves to the intentional economy, and by what means might one clearly know what relation obtains between the non-intentional object as cognized (i.e., as appropriated by an intentionality) and the object in itself? If meaning (*Sinn*) is 'given' to an object by the noesis, i.e., it is noetically constituted, in what sense (*Sinn*) can one say that the meaning is *of* the object? Do objects (*Stoffe,* 'material [fabric or matter], substance, subject-matter') announce their meanings or are all meanings gifts from noesis? What does the sensory (*sensuelle*) and the sensible (*sinnliche*) mean? Does the form-matter model solve or perpetuate these difficulties? Further, if we perceive non-intentional objects as such, then

consciousness is not essentially intentional, but only partially intentional,[20] a possibility that some readers of Husserl maintain he advocated. As Welton points out, many other technical problems emerge as well. He continues:[21]

> These difficulties also have a disturbing effect on Husserl's discussion of sensation and sense-data. In *Ideas* the hyletic data are considered to be a formless, timeless, immanent, noetic content of consciousness which the act then animates with a representative function. They accounted for the fact that we see the same color, for example, with different intensities and textures – for what Husserl spoke of as adumbrations of profiles. What is amazing, however, is that Husserl considered them not something excluded by the transcendental reduction but rather a noetic "residue" to which we have immediate access from within the reduction. This creates not merely an insurmountable methodological problem, but it also seems to transpose – once the split between intentional object and real object is forced – all the problems of Hume's empiricism into a transcendental phenomenalism.

He describes the "insurmountable methodological problem" in a note:[22]

> Asemissen has described this problem with clarity and force: "Without the corporeality of the body (*Leiblichkeit*) the sensations are absolutely nothing. The body (*Leib*) is the medium of their being. In that Husserl bracketed the body in the reduction in order to gain the pure ego and pure consciousness as the proper domain of phenomenology, he, at the same time, without knowing it, also bracketed the sensations.... Just as the pure ego does not have a body, so it also does not have and cannot have sensations. And just as the body is not an immanent (*reel*) content of consciousness, so neither can the sensation be such. Husserl's talk of sensations after the bracketing of the body as content of pure consciousness is not a phenomenological discovery." Herman Asemissen, *Strukturanalytische Probleme der Wahrnehmung in der Phänomenologie Husserls*, Kantstudien Erg. H. (Cologne, 1957), 73: 34.

But this criticism begs the question, and invites a chicken-and-egg dilemma. What guarantees the body as either the medium or necessary a priori condition of sensation? Through what is that known? The body's necessary role may be established a posteriori, but its givenness is only self-evident, if at all, after reflection. The evidence is not unquestionably self-evident, since most people

seem completely unaware that *everything* they know, think, experience, etc. has come to them through/as the sensorium (especially if we grant with the Buddhists that the mind is only another sense, functioning in a similar manner to the other sense organs). The necessity of the body for experience was clearly not self-evident to Plato, nor to most Christian theologians; the cognition of ideas, etc., was for them an entirely different order of experience than 'sensation', restricted to the five senses, distinguishable because ideas could be constant, eternally true, whereas sensations were always temporally subject to generation and decay. Actually the ideas *qua* cognition were conceded to arise and cease temporally, but the *essence* of the idea, that essence which the idea is about (e.g., a geometric theorem) was eternal, always already true whether or not cognized at such and such a time by anyone or not. The faculty through which that type of cognition occurs had to be thus radically different from the sensory cognizor, and thus divorceable from the body as such. Hence I can know true things without recourse to my body. Husserl's phenomenology denies that knowledge can arise anywhere else than in experience.[23]

The determination that the body is always present during sensation is arrived at in reflection, by a reduction which exposes its ubiquity. To insist beforehand, as Asemissen is doing, that the body must remain non-bracketed, is to naively buy into a causal theory of sensation, or some such theoretical construction before it has been phenomenologically grounded. Simply put, to a large extent, the body remains transcendentally poised through much of the experience of which it is the ground. The reduction and bracketing are advocated by Husserl precisely to establish the body as a transcendental ground (transcendental = constituting experience, though not itself given in experience). Not only do we become oblivious to basic sensations (such as the pressure of

your chair or seat against your backside as you have been reading this) which involves being unaware of the full role of the body in constituting the experience of reading, but we can sit, for instance, in a movie house, and not only lose track of our bodily sensations as such, but forget we are physically in a movie house, in such and such a seat, in such and such a city, etc. We may become so engrossed in the film, so deeply identified with one of the characters, that we literally forget we are anywhere other than a ghostly witness to the world of the movie. The body through which we are participating in the film has become entirely transcendental. Husserl's reduction aims at bringing us back to an awareness of body.

This loss of the role of the body, it should be pointed out, never occurs in Buddhism. Even in its most idealistic strains, Buddhism remains committed to at least a Dharma-kāya, i.e., a dharma-body which interacts with the dharma-dhātu (the field of every and all things just as they are). Even texts are considered em-bodied (***nikāya***).

The force of Asemissen's argument lies in the epistemic chicken and egg. If consciousness requires the body in order to sense, then a pure consciousness or a pure ego, etc., cannot ground or recover the transcendental body, since the very sensations which the consciousness would reflect on are always already the non-bracketed bodily sensations. The body can only ground itself tautologically, in which case the role of consciousness as something other or at least distinguishable from body becomes problematic. And even if consciousness and body are equated, as Merleau-Ponty reads Husserl as doing, the problem of grounding remains, and another issue arises: Why then does consciousness know itself as other than body, and why can body be conceived as other than consciousness?

It is ironic that the attack against Husserl here focuses on the body, since the body's importance, in fact, was one of the revelations that Husserl gave us. Though the rediscovery of the body is often associated with Buytendjik or Husserl's leading French disciple, Merleau-Ponty, already in *Ideas II,* completed sometime before 1925,[24] Husserl delves deeply into the question of the body, though it is true that through it he tries to approach the pure-ego, pure consciousness, ***Geist*** and the transcendental self that is further quested after in the ***Cartesian Meditations*** (1928-31).

Levinas, who studied with both Husserl and Heidegger in Germany, characterizes this aspect of Husserl's thought thus:[25]

> ...Concrete life is not the solipsist's life of a consciousness closed upon itself. Concrete being is not what exists for only one consciousness. In the very idea of concrete being is contained the idea of an intersubjective world. If we limit ourselves to describing the constitution of objects in an individual consciousness, in an ***ego,*** we will never reach objects as they are in concrete life but will reach only an abstraction. The reduction of an ***ego,*** the ***egological reduction,*** can only be a first step toward phenomenology. We must also discover "others" and the intersubjective world. A phenomenological intuition of the life of others, a reflection by ***Einfühlung*** [empathy, sympathetic understanding] opens the field of transcendental intersubjectivity and completes the work of the philosophical intuition of subjectivity. Here again, the problems of the constitution of the world will arise. [square brackets mine]

Interestingly, although what he says is faithful to Husserl's texts, his predictions about the direction in which Phenomenology would have to go reveals more about where Levinas himself has gone – i.e., to an interpersonal ethic 'otherwise than being' – than Husserl, who doggedly pursued the transcendental ego in his ***Cartesian Meditations*** and sought to discover it still constituting the Live-World (***Lebenswelt***) in ***The Crisis of European Sciences.***[26]

Levinas continues:[27]

> The works of Husserl published so far make only very brief mentions of an intersubjective reduction.[28] We can do no more than repeat what Husserl has said. However, we believe that this intersubjective reduction and all the problems that arise from it have much preoccupied Husserl. He has studied the *Einfühlung,* the intuition through which intersubjectivity becomes accessible; he has described the role played in the *Einfühlung* by the perception of our body and its analogy with the body of others; he has analyzed the life which manifests in this other body a type of existence analogous to mine. Finally, he has examined the characteristic of the constitution proper to intersubjectivity, the conscious reality without which no existence at all would be possible. Although his unpublished works have been very influential, we are not authorized to use them prior to their publication[29]

Ricouer's essay summarizing *Ideas II* fleshes out some of the then 'unpublished' details.[30]

As phenomenology reaches for its heights, the hyle is forgotten, buried beneath transcendental egos, intersubjective empathies, personal and cultural bodies, and a reflectivity so intent on catching itself in the act of intending that it virtually overlooks that which it originally intended toward. Why then, should I want to pick up this obscure, difficult term "hyle" for a discussion of Yogācāra, which has more than enough of its own obscurities?

Ricouer notes that kinesthetic sensations, such as eye or hand movements, differ from "the sensations of color, roughness or warmth that immediately constitute the aspects of the thing itself." The "apprehensions" or intentive "meanings" which pass through them differ: The latter's goes into the object itself, even if abstractly.[31]

> But on the other hand, kinesthetic sensations do not go beyond themselves into the thing itself but rather reveal my corporeal existence to me. And yet this revelation of the body still remains a function of the percept, no longer as hyle – as brute matter – it is true, but rather as "motivating" circumstance in the course of perception. The thing can appear to me in this way if I turn my head or my eyes, or if I extend my hand. Thus, the same course of

> perception refers in a polar manner back to a stream of kinesthetic subjective processes as a typical group of circumstances, for the relation of motivation, the lived-through reference to a motivated order of appearances, still plays a part in the apprehension of "things." And since it is possible for all other sensations to be "motivated" is a spontaneous motion of my body, the totality of sensoriality appears as a unique operation with a double pole. At one end, sensoriality goes beyond itself into the spatial [? sic] order of the things; at the other end, it is motivated in the free spontaneity of a course of conscious processes.

The dividing line, as Ricouer sketches it, runs between sensation in a sensory world, presumably 'constrained' and 'resistant' to being otherwise than it is, and a mental, noetic realm of 'free spontaneity.' Husserl's possible dualism has become here only bipolar, and that bipolarity is determined by the direction of intent in terms of the body: If it intends outward, externally, it is (merely) sensory; if it folds back into the body and noetic processes which constitute it, then it is 'kinesthetic.' Despite the neatness, this again smacks of platonism and the separation of intellect from sensation, with the same hierarchical value assigned, viz., sensation is mundane while ***Geist cum Nous cum ésprit*** is freedom, even though this latter is here at least nominally classified as 'sensation' as well. This, as was the case with Levinas, is more indicative of Ricouer's own issues than a totally fair depiction of Husserl, though, again, like Levinas, the basic details here ***are accurate.*** The hyle has been already displaced by the sensor, the unintentional now at most an invisible, unimportant blank screen to be filled with intentionality, with meaning by an in-forming noesis. And this sensor, will soon play background to the self's self-reflection.

It should not be shocking then that in his latest writings Husserl turns to history, for, with the empty self that he was etching through these and the other reductions, where else could he go for constitutive meanings? The self's structures, its meanings, are, as Husserl points out later, sedimented meanings,

embodied history. In Chapter Five below we will see that these sedimentations are called ***bījas*** (seeds) and ***vāsanā*** (perfumings; habitual residue) by Yogācāra. We note as a point of interest that for both Husserl and Yogācāra the present moment alone was real, and yet the present is never anything other than an embodied history. Phenomenology reached history through the moment by an innovative method of reflection and description of that moment. Conversely, Yogācāra arose out of a history, i.e., Buddhist tradition, which carried a karmic theory of historical embodiment (see Chapter Three). The primacy of the moment appeared to them through that history; and they reinterpreted that history in the light of an epistemology that, like Husserl, scrutinizes the structure of a moment of cognition in order to recover its context and horizons.[32] For both Husserl and Yogācāra understanding involves a leap from the present as mere presence to embodied history, to the uncovering and reworking of habitual sedimentations – and in the case of Yogācāra, the ultimate elimination of habit (karma) altogether.

But the hyle is not so easily abandoned. It forms the limit case, that which makes the perception of a red shirt as red imperative.[33] It also implies something stubbornly irreducible to the capricious consciousness which would make it over entirely in its (i.e., the consciousness') own image. It is through the hyle, moreover, that the other, including the other mind, is known – whether by analogy or in some other fashion. The ***Ch'eng wei-shih lun*** will introduce the hyle at just these junctures. I will use it to translate the Chinese character *chih* 質, which means 'matter, substance.'

III – The Intentional Arc

As we have seen, for Husserl the interplay between ***what is perceived*** and ***that which perceives*** was situated in philosophically difficult waters. By

emphasizing the noetic constitution of experience over the hyletic contribution, his transcendental idealism talked about materiality but never took matter seriously, either on a causal or ontological level. His attempts to overcome the problems of this interplay with recourse to the notions of the sensorial body, intersubjectivity, and intentionality as a process of historical sedimentations, i.e., ***historical intentionality,*** proliferated a sophisticated grid of concepts and descriptive terms which brought a degree of clarity to the experiencer–experienced issues without solving them altogether. To the end he maintained a primacy of noesis in the constitution of experience, and even with his elaborations of the historical origins of attitudes and their intentionalities, he still treated the transcendental subject as the ultimate source of consciousness, and, thus, all experience.

With the transcendental ego as its source, intentionality reached out toward its intentional objects, reducing the 'hyletic data' to noemata, unified perceptual contents. Often he seems to presuppose an analogy to a spotlight or beacon that shines on ("animates," "bestows") a certain hyletic field, and by illuminating it making it accessible to perceptual apprehension (***auffassung***). Bouncing off a realm of transcendental objects, noesis constitutes a noema, a reductive, synthetic representation that cojoins the transcendental object with the transcendental subject at once ***in*** consciousness and ***as*** consciousness.

By criticizing the beacon model, which seemed to posit the source of the intentional act as originating each moment in the transcendental subject, Merleau–Ponty utilized other Husserlian elements to 'solve' the apparent dilemmas by reconfiguring them through the notion of the 'intentional arc,' a term he borrowed from others. The term itself occurs only twice in ***The Phenomenology of Perception,*** both in the same paragraph. He writes:[34]

Beneath intelligence as beneath perception, we discover a more

> fundamental function, 'a vector mobile in all directions like a searchlight, one through which we can direct ourselves toward anything, in or outside ourselves, and display a form of behavior in relation to that object'.[35] Yet the analogy of the searchlight is inadequate, since it presupposes given objects on to which the beam plays, whereas the nuclear function to which we refer, before bringing objects to our sight or knowledge, makes them exist in a more intimate sense, for us. Let us therefore say rather, borrowing a term from other works,[36] that the life of consciousness – cognitive life, the life of desire or perceptual life – is subtended by an 'intentional arc' which projects round about us our past, our future, our human setting, our physical, ideological and moral situation, or rather which results in our being situated in all these respects. It is this intentional arc which brings about the unity of the senses, of intelligence, of sensibility and motility. And it is this which 'goes limp' in illness.

Such a potent unitary force, in order to be understood more clearly, obviously requires some unpacking. To simplify to the extreme, our body is a lived–body, meaning that it *is not* a material entity but a sensorially, cognitively charged intending movement (the cogito is not an "I think," but an "I can," *je peux*). The limits of the body are not epidermal, but cognitive. I live the feelings of my body, such that my body at this moment includes my inner feelings (memories, discomforts, kinesthetic perceptions, etc.) as well as the time and space in which I am located. My lived–body is as large as the room, or ideational space it occupies at any moment. The visualizing aspect of my body is not limited to the tissues and humours of my eyes, but includes my intent–to–see and extends through my current field of vision, and likewise for all my senses. What my body perceives is called by Merleau–Ponty the 'perceptual field.' The field is a complex network of embodied intentionalities, i.e., potential and actual meanings, primarily characterizable through the distinction between foreground or *Gestalt,* and background or *Ganzfeld*. My lived–body intends towards my perceptual field, shifting focus so that various gestalts arise from and return to their background. So far this accords fully with Husserl's analysis and seems to be another

variation of the searchlight model. But Merleau-Ponty reminds us that the perceptual field also embodies intentionalities. Thus, it is not simply that we, as transcendental subjects, or even lived-bodies always initiate intentionality and hence acts of cognition. The perceptual field also intends toward us. As we reach towards it, it is reaching toward us. I condition my world as it is conditioning me. Intentionality is, then, not a unilinear act projected outwards that bounces back and reflects itself into a noema. A circuit constitutes intentionality such that it flows from the world into me, from me into the world, and back again. My subjectivity is a cognitive location in an intentional circuit, its center to be sure, but not its only source. Since my lived-body includes all that I perceive through my body at any moment, it coincides hyletically with the perceptual field, and yet *in perception* there clearly exists a distinction between them. This elusive but real margin which always places itself between my lived-body and my perceptual field is the region of ambiguity in which 'meanings' are forged. Meanings are our attempts to tame and curtail this foundational ambiguity.

Thus, Merleau-Ponty solves Husserl's hyletic problematic dialectically. This interaction between body, field and the intentional consciousness which arises through their 'contact' (*sparśa*) is also foundational for Buddhism, as will be seen in later chapters. The *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* in fact sees the world as constituted precisely of this arc (see Chapter Five).

Once the region of consciousness becomes the critical region of inquiry – and any type of thought which attempts to ground itself in actual experience has no choice but to begin with such inquiries – certain consequences logically follow. Merleau-Ponty begins the third section of his *Phenomenology of Perception,* entitled "The Thing and the Natural World," with the following

paragraph:[37]

> A THING has 'characteristics' or 'properties' which are stable, even if they do not entirely serve to define it, and we propose to approach the phenomenon of reality by studying perceptual constants. A thing has in the first place *its* size and *its* shape throughout variations of perspective which are merely apparent. We do not attribute these appearances to the object itself, but regard them as an accidental feature of our relations with it, and not as being of it. What do we mean by this, and on what basis do we judge that form or size are the form and size *of the object* ?

Here is evident also a seeming reduction to the noetic side of experience. But something new has been emphasized. What is of import for our study is not how momentarily Merleau-Ponty will demonstrate that these and other seeming constants are not constant at all, but rather the necessary and radical move of bracketing the object as such from being a substance in which inhere perceptible properties.

The move he makes, reemphasizing something already in Husserl but sometimes obscured or overlooked in Husserl's metalogical language, points to the fact that all experience is interpretation. To perceive, to cognize is to interpret. He challenges the naiveté with which we appropriate the world through experience. Thus, he proposes a *hermeneutics of cognition.* This, too, is the Yogācāra proposal.

A thing is a thing precisely insofar as it is a thing *for me,* or for a lived-body. What does not enter the cognitive sphere(s) in one form or another simply does not exist; or better put, cognition is always potentially cognition of all that can be. The thing, thus, is always a correlate of my (or someone's) body.

Merleau-Ponty writes:[38]

> However, we have not exhausted the meaning of the 'thing' by defining it as the correlative of our body and our life. After all, we grasp the unity of our body only in that of the thing, and it is by

> taking things as our starting point that our hands, eyes and all our sense–organs appear to us as so many interchangeable instruments. The body by itself, the body at rest is merely an obscure mass, and we perceive it as a precise and identifiable being when it moves towards a thing, and in so far as it is intentionally projected outwards, and even then this perception is never more than incidental and marginal to consciousness, the centre of which is occupied with things and the world. One cannot, as we have said, conceive any perceived thing without someone to perceive it. But the fact remains that the thing presents itself to the person who perceives it as a thing in itself, and thus poses the problem of the genuine *in–itself–for–us*.... The thing holds itself aloof from us and remains self–sufficient. This will become clear if we suspend our ordinary preoccupations and pay a metaphysical and disinterested attention to it. It is then hostile and alien, no longer an interlocuter, but a resolutely silent Other, a Self which evades us no less than does intimacy with an outside consciousness. The thing and the world... are offered to perceptual communication as is a familiar face with an expression which is immediately understood. But then a face expresses something only through the arrangements of the colours and the lights which make it up, the meaning of the gaze being not behind the eyes, but in them, and a touch of colour more or less is all the painter needs in order to transform the facial expression of a portrait. In the work of his earlier years, Cézanne tried to paint the expression first and foremost, and that is why he never caught it. He gradually learned that expression is the language of the thing itself and springs from its configuration.

While the thing is always *of my experience,* it nonetheless has an integrity of its own. There is no 'red' per se, only specific things with specific textures, sensory configurations, etc. that are or aren't red, in such a way that the red itself is always a specific red, a 'woolen red' or 'sunset red,' etc. And it always gives itself to me in some configurational combination. To know the thing beyond the merely psychological sphere of fleeting subjective impressions means not to construct an ideological representation, but rather to take account of the full range of its possibilities, i.e., its configurational limits

This, for Merleau–Ponty, goes beyond attempts to 'define' a certain thing, to delimit it and reduce it to its definition; in a move prefiguring the

poststructuralist thinkers to come twenty or more years later, Merleau-Ponty calls this quality of a thing its 'style'.[39]

> What needs to be elucidated, then, is this primary comprehension of the world. The natural world, we said, is the schema of intersensory relations.... The world has its unity, although the mind may not have succeeded in inter-relating its facets and in integrating them into the conception of a flat projection. This unity is comparable with that of an individual whom I recognize because he is recognizable in an unchallengeably self-evident way, before I ever succeed in stating the formula governing his character, because he retains the same style in everything he says and does, even though he may change his place or his opinions. A style is a certain manner of dealing with situation, which I identify or understand in an individual or in a writer, by taking over that manner myself in a sort of imitative way, even though I may be quite unable to define it; and in any case a definition, correct though it may be, never provides an exact equivalent, and is never of interest to any but those who have already had the actual experience. I experience the unity of the world as I recognize a style. Yet even so the style of a person, or a town, does not remain constant for me. After ten years of friendship, even independently of any changes brought about by age, I seem to be dealing with a different person, and after ten years of living in a district, it is as if I were in a different one.

The world seems to change, but what of the self cognizing it? Neither, finally, can the world or myself be seen as ineluctably constant. For me to perceive the world or things within it as changing, I must fix myself as the constant against which their variations and alterations are measured. In order to see the variability of my inner world, the world (e.g., notions of role, gender, religious affiliation, age, profession, psychological values, etc.) must be fixed as constant. Both change, but their changes must be temporarily suspended in order that either be known. In order to see variables, constants must be fixed. This is an invariant epistemological axiom. Thus, knowledge at its roots is constituted by a kind of blindness, an imaginary pretending that fixes constants out of variables.

Later, again prefiguring the deconstructive poststructural notion of

alterity, particularly of the self and consciousness, Merleau-Ponty, striking a non-Wittgensteinian stance, writes:[40]

> To ask oneself whether the world is real is to fail to understand what one is asking, since the world is not a sum of things which might always be called into question, but the inexhaustible reservoir from which things are drawn.... There could not possibly be error where there is not yet truth, but reality, and not yet necessity, but facticity. Correspondingly, we must refuse to attribute to perceptual consciousness the full possession of itself, and that immanence which would rule out any possible illusion. If hallucinations are to be possible, it is necessary that consciousness should, at some moment, cease to know what it is doing, otherwise it would be conscious of constituting an illusion, and would not stand by it, so there would no longer be any illusion at all. And if, as we have said, the illusory thing and the true thing do not have the same structure, for the patient to assent to the illusion, he must forget or repress the true world, and cease to refer back to it, and retain at least the ability to revert to the primitive confusion of the true and the false.

Merleau-Ponty has here broached, in a style very like Yogācāra Buddhism and Kashmir Shaivism, the problem of cognitive closure. We will look at how he treats closure momentarily, but first let us finish out this passage, to see what he says about alterity.

> Yet we do not cut consciousness off from itself, which would preclude all progress of knowledge beyond primary opinion, and especially the philosophic examination of primary opinion as the basis of knowledge. All that is required is that the coincidence of myself with myself, as it is achieved in the *cogito*, shall never be a real coincidence, but merely an intentional and presumptive one.[41] In fact, between myself who have just thought this, and myself who am thinking that I have thought it, there is interposed already a thickness of duration, so that I may always doubt whether that thought which has already passed was indeed such as I now see it to have been. Since, furthermore, I have no other evidence of my past than present testimony and yet do have the idea of a past, I have no reason to set the unreflective, as an unknowable, over against the reflection which I bring to bear on it. But my confidence in reflection amounts in the last resort to my accepting and acting on the fact of temporality, and the fact of the world as the invariable framework of all illusion and all disillusion: I know myself only in so far as I am inherent in time and in the world,

that is, I know myself only in my ambiguity.

My self is my self-otherness, and between my lived-body and 'myself' as a perceptual field I always approach myself through the region of ambiguity.

But the "confidence," the self-evidential appearance that hinges on the blind spots in my consciousness, envelops me. In the following two passages, Merleau-Ponty suggests how cognitive closure functions. Curiously, in both passages which are separated by more than fifty pages in the English translation, he makes reference to Spinoza.

> My thought, my self-evident truth is not one fact among others, but a value-fact which envelops and conditions every other possible one. There is no other world possible in the sense in which mine is, not because mine is necessary as Spinoza thought, but because any 'other world' that I might try to conceive would set limits to this one, would be found on its boundaries, and would consequently merely fuse with it.[42]

> Between this experience of red which I have, and that about which other people speak to me, no direct comparison will ever be possible. I am here in my own point of view, and since all experience, in so far as it derives from impression, is in the same way strictly my own, it seems that a unique and unduplicated subject enfolds them all. Suppose I formulate a thought, the God of Spinoza, for example: this thought as it is in my living experience is a certain landscape to which no one will ever have access, even if, moreover, I manage to enter into a discussion with a friend on the subject of Spinoza's God.... [However,] my thought about the God of Spinoza is only apparently a strictly unique experience, for it is the concretion of a certain cultural world, the Spinozist philosophy, or of a certain philosophic style in which I immediately recognize a 'Spinozist' idea.[43]

Its integrity, though its own, likewise depends on my recognition of that integrity, and my recognition will never be identical in all respects to anyone else's.

While I have seemingly set out phenomenological positions of two Western philosophers, the reader will discover in later chapters that we have in fact set the stage for a proper appreciation of Yogācāra. If there is one striking

difference between Husserl and Merleau-Ponty on the one hand and Yogācāra Buddhism on the other, it would concern the function and type or 'reductions' employed by each. Though one may find glimpses of Husserl's eidetic reduction, phenomenological reduction, transcendental reduction, etc., in Yogācāra, one will find a reduction in Yogācāra not readily evident as such in the Western phenomenologists. I call this the 'karmic reduction.' Following the function given to consciousness in the Buddhist analysis of karma since the inception of Buddhism, Yogācāra's emphasis on 'nothing but cognition' (***vijñapti-mātra***: *gnō*[sis] is the cognate of ***jñā***, and ***mātra*** means 'something to the exclusion of all else') serves to highlight and reduce description and analysis of the human condition to a moral sphere of advantageous (***kuśala***) and disadvantageous (***akuśala***) actions and attitudes (***kāya-vāc-manas karma***). They put forth the notion of psychosophic closure (***vijñapti-mātra***) as a way of making us aware that our karmic dilemma occurs only in that sphere; that the positing of externality to things is only the most basic of the self-blinding moves that keeps us enmeshed in the appropriational web we conceive of as a world. Their denial of externality is not an ontological position; it is an existential disruptive force. They attempt something which has not yet been successfully accomplished in Western thought, which is *epistemo-ethics*, i.e., a liberational ethics fully derived from a coherent epistemology grounded in radical experience. They displace ontology and thus ground ethics in something other that metaphysics - in fact, they ground it in the very necessity of bracketing metaphysics. This will become clearer in Chapters Three through Five.

IV - A Resume of the Chapters

In order to properly understand Yogācāra and the ***Ch'eng wei-shih***

lun in particular I have tried to properly contextualize it. This necessitated going back to Early Buddhism and tracing out the lines of development leading to Yogācāra. I approached this task not as an exercise in textual history – the literature is too vast and there are too many gaping holes in it to reconstruct the necessary lines with any diachronic certainty – but rather as an exploration of intellectual history. I strive to show that Yogācāra arose out of basic Buddhist issues going back to Buddhism's inception. As mentioned above, in order to demonstrate that Yogācāra is unquestionably Mahāyānic, I have devoted some space to exploring Mādhyamikan texts as well, to highlight their affinities.[44]

Once contextualized, I tried to let the *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* speak for itself. I offer now a brief statement on the content or aim of each chapter.

CHAPTER TWO discusses what I argue are the Four Basic Models through which all of Buddhism is generated. Though these four are extremely familiar to students of Buddhism, my aim was to open a discussion on these beyond the superficial introductory remarks with which they are usually approached (and thus frequently misunderstood). Further, I try to show how from the beginning Buddhism was predicated on a 'karmic reduction' of the sensorium. Consciousness is grounded in a radical contingency through which awareness and all reflective existence produce and are produced by a radical marginality. In Chapter Five, we will see that marginality remolded into a notion of radical alterity (*pariṇāma*). The key issue for Buddhism, and for Yogācāra especially is *appropriation.*[45]

Buddhism is not simply a theoretic enterprise, but an ethical soteric practice. As a praxis certain inevitable problems arose: e.g., the problem of means and ends, desiring to become desireless, or ateleological teleology, etc. These questions are addressed in this chapter.

CHAPTER THREE: The focus in this chapter is *Karmic analysis.* Textual sources are investigated (e.g., Pāli literature, Abhidhamma, Abhidharma, Mādhyamika, etc.) and philosophical issues are raised and explored.

There is a lengthy discussion of the two satyas (***saṃvṛti–satya*** and ***paramārtha–satya***) which are not two types of 'truths' in either a propositional or ontological sense, but rather should be understood as psychosophically contextualized 'actualities.' Since ***vijñapti–mātra*** concerns 'psychosophical closure', this chapter also discusses closure and the deconstruction of the conditions through which closure dis–closes itself. The notion of closure is crucial; since it is this above all else that Yogācāra seeks to understand and overcome.

This chapter also investigates how as Buddhism developed it privileged the cognitive (psychological, logical, intellective) over other facets of the human being; this made the region of consciousness unavoidable for Yogācāric analysis, and provided the field in which Yogācāra could develop its own soteric orientation.

Of the issues raised in this chapter, the most important for the East Asian Buddhist schools is the opposition of Essentialism vs. Progressionalism (e.g., as Sudden vs. Gradual Awakening, etc.).

CHAPTER FOUR presents Vasubandhu's root text, the ***Triṃśikā***. Included are the Sanskrit and Chinese texts, my translation, and a number of translations by other scholars from the Sanskrit. My translation is an attempt to read it ***as a Chinese text,*** while maintaining an eye to its self–distancing from the Sanskrit. Even where the Chinese follows the Sanskrit closely it does not always evoke identical connotations in a Chinese and Sanskrit reader. The notes constitute a detailed running commentary.

CHAPTER FIVE: If the other chapters were successful then this

chapter will accomplish its purpose, which is to revive Yogācāric discourse, the Yogācāric orientation, its method of addressing issues, etc. After a very brief summary of some pre-T'ang developments in Chinese Buddhism, we turn to several sections of the ***Ch'eng wei-shih lun,*** trying to let the text speak for itself where ever possible. This will not be an exhaustive study of the entire ***Ch'eng wei-shih lun,*** but a select examination of those portions which focus most directly on the issues which have already arisen and become pivotal in our investigation, such as the two satyas, tathatā, and the status of the cognitive object and the one who cognizes it.

The purpose of our investigation is not to examine all the minutiae of every doctrinal dispute, or to fully elaborate all the numerous, intricate multifaceted models that the ***Ch'eng wei-shih lun*** relentlessly throws at us. Rather we intend to bring to light what it is that Yogācāra in the ***Ch'eng wei-shih lun*** thought itself to be doing in this text.

The typical Yogācāra 'models', (***trisvabhāva,*** eight consciousnesses, etc.) are not the main subjects of our investigation. So much of Yogācāra's actual intent has been overlooked due to an overabundance of repetitious 'expositions' of these models, often thoroughly misrepresenting them. By focusing our investigation on what might initially seem to be more peripheral matters, we hope to establish the necessary context for reading more central matters with a higher degree of accuracy.

CHAPTER TWO

What is it that the common people take for knowledge? What do they want when they want 'knowledge' ? Nothing more than this: Something strange is to be reduced to something familiar. . . the will to uncover under everything strange, unusual, and questionable something that no longer disturbs us. Is it not the instinct of fear that bids us to know? And is the jubilation of those who attain knowledge not the jubilation over the restoration of a sense of security?

. . . To become the founder of a religion one must be psychologically infallible in one's knowledge of a certain average type of souls who have not yet recognised that they belong together. It is he that brings them together. The founding of a religion therefore always becomes a long festival of recognition.

Nietzsche, Joyous Wisdom (#355 and #353)

Now I know well that when I approached various large assemblies, even before I had sat down there or had spoken or begun to talk to them, whatever might have been their sort I made myself of like sort, whatever their language so was my language. And I rejoiced them with talk on Dhamma, made it acceptable to them, set them on fire, gladdened them.

Dīgha-Nikāya II, 109

Indeed, the designation 'name and clan' in this world, arisen here and there, was settled by convention.
The ignorant declare to us this groundless opinion, unknowingly, latent so long 'One is a Brahmin by birth'.
One becomes neither a Brahmin nor non-Brahmin by birth, one becomes a Brahmin by kamma; one becomes a non-Brahmin by kamma. . .
Thus the wise truly see kamma. Seers of conditioned co-arising, those who know kammic-results (***kammavipāka***).
The world fares on by kamma. Mankind fares on by kamma, kamma [actions] binding beings, as a linchpin the quickly moving chariot.

Samyutta-Nikāya 648-650, 653-654

CHAPTER TWO

The Pre-Yogācāra Context in India: Part One

Buddhism founded itself on the observation that something was wrong, something was unsatisfactory with the human condition -- *as lived.* Further, it observed that we are all aware on some level of this unsatisfactoriness, and most acutely aware of it in moments of crisis. This sense of unsatisfactoriness, of dis-ease, Buddha called ***duḥkha***. Through study, self-investigation, and resolute perseverance, Siddhartha Gotama 'Awakened' (***Bodhi***) to the source of ***duḥkha*** and the means of its eradication. Through various methods, models and arguments Buddha (lit. 'The Awakened') endeavored to enable others to also 'Awaken'. [1] How his followers have appropriated and utilized these methods, models and arguments -- augmenting, elaborating, and altering them -- and the schisms which arose out of differing interpretations, constitutes the 'Buddhist Tradition'.

In order to examine how Yogācāra appropriated and presented Buddha's teaching, in this chapter certain terms and concepts which became crucial for Yogācāra will be examined. In the next chapter we will trace out how some of these issues developed into Yogācāra. Since our tracings will lead us from the early Pāli texts up to the writings of Vasubandhu,[2] what follows cannot be exhaustive, as any one of the terms to be considered could rightfully be made

the subject of a number of separate works.[3]

The Four Basic Models

It is possible to generate Buddhism, in all its complexity and variant developments, out of four basic and somewhat overlapping models.[4] These four, well-known to all students of Buddhism, are: 1- the five ***skandhas*** ; 2- the twelve links of ***pratītya-samutpāda*** ; 3- the ***tri-dhātu*** ; and 4- the trialectic praxis of ***śīla, samādhi,*** and ***prajñā***. A brief account of each will be given in this chapter. This will set the stage for the next chapter, in which an examination of their treatment in the Pāli and Abhidharmic texts will be undertaken, particularly in relation to the problem of karma[5], and the manner in which this problematic helped shape the Yogācāric system.

I- ***Skandha*** (P. ***khandha***)

Denying the existence of any permanent, unchanging, substantial 'self' or 'I' (***anātman,*** P. ***anatta***), Buddha analyzed that which we perceive to be a self as a mere collection of five 'aggregates' (***skandha***). These five are subdivided into two types, (1) ***rūpa*** (sensorial materiality) and (2) ***nāma*** (*nomi*-nal foci). The five ***skandhas*** are:

1- ***rūpa*** -- though often translated as "form" or "matter", in most Indian thought ***rūpa*** denotes a materiality capable of being sensed. It is not matter as the antipode to consciousness, but rather what offers 'resistance' to a sensorial body (***saviññāṇaka kāya***). Its secondary meaning is '[what is] visible', 'color-datum', etc., reinforcing its sensorial characteristics. In the earlier

texts it is generally glossed as the four Great Elements (***mahābhūta***) of Earth, Water, Fire and Air and their qualities (hardness/softness, fluidity, temperature and movement). We will have occasion to investigate ***rūpa*** more thoroughly later;

2- ***vedanā*** – the three modalities through which we cognize anything, viz. as pleasurable (***sukha***), as painful (***dukkha***, S. ***duḥkha***) or as neutral (***upekkhā***, S. ***upekṣa***). As modern psychology reiterates, these modalities condition how we perceive and respond to all experience. Moreover, through them we become conditioned in regard to future experiences.

On the simplest level, 'pleasurable' experiences condition us to desire their reoccurence while 'unpleasurable' experiences generate the desire to avert future occurences. Hence, for instance, we repeatedly eat the foods which taste 'good' (= pleasurable taste) to us, and try to avoid 'bad' (= painful) tasting food. This process, which produces and conditions our eating *habits* (= karma), although seemingly overt is to some extent subliminal, particularly in the manner of its 'habitualness'. On a more intricate subliminal level ***vedanā*** determines to greater and lesser extents how we actually perceive experiences. When hearing a spokesman express an opinion that we also hold, we may feel and even 'judge' him to be 'right' and 'speaking honestly', while when hearing someone express a position significantly different from ours or even opposing ours, we may feel and judge that person to be 'wrong' and 'speaking deceitfully'. If listening to the latter is sufficiently 'painful' we may even *perceive* the perverse motives behind his declarations as he utters them, as if they were written on his face or inscribed in his voice.

Inanimate objects can be infused with living meanings through

associations we make with previous experiences. For instance, a certain object associated with a traumatic experience can, just by its mere presence, recreate some of the affective ambience of the original experience, such that we perceive the object as possessing properties which empirically are not intrinsic to the object. Similarly a certain song or place may regenerate old familiar feelings, our associations with previous experiences of that event producing affective corollaries such as moods, inner comfort or discomfort and perhaps even details long forgotten. We call these feelings, whether pleasant or unpleasant, "familiar" precisely because they had been temporarily forgotten, inexperienced, and now those experiences are re–emerging. It is not uncommon to attribute the source of those feelings, thoughts, remembrances, etc. to the object, as if we perceive them directly *as* the object ("what a depressing song" or "that picture *carries* memories of my childhood", etc.). ***Vedanā,*** though, is simply the perceptual modalities of pleasure, pain, and neutral (sometimes rendered "indifference") apart from these associational embellishments.

3 – ***saṃjñā*** (P. ***saññā***) – the subjecting of pain–pleasure–neutral perceptions to further 'conceptualizations'. In part, ***saṃjñā*** means the webs of association and relation through which vedanic experience is strung together (***saṃ–*** = to put together + ***–jñā*** = knowing, hence 'knowledge which puts together' or 'associational knowledge'). The acquiring of a habit requires repeated pleasurable and/or painful experiences which somehow become psychologically associated or mutually related. In a more general sense ***saṃjñā*** involves and includes most of what we would mean by 'thinking' or 'rational–izing'.

4 – ***saṃskāra*** (P. ***saṃkhāra***) – 'embodied conditioning'. These are the karmic

latencies which predispose us to perceive or react in certain ways. They are karmic insofar as they are the product of previous vedanic experience, now latent, and insofar as they condition how we re–act or will re–act to present or future vedanic experience. I have translated this as *embodied* conditioning because one of the basic formulae for karma is 'activity of *body, mind and speech*'. Eventually Buddhist analysis treated ***saṃskāra*** as virtually synonymous with 'intention' and 'volition' (***cetanā***). The implications of defining volitions or intentionality in terms of latent conditioning, particularly as that affects ethical considerations, will be discussed later.

5 – ***vijñāna*** (P. ***viññāṇa***) – 'consciousness'; that which bifurcatingly (***vi***–) cognizes what is known (***–jñāna***) in the other four ***skandhas***. For reasons which will become apparent as we progress, 'consciousness', of all the skandhas, was selected for the most thorough and rigorous scrutiny and elaboration by all Buddhist schools.

The first skandha is rūpic, while numbers two through five are nominal (***nāma***). For now we may call this model a phenomenological description of the psycho–physical organism. When conditions are such that these aggregates arise together, there is an 'individual' (***bhāva, sattva,*** etc.); with the absence of any of these conditions or at their dissolution, no individual exists. Also, as the contents of the aggregates change, so does the individual. Hence no enduring, unchanging 'self' exists.

This almost simplistic model carried such intricate implications, that one might be tempted to claim that Buddhism is the systematic unpacking of this model's ramifications. This is undeniably the case with Abhidharma, Sarvastivāda, and Yogācāra.[6] This will be demonstrated shortly.

The Pāli texts generally discuss the khandhas as ***upādānakkhandhas,*** 'appropriational aggregations'. We will examine ***upādāna*** as it occurs in the next model, and return to implications of ***appropriational aggregations*** in the next chapter.

The ***skandha*** model in several ways overlaps the next model to be presented. Not only do they share some of the same key terms, though each model distributes these terms differently, but they may also be understood as addressing the same concern, the second model offering an expanded analysis or description of what the skandhic model has outlined.

II– ***Pratītya–samutpāda*** (P. ***paṭicca–samuppāda***)

Generally considered the most fundamental or central doctrine in Buddhism, 'conditioned co–arising' is often held to be the actual content of Buddha's Awakening in the third watch of the night under the Bodhi–tree.[7] As such, all schools of Buddhism have been compelled to develop their own interpretations of this doctrine in the light of their specific concerns and emphases. Here I shall offer a basic, generic description of conditioned co–arising in terms of the twelve links (***nidāna***).[8] Aspects of this model which assumed prominence in Yogācāra, however, will be highlighted.

1 – ***avidya*** (P. ***avijjā***) – A basic and ubiquitous 'nescience', the fundamental 'non–knowing' due to which beings are bound in saṃsāra (the habitual repetition of 'experiencing' derived from ***vedanā***). Exact definitions of precisely what constitutes ***avidya*** vary from text to text and school to school,[9] but everywhere it is taken to be indicative of the root problem of the human condition. It eventually comes to be glossed as the more radical of the two primary ***āvaraṇas,***[10] namely the ***jñeya–āvaraṇa*** (obstruction of what is knowable). ***Jñeya–āvaraṇa***

itself becomes glossed as a synonym for ***ātma–dṛṣṭi*** (belief that a self exists) or ***sat–kāya–dṛṣṭi*** (belief in substantialistic selves and entities). However, originally ***avidya*** carried other connotations as well. Whether taken to be something specific -- a particular nescience of some particular insight or principle, e.g., lack of insight into the Four Noble Truths, as some texts argue -- or as a more general non–knowing, ***avidya*** signifies the absence of that knowledge which would prevent one from becoming conditioned (***saṃskṛta***). Inversely, in the absence of ***avidya*** conditioning ceases (***asaṃskṛta***). However, because there is nescience, there arises 2 - ***saṃskāra*** (P. ***sankhāra***) - As in the skandhic model, it here stands for 'embodied conditioning'. Inclusive of all psycho–physical conditioning each sentient being carries from the past, whether what we today would call "evolutionary inheritances" (all humans embody conditioning which re–acts in certain conditioned ways, such as the 'flinching reflex', or eyes which only react to certain wavelengths of the electromagnetic spectrum and not others, etc.), or predilections and predispositions, etc., these ***saṃskāras*** are latent and usually subconscious. For this reason Yogācāra viewed ***saṃskāra*** as ***citta–viprayukta,*** i.e., not directly accessible to conscious mental processes. Rather than cognizable within immediate, direct perception, it is only known inferentially, insofar as it constitutes experience but does not give itself as itself in experience. ***Viprayukta*** in this context is similar to Husserl's notion of 'transcendental'. For instance, 'aging' or 'numericality' are not immediately given in perception, but the manner in which they influence perception can be ascertained through reflection.

Saṃskāra covers a wide field inclusive of cognitive, dispositional and psychological tendencies, from 'presuppositions' -- especially insofar as they are suppositions or assumptions which operate prior to our being conscious of them or outside the range in which we apply conscious scrutiny -- to subconscious

motivations. Thus the term carries cognitive as well as affective implications. A major part of Pāli abhidhammic psychology hinges on the manner ***sankhāras*** and volitions (***cetanā***) are reducible to or distinguishable from each other. Mahāyānic psychology emphasizes how the cognitive (presuppositions), affective (motivations) and even physical (***rūpa***) ***saṃskāras*** collapse into each other, being merely alternate modes of observing the same type of karmic operations.[11] Again, ***saṃskāra*** is entirely karmic, and could perhaps be translated as 'latent karma'.

3 – ***vijñāna*** (P. ***viññāṇa***) – 'Consciousness', which becomes crucial to the Abhidhammic and Abhidharmic systems as well as Yogācāra, will be treated thoroughly later so that here we may merely note its position as mediating between ***saṃskāra*** and

4 – ***nāma–rūpa*** (P. ***nāma–rūpa***) – Literally 'name–[and]–form', ***nāma–rūpa*** implies the five ***skandhas***. Again, it may be understood as a 'psycho–physical' organism, or as a phenomenal 'body' (***kāya***) consisting of psycho–cognitive and physical components.[12] It denotes both sensorial capacity and the physico–cognitive structures necessary to ***interpret*** the sensorium. Significantly ***nāma–rūpa*** precedes both the actual differentiation of sense–organs (***nidāna*** #5) as well as any actual sensorial 'contact' with the sensorium (***nidāna*** #6), indicating that we are predisposed (***saṃskāra***) to interpret and in fact are already interpreting prior to (again ***saṃskāra***) any particular sensation. Hence Buddhism, like Sāṃkhya, claims it is not because there are sounds that our ears hear, but rather that it is because we have ears (which are embodiments of an intentionality to hear) that there are sounds (and likewise for the other senses).[13]

Rūpa was never understood in the way 'matter' is sometimes currently conceived in the West. For instance, the 'ear' as a physical, sensory organ was not regarded as inert matter, but as an intentional, charged mechanism always

already embodying the characteristics of hearing (elsewise it is considered defective). Thus the ear, or any of the sensory organs are not reducible to mere physical objects (size, shape, tactile structures, etc.). They are essentially *sensorial.* For this reason, even physically speaking, the ear is primarily understood to be an ***auditory condition.***

Nāma denotes not only the four namic ***skandhas***, but the entire psycho-linguistic sphere, and thus implies such terms as ***prajñapti*** (P. ***paññati,*** 'designation', or more accurately language's nominalistic pretext towards referentiality, accomplished by as-signing an identity to disparate conditions through the sheer power of uniting them under a single name) and ***prapañca*** (P. ***papañca,*** a multivalent term connoting something like the psycho-linguistic proliferation of cognitive-conative projections onto experience; or the linguistic "excess" responsible for and resulting from mistaking interpretation for 'reality' [14]) which we will discuss later.

5 – ***ṣaḍ–āyatana*** (P. ***saḷāyatana***) – The 'six sense-bases' is a curious enumeration. This is generally understood to signify the six sense-organs, viz. eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind -- mind (***manas***) being considered the sixth sense, its 'sense-objects' being ***dhammā*** (S. ***dharmā***), i.e., ideas, thoughts, experiential components, etc. However in Buddhist texts, usually the word ***indriya,*** not ***āyatana,*** is used to denote the six sense organs. ***Indriya*** implies that they are faculties, capacities, thus reinforcing that sensation is an active, constructing process and not a passive reception of such things as external "sense-data".

The term ***āyatana*** usually denotes the *twelve* sensory bases or domains, i.e., the six kinds of sensory organs and their respective six kinds of sensory objects. The eye sees 'visibles' (***rūpa***), the ear hears 'audibles' (***śabda***) ,

etc. The twelve ***āyatana*** are regarded as the twelve 'bases' upon which six consciousnesses arise, viz. when the eye-organ and a 'visible' (***rūpa***) concur, visual consciousness arises, and when the ear-organ and a sound concur, auditory consciousness arises, etc. Each of these six consciousnesses (five senses and psycho-cognitive 'sense') is discrete and occurs separately from the others, though the sixth consciousness (***mano-vijñāna***) to some extent appropriates and interprets the other five.[15]

indriya (organ; faculty)	***viṣaya*** (sensory object)	***vijñāna*** (consciousness)
1. eye	7. visibles (***rūpa***)	13. visual-consciousness
2. ear	8. audibles	14. auditory-consciousness
3. nose	9. smells	15. olfactory-consciousness
4. tongue	10. tastes	16. gustatory-consciousness
5. body/skin	11. touchables (***sparśa***)	17. tactile-consciousness
6. mind (***manas***)	12. ***dharmā***	18. ***mano-vijñāna***

|------------ ***āyatana*** ------------|

|------------------------------ ***dhātu*** ------------------|

The twelve āyatanas are 1 through 12, grouped as 1 with 7, 2 with 8, 3 with 9, etc. The six sense-organs, with their six respective types of objects, along with the six types of consciousnesses they engender all together constitute the Eighteen Dhātus. These fields, viz. the sensorium, are *everything* (***Samyutta Nikāya*** 4.15, ***Sabba-sutta***). The cognitive sensorium is all-inclusive. Nothing whatsoever exists outside the eighteen dhātus.

Each sensory realm (vision, audition, etc.) constitutes a distinct perceptual domain. To say that we *see* a "tasty object" bespeaks a category

mistake, since we neither taste visibles nor see gustatory sensations. Only mentally do we construct a referent as the identical 'source' for both sensory realms. Although each sense constitutes an entirely separate domain and occurs independently of the other five senses, such that taste is taste and always radically different from and nonreducible to, for example, a sound, nonetheless mental-consciousness (***mano-vijñāna***) *interprets* these discrete sensations as if they were unified, thus mistakenly constructing a unified subject as well as a unified object. Hence the 'red' seen, the 'sweetness' tasted, the 'smooth solidity' felt, the 'tart aroma' smelled, the 'tearing noise' heard become properties of a single, unified apple that I, as agent and locale of these perceptions, am eating. Not only do simultaneous sensations get blurred together as referring to unified objects and subjects, but temporally discrete sensations also become 'unified'. For instance the belief arises that the apple I picked up and bit is the *same* apple I continue to eat, and finally the eaten apple was one object just as the eater was one subject.

These psycho-linguistic cognitive errors are errors precisely because they are inferences displacing actual perception, i.e., inferences masquerading as perceptions. 'I ate an apple' is an inference based on discrete sensations in which, technically speaking, in the absence of those inferences, no "I" or "apple" occur. The error arises when the inference substitutes itself for the sensation in such a way as to mask the inferential origins. Inferential aggregations come to be experienced as perceived 'identities' (***ātmadharmasvabhāva***).

Buddhism further argues that these cognitive displacements are symptomatic of one's deep desire to be a (universalizable) self (***ātma-dṛṣṭi***), to be a permanent identity not subject to the limitations and vicissitudes of mortality and the loneliness of a finite spatio-temporal horizon. We are driven to expand

our horizon, to universalize our 'self', not only by attaching to theories which are communal identities larger than any individual (e.g., a tradition, a religion, a family or clan, a political movement, a God, etc.); more radically the very structures through which those theories arise -- such as language, perception, and action -- carry the signs of this anxious displacement. Anxiety encodes itself within or as these human structures. Moreover *perception*, insofar as it is a constructive enterprise, is regarded as an *action*. This simultaneously implicates and is implicated by the presuppositional belief (*saṃskāra*) that language (*nāma*) is always referential (*āyatana*); that action (*karma*) is everywhere invisibly mediated by a language that 'refers' subjects to objects, and *vice versa*. From this it follows that action has a 'grammar', a discernible structure through which it is 'articulated'. Since for a self to act *towards* an object follows the same propositional structure as that of a signifier signifying towards a signified, language and action (*karma*) share the same grammar, the identical structure.[16] One step further and all nominalizations (*prajñapti*, i.e., psycho-linguistic approximations) which can be said to be empirically demonstrated (or otherwise 'validated') may come to be taken as substantives, since one may forget that the validated referent is a linguistic event, not a substantial entity. A referent never occurs elsewhere than in an act of referring. To claim the referent *refers* to some object outside the act of reference is to invite an infinite regress. Hence the substantialized nominalization, which presents itself as an *identity* (i.e., 'referent *qua* object') may seem to exceed its role in the act of reference, though as 'referent *qua* referent' it can never be found elsewhere, rendering this excess always questionable. That ironically precisely in their capacity to seemingly *refer*, both language and action cannot escape their horizons, i.e., they cannot refer beyond themselves, I will here call *closure*. They are both closed systems,

self-referential, whose perpetuation constitutes and is constituted by repetition. In Buddhist terminology karmic closure is called *saṃsāra*, the reiterative repetition of birth and death[17] or 'arising and ceasing', a repetition impelled by the desire to substantially embody as a permanent entity in spite of the variable, fluxational impermanence (*anitya*) which invariably characterizes all conditioned things (*saṃskṛta-lakṣaṇa*). Hence one prapañcically arrives at substantial selves and objects.

Embodied conditioning (*saṃskāra*) continues to en-act and unfurl due to the absence of some basic insight (*avidya*). Hence cognizance (*vijñāna*) arises as a lived-body (*nāma-rūpa*) bursting with sensorial capacity (*āyatana*). At this stage, the circuits between organs and objects which result in the sensory consciousnesses constitute a kind of 'intentional arc'.[18] This sets the basis for the Buddhist version of *intentionality*. Because sensation, according to Buddhism, is always already intentional, at each and every moment it involves

6 – *sparśa* (P. *phassa*) – Literally 'touch' or 'sensory contact'. This term accrued varied usages in later Indian thought, but here it simply means that the sense organs are 'in contact with' sensory objects. The circuit of intentionality, or to borrow Merleau-Ponty's term *intentional arc*, is operational. This term could be translated as 'sensation' as long as this is qualified as a constructional, active process[19] that is invariably contextualized within its psycho-cognitive dimensions. For Buddhists, sensation can be neither passive nor purely a physical or neurological matter. When the proper conditions aggregate, i.e., come into contact with each other, sensation occurs. These proper conditions include a properly functioning sense organ and a cognitive/sensory object, which already presuppose a linguistically-complex conscious body (*nāma-rūpa*).

Further, there is no moment when 'contact' does not occur. At least

one of the six senses (and in this model the mind is treated as a sense), if not all of them, is in contact with its cognitive object at any given moment. Hence each moment constitutes and is constituted by intentionalities inhabiting one or several of the sensory domains.[20] Put another way, ***experience is always in and of the sensorium.*** This carries implications similar to those of the existential–phenomenologists who claim man is never other than being–in–the–world. Moreover the psycho–cognitive dimensions of sensation are reinforced by the next ***nidāna.***

7 – ***vedanā*** – As in the ***skandhic*** model ***vedanā*** here means the three initial interpretive modes of any experience, viz. pleasure, pain, and neutral. Every instance of 'contact' always already derives from, instantiates, produces and is classified as pleasure, pain or neutral. The person (***pudgala,*** P. ***puggala***) -- insofar as 'person' is merely a designatory label (***prajñapti***) for the karmic stream (***santāna***) produced by and producing pain and pleasure -- develops and is conditioned by the repeated experiences of these positive and negative reinforcements, viz. enjoyment and hurt, reward and punishment, etc.

To some extent Buddhism and Behaviorism concur on the nature of the self. For both, the self is considered a merely nominal substitute for behavior (= karma), which derives through pleasure/pain conditioning. They diverge on the importance of non–apparent 'behavior', or the unconscious processes (***saṃskāra***) which underpin and actually operate the conditioning. Behaviorism is content to note that pleasurable stimulus X, when sufficiently reinforced or repeated produces behavioral action Y. Buddhism, on the other hand, holds that not only must 'unconscious motivations' be reducible to empirical conditioning, but that empirical conditioning is only efficacious because of latent, previously embodied conditioning, and that these latencies are therefore more radically significant, since

they are temporally, logically and psychologically prior to any single empirically observable occurance of that conditioned behavior.[21] Hence when a behaviorist claims that in order to modify behavior one must find an appropriate reinforcement (e.g., while a cookie might work for a young child, an adult might require a salary incentive), he will nonetheless regard the selection of an appropriate reinforcement as a purely random, pragmatic affair;[22] whatever works for a subject, works. For the Behaviorist the 'general' principle is more important than its application in particular circumstances. The Buddhist is more interested in concrete particularities. Each individual's conditioning is the primary issue; the principle of conditioning alone has no soteric value. Thus Buddha emphasized that teaching must be geared to the capacities of particular audiences. To know there is such a thing as conditioning may lead one to metaphysicalize; and what is worse, such 'knowledge' does not offer any leverage into resolving one's own embodied conditioning. Each person must uncover his own conditioning, and not be content with theoretical panaceas. While the Behaviorist is content to substitute one form of conditioning (behavior) for another, the Buddhist attempts to overcome the conditioning process itself. The Buddhist is more interested in (a) ***why*** someone responds as he/she does to certain things, and (b) why pain and pleasure are so ubiquitous and radically constitutive.

The issue of latency was crucial because it helped explain how discrete experiences of pleasure and pain, through reiteration, formed habits (some scholars have translated ***saṃskāra*** as 'habit-formations'). In other words, karma was understood as a designatory label for the process of pleasure/pain/neutral conditioning. That which gives me pleasure I wish to experience again (***rāga***), while that which causes pain I wish to continually avoid (***pratigha***). Hence my behavior (***karma***) arises from what I do positively or negatively to reiterate pain

and pleasure. As this shapes my actions (*karma*), it is called

8 – *tṛṣṇa* (P. *taṇhā*) – 'Desire' or 'thirst'. In a Buddhist context 'desire' connotes more than just lust, wanting, or craving. As previous vedānic experiences simmer (*saṃskāra*) and coalesce, they come to actualize as specific intentions. The movement by which tendencies and predispositions become teleologically focused –– in other words, when intentions cathex on goals –– is called 'desire'. According to Merleau–Ponty, intentionality involves a *directed towardness* of a lived–body and a perceptual field, and *vice versa,* or in Husserl's phrase "consciousness is always *consciousness of* ". Particularly in Merleau–Ponty's reading, this indicated the simultaneity of consciousness being (i) of an object *and* (ii) of a subject, this simultaneity constituted by and constitutive of the mutual influences and appropriations of the lived–body and the perceptual field.

While the previous *nidānas* were more concerned with the engendering of *possibilities* (the nescience which underpins and makes possible the dynamics of being–in–the–world, the process of embodiment and the further possibilities and limitations which that entails), desire and the subsequent *nidānas* are more concerned with *actualizations.*

In the cardinal doctrine of Buddhism called the Four Noble Truths, 'desire' is usually cited as the cause of *duḥkha* (this is the second of the Four truths). But since even the earliest texts claim that the overcoming of *duḥkha* involves knowledge or special modes of knowing (*jñāna* or *prajñā,* P. *aññā* or *paññā* ; see, e.g., n. 7), it quickly became standard practice to assert a kind of parity between *avidya* (nescience) and *tṛṣṇa* (desire) as co–causes of *duḥkha.* Sometimes this was treated as a parity between cognitive and affective root problematics. However affective (*kleśa*) disorders came to be seen as derivative of cognitive disorders. With nescience considered more radical and fundamental

than desire, the parity was disrupted. While feelings (*vedanā*) played a crucial role in the formation of karmic tendencies, it was nescience that allowed these feelings to engender habitual continuity, that allowed them, as it were, to take on a life of their own. One can only be conditioned by positive and negative reinforcement when, on some level, one is unaware of or overlooks the process of conditioning as it happens. Hence while affective correctives were beneficial, particularly in the moral and ethical spheres, the truly radical remedy to the duḥkhic dilemma was correct knowledge.

Initially correct knowledge was encapsulated as four items in the Noble Eightfold Path (which is itself a corollary to the fourth Noble Truth), viz. ***sammā–diṭṭhi, sammā–saṃkappa, sammā–sati*** and ***sammā–samādhi*** (S. ***samyagdṛṣṭi, samyaksaṃkalpa, samyaksmṛti*** and ***samyaksamādhi***) meaning 'correct perspective, correct thought or consideration, correct mindfulness or recollection and correct meditation', respectively. The first two items involve theoretic orientation, while the second two items emphasize attitudinal focus and context. As Buddhist theory grew more intricate and diverse, the scope of correct knowledge accordingly expanded, eventually encompassing the vast complex of Abhidharmic speculation and categorization. Mahāyāna, in one stroke, attempted to resimplify correct knowledge, asserting that it involved exposing (1) a false deep inner conviction that eternal essences exist, particularly as as***signed*** to selves (***ātman***) and events (***dharma***) under the rubric of 'intrinsic natures' (***svabhāva***), (2) a false sense of the continuous in the discontinuous[23], and (3) the underlying dualistic extremism of all attempted theories (***dṛṣṭi***). By exposing these problems one is enabled to follow a middle way between extremes.[24]

Tṛṣṇa, 'thirst', evokes the sense of a man stranded in the desert, whose sole guiding passion and concern is the alleviation of his thirst. This thirst

obstructs and trivializes any other competing concerns. Driven by desires, we formulate and project expectations and aspirations. The success or failure of our attempts to reach our 'objectives' (i.e., those desires which have projected and objectified themselves, transferring[25] to the object so as to cathex or teleologize themselves) encourages or frustrates further efforts, hence this too is subject to ***vedanic*** cataloging and conditioning. The 'successful' precipitates the 'successive'. More importantly, the so-called 'objects' of our world of experience become a thick texture of teleologically cathexed desires, bristling with the same allure and exclusivistic attraction that a mirage holds for the desperate thirsty man lost in his desert.[26] Even the 'objective scientist', who supposedly observes objects and events dispassionately, has actually cathexed his desire for hypothetical verifications, principles and understanding onto the events he observes and manipulates. Buddhism reasserts the parity between ***avidya*** and ***tṛṣṇa*** by arguing, as did Kierkegaard[27], that reason itself is a passion, an expression of desire.

While the dyad of ***avidya/tṛṣṇa*** is much discussed, a lesser appreciated but equally important dyad remains virtually unnoticed in much of the secondary literature. The interaction of ***saṃskāra*** and ***vedanā*** mirrors to some extent the interaction of the former dyad. While the first term of each pair (***avidyā*** and ***saṃskāra***) primarily involves subliminal or unconscious conditions, the second terms (***vedanā*** and ***tṛṣṇa***) primarily concern the processes through which the latencies of the first terms become conscious. Also as ***avidya*** is the condition upon which ***saṃskāra*** arises, so is ***vedanā*** the condition upon which ***tṛṣṇa*** arises. The Abhidhammic literature especially grounds its analyses on the interrelation of ***vedanā*** and ***sankhāra***. Its kammic analysis is rooted in descriptions of how ***vedanic*** activities latently develop and ultimately reiterate themselves saṅkhārically as they come to fruition (***vipāka***). We will examine this in more

detail later.

As *avidya* came to be glossed as the fundamental cognitive error under the term *jñeya-āvaraṇa, tṛṣṇa* was glossed as the fundamental affective error under the term *kleśa-āvaraṇa*. *Kleśa* (P. *kilesa*), often translated as 'defilements', 'afflictions', 'evil passions', etc., means *mental disturbances,* i.e., those things which disturb a healthy mental condition.[28] Their specific enumeration varies from text to text and school to school. We will later examine the curiously disparate conceptions of *kleśa* in the lists of 75 dharmas and 100 dharmas of the *Abhidharmakośa* and Yogācāra respectively.[29]

9 – *upādāna* – 'Appropriation' arises with the movement of *saṃskāras* through sensorially operative lived-bodies, conditioned by pleasure/pain. What is pleasurable I desire to repeat; what is painful I desire to avoid. To repeatedly reach out and grasp for what has given me pleasure, or to negatively seize on ways to avoid what has given pain, is called *appropriation*. Its enactment presupposes the prior establishment of a teleological, referential relationship between X and Y such that X has desired Y, has in some manner made it his goal, and now has succeeded in attaining it. Appropriation also involves a kind of accretion (*prāpti*) onto or into the self. Only that which in some sense is *external* to me can be appropriated. If it were already internal, intrinsic, I could not *take* it; it would already be mine. Even my innermost feelings and thoughts can only be appropriated when they are elsewhere or otherwise then how and where I find myself. That which is already mine, according to Buddhism, likewise should not be seen as *essentially* or *intrinsically* mine (sva-*bhāva*), but as products and fruits of prior appropriative acts. We appropriate in order to expand, strengthen and affirm our selves. What is *other* becomes *mine*. The more I possess, the 'greater' I *am*.

Conversely its corollary, negative appropriation, defines me by what I reject.[30] It is constituted by the attempt to eject out from myself that which I carry with me always, viz. the memories of previous pains.[31] However it shares the same objectives as positive appropriation, viz. to expand, strengthen and affirm our selves, but in these instances, by the avoidance of that which opposes or hinders, i.e., hurts, the self's efforts at self-perpetuation.[32]

Appropriation thus sets and defines the limits of my 'self' while simultaneously striving to always alter it. As I accrete or divest, I expand or contract my self, my horizons. Appropriating ideas, things, people, relationships, personal biography, beliefs, the sensations and feelings which are *mine,* etc., I become the person who, after the fact, can be pointed to as who "I" am.

Whereas desire (***tṛṣṇā***) affectively establishes goals and objectives, appropriation (***upādāna***) actively grasps and clings to them. Appropriation is the behavioral correlate to desire. They are two aspects of a conational drive, with desire primarily a mental aspect and appropriation primarily an aspect of action. They overlap, since the conative is always constituted by affective as well as actional aspects -- or as Buddhists might put it, since karma is the 'activity of ***body, mind and speech***', desire and appropriation, insofar as they are sensorial, cognitive and linguistic affects/actions, karmically they share the same conative structure.

We may point out here a feature of the ***nidānas*** in general. ***Prajñapti*** in part indicates the reduction of complex factors to a single word or phrase which can then become a kind of conventional shorthand or heuristic. The danger of ***prajñapti*** is that users of a prajñaptic term will think that it has an actual integral referent and thus overlook the diverse conditions it has heuristically simplified and supplemented (cf. e.g., ***Mādhyamaka-kārikā*** IX.3-4). In the same

manner, each of the *nidānas* functions as a heuristic or conventional supplement for the others. This is most clearly seen when a *nidāna* is deconstructed into its contiguous *nidānas*. For example, there is actually no independent or self-functioning thing called 'desire' (#8). Desire is a verbal substitute for saying 'the interrelationship of *vedanā* (#7) and appropriation (#9)'. Based on particular experiences of pleasure and pain, there will be a tendency to appropriate particular things. That 'tendency' is desire. Similarly, *nāma-rūpa* ('name and form' lived-body, #4) is shorthand for *vijñāna* (consciousness, #3) and its relation to *āyatana* (sensorial capacity, #5), i.e., the relation (*nāma*) to *rūpa*. Or, consciousness (#3) is shorthand for the relation between *saṃskāras* (embodied conditioning, #2) and *nāma-rūpa* (#4), i.e., the cognizance suspended between embodied unconscious dispositions and the psycho-physical structures. This exercise could be applied to any of the *nidānas*: they all reduce to their contiguous neighbors.[33] Moreover, this mutual reductionism can be expanded, so that all the *nidānas* reduce to all the others. Hence Buddhists claim that they are always simultaneous, that each moment is constituted by the full twelve *nidānas*, and that this model is merely a heuristic, though an extremely efficacious one. This will be elaborated further after the full twelve are elucidated.

For the Yogācāra school the 'appropriation' *nidāna* is the most crucial.[34] When we come to Vasubandhu and his doctrine of *vijñapti-mātra*, we will see that he identified the root problematic as the objectification and subjectification of appropriation (*grāhya-grāhaka*). Unlike many Western commentators, Vasubandhu rarely talks about 'subject' and 'object' but rather describes *grāhaka* ('that which appropriates', which will be translated subsequently as *noesis* in order to emphasize its intentional, appropriating structure) and *grāhya*

('that which is appropriated', to be translated *noema*). The movement through which noema are noetically constituted is appropriation. It is within the circuit of intentionality as it constitutes a world in which noetic subjectivities attempt to project and locate themselves that Vasubandhu attempts to rupture karmic continuity.

As an instantiation of conditioned desires, appropriation infuses the subjects and objects of experience.[35] Eventually the *activity* of appropriating (the making of karma) supplants and represses the *conditions* for appropriating (the experiential enactment of ***pratītya–samutpāda***), establishing a self–perpetuating appropriational dynamic. This dynamic, when self–perpetuating, is called

10 – ***bhāva*** (P. ***bhava***) – Here this term should be translated 'impetus' or 'impulse', or perhaps 'motiv–ation'. ***Bhāva***, which sometimes means 'an existent', is usually translated in the ***pratītya–samutpāda*** model as 'becoming', perhaps in resistance to the tendency to translate the term as 'being'.[36] Becoming, if taken as a bare concept stripped of its philosophical and metaphysical baggage, conveys the basic sense. ***Bhāva*** overlaps the notion of active inertia. It signifies the fact that there is always already something *going on*. We are impelled to always take a next breath; atoms are in constant motion; the heart keeps beating; even the corpse as a bundle of materiality is fully active and engaged in transformation; each thought and sensation gives way to a subsequent thought or sensation. Everything is driven, moved (motiv–ated) by an impetus into the next moment, constantly. This concrescence of the previous ***nidānas*** is never a terminus. It is ongoing, though durational (in Bergson's sense of the term). As the ongoing duration of types of activities, ***bhāva*** may be called 'behavior'. As that which can be said to always keep the world in motion, it may be called 'motive force'. However, as our description of the previous ***nidānas*** should indicate, this 'force' is understood in

Buddhism as primarily psychological -- the implementation of formalized tendencies -- and not metaphysical.

As the durational instantiation of appropriational modalities, it is always intentional and hence directional. This directionality signals ***bhāva*** as radically temporal, suggesting that time itself functions through motives, or that time is nothing other than a way of measuring the im-pulses.[37] These impulses coalesce as

11 - ***jāti*** - birth, and

12 - ***māraṇam*** (P. ***maraṇa***) - death. Sometimes this last ***nidāna*** is called 'sickness, old age and death', evoking the four signs prince Gotama saw before leaving home to become the Buddha.[38] Birth and death, in the Buddhist context, mean more than simply the birth and death of an individual. They signify the arising and ceasing of all conditioned things (***saṃskṛta***), each and every moment. 'Arising and ceasing' signifies the perpetuating, impermanent coursing of ***saṃsāra*** as well as the arising and ceasing of objects, thoughts, persons, moments, etc. within it. By designating this coursing as 'arising and ceasing' Buddhism seeks to emphasize that everything relies on conditions in order to come into or go out of existence, and further, that all conditioned things inevitably cease or die. Hence 'arising and ceasing' mark the inseparability of life and death as well as highlighting the simple but dialectical fact that the full power and vitality that each and every thing enjoys at the peak of its coming into existence always already marks the limits, boundaries, ends and death of that thing and its power.

Though we have presented the twelve nidānas in the order most typically found in modern sources, traditionally other orders and configurations of the model were equally, and often *more* important. For instance, when pratītya-samutpāda is taken as a circle (known as the ***bhavacakka,*** S. ***bhāvacakra,***

'impetus–wheel') #12 (death) and #1 (nescience) become contiguous. As the first and last *nidānas* of the standard formulation, they occupy highly significant positions. In one frequently cited exposition of *pratītya–samutpāda*[39] Buddha is depicted as gaining Awakening, and discovering the process of *pratītya–samutpāda,* by contemplating "why is there death?" Through a kind of process of deduction, he reasons there is death because there is birth, and there is birth because there is *bhāva,* etc., until he uncovers all twelve *nidānas* culminating in nescience. The listing of the links in their order of 'discovery', i.e., from #12 to #11, #11 to #10, all the way to #1, is called *pratiloma* (discovery) or *sammāpatipadā* (correct methodology). He then further reasons that if nescience is extinguished, *saṃskāras* likewise will be extinguished, and if *saṃskāras* are extinguished then consciousness will be eliminated, and so on, until death itself is extinguished. Significantly Nāgārjuna in his *Mūlamadhyamika kārikā,* in the chapter on *pratītya–samutpāda,* not only chose to repeat this version of the formula verbatim, but more surprisingly, he utterly neglects to negate or even challenge this formula or the manner of its formulation[40] -- which is something that cannot be said for virtually every other Buddhist doctrine he treats, including *nirvāṇa* and *tathāgata.*

Hence we may say that while the root *problematic* is nescience, the root *problem* is death. While the former is the (indirect) cause of the latter, the dilemma of the latter is what instigates the investigation which uncovers the former. When the former is eliminated, the latter also disappears. Since knowledge of some sort (*jñāna*) is necessary to eliminate nescience, nothing is more vitally important, valuable or useful for overcoming life's problems. Thus Buddhist praxis inevitably centers on the clear, insightful seeing (*vipaśyana*) of things as they are (*yathābhūtam*). Moreover, as the problem of death is not

merely an intellectual or abstract problem, but involves powerful and even terrifying existential and psychological dimensions, Buddhist 'reason' endeavors to existentialize and psychologize the intellectual, while simultaneously rigorously reasoning through the psychological and existential. This marks the psychosophic project of all schools of Buddhism, no matter what method or approach they take to this problem.

Before moving on to the next model, it should be noted that although throughout Buddhist history the ***pratītya–samutpāda*** model has been used and explicated in countless and diverse ways, primarily they boil down to six basic paradigmatic interpretations, several of which have been suggested during the course of this exposition.

(1) It is often treated as a ***sequential series*** of twelve links, link #1 leading to link #2, etc. This is usually stated through the conditional causal formula '[when] X exists, Y comes to exist' or 'dependent on X, there is Y'. Typically these formulae occur in the following forms: ***avijjāpaccayā sankhāra*** '[given the] condition nescience, embodied–conditioning [arises]'; or the formula in M I.262–64:

> ***Imasmiṃ sati idaṃ hoti, imassa upādā idaṃ uppajjati. Imasmiṃ asati idaṃ na hoti, imassa nirodhā idaṃ nirujjhati.***
> 'when that exists, this comes to be; on the arising of that, this arises. When that does not exist, this does not come to be; on the cessation of that, this ceases.'

This meant, given link #1, link #2 arose, and given link #2, link #3 arose, etc., all the way up to link #12. By extinguishing link #1, link #2 also ceases, and so on. Pratītya–samutpāda was also treated as bi–directional, i.e., as #1 up to #12 (called ***anuloma,*** 'conforming' or ***micchāpatipadā,*** 'erroneous methodology') as well as from #12 down to #1 (called ***patiloma*** or ***sammāpatipadā***).

Frequently modern writers fail to appreciate the cogency and coherency of pratītya-samutpāda simply because the ascending causal sequence puzzles them. They wonder, for instance, Why should birth (#11) come so late in the sequence? The order of discovery, i.e., the order in which Buddha supposedly discovered the twelve links, however, is not the ascending order (#1 -> #12), but rather the descending order (#12 -> #1). As stated above, he asked, 'Why is there Death?' (#12), and answered, 'Because there is Birth' (#11). 'Why is there Birth? Because there is Impetus/impetuousness (#10, *bhāva*),' and so on until he reached Nescience (#1). Viewed in this way, the twelve links are eminently reasonable.

The *Saṃyutta Nikāya* in the saḷ-āyatana section claims that the *anuloma* version is 'incorrect' (*micchāpaṭipadā,* lit. 'erroneous method'), whereas its negative counterpart ('when nescience does not exist, embodied-conditioning ceases, etc.') is 'correct' (*sammāpaṭipadā,* lit. 'correct method'). Vasubandhu later elaborated on this, differentiating a saṃsāric pratītya-samutpāda (anuloma) from an Awakened pratītya-samutpāda (the negative version).

(2) For several reasons, including the overlap of connotations between the various *nidānas* (see n. 14), the fact that each can be seen as a mere nominalization of the dynamics of the others (see n. 33), that each *nidāna* is a necessary cause of the others, and that they are thus mutually dependent, etc., led to the conclusion that rather than being treated as a sequence, more properly they should be understood as *simultaneous.* Once the Mādhyamika doctrine of *śūnyatā* took hold, namely that all things lack a self-creating, self-defining essence (*svabhāva*), no single thing, much less a single *nidāna,* could be postulated as causally efficient in and of itself. Since the 'others' upon which anything depended were in turn also devoid of self-essence, things were all to be regarded

as mutually dependent, i.e., mutually conditioned and conditioning. Since no thing and no moment could be given primacy, all were evened-out into a simultaneous synchronicity, which itself had no self-essence. Since even the nomenclature 'simultaneous synchronicity' becomes meaningless without its diachronic counterpoint, ***pratītya-samutpāda*** came to be regarded, as Candrakirti writes in the ***Prasannapadā***, as ***pratyayatā matreṇa*** ('utter conditionality').

(3) It came also to be treated as a sophisticated and intricate ***causal nexus***. This genre of interpretation is best represented by Abhidharma literature and Buddhaghosa's ***Visuddhimagga***.[41]

(4) When applied as a methodological tool for analyzing how, in terms of conditioning, no thing has a self or essence, ***pratītya-samutpāda*** enables the ***dialectical and deconstructive de-nominalization*** of all 'theories' (***dṛṣṭi***) of reality. This usage was most consistently carried out by the Mādhyamika school. It also shows up in other writings, particularly when the entire list of twelve links becomes subsumed under the dialectical tension of some particular pair. The most frequently encountered example of a dialectical dyad metonymically substituting itself for the full formula, is the birth-death pair, which as stated above came to stand for the entire realm of ***saṃsāra***, as did ***pratītya-samutpāda*** itself. The pair ***vijñāna*** and ***nāma-rūpa*** also emerged sporadically in various manifestations of the mind-body problem. When Buddhism psychologized, usually the ***vedanā-tṛṣṇa*** pair took center stage; and when it moralized, the ***tṛṣṇa-upādāna*** dyad became prominent. Incidentally the highly moralistic content of much Yogācāra material derives from the preeminence this last dyad enjoys in their system, particularly the latter term.

(5) When applied to an individual, it could also give an account of his/her transmigratory existence. Buddhaghosa's formulation of this is the best

known. He claimed that #1, #2 and half of #3 signified one's past life; the other half of #3 through half of #10 signified one's present life; and the last half of #10 through #12 signified one's future life. Conze (see n. 8) believed that the present form of twelve links developed as the ***pratītya–samutpāda*** doctrine came to be applied to the problem of transmigration.

(6) It can also be used to highlight what each school considered paradigmatic of Buddhism. Note 34 offers some suggestions on how this could be explored.

Though we have barely scratched the surface in our exploration of ***pratītya–samutpāda*** it is now time to turn to the next model.

III– *Tridhātu*

The model of the "three realms" or "three existential horizons" involves some of the most intricate and hair–splitting distinctions in Buddhist doctrine. It has been applied to cosmology, meditation levels and classifications, transmigratory schema, and the hierarchical categorizing of psychological situations. As with the previous model, the description here will be far from exhaustive, but rather will aim at orienting the reader toward very basic but significant issues which will help prepare the way for understanding how this model came to be appropriated and utilized by Yogācāra.

The three realms are (1) the realm of desire (***kāma–dhātu***), (2) the formal or material realm (***rūpa–dhātu***), and (3) the formless or immaterial realm (***ārūpa–dhātu***).

As humans we "live" primarily in the desire realm. The word for desire here is ***kāma,*** not ***taṇha*** or ***tṛṣṇa*** as in the ***pratītya–samutpāda*** model. Its closest equivalent term would be the Greek word *Eros,* meaning not just what we

today would consider "erotic", but the entire domain of sensorial pleasure, particularly as that domain involves the pleasure principle as a motive for all action and interpretation. To say we primarily live in the desire realm means that to us life and its meanings generally derive from how, by way of pleasant and painful experiences, we *interpret* the world through our senses. Moreover the will-to-meaning and the will-to-life are derivative processes of a fundamental desire or urge that there be a world of objects so constituted that this desire can locate and attempt to satisfy itself within such a world; constructing and interpreting the world to 'be' what this desire desires. The pursuit of pleasure (***kāma***), worldly success (***artha***) and ethical betterment (***dharma***) all derive through this 'desire', and help establish its horizons. The horizons of our experience (***dhātu***) are constituted by the 'erotic sensorium' (***kāma***).

Rūpa–dhātu is hard to render accurately in English. ***Rūpa,*** though generally translated as 'form' or 'materiality' in this model displays none of the characteristics usually associated with 'matter' in Buddhist thought. If anything, it denotes a realm whose properties are best understood as *formal thought*. The modern notion of Formal Logic as a logic radically separated from any empirical content would be located, by the Buddhist, in this ***rūpa–dhātu***. Since the term ***rūpa*** functions in this model in a manner inconsistent with its more common usage as 'materiality', it has engendered a great deal of hermeneutic difficulty for Buddhists in all subsequent interpretative traditions. The ***rūpa*** of the five skandhas (see above) has little in common with this ***rūpa*** either in terms of definition or function. The Abhidhammic attempts to conflate these two ***rūpas*** only generated further obfuscations, and in the end led Buddhaghosa, as the leading compiler and codifier of Theravāda doctrine, to severely violate and contradict the original Abhidhammic doctrines.[42]

The meaning of ***rūpa*** in this model may become more evident if we turn to the next realm, the formless (***arūpa***) realm. The arūpa–dhātu is described as a series of ever expansive boundless realms, i.e., as one progresses through the formless realm, boundaries or restrictions are stripped away. As we shall see in a moment, successively vaster and more inclusive horizonal margins are uncovered and stripped away. One's awareness becomes coterminal with the full expanse of each realm, as one sees how it underpins the preceding realm, and each margin in turn is erased until one achieves direct experience of marginality itself.

The first arūpa horizon is ***ākāśa*** or 'spatiality'. Thus the rūpa–dhātu may be seen as underpinned by or presupposing 'spatiality'. In this context, ***rūpa,*** as the contrary of ***arūpa,*** would signify a (mentally) limited or restricted realm. This implies that early on Buddhists understood ***rūpa*** by the formal definition which became prominent later in the scholastic period, viz. "what offers resistance" or "what obstructs space", rather than simply as the material 'Great Elements' (***mahābhūta***). The ***Potthapāda Sutta*** of the ***Dīgha Nikāya*** does in fact suggest such an understanding, when, while describing how a meditator advances from the rūpa–dhātu to the arūpa–dhātu, it says: "The Bhikkhu, by passing beyond the consciousness of rūpa, ***by putting an end to the sense of resistance,*** by paying no heed to the idea of distinction, thinking: 'The space is infinite,' reaches up to and remains in the mental state in which the mind is concerned only with the consciousness of the infinity of space." (T.W. Rhys David's tr., slightly modified)

Each of the three realms is subdivided into various levels, which vary slightly in different traditions. In cosmological versions of the tridhātu each level is treated as a separate transmigratory realm where various kinds of beings are born and live and die. The desire realm includes the hells, animals, ghostly spirits, and humans, as well as some lower heavens. The formal realm contains various

higher heavens, and the formless realm is abodeless (though some sources correlate the ***ārūpa*** levels with the transmigratory abodes for advanced practitioners).

I will not give a detailed description of this scheme since such descriptions are available elsewhere[43] and need not be repeated here. Rather a generic, skeletal description will be offered, along with an attempt to suggest some of the critical issues which came to bear on Yogācāra theory.

A – ***Kāma–dhātu*** is generally subdivided into five regions:

1. ***Naraka*** (P. ***niraya***) – The hellish regions. Buddhist cosmology conceived of many types of hells: cold ones, hot ones, desolate ones, ones with multiple tortures, etc., which vary from text to text and tradition to tradition.[44] As Conze points out[45] "since life in hell comes to an end some day, they are more like the Purgatory of the Catholic Church, than like the Hell in orthodox Christianity." As Vasubandhu points out in the ***Viṃśatika,*** the hells are not ontological regions awaiting denizens, but are produced, intersubjectively, by the collective karma of those whose actions project the requisite tendencies. If the karmic habits which lead to hellish experiences would cease, so would the hells they in–habit.
2. ***Tiryagyoni*** (P. ***tiracchānayoni***) – The animal world. Any one or anything can be born as anything else. The chain of saṃsāra involves all sentient beings. People may be reborn as animals, and vice versa. In fact, since there is no abiding self, it would be improper to say a 'person' was reborn as an animal (or vice versa) since the animal, despite his past karma, is now fully an animal, just as a person is now fully a person. Nonetheless in popular thinking, such intra–life 'relationships' are contemplated. Hence the Buddhist notion of ***ahiṃsā,*** the non–harming of any sentient being, extends to animals, since the

cow or ox or cockroach you abuse may be a (former) member of your family. Buddhists have also produced a rich literature of legends and fables detailing what kind of personality traits lead to what kind of animal rebirth. Stubborness may lead to being born as an ass, cleverness may lead to life as a fox, etc. These stories have always been popular, even in Zen.[46]

3. ***Preta*** (P. ***petta*** or ***pettivisaya*** 'preta sense–field') – The hungry ghosts. There are several versions of what exactly a preta is. Generally, they are ghostly figures with perpetual ravenous appetites who are somehow constituted in a way that makes satisfying and gratifying those appetites impossible. One version asserts that they have large, insatiable stomachs, and mouths the size of pin–pricks, making the act of eating virtually impossible. Another asserts that their throats are too narrow to actually swallow anything. When food or drink come within their grasp, it turns to pus or blood. Their immediately previous life was almost definitely human, and even more than with animals, they are commonly considered to be recently departed relatives. There is an annual festival in most Buddhist countries where food is put out for them by their living relatives, and on that day they can eat. Pretas are victims of frustrated desires which they could not overcome while human. Like the hells, and all the other ***gatis*** or transmigratory realms, existence as a preta is not permanent, and eventually leads to rebirth elsewhere.

4. ***Manuṣya*** (P. ***manussa–loka*** 'human world') – The human realm. As the middle way between those realms beneath it and those above it, Buddhism considers this the most auspicious realm in which to be born. It is neither too hellish or unpleasant to keep one constantly distracted (as in the lower realms), nor is it so unimaginably pleasant that the thought of self–improvement or untangling the saṃsāric knot would never occur to one (as in the divine realms). Its

auspiciousness is matched by the difficulty of being born in it. Rahula paraphrases the ***Majjhima Nikāya*** thus:[47]

> Suppose a yoke with a single hole is cast into the great ocean where it is tossed about by the winds that blow in all directions, and that in this same ocean lives a one-eyed turtle who comes up once in a hundred years to catch a glimpse of the heavens. Is it possible that this one-eyed turtle would ever chance to look at the sky through the hole in the yoke?. . .it is even more difficult. . .to be born a man.

Significantly, Buddhism holds that complete unexcelled Awakening (***anuttara samyak saṃbodhi***) is only attainable in the human realm. Gods can progress on the path of Dharma, but even they need to be reborn as humans in order to achieve Nirvāṇa.

5 ***Kāmadeva*** (P. ***kāmavacara sugatibhūmi***) – The divine Kāma realm. In this realm the various traditions and texts begin to exhibit significant divergences. For instance, in the Pāli tradition, particularly following Buddhaghosa, the ***kāmavacara sugatibhūmi*** (lit. 'pleasant [reward] stage of the eros field') includes the human realm as well as the divine kāma heavens. Among other things, this indicates that desire (***kāma***) per se is not taken to signify an a priori evil, since even within the realm of desire, certain desires may yield pleasant and beneficial fruits.

Texts also diverge as to how many levels to assign to the ***kāma-dhātu***. Sometimes instead of dividing it into five parts, a sixth is posited, viz. the ***Āsuras*** who are comparable to the Greek titans, i.e., divine beings coarser than the higher divinities who jealously wrangle with their superiors. The Āsuras are sometimes placed below the human realm, and sometimes above it; sometimes they are included in the divine realms (though on the lowest rung), and sometimes they are completely ignored in the tabulations.

Even without the Āsuras, this fifth level is usually subdivided into six

regions, which from lowest to highest are:

[a] the realm of the four great kings (*caturmahārājakāyika;* P. *cātummahārājikā devaloka*)[48];

[b] The realm of the thirty-three gods (*Trāyastriṃśa,* P. *tāvatiṃsa*);

[c] The Yama realm (in Hinduism, Yama is the god of death);

[d] The realm of delight, i.e., *Tuṣita* heaven. This 'heaven' becomes most important in Yogācāra thinking, since it is considered the abode of Maitreya, the future Buddha who, according to tradition, dictated the Yogācāra sūtras to Asaṅga, Vasubandhu's half-brother, while Asaṅga visited Tuṣita through meditation.[49]

[e] The realm of gods who rejoice in their own creations (*Nirmāṇarati,* P. *nimmāṇarati*);

[f] The realm of gods who lord over the creations of others (*Paranirmatavaśavatin,* P. *paranimmitavasavatti*).

As pointed out, these five 'worlds' (*loka*) are accessible through rebirth and meditation. Since 'desire' may lead to propitious or inauspicious situations, Buddhists distinguish between two types of desire: *kusala* (beneficial) and *akusala* (non-beneficial, harmful). Morally and ethically these terms may also be rendered 'good' and 'bad', or 'wholesome' and 'unwholesome', etc.

Akusala-karma, constituted by and constitutive of akusala desires, results (*vipāka*) in the first three worlds (hells, animals and pretas); and kusala-karma results in the upper two worlds (human and kāmadeva). Of course, in practice this is an oversimplification, since in any of these realms some traces of the inverse karma (kusala or akusala) are also found, though perhaps temporarily latent.

It is interesting to note that these kinds of heavenly rebirths, no

matter how good (kusala) or noble the intent, are still considered to be within the desire-realm (*kāma-dhātu*), and hence relatively low-level accomplishments. Even the desire for Awakening or nirvāṇa may limit one to rebirth (i.e., the existential horizon toward which one's actions generate anticipations and expectations) in the desire-realm. Further, since all the realms into which one could be born are impermanent, as is one's duration within them, whatever transmigratory achievement one attains itself can only be temporary. As in ordinary life, success and failure dialectically grow out of each other. The nicer one's current life, the more attached one will become to it. Hence leaving that life – which is necessary since all the realms are impermanent and therefore one will eventually die and leave it – will be painful, and the inevitable pains of the subsequent life will seem, by contrast, that much more outrageous and frustrating. Conversely, to be 'upwardly mobile' transmigrationally necessarily involves desiring, to some extent, the pleasures of betterment and comfort. Hence even seeking betterment leads to the karmic trap of attachment to pleasure through desire. None of these realms, moreover, can guarantee absolute security, since they are impermanent. Since the movement from life to life, according to most Buddhist thought, is merely an extension of the movement from moment to moment within a life, this transmigratory schema should also (and some schools would argue primarily) be understood as a description of how the dynamics of one's current existential circumstance tends to predict and predispose one towards future existential circumstances, from moment to moment, hour to hour, day to day, year to year, and life to life.

As for the Maitreya heaven, the Tuṣita, one desired rebirth there in order to study Dharma directly with Maitreya and his retinue in order to advance toward the attainment of the complete Awakening which one could not reach in

the present life, and thus to return to earth with Maitreya when he returns as the next Buddha, at which time Awakening is guaranteed to all sentient beings. Maitreya is very much a Buddhist messianic figure.

B – ***Rūpa–dhātu*** is subdivided into either four or five levels.[50] Its significance is primarily meditational, though transmigratory fields are also associated with each of the levels.[51]

As meditational strata, each of the levels is defined by the conditions and factors which cause it to arise. That is, when certain specific conditions coalesce, a meditative level defined as the concurrence of those conditions occurs. Since these are important practices, one might expect that the literature would offer precise definitions. Unfortunately the Pāli Abhidhamma texts, notably the ***Dhammasaṅgaṇi*** and ***Vibhaṅga,*** differentiate between two models, one ascribed to the ***suttas*** and the other to the abhidhamma itself. These models differ precisely as to what factors constitute each level, i.e., their enumeration as to which conditions make up each level differs. Moreover, the conditions which the abhidhamma texts cite as representing the sutta version do not coincide with what is actually found in the suttas. The origin of the abhidhamma models and how they came to diverge from the original models of the suttas is unknown. Apparently by the time the Abhidhamma texts were codified, such supplementary models were practiced, common and accepted.[52]

Buddhaghosa, the great Theravādin codifier and commentator, who probably lived in the fourth or fifth century (ca. a century or more after Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, and ca. a century or two before Hsüan–tsang), opted for the abhidhammic version. Since his work, the ***Visuddhimagga,*** became the definitive Theravādin textbook for meditative practice, particularly as it applies to the ***rūpa–dhātu,*** to find a modern source that does not reiterate (sometimes blindly)

Buddhaghosa's conclusions is rare. Unfortunately this makes critical appraisals of this model, such as those by Rahula and Wayman[53], even rarer, since Buddhaghosa's late interpretations often impose an order and structure on the original texts not readily evident there.

Curiously, though the Sarvāstivādin and Yogācāra schools are usually described by scholars as abhidharmic in orientation, rather than sūtric, the rūpa–dhātu models found in both these schools are closer to the Pāli suttas than to the Abhidhamma.

What makes the abhidhammic version attractive is its neatness and symmetry. Each succeeding level consists in the dropping of conditions present in the immediately previous level. The sutta version is more ambiguous, and the Sarvāstivādin and Yogācāra texts which follow it closely are less symmetrical than Buddhaghosa's account.

Since an examination of the differences between these two models has already been commendably executed by others[54], we will only give a bare skeletal description here and refer the interested reader to those other works.

As to the Rūpa–dhātu divided into four levels (i.e., the sutta version), called ***jhānas*** (S. ***dhyāna,*** 'meditative situational contexts'), we may offer the following enumeration, going from lowest to highest:

1. The first dhyāna involves the following four components:

   (a) ***vitarka*** – initial mental application, i.e., initial intellectual investigative intent;

   (b) ***vicāra*** – subsequent discursive reasoning and thought, i.e., investigating what has been focused on by ***vitarka;***

   (c) ***pīti*** – intense joy; and

   (d) ***sukha*** – intense pleasure and happiness.[55]

2. The second dhyāna involves the subsiding (***vūpasamā***) of ***vitarka*** and ***vicāra*** which leads to

   (a) ***ajjhattaṃ sampasāda*** (S. ***adhyātmasamprasāda,*** inner serenity),

   (b) ***pīti,***

   (c) ***sukha*** and

   (d) ***cetaso ekodibhāvaṃ*** or ***cittassa ekaggatā*** (S. ***cittaikāgratā,*** one–pointedness of mind) arising through ***samādhi*** (meditative concentration).[56]

3. The third dhyāna consists of detaching (***virāgā***) from ***pīti*** (intense joy) leading to

   (a) ***upekkhā*** (S. ***upekṣā,*** equanimitous neutrality) implying neutrality between the pain and pleasure of ***vedanā*** previously discussed in the skandha and pratītya–samutpāda models,

   (b) ***sati*** (S. ***smṛti,*** recollective mindfulness),

   (c) ***sampajañña*** (S. ***samprajanya,*** discerning awareness) which the ***Vibhaṅga*** (p. 259) says is synonymous with ***paññā*** (S. ***prajñā***),

   (d) ***sukhañ ca kāyena paṭisaṃvedeti*** (S. ***kāya–sukha saṃveda,*** 'enjoying bodily happiness and pleasure'). This is paraphrased as "dwelling in equanimity, mindfulness and happiness".[57]

4. The fourth dhyāna climaxes the process by

   (a) abandoning (***pahānā***) both ***sukha*** and ***dukkha***, i.e., overcoming pleasure and pain,

   (b) and by eliminating (***atthaṅgamā***) enjoyment and unpleasantness (***somanassa domanassānaṃ***) one reaches

   (c) purified [vedanically] neutralized recollected–mindfulness (***upekkhā sati pārisuddhi***, S. ***upekṣā smṛti pāriśuddhi***).[58]

The neater, symmetrical fivefold scheme of the Abhidhamma organizes this as

follows[59]:

1st dhyāna	*vitaka*	*vicāra*	*pīti*	*sukha*	*ekaggatā*
2nd dhyāna	----	*vicāra*	*pīti*	*sukha*	*ekaggatā*
3rd dhyāna	----	----	*pīti*	*sukha*	*ekaggatā*
4th dhyāna	----	----	---	*sukha*	*ekaggatā*
5th dhyāna	----	----	---	*upekkhā*	*ekaggatā*

Whether we follow the fourfold scheme or the fivefold scheme, certain aspects remain constant. The dhyānas begin with an initial mental effort (*vitaka vicāra*) that is accompanied by pleasant feelings (*pīti sukha*). As the effort subsides, the intensity of the pleasurable feelings decreases until finally pleasure itself is sublimated into an equanimitous neutrality.

In a sense, the rūpa-dhātu is a formal abstraction from the kāma-dhātu. Whereas the latter operates as and through an appropriational desire predicated on and conditioned by vedanic experience (pleasure, pain, neutral), the former involves the neutralization of this conditioning. As the conative force becomes less emotive and affective, it becomes more intentional and formal. The charged appropriational milieu of kāma-dhātu gradually gives way to a clarified, purified (*suddha*) formal mental realm removed from pain and pleasure or sadness and delight (*dukkha sukha, domanassa somanassa*). The formula in the suttas for this stage is "by abandoning happiness and suffering (*sukha dukkha*), by the elimination of delight and sadness, [arises] the fourth *jhāna,* which is neither happiness nor suffering and which is clarified-purified equanimity and recollective-mindfulness." It is an alert, relaxed awareness thoroughly detached from positive and negative conditioning.[60]

We will return to this, but first we will outline the next realm.

C - ***Arūpa-dhātu*** - As stated previously, this realm involves the

progressive erasure of formal boundaries. As with the rūpa–dhātu the most commonly encountered interpretation of this realm is that advanced by Buddhaghosa in his ***Visuddhimagga***. In his account each of the four levels of the ***ārūpa–dhātu*** consists in taking its immediately antecedent level as an object, and becoming more and more rarified. His interpretation can be read as a kind of crude Hegelian ***aufhebung***, each level sequentially negating its immediate antecedent level while simultaneously retaining it as an objectified 'concept'.[61] Following his idea, I will offer a slightly different interpretation.

There is much ambivalence in Buddhist literature about the status of the ārūpa dhyānas. Without entering into the full web of these complexities, a few comments are in order. First, they are sometimes not treated as dhyānas of a distinct, arūpic realm, but as adjuncts or corollaries of the fourth (or fifth) dhyāna of the rūpa–dhātu. To be more precise, while the suttas enumerate them as ārūpa jhānas, the Pāli Abhidhamma considers them to be aspects of rūpa jhāna since the conditions which form them are identical to the (abhidhammic version of the) constitutive conditions of the fourth rūpa dhyāna (i.e., ***upekkhā*** and ***ekagattā***).[62] Secondly, while the rūpic dhyānas are considered necessary prerequisites for the ārūpic dhyānas, these latter are sometimes considered to be unnecessary, diverginary practices, useful perhaps for fully developing spiritual powers (especially the ***iddhis***[63] and ***abhiññā***[64]), but inconsequential in the pursuit of Awakening.

The four ārūpa dhyānas are:

1. ***Ākāśānantya*** (P. ***ākāsānañca*** or ***ākāsanañcāyatana***) – Gunaratana translates this as 'boundless space', while Guenther translates it 'infinite space'. Technically, ***anta*** means 'other' or 'side', and ***ananta*** means 'non–other' or 'not–otherwise'. ***Ananta*** also means 'without end', or 'without a side', hence

something 'ananta' would seem to be devoid of a limiting margin or absolute circumference. It is without bounds, without limits, infinitely present, a range non-obstructed on any side. As we shall see shortly, this seeming boundlessness actually temporarily inscribes that which seems boundless. Each of the boundless realms dissolves into another, more radical seemingly boundless realm. This shedding of horizonal margins finally leads to utter marginality, to an aporia or undecidability whose teetering locates itself in, or more accurately *as* a margin. This will be clearer presently.

Ākāśa does not really imply the common notion of 'space' which we usually oppose to 'time' (in Sanskrit, that would be ***deśa***); it is closer to the alchemical notion of ether, an all-pervading space-ness or spatiality *in which* space *per se* may be located. Thus ***ākāśānanta*** means that in which one is aware (***citta***) of ***ākāśa*** and nothing other than ***ākāśa***. Whereas rūpa signified 'resistance' and sensorial obstruction, i.e., what obstructs space such that two rūpic things may not occupy the same space, ***ākāśānanta*** unobstructedly opens out without circumference or center. It is ***ārūpa*** in the sense that it involves the background, or radical *Ganzfeld,* within which any formal, specific content may arise. It is the necessary condition for the arising of formal structures. In this sense, Guenther is justified in translating ***ārūpa*** as 'non-Gestalt'.[65] It simultaneously erases the formal realm (***rūpa–dhātu***) while presenting itself as the ground, or field of possibilities through which that realm comes to be constituted. Stated simply, the contents, images, sensations, and formal structures of the cathexic (***kāma–dhātu***) and the formal (***rūpa–dhātu***) realms dissolve into a non-conditioning neutrality and mental equanimity (***avyākta upekṣā***)[66] which itself engenders an awareness of the ethereal matrix through which those realms arise.

2. ***Vijñānānantya*** (P. ***viññāṇañca*** or ***viññāṇañcāyatana***) – Having become aware of ***ākāśa*** as the ubiquitous ground of the sensorium with its 'erotic' and formal characteristics, ***ākāśa*** itself becomes emptied, revealing the ground on which it arises, namely 'nothing–other than (***ananta***) consciousness (***vijñāna***)'.

In terms of Yogācāra, it should be noted that had Yogācāra indeed wished to present itself as an idealism, basing all 'reality' in the mind, it would have chosen to call its philosophy ***vijñānānanta*** and not ***vijñapti–mātra***. While the former term carries a positive connotation *vis–à–vis* the presence of 'consciousness', the latter is more negative and ironical, as we will argue later. Since the model of the ārūpa–dhātu clearly indicates that becoming aware of the ubiquity of consciousness is an important, but nonetheless *transitive* experience, Yogācāra would be in violation of basic Buddhist doctrine if it held to the position that 'consciousness alone' is real. One of the points I will strive to prove in the course of this work is that Yogācāra, at least in the forms advocated by Vasubandhu and Hsüan–tsang, in no way attempted to violate basic Buddhist doctrine nor did it contemplate any form of idealism.

This stage involves the awareness of the fact that wherever awareness occurs, such that it may (dis–)locate itself anywhere, awareness is always within or of consciousness. While 'things' may be located in ***ākāśa,*** which stands for the raw possibilities of the arising of things[67], ***ākāśa*** itself is always located in consciousness, i.e., it is always *of* experience. Hence the ubiquity of consciousness should be understood as phenomenological, not metaphysical.

3. ***Akiṃcanya*** (P. ***ākiñcañña*** or ***akiñcaññāyatana***) – If ***ākāśa*** underpins the structures by which we perceive the world(s), and that in turn is underpinned by consciousness, what underpins consciousness? ***Akiṃcanya*** means 'nothing'. Notice the suffix ***–ananta*** ('nothing–other') is absent from the title of this

dhyāna, since this 'nothing' is not an antipode to 'being', but rather the radical erasure against which any comparison would be absurd. It is a nothing which cannot be construed, even formally, such that anything might be compared to it. At the same moment, as erasure and as a radical underpinning, it secures all that is not nothing, but *through* nothing. It is not "nothingness".

Nonetheless this 'nothing' can be understood as implying death, i.e., the possibility of not-being. Consciousness, far from being ubiquitous and eternal, exists only within the parameters of its possibility of not existing. Existentially, the margin of consciousness is death or its own radical contingency.

Buddha is said to have engaged in a battle of wits with the god Brahma while sitting under the Bodhi-tree seeking Awakening. Brahma accused Buddha of arrogance and of having an inflated sense of self-importance since he (Buddha) believed he could solve the riddle of *duḥkha* and thereby save others. As a mere mortal he didn't even measure up to the puniest of gods. Buddha responded, "You, Brahma, are considered a great God indeed. You are said to be eternal, immortal, beginningless and endless. Is that true?" Brahma answered, "I am eternal." Buddha then asked, "Can you choose *not* to be?" Brahma, proudly, reiterates, "No; I am eternal." Buddha then said, "Then I am greater than you, since I can choose not to be."

In one sense, this exemplifies a profound application of the Buddhist rejection of essentialism. As one delves deeper and deeper into the perceptual roots of experience, into the conditionality which constitutes it, no essence is found. The structures of experience continually dissolve into more basic structures until even the matrices through which those structures arise also dissolves. This implies, amongst many other things, a radical contingency to

the Buddhist notion of conditionality. Without essences, there can also be no necessary causes, but only contingent conditions which within the parameters of a given structure (*loka*) function ineluctably. This contingency is the hinge allowing freedom and liberation *within* and not *from* conditions. The 'nothing' is not that freedom, but the simultaneous acknowledgement and emptying of contingency.

This nothing should not be construed as a 'void', much less a 'void-essence'. In language which sounds more like Mahāyānic Yogācāra than the Theravādin tradition it actually represents, Buddhaghosa's *Visuddhimagga* states:[68]

> [By paying] attention to the non-existence (*abhāva*), emptiness (*suññata*), and isolated mental-image (*vivittākāra*) of that same consciousness belonging to the base (*āyatana*) consisting of nothing-other than *ākāśa* which became the object of the base of nothing-other than consciousness

the meditator reaches the dhyāna of nothing. Here Buddhaghosa's primitive notion of *aufhebung* is clearly apparent, as is his use of important Mahāyānic terms such as *suññata* (S. *śūnyatā*) and *vivitta* (S. *vivikta*).[69]

The Pāli term *akiñcañña* can be taken as containing the root *–aññā* (knowing), hence signifying that this nothing is known. Conversely if the term *kiñcañña* is taken to mean 'known thing', then the *a–* prefix would render this 'no-known-thing'.[70] For Buddhism, *ākiñcañña* involves the (positive) cognition of the (negative) 'emptied' aspects of the cognizing consciousness. Etymologically it implies the absence of any cognition whatsoever. In a moment we will see that this etymological impasse may indeed be intentional, since the next dhyāna capitalizes on the ambivalence.

Having achieved this penultimate 'nothing', which consists of emptying

out all the previous dhyānas and lokas of any content whatsoever, including anything resembling 'objective' or 'subjective' poles (the ākāśa and vijñāna realms, respectively), one is prepared to embark on the final dhyāna, one marked as radical marginality itself. We will see later how this sequence of first emptying the objective pole, then the subjective pole (including consciousness itself), finally opening to an Awakened, non-polarized realization, is maintained to the letter in Yogācāra.

4. ***Naivasaṃjñānāsaṃjñā*** (P. ***nevasaññā nāsaññāyatana***) – Neither with nor without associative thinking (***saṃjñā***), this level sometimes also explicitly mentions ***vedana***, i.e., neither vedana nor non-vedanā, though sometimes that is construed as a separate, fifth ārūpa level. The ***Vibhaṅga*** describes this as:[71]

> By completely surmounting the base consisting of 'nothing' he enters and dwells in the base consisting of neither ***saññā*** nor ***asaññā***.

Straddling the margins of thinking and non-thinking, of contentful and contentless awareness, of aware and unaware, this sphere of meditative activity bristles with the deconstructive dynamics of what Derrida has called "the trace".[72] To flesh this out, let us first see how Buddhaghosa interprets this phase, and then examine it.

Gunaratana offers the following reading of Buddhaghosa:[73]

> The [fourth ārupya] ***jhāna*** receives this name [reading ***nevasaññā nāsaññā*** as 'neither perception nor non-perception'] because on the one hand it lacks gross perception and on the other retains a subtle perception. Lacking gross perception, it cannot perform the decisive function of perception – the clear discernment of objects – and thus cannot be said to have perception (***neva saññā***). But yet this attainment retains an extremely subtle perception and thus cannot be said to be without perception (***nasaññā***). To make plain this ambivalent character of the ***jhāna*** it is named "the base of neither perception nor non-perception." Because perception as well as the other mental factors such as feeling [***vedanā***], consciousness, contact [***phassa***], and the rest, continue here reduced to the finest subtlety this

jhāna is also named "the attainment with residual formations" (***saṅkhārasesa samāpatti***).

> ...A novice smeared a bowl with oil and an elder monk asked him to bring the bowl to serve gruel. The novice replied, "Venerable sir, there is oil in the bowl." Then the monk told him, "Bring the oil, novice, I shall fill the oil tube." Thereupon the novice said: "There is no oil, Venerable sir." In this tale what the novice said is true in both cases: there is no oil since there is not enough to fill the tube yet there is no utter absence of oil since some remains at the base of the bowl. Similarly, in this attainment perception cannot be said to be fully present since it is so subtle that it cannot perform the decisive function of perceiving; yet it cannot be said to be absent since it remains in residual form. [square brackets mine]

But isn't there a difference between "there is no [oil]" and "there is not enough [oil]"? Wouldn't Buddhaghosa's example imply that ***asaṃjñā*** is an overstatement, that in fact there is no absence of ***saṃjñā*** but only a diminution of its functioning? Could the tension evoked by juxtaposing ***saṃjñā*** and ***asaṃjñā*** have been proposed so carelessly by the early Buddhists? What is the purpose of this paradoxical tension?

Buddhaghosa 'solves' the paradox by proposing two types of perception: (i) gross perception (P^1), or perception proper, which is defined as 'discerning objects', and (ii) subtle perception (P^2), in which no objects appear, but nonetheless certain functions continue to operate[74], in particular, the operations of embodied–conditioning (***saṃskāra, saṅkhāra***). This is clever, but glosses the radical nature of this dhyāna. It is as if Buddhaghosa is saying that ***saññā,*** along with the other nāmic skandhas (***vedanā, viññāṇa,*** and the typical abhidhammic substitution of ***phassa*** for ***rūpa***), are put on hold, or standby. 'Perception' is ***on,*** but not functioning as usual. He has reduced the tension between ***saññā*** and ***asaññā*** to the status of a hyperbolic expression denoting 'subtle saññā', a ***saññā*** so faint that it can barely be called ***saññā***. In fact, following his reasoning, it should be called ***saṅkhāra,*** which is an entirely different skandha! Moreover, his

logic, which implies that two contradictories can both be true if viewed within different contexts, is reminiscent of Jaina logic (in particular, their notion of ***anekāntavāda***) rather than Buddhist logic.

His analogy of residual oil also raises problems. Rather than splitting perception into two types, such that this dhyāna consists of P^2 while P^1 is absent -- which implies (a) that normal perception consists of $P^1 + P^2$, (b) something, which remains unclear, has rent them asunder, (c) that an objectless subjectivity continues to function in P^2 even without P^1, (d) that the notion of ***phassa*** (S. ***sparśa***) makes sense without an object[76], and (e) that ***asaṃjñā*** does not really mean ***asaṃjñā*** -- it would be better to say there is no P^1 vs. P^2 dichotomy.

To maintain Buddhaghosa's explanation one would have to respond to the following problems: (1) Why should there be two such thoroughly different cognitive functions bearing the same name ***saññā*** ? (2) Isn't there a difference between 'subtle saññā' and 'the absence of saññā'? Don't the differences merit clear terminological distinctions? Isn't there a difference between 'no oil' and 'not enough oil'? (3) What has rent these two types of ***saññā*** asunder, and why? Also how was this accomplished cognitively? (4) If, as virtually every Buddhist text argues, in the absence of a cognitive-subject no cognitive-object arises, and in the absence of a cognitive-object no cognitive-subject can arise, what are the grounds for asserting that in this dhyāna such a cognitive impossibility occurs? (5) Similarly, if ***phassa*** is defined as the contact-point of the sensory interchange between a cognitive-subject and a cognitive-object (as every Buddhist would define it), the notion of an objectless ***phassa*** is equally impossible and absurd.

This dhyāna neither consists of P^1 nor does it lack P^1, nor is it other than P^1. Each of the ārūpya dhyānas constituted itself as if it were 'boundless' or 'infinite', only to be exposed by the subsequent dhyāna as circumscribed by a

horizon, a closure. Ākāśa seemed limitless until it was exposed as a mere horizon within consciousness. Likewise consciousness seemed limitless until its circumscriptive closure was revealed by the 'nothing' which contingently conditions it. This nothing now also is shown to be a closure, an inversion of the foundations of experience which, as an inversion, is entirely dependent upon and relative to those foundations. This last dhyāna, by remaining on the margins between a cognitively constructed world and that world's 'un-structing', establishes a deconstructive (de + con + struction) circuit which marks the extreme limits of that margin as well as the ability of that margin to perpetually fold over into itself. It opens the closure, not by going elsewhere, but by making the margin fluid.

We shall see in a later chapter that this sequence – viz. (i) grappling with the confusion caused by not recognizing that so-called objective referents are actually projections of consciousness (***parikalpita***), (ii) that consciousness itself is constituted by a contingent conditionality (***paratantra***), which (iii) if conceived as an appropriational, substantive conditionality, needs to be effaced through the radical negation of the referents and procedures which produce and reify it (***pariniṣpanna***), resulting in (iv) a conditionality marked by the absence of (i) in (ii) as a middle-way (***paratantra***) – reasserts itself as the ***tri-(a-)svabhāva*** doctrine in Yogācāra. Hence I am proposing a thematic continuity between the ārūpya model and the trisvabhāva model as follows: (1) ***ākāśānantya*** vis-à-vis parikalpita; (2) ***vijñānānantya*** vis-à-vis paratantra; (3) ***akiṃcanya*** vis-à-vis pariniṣpanna; (4) ***naivasaṃjñānāsaṃjñā*** vis-à-vis 'corrected' paratantra.[76]

Before turning to the last of the four models, some final remarks about the tri-dhātu model are in order. First, true to the Buddhist tendency towards a middle way, it is the middle dhātu, i.e., the rūpa-dhātu, rather than the 'highest'

(i.e., ārūpa) dhātu, which is considered the most important for Awakening. This valuation is reinforced by the description of Buddha's death given in the Pāli ***Mahāparinibbāna sutta.***[77] Buddha ascends through the rūpa–jhānas, then the five (!) ārūpa–jhānas, then descends back down to the beginning of the rūpa–dhātu again, and then begins to reascend.[78] When he reaches the last rūpa–jhāna, but not having re–entered the ārūpa–jhānas, he passes on into Nibbāna. These three dhātus or lokas together make up virtually the entire horizon of sentient experience. Whatever is of the world or in the world is ***lokiya*** (mundane). But Buddhism developed a vocabulary for breaking out of this closure. The highest attainments and Nirvāṇa itself were considered ***lokuttara*** (supra–mundane). These highest attainments (***samāpatti***), like Buddha's entry into Nirvāṇa, tended to be located near the upper margin of the rūpa–dhātu.

Since Buddha himself, according to the tradition, entered Nirvāṇa through this methodology, its importance for Buddhist praxis was assured.

Noteworthy implications of the tridhātu model for Yogācāra include:

(1) the initial domain in which the human condition is located (***kāma–dhātu***) operates by a conative, affective economy. What here comes under the rubric of ***kāma*** (eros) will be repeated in Yogācāra vocabulary as the 'noetic–noemic appropriational economy' (***grāhaka–grāhya–upadāna***). Yogācāra analysis begins and ends with this economy. The bulk of one's ethical and moral practice occurs on this level. Hence even the provisional goal of experientially acquiring access to Maitreya's Tuṣita Heaven remains within this sphere.

(2) The appropriational problematic is ameliorated and gradually removed through meditation and the development of a formal, mental 'equalization' (***upekṣa***). What here has been labelled ***rūpa*** will become explicitly a matter of mental reductionism in Yogācāra. As we shall see, this transition is merely the

fruition of factors already at play in Buddhist thought prior to Yogācāra.

(3) Yogācāra will reinforce that the search for substrata inevitably gives way to a realization of 'marginality'. As *vijñāna* (consciousness) serves as a substratum for spatiality, it itself is contextualized by a 'nothing' which exposes its contingency. The context for that contingency is an indeterminable aporia between the presence and absence of *saṃjñā* and *vedanā*. If we follow Buddhaghosa's synonym, this margin involves *saṃskāra* (*saṅkhārasesa samāpatti*). Thus four of the five skandhas reconverge in the ārūpa-dhātu, which explicitly involves the mental search for horizonal roots produced by separating from *rūpa*. This erasure, whose marginality eclipses consciousness as well, finally hinges on the excess: what remains, and what does not. The term *vijñapti-mātra* will also invoke the same marginality. It, too, signifies a non-substrative margin which constitutes the ultimate human horizon.

To sum up, the human condition locates itself within three existential horizons, or regions (borrowing the term from Husserl) with multiple horizons: a cathexic region, a formal/structural region, and a region which discloses its horizons as marginality. None of these regions or horizons are ontologically prior to their denizens, nor do they survive without them. Each is entirely and utterly constituted by actions and the consequences of actions (karma). Both the horizons and those who occupy them are constituted through action, and have no other ontological status.

Thus it is not surprising that the later Indian Buddhist schools considered efficient causality (*kāraṇa, karoti*) to be the only valid criterion for determining the 'realness' of something. Efficacy, not 'existence', determines reality. Hence even a delusion which 'works', i.e., which functions, is 'real'; and *as real* as any other concrete, empirical event, which itself must be measured

(*pramāṇa*) against the efficacy criterion. Thus in the seminal Yogācāra text, ***Madhyānta-vibhāga,*** the ***abhūta-parikalpa*** ('that which schematically constructs and attaches to what is not actually there') is taken as a ubiquitous cognitive ground. The ***Lotus Sutra's*** theory of ***upāya*** derives from the same criterion.

Here, perhaps more radically than we see in Husserl, the noetic-noemic intentional process constitutes 'ontology'; it is not merely a 'reduction' or system of reductions from ontology. Thus for Buddhism, ontology is always and everywhere nothing but an epistemological construction, constituted through action and/as cognition. Buddhism is thus concerned with Seeing, not Being.

In the first horizon/region (kāma-dhātu), cognition is primarily conative. In the second (rūpa-dhātu), conation decreases as cognition becomes increasingly formal, until it reaches a point where the conative thrust is utterly neutralized. In the third (ārūpa-dhātu), cognition seeks the limits of its own presuppositions. Realizing that presuppositionlessness is itself a presupposition, that it simultaneously produces and derives from other presuppositions, the middle way, as marginal trace, is/isn't cognized. Insofar as the delving into the ārūpa-dhātu was predicated on a search for cognitive grounds or origins, it results in the aporetic conclusion that the 'origin' is, in fact, a trace (***saṃskāra***).[79]

Two Zen accounts should help us put the theory of the 'Three Worlds' into proper Buddhist perspective. The first offers a reminder that one should be careful about adopting or clinging to any ontologies or cosmologies:[80]

> Sato-Kaiseki was very much disturbed by the implications of Copernicus' heliocentric theory, which, of course, was inconsistent with the old Buddhist cosmology in which Mount Sumeru occupies the center of the universe. He reasoned that if the Buddhist view of the cosmos proved false, the triple world [***tri-dhātu***] ... would be reduced to nonsense, resulting in the negation of Buddhism itself. Immediately he set about writing a book in defense of the Mount Sumeru position, sparing himself no effort as a champion of Buddhism.

> When he had finished the work, he took it at once to Master Ekido (1805–1879, Soto) and presented it to him triumphantly. After leafing through only the first few pages, however, the master thrust the book back and, shaking his head, said, "How stupid! Don't you realize that the basic aim of Buddhism is to shatter the triple world...? Why stick to such worthless things and treasure Mount Sumeru? Blockhead!"
>
> Dumbfounded, Kaiseki shoved the book under his arm and went quickly home.

Lin–chi (Jp: Rinzai), drawing on what Buddhism considers the three fundamental roots of ***duḥkha*** – viz. ***rāga*** (appropriational intent, passionate drives), ***dveṣa*** (aversion, hatred, despising) and ***moha*** (misconception, mental confusion) – existentializes the ***tri–dhātu*** and drives the basic point home.[81]

> From everywhere you have come here; all of you eagerly seek the Buddha, the Dharma, and deliverance; you seek to escape the Three Worlds. You foolish people, if you get out of the Three Worlds, where then can you go? The Buddhas and patriarchs are only phrases of adoration. Do you want to know the Three Worlds? They do not differ from the sensation of your listening to the Dharma now! One of your passionate urges, however fleeting, is the world of desire. A momentary anger is the world of form. And a second's foolish ignorance is the formless world. These are the furniture of your own house. The Three Worlds do not of themselves proclaim: We are the Three Worlds! Followers of the Way, it is the one clearly manifested and lively before your eyes, who perceives, weighs and measures the Three Worlds, and it is he who puts names to them.

With the move to the next model, we will have completed a transition from theory to practice: the skandha and pratītya–samutpāda models entailing primarily theoretic aspects for practice, while the tri–dhātu and śīla–samādhi–prajñā models are primarily emphasizing the practical side of theory. All four together indicate the spectrum of Buddhist praxis.

IV – ***Śīla–samādhi–prajña*** (P. ***sīla–samādhi–paññā***)

The trialectic interrelationship of 'behavioral discipline' (***sīla***), 'mental

training through meditation' (*samādhi*) and 'cognitive acuity' (*prajñā*) forms the bedrock of Buddhist praxis. Their relationship is trialectic since as one endeavors to improve within one aspect, the other two automatically are involved and improve as well. The relation between the three is not isomorphic, but rather one of mutual influence.

For instance, progress made through behavioral discipline (śīla), such as gaining control over one's eating habits, necessarily involves focusing one's attention (samādhi) on the variety of food types, the types and intensities of one's hungers and thirsts, the conditions by which and surrounded by which one eats, etc. This then develops insight (prajñā) into the confluence of conditions we call 'eating habits' (the karma of eating). Further, as one's insight increases, the efficacy with which one implements the behavioral discipline and mentally observes and analyzes its conditions and consequences likewise improves. As discipline improves, so do meditation and insight. As meditation improves, so does discipline and insight. As insight improves, so will discipline and meditation. Thus one must make an effort in all three areas, knowing that accomplishments in any one area will prove beneficial in the others, which in turn will facilitate further accomplishments in all three.

Scholars sometimes translate śīla as 'morality' because it involves not only a general sense of behavioral discipline, but it frequently signifies specific ethical injunctions and guidelines. The monastic rules and the rules for the laity, codified by the various schools in their respective *Vinaya* (the section of the canon dealing with the rules for the Saṅgha, i.e., the Buddhist 'community') and *Prātimokṣa*[82] (initially a section of the *Vinaya* which came to signify the monastic rules themselves, particularly as ritually expressed), came under the rubric of śīla.

In this moralistic sense śila may be simplistically reduced to either the so-called 'Five Precepts' for laypeople (*pañca-śīla*) or to what has sometimes been called the Buddhist Ten Commandments[83], the ***daśa-kuśala-karma-patha,*** 'the Tenfold Path of Advantageous Karma/Actions'.

The Five Precepts are abstain from (i) destroying life, (ii) stealing, (iii) adultery, (iv) lying, and (v) intoxicating drinks. The Five Precepts are expanded in the Tenfold Path of Advantageous Karma/Actions, which are expressed in negative and positive forms.

The negatives are: (i) don't kill, (ii) don't steal, (iii) refrain from sexual misconduct,[84] (iv) don't lie, (v) refrain from harsh speech,[85] (vi) backbiting,[86] (vii) and frivolous speech,[87] (viii) don't covet, (ix) refrain from malice or dishonest acts, and (x) relinquish wrong views.

The positive version is: [1] the three bodily (***kāya***) advantageous activities, viz. (i) saving lives, (ii) giving, and (iii) sexual propriety; [2] the four verbal (***vāc***) advantageous activities, viz. (iv) truthfulness, (v) reconciling disputes, (vi) gentle speech, (vii) speech conducive to Dharma; and [3] the three mental (***manas***) advantageous activities, viz. (viii) compassionate attitude, (ix) generous attitude, and (x) right views.

Since karma is defined as the activities of body, speech and mind, this program is designed to utterly reshape the manner in which karma is produced and, by extension, its consequences. In other words, śila involves a comprehensive program aimed at intercepting and reconstructing human actions (karma), particularly in respect to the recurrency process of habitualization. Since the criteria by which the value and implementation of such changes involve the systematic analysis of what constitutes an acting person, here, quite clearly, the philosophical, epistemological, psychological, soteric and ethical dimensions of

Buddhism converge.

Also noteworthy is the importance given to language and its usage in these cardinal rules. Rules (iv) through (vii) of the negative version explicitly involve speech acts, and others, such as (ix) and (x), imply them. In the positive version again (iv) through (vii) are explicitly associated with speech (*vāc*), while language and its functioning is implicit in most of the others. Language serves as a medium between bodily and mental acts, i.e., it mediates and interrelates thought and deed. Language is neither the ground of thought or action, nor does it simply derive from them. It is the communicative medium between them; and still it functions in its own sphere as well.

The relative importance of each of the three, viz. body, speech and mind, was apparently a matter of dispute in Buddha's day. Ergardt[88] offers the following summary of such a dispute in the ***Majjhima Nikāya*** I:371–378:

> The debate starts on a controversial point concerning the problem of kamma. Whereas the Buddha talks about the neutral concept of kamma as connected with body, speech, and mind (*kāya, vacī, mano*) with mind as the most important, the Jainas talk about the more ethically readymade concept of daṇḍa, which contains something of activities worthy of penalty, of which they regard activities of body (*kāyadaṇḍa*) as more important than speech and mind.

It is interesting that here Buddhism is already espousing an ethical criterion which did not emerge in the West, including Jewish and Islamic medieval Jurisprudence, until more than a thousand years later. While the Jains are arguing that one's 'actions' (karma) must be judged by what we in fact bodily do, Buddha is claiming the criterion of 'intention' (manas) is even more important. Thus the Jains (and many in the West) were hard put to differentiate between accidentally killing someone or something and doing so intentionally ("with premeditation"). As a consequence, Jains structured their activities around avoiding the accidental

harming or killing of any embodied *jīvas* (living, omniscient forces) which they believed resided in virtually everything. While Buddhists also frowned on unintentionally harming things, they put more emphasis on rooting out the desire and intention to harm. Interception of the karmic problematic could be facilitated by 'neutralizing' (*upekṣa*) the conditioning extremeties of pleasure and pain, or reward and punishment, though eventually even this neutrality must be overcome. Technically, unintentional harming may not even carry any karmic significance -- it may simply be *krīya*, 'sheer action devoid of moral or ethical significance'. On the other hand, intentional harming, in fact *any* intentional act, always carries karmic significance. Later Buddhists even went so far as to claim that intentions which do not show themselves in action are karmic and material (*rūpa*).[89]

Along with these 'ten' rules, laymen and women were expected to honor over a hundred additional rules, and the monks and nuns had to comply with over a hundred extra rules beyond those required of the laity.[90]

The degree to which śila or various specific śilic rules were considered provisional or indispensable has been a bone of contention between Buddhist schools almost from Buddhism's inception.[91] The *Mahā-parinibbāna sutta* records this famous utterance, one of the last uttered by Buddha[92]: "When I am gone, Ānanda, let the Saṅgha, if it so wish, abolish all the lesser and minor precepts." Unfortunately there seemed to be no consensus as to which of the precepts were major and which were minor. Subsequently, the Second Council, which convened about a century after Buddha's death, instituted the first major Buddhist schism, the Mahāsāṅghikas or 'popularist majority' group splitting off from the Sthaviras or 'Elders'. The issues on which these groups conflicted revolved around relaxing the precepts.[93] Eventually different sects developed their own Vinaya.[94] Occasionally tendencies arose within Mahāyāna to jettison śila

altogether (e.g., some Mādhyamika thought and certain strains within Zen).[95]

However Śīla should not be confined strictly to rules, ethical or otherwise. These rules are merely guidelines to help one comprehend and comprehensively reconstitute the processes through which one acts. Action (karma), methodically and methodologically reconstituted, precisely is Buddhist soterics or Mārga (path or method).

Samādhi includes not only the dhyānas described earlier, but a vast score of practices from basic mindfulness (*smṛti*) of inhaling and exhaling, taking constant cognizance of what one is doing at every moment,[96] etc., to elaborate mental visualizations and sonorisations, such as tantric maṇḍala and yantra meditations[97] and mantras and dhāraṇi.[98]

Samādhi can be etymologically derived from ***sama*** (the same, equalized, the convergence of two distinct things based on some commonality) + ***adhi*** (an emphatic, meaning something like 'higher', 'better', or 'most skillfully achieved'). Thus samādhi signifies the skillful unification of mind and object, or the mental equanimity conducive to and derived from attention perfectly focused on its object. Hence it is sometimes treated as synonymous with ekacitta, 'one-focused mind', i.e., mind (citta) completely focused on and at one (eka) with its object. As such, every act of perception or cognition involves some degree of samādhi or meeting of mind and object; though usually this 'unity' is obscured by a host of distractions and diversionary conditions. As a technical term, then, Buddhists use samādhi only for those cognitions in which the diversionary conditions have been minimized or eliminated.

It can also be derived from ***sam*** (to bring together) + ***ādhi*** (to place on, put, to impregnate, to give, to receive). In this sense, samādhi signifies the bringing together of cognitive conditions such that the mind is impregnated, or

becomes the locus of the economy of those conditions. In this sense, the mind is not only the giver and receiver of the confluence of cognitive cognitions, but it is also understood as impregnated by and bringing to term deep seeded conditions.[99] Samādhi, then, involves bringing the buried latencies or saṃskāras into full view. The obscure and hidden become clear objects of cognition. This etymology also implies that samādhi itself may be the act of impregnation, the planting of advantageous (kuśala) seeds through unificatory mental practice. Meditation then is the womb through which insight is born. Cognitive acuity emerges from mental discipline.

In the threefold schema of śīla–samādhi–prajñā the term samādhi also implies the entire range of ***bhāvanā,*** or 'mental cultivation'. Etymologically linked with the term ***bhāva,*** bhāvanā at once invokes a sense of process, becoming (cf. #10 of ***pratītya–samutpāda***) as well as an uncovering of things (***bhāva***) as they are.[100] Like śīla, bhāvanā proceeds programmatically. Centered on the moment of actual experience, bhāvanā is methodical real–ization, i.e., training which actualizes a method. It becomes a kind of experiential laboratory through which one focuses on the components of embodied experience while deconstructing that embodiment. Each school defines the structure and steps of the Mārga in terms of the order and procedures that school deems necessary.[101] Texts such as Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa,* Maitreya and Asaṅga's *Yogācārabhūmi* and Buddhaghosa's *Visuddhimagga* illustrate how Buddhists could develop elaborate edifices to explicate the specifics of their methods/mārga in detail.

Samādhi also includes the samāpattis or specific meditational attainments, the most important of which are ***asaṃjñi–samāpatti*** and ***nirodha–samāpatti.***

The first signifies a temporary experience wherein the saṃskāric forces

which flow continuously from one moment to the next, giving one a sense of continuous existence, are arrested and disrupted. The consciousness stream (*santāna*) temporarily stops, perhaps for a few seconds or a few hours (cf. our discussion of *asaṃjña* in the ārūpa-dhātu). This is, according to some texts, the first experience of the disruption of karmic continuity. Since it is temporary, karmic continuity has not been terminated, but merely interrupted.

Nirodha-samāpatti involves the uncovering and termination of those embodied factors (*kleśa, āsava,* etc.) which allow present experience to condition future experience. The citta, or 'apperceptive vector', disappears for the duration of this samāpatti, though it re-emerges at its completion. That citta re-emerges signifies that though present conditioning had been temporarily suspended, past conditioning still harbors causal efficacy and thus future conditioning continues. Experientially, though, this samāpatti marks an important occasion, since it offers a preliminary taste and insight into the climactic *nirodha,* or 'cessation' which marks the utter elimination of conditionality (*saṃskṛta*).[102] Awakening, in this context, signifies the extinction of those proclivities which engender present and future conditioning. Post-Awakening consists merely of burning off the residue of past conditioning, since no new conditioning can be produced. However, as we will see later, Yogācāra offers a major contribution to Mahāyānic praxis by introducing a post-Awakening program for the Bodhisattva, one which infuses post-Awakening existence with positive epistemic, soteric and ethical dimensions.

The notion of nirodha-samāpatti raised several important practical and logical dilemmas which we will deal with later, since these dilemmas were major contributing factors to Vasubandhu's move to Yogācāra from Sarvāstivāda and Sautrāntika.[103]

Like śīla, samādhi enacts a methodological assault on karmic

conditioning. Since conditioning arises through conditions, and according to Buddhism these conditions are always conditions of and in experience (i.e., Buddhism denies the existence of any non-experiential metaphysical factors), the analysis, insight and elimination of karmic conditioning must occur within the locus of experience. Just as the mind is known through the mind (***citte cittānupassī viharati***) and thereby liberated (***cetovimutti***), so is experience understood through experience (***paṭisaṃvedeti***) and thereby de-conditioned (***asaṅkhata*** [S. ***asaṃskṛta***] = ***vimoceti***).[104]

To be more precise, Buddhism argues against the existence of any factors, metaphysical or otherwise, which are not, at least in principle, capable of being experienced. It might be instructive to indicate here how the Buddhist position differs from Berkeley's *immaterialism*.

Berkeley argued that "*esse* is *percipi*",[105] that is, that the "being" or essence of things is "to be perceived"[106], since nothing can be conceived apart from someone's cognition of it.[107] In other words, perceptibility serves as the criterion of existence, or as he puts it, "ideas" and the "minds" or "spirits" which are the agents of these ideas are the only "real things" which exist.[108] For Berkeley 'ideas' are not mere ephemeral mental abstractions, but the concrete sensorial perceptions by which we know our world, and by which we find ourselves in a world. To the question, 'How can you know that a certain swiss chalet exists, if you are not presently perceiving it, or perhaps have never personally perceived it?', Berkeley would argue,[109] 'It exists because even if and when I or you fail to perceive it, God perceives it.'[110]

The Buddhists would revise Berkeley's argument to say: the 'swiss chalet' exists, not because God (whom no one perceives) is perceiving it, but because, given the proper conditions, that chalet is perceivable. 'Proper conditions'

would include a perceiving subject with adequate sense organs, sufficient light or sensory media, an actual chalet, adequate proximity of sensor to sensed, etc. Again, even the most specialized and rare meditative experiences, such as the advanced samāpattis, are considered to be real because, like the chalet, even if you or I are not perceiving them at present, given the right conditions (adequate training, etc.), we would perceive them. If we undergo adequate training, or establish the necessary conditions, and still do not perceive the intended object, then, by Buddhist standards, we would be perfectly justified in declaring that no such thing exists. Implicit in this demand is the fact that the so-called necessary conditions must be explicit. In other words, for the formula 'given conditions Q, R necessarily obtains', Q must be sufficiently explicit so that the fulfilment or non-fulfilment of Q would not be in question. For instance, given proximity, operational eyesight and light, any chalet in front of me should be visible. Failing to see a chalet, granting the presence of those conditions, leads to the unavoidable conclusion that no chalet exists in front of me. Likewise, the conditions given which unusual cognitions such as the samāpattis obtain must also be explicitly layed out, and the tradition has, therefore, devoted a substantial literature to addressing this, though not without controvesy or ambiguity, as we will later discover.

Having said this, we must immediately qualify this and point out that, in fact, not everything is deemed as directly experiential, and that therefore Buddhists also allow for inference as a provider of correct knowledge. In general, Buddhists would however claim that a logical proof which either assumes, uses or concludes something non-experiential is necessarily a false inference. Every part of a syllogism must be capable of being perceived, given proper conditions. Nonetheless, things such as aging, impermanence, time, numericality, the relation

of birth to death, etc. are not directly perceived, though cognizable through inferences based on actual perceptions.[111]

While change (*pariṇāma, vipariṇāma*) and relations (causal, formal, etc.) normally are not directly perceived, but only known through inference, Buddhists, by claiming that directly seeing *pratītya-samutpāda* is a necessary ingredient of Awakening, are in effect claiming that Awakening involves *a direct experience of change and relations* (though how this alters what then is understood by change and relations is a matter of some dispute between the different schools). The implications of the Buddhist claim that relations can be objects of direct perception has received little or no attention by modern scholars. The classic texts, as well, neglect to offer extensive discussions on this topic. Once Buddhist epistemology accepted the Sautrāntika notion of *kṣaṇika* (momentariness), the implicit ontological discontinuity of the resulting systems made such an examination of the perception of relations and change superfluous.

It is important to note here as well that 'perceptibility' in a Buddhist context does not mean private, personal perception, but public, or better put, 'intersubjective' perception. Since the Buddhists felt compelled to account for the karmic efficacy of one's personal thoughts and decisions even when they were not apparent to others (e.g., having the desire to injure someone while 'on the surface' appearing completely cordial), some, such as the Theravādins and Vaibhāṣikas, developed a material (rūpic) category to act as a conduit for these 'private' karmic conditions, called *avijñapti-rūpa*. We will look at this notion more carefully later.

Samādhi provides the methodology and context within which experience is to be examined, which is to say, the situation in which experience examines itself. Samādhi, by training, focusing/collecting, cleansing and calming the mind (*cittabhāvana, cittaṃ ṭhapetabbaṃ/samāhitaṃ cittaṃ, cittaṃ paṭivāpeti, cittaṃ*

paṭipassaddha, etc.), by examining the mind through the mind (***citte cittānupassī viharati***) and observing dharmas through dharmas (***dhammesu dhammānupassī viharati***), facilitates things being finally known (***jānāti***) and seen (***passati***) just as they are (***tathatā***). ***Majjhima Nikāya*** I:301 states ***atha khvāssa pubbe va tathā cittaṃ bhāvitaṃ hoti yan–taṃ tathattāya upanetīti***, "and so, having developed his mind just–so, it brings him to 'just–so–ness'." The term Tathatā, frequently translated as Suchness or Thusness, which is usually taken to be a Mahāyānic term, here already occurs in a pre–Mahāyānic text in a manner wholly concordant with its later signification. Knowing and seeing things as they are (***yathābhūtaṃ***) means tathatā.[112]

While samādhi provides the situation for observing what needs to be observed, the act of successful observation, insofar as it aims to produce 'knowing' as well as 'seeing', involves knowledge (***jñāna***) both as a prerequisite and as a consequent condition.

Of the three terms in the model under current discussion, ***prajñā*** is undoubtedly the most important. Since avidyā is the etiological basis of dukkha and saṃsāra, 'knowledge' (***vidyā, jñāna***) is its necessary cure.

Prajñā signifies not only the culminating insight(s) of the threefold praxis, but also its intellectual and cognitive prerequisites. Successful action requires a guiding theory, just as the veracity of a theory hinges on its ability to act–ually function, i.e., become actual when activated through action and activity. The path/method (mārga) begins and ends with prajñā.[113]

Prajñā connotes the full spectrum of Buddhist doctrine as doctrine, as well as the cognitive comprehension of those doctrines. Thus to spell out its contents would require stating the totality of Buddhist doctrine in all its particulars. For the sake of overview, prajñā may be associated with four types

of activities emphasized by Buddhism.

First, it signifies the clear and efficacious formulation and comprehension of Buddhist perspectives (***samyak–dṛṣṭi***). Not only must the correct views be engendered and nourished, but more importantly one must investigate how it is that views (***dṛṣṭi***) are engendered and nourished in the first place. Thus ***dṛṣṭi*** signifies more than views or opinions. Etymologically implying a 'way of seeing', 'point of view' or 'perspective', ***dṛṣṭi*** instantiates the limitations imposed by the horizon and focal center which invariably constitute any perspective. Dṛṣṭi signifies a partial vision, a limiting and limited perspective whose 'partiality', in spite of the fact that what it appropriates cannot be reduced to within the confines of its horizons, nonetheless insists on appropriating precisely by means of such a reduction. ***Dṛṣṭi*** implies a cognitive tropology, i.e., a program of tropological displacements and substitutions which ubiquitously reduce experience to an implicit, presupposed 'order of experience', such that experience itself becomes reduced and constricted within the margins of the closure of that 'order'. More simply put, a single perspective is necessarily incomplete. If I look at my hand, only part of it can be seen from a single perspective. If the back of my hand is fully visible, my palm remains outside my vision, and vice versa. As I turn my hand, what becomes visible and what becomes invisible changes; but some part of my hand always remains hidden from view. Whether my eye moves around the hand or the hand is rotated in front of my eye, the entire hand can never be seen all at once. My sense of 'order', in this case a belief in the continuity of experience such that the 'hand' seen from multiple perspectives is in fact a single self–identical hand, allows me to infer that I have a hand which includes a back, a palm, sides, fingers, etc. This unified image of a 'hand', however, is an abstraction, pieced together from disparate perspectives. Both the

abstraction and the presupposed beliefs through which it is constituted are termed *dṛṣṭi*. The actual 'hands' which are perceived become displaced in my thinking by my abstracted, consolidated 'hand'. Thus *dṛṣṭi* connotes the entire process through which we displace actuality with our interpretation of it. As such, *dṛṣṭi* can be taken as the *content* which avidyā produces. *Dṛṣṭi* are the defensive stopgaps we use in our attempts to fill in the gaping abyss of anxiety which marks our nescience. Confronting the void of our most profound ignorance, we desperately seek to plug it up with theories; we build theoretical constructions on the foundation of abysmal ignorance. Dispelling nescience thus necessitates plunging, without distractions or stopgaps, into the abyss. In this light, 'Buddhist perspectives' means the uncovering of the epistemological determinants conditioning our nescient cognitive constructions or interpretations such that the tendency to displace actuality with an interpretation is arrested. This type of prajñā can be called 'prescriptive epistemology'.[114]

The second type of prajñā is analytic scrutiny. The first step towards understanding something, according to Buddhism, involves focusing on it and then breaking it down into its functional components. This breakdown, whether simply clarifying the senses of a term or distinguishing the multitude of conditioning factors implicated in a phenomenal event, must be reasonable. Vitarka-vicāra (see section above on Rūpa-dhātu) and the Abhidharmic methods of dharmic analysis are examples of this type. It builds and investigates categories, though it remains constantly on the lookout for prajñaptic reifications. This type can be called 'categorial analysis'.

The third type falls under the heading of *pramāṇa*, i.e., establishing, validating and using 'valid means of knowledge'. In its most limited sense it means to conform to the rules of logic. In its most general sense it means to set

the standards and criteria by which any truth-claim may be evaluated. Insofar as it thus restricts what may or may not be affirmed or negated, and sets the rules by which such affirmation or negation may be implemented, it inevitably imposes a criteriological closure which demarcates 'acceptable claims' (and thus valid knowledge) from 'unacceptable claims' (invalid knowledge). The works of the Buddhist logicians from Dignāga on are examples of this approach to prajñā. This type of prajñā may be called 'proscriptive epistemology'.[115]

The fourth type can be called 'clear and penetrating insight'. Whether examining why and how the mind functions as it does, discerning the variety of factors involved in a given event, or just correctly cognizing an occasion, if one's cognitive acuity is on target, then it may be called prajñā. In meditative contexts, such penetrating insight is called ***vipaśyana*** (P. ***vipassanā***). This insight is never divorced from praxis, and thus in Mahāyānic contexts prajñā is often paired with ***karuṇā*** (compassion) while tantric contexts pair it with ***upāya*** (soteric efficacy). This insight doesn't penetrate into some 'other' mystical realm; it directly sees and knows things as they are. This knowing remains practical and practicable. It means the clear seeing which facilitates any task.

Prajñā thus means 'know-how'. Tying shoelaces requires prajñā (the requisite know-how) as well as the skillful action (upāya). To tie someone else's laces, or to teach that person how to tie his/her own, or to tie one's own in order to make oneself available to help others is karuṇā. To claim one knows how to tie shoelaces is meaningless unless one can demonstrate this 'knowledge' by actually doing it. Likewise, without upāya or karuṇā, there is no prajñā. Whether tying shoelaces or resolving the dukkhic dilemma, prajñā signifies the enabling insight.

Taking śīla, samādhi and prajñā together, the basis of Buddhist praxis

is neither ultimately teleological -- which would take these three as 'goals' -- nor is it finally processional -- which would take them as means only. Ends and means equally are absorbed into 'method'.[116]

In the next chapter we shall return to the problematic of 'means and ends' and the crucial role that that controversy played in the development of various strands of Buddhist thought. In particular, we shall see how one of the three trialectic terms, viz. prajñā, became privileged above the other two, and how this privileging was reflected in such developments as the notion of ***prajñā–pāramitā*** (perfecting of wisdom), the arising of essentialistic and progressionalistic interpretations of the Buddhist 'method', and the narrowing of Buddhist praxis to cognitive and epistemic issues. As a result of that narrowing the Yogācāra school emerged.

We shall also see how the interplay of the four models outlined in this chapter simultaneously produced the deep issues which Buddhism continually confronted, while at the same time setting the parameters within which those issues could be addressed and thought about. When, for instance, the five skandhas seemed to become too restrictive a notion to adequately account for a person, they could either be further subdivided into eighty nine, seventy five, or one hundred dharmas, etc., as the abhidhammic and abhidharmic schools attempted, and thereby be extended to whatever new notions needed to be entertained and discussed; or the skandhas could be metaphorically reinterpreted through their nāma–rūpic aspects as some configuration of the problematic of the superimposition of 'nominal' characteristics onto neutral 'material/formal' causal chains; or they could be rejected outright as vestiges of a creeping substantialism, etc. However, no Buddhist could claim to locate any part, aspect, essence or layer of the human being *outside* of the five skandhas without incurring the charge

of heterodoxy.

To conclude this chapter, we will review a few salient features of the four models.

Review

The notion of skandhas serves not only to decentralize what it is we consider to be a person by (i) denying that any part or aspect of that person remains constant while other parts observably change, and (ii) asserting that persons are not wholes but rather are conditioned and constituted by the aggregation of mututally dependent and changing parts. It also serves as a declaration against any metaphysical claims concerning 'personhood', 'soul', human 'natüre or essence', in short, it forecloses the possibility of asserting that anything lies behind or outside the economy of the human sensorium. Since everything experienced lacks true constancy, no constants may be asserted without violating the exhaustive givens of experience.

Since the sensorium is all-inclusive, such that nothing which is incapable of being experienced may be admitted, and we are never located anywhere other than within it, and duhkha arises by way of a non-recognition (*avidyā*) of the conditions (*hetu-pratyaya*) which enact and control the sensorial economy, viz. saṃsāra, epistemology is the crucial entry into and linchpin for Buddhist soterics. Epistemology in this sense includes not only general theories of language, but it must constitute and focus a sustained gaze on the intersection of the issues of perception, valuation, judgement, logic, validation, criteriology, psychology, etc., in short, the entire gamut of fields raised by the question 'How do we know?', concisely encapsulated in Buddhist thought as the 'double

obstructions', viz. the cognitive and affective obstructions (*jñeya–āvaraṇa* and *kleśa–āvaraṇa*) preventing our seeing things as they are, etc.

Moreover, since sensorial confusion is saṃskāric, philosophy, psychology and linguistics become the critical sciences, i.e., the *nāma* side of the skandhas as nāma–rūpa takes precedence. The model was always tipped in this direction, since there are four nāmic skandhas to only one rūpic skandha. This imbalance increases. Rūpa as a term often is displaced in abhidhammic discussions of the skandhas with the term *phassa* (contact, S. *sparśa*), meaning that materiality could be reduced to considerations of how the four nāmic skandhas experienced and appropriated it.

Further, despite the seemingly empirical basis upon which Buddhism grounded itself, *inferentials* also had to be admitted. Things which were perhaps potentially perceivable, but not perceived at present, were knowable only through inference. For Early Buddhists this included not only places some particular person had never been, but Nirvāṇa and even the existence of Buddha himself.[117] In meditation practice, the realm of inferentials was dealt with as saṃskāras, i.e., cognitive latencies. Like Husserlian transcendentals, saṃskāras by definition do not reveal themselves entirely within the moment in which they discharge their functioning. They carry the latencies and tendencies engendered and embodied from one moment to some subsequent moment. When the latencies do emerge, they emerge as volitions (*cetanā*), and the abhidhammic literature often replaces the term *saṅkhāra* with the term *cetanā* when discussing the skandhas.

Most important, the skandhas are rarely if ever discussed in Pāli literature as if they were metaphysical components of a person, despite accusations to that effect in some Mahāyānic texts. More often than not they are discussed as *upādānakkhandha*, i.e., the 'appropriational aggregates'. Rupert

Gethin states:[118]

> A *khandha-saṃyutta* passage states that the *khandhas* are to be considered *upādānakhandhas* only when they are with *āsavas* (*sāsava*) and subject to grasping (*upādāniya*).[119] In another passage that recurs several times in the *nikāyas*, the question is asked whether *upādāna* should be considered the same as *upādānakkhandahas* or whether there is *upādāna* apart from them.[120] In reply it is stated that although *upādāna* is not the same as the five *upādānakkhandhas* there is no *upādāna* apart from them; *upādāna* is then defined as "whatever is will and passion (*chandarāga*) in respect to the five *upādānakkhandhas*".... The early *abhidhamma* texts clarify *upādāna*'s relationship to the *khandhas* under three principal headings: active grasping (*upādāna*), subject to grasping (*upādāniya*), and the product of grasping (*upādinna*). *Upādāna* as an active force is confined to *saṃkhārakkhandha*, although all five *khandhas* are potentially the objects of *upādāna* – that is, are *upādāniya*, similarly all five *khandhas* are said to be in some measure the products of *upādāna* – that is, *upādinna*.

Gethin offers the following note: "Four *khandhas* are not *upādāna*, *saṃkhārakkhandha* may or may not be; *rūpakkhandha* is *upādāniya*, four *khandhas* may or may not be; all five *khandhas* may or may not be *upādinna*, Vibh 67." For now we will merely note that according to the *Vibhaṅga* (the second abhidhamma text of the Pāli canon) (i) that whereas the four *nāmic* skandhas may or may not be graspable, rūpa *always* is, (ii) rūpa may be 'the product of grasping', i.e., appropriation can give rise to materiality, and (iii) only *saṃkhāra* can 'actively appropriate'. This confers a special status on *saṃskāra*. Later in this paragraph Gethin writes:

> The early *abhidhamma* texts also state that *rūpakkhandha* is always considered to be with *āsavas* and subject to grasping, and that the only time when the four mental *khandhas* are not such – that is, in *nikāya* terminology, are not *upādānakkhandhas* – is on the occasions of the four *ariya* paths and fruits.

Yogācāra will expand on this, making 'appropriation' (*upādāna*) the cardinal problematic particularly as engendered in the grasper-grasped or noetic-noemic

opposition (*grāhaka–grāhya*).

Pratītya–samutpāda should not exactly be taken as a causal formula, though it was sometimes pressed into service in that capacity by the Sarvāstivādin and Theravādin schools. By modern Western standards, at best *pratītya–samutpāda* might be considered a case of a theory of 'conditionals', which means it falls short of being a 'hard' causal theory. This should not disturb the Buddhist, who, despite the mass of modern literature which discusses 'Buddhist causality', was invariably more interested and concerned with *conditions* (*pratyaya*) than with causes (*hetu*). Since the formula generally is applied to *conditioning factors and sequences* in the mental, psychological, cognitive sphere rather than the domain of sheer matter, so that even matter is invariably viewed from the point of view of how it is cognized, *pratītya–samutpāda* might be understood as a formula or description of psychosophic conditioning.

That the twelve links form a circle, such that they encircle and recycle, indicates that they form a *closure* in which there is no beginning or end, since #12 leads to #1 and #1 presupposes #12. The bondage (*sambandha*) of this 'encirclement' (*samvṛtti*) suggests that the closure must be *erased*. Thus: when there is no avidyā, then there is no samskāra, etc. The links, their configuration, how they relate to each other, how their descriptions interweave with each other, etc., all establish *pratītya–samutpāda* as a model designed to set coordinates for self-examination. But this self-examination does not aim at a metaphysical subjectivity which reflects on itself or its own intuitions. To examine the self by Buddhist methods, is to examine experiential conditions. *Pratītya–samutpāda* thus marks the crucial Buddhist doctrine: *conditionality*.

The *tri–dhātu* demarcates the existential horizons as they are constituted and deconstituted through experience and examination. As a

paradigmatic tool its two major lessons are: (i) all experience is contextual, contextualized by the 'realm' (desire, formal, aformal) through which it and its meanings are generated, and (ii) that each context is constituted by a margin which breaks down into ever larger, more inclusive contexts until contextuality itself is revealed as nothing other than the activity of marginality. At the 'peak' of the ārūpa-dhyānas, two of the skandhas, viz. rūpa and vijñāna, are thoroughly eclipsed; the eclipse of rūpa is the condition for entering the *ā*-rūpa dhyānas initially, and vijñāna horizon has been eclipsed by its own contingency. At the 'peak' two other skandhas stand undecidably across the marginal chiasm, their efficacy and potency paralyzed by this marginal undecidability. With pain/pleasure perceptuality (*vedanā*) and associative-thinking (*saṃjñā*) thus stymied and stilled, the one remaining skandha, *saṃskāra,* the dynamic of causal and psychological conditionality, emerges in stark relief. Neither with nor without vedanā and saṃjñā, the margin which both separates these possibilites and is constituted by their mutually opposing impossibility eclipses itself as it becomes a penumbra to saṃskāra which itself signifies the margin between conscious and unconscious, freedom and conditioning, karma and nirvāṇa. Buddhist meditation seeks insight into this dynamic.

The trialectic factors of śila-samādhi-prajñā *prescribe* the 'attitudinal' basis for self-correction. As a model, they map the proceedures for observing (*vipassanā*) and disrupting (e.g., the *ana-gamin,* lit. 'non-goer') and ultimately overcoming (*nirodha*) the karmic flow (*saṃsāra, saṃskṛta-sambandha,* etc.). In the next chapter we will begin by examining the notion of karma.

CHAPTER THREE

The Context and Development of Yogācāra in India: Part II

In this chapter we will examine the notion of karma. Of special interest will be the role that mental functions (***manas, citta, viññāṇa,*** etc.) play in the karmic process. Several other concomitant themes and topics will also be discussed, since it would be impossible to understand Yogācāra correctly without first coming to terms with these notions. After a statement of the general issues involved, we will discuss the two satyas, saṃvṛti and paramārtha, in an attempt to elucidate whether Buddhist discourse can be metaphysical or ontological, or whether such interpretations are misreadings. Later in the chapter the term ***tathatā*** will be subjected to similar scrutiny, since this is the term most frequently taken by scholars to signify some metaphysical foundation or reality, particularly in Yogācāra. We will then return to the issue raised in Chapter Two concerning the Buddhist understanding and use of 'means and ends'. Specifically, how do the tensions between progressionalistic and essentialistic interpretations of Buddhadharma affect the development of Buddhist doctrine? Since the theory of karma interprets human action as a causal sequence, each action being simultaneously an effect of previous causes while causing subsequent effects, and karma unmistakably is targeted by Buddhists and many non–Buddhists as the fundamental human problematic such that some way of non–karmically acting–in–the–world is touted and sought, an examination of the progressional vs. essentialist controversy may help shed some light on this aspect of the Buddhist project. How does one intercept a karmic sequence? Can it be progressively

altered, reconstituted, tapered off, or can an alternate series be substituted for it? Or is the entire dimension of 'karmic sequence' abandoned for a more fundamental, essential reality? We will argue that this tension stands at the core of the ***Prajñā–pāramitā*** literature, and that that literature, symptomatic of the ascendancy and privileging by Buddhist theory of cognitive acuity (***prajñā, jñāna***), led to the drive for ever greater epistemological, psychological and hermeneutic clarifications and elaborations, which finally ushered in the need for Yogācāric formulations.

If action (karma) ***qua*** soteric action leads to a soteric realization which performs the overcoming of karma, what accounts for or provides this radical alterity? How does action self–negate? And if action ***qua*** bodily, verbal and mental action involves the construction of a linguistic, psychological, cognitive closure (***saṃvṛti, parikalpita***) such that language is always already incapable of referring to anything outside itself, how might that soteric realization be characterized and described? We will argue that to characterize it as ***tathatā,*** like the Yogācārins do, signals that realization is neither immanent nor transcendental, but indexical, such that ***tathatā*** should be translated as ***Indexicality.***[1]

In order to enact the disentangling of conditioning, both experiential and embodied, a method etiologically grounded must be uncovered and introduced. Whether the etiological source is conceived of as an originary source, such that one must return to the scene of this source and recover one's lost ground;[2] or whether it is conceived of as a rudimentary, even ever–present underpinning which may transform someone if he/she consciously intersects with it;[3] or whether it be conceived of as the remote causal root of a beginningless causal chain,[4] which, though itself too remote to be altered or tampered with directly, nonetheless is

capable of having the consequential continuity of its chain of effects disrupted and terminated for good -- and Buddhism has countenanced all these possibilities (e.g., the first approximates Hua-yen, the second describes the 'Sudden Awakening' schools, and several schools, including Yogācāra, presuppose some modified version of the third[5]) -- some etiological method, some tactic or means for getting at the source of the human problematic must be proposed and tested, or else Buddhism must renounce all rights to make soteric claims. Whether the vision which observes the flow of conditioning is itself etiologically focused or not, the method can only be efficacious if, whether suddenly disruptive or gradually unraveling, it penetrates and neutralizes conditioning's etiological basis.

Conditioning (***pratyaya***), then, is what passes for ontology in Buddhism, since whatever transpires ineluctably arises in virtue of conditions. But since conditioning per se may be taken in several senses, such as mechanistically, psychologically, materialistically, metaphysically, etc., and Buddhism refuses to ultimately privilege any of these perspectives exclusively -- though it will take and develop the psychological notion of conditioning (i.e., analytically, therapeutically, epistemologically, pedagogically, and so on) more seriously than the rest, as we shall see -- Buddhism has no ontology as such. Conditioning is an analytic principle, a method for analyzing actual occurrences, though 'conditioning' is merely a formal construct, empty of specific content. Analytically, it announces that any occurrence, any entity, any condition can be broken down into other conditions, other events, and those conditions likewise may be broken down and reduced to other conditions *ad infinitum*. The notion 'conditioning' thus simultaneously warns that all conditions are reductionistic while offering a methodology for exploring, investigating, utilizing and generating these reductions. Conditions are reductionistic because, like prajñapti, a single isolatable

condition becomes mental shorthand for a complex field of interacting conditions.[6] Moreover, conditioning implies that events are never random, but always depend on specific conditions other than themselves. Hence conditioning means that each thing is constituted through a specifical alterity, a chain of conditions in which each link is empty of independent self–generative or self–sustaining status. Properly understood the notion 'conditioning' does not involve any ontological principle, ontological state, or other ontological mooring. Rather it is the very condition by which we generate such ontological determinants and their systems. What we claim to be the case is not the case because "it is"; rather, it could be the case (or is the case 'for us') because we have been conditioned to notice, assert and accept such a claim as the case. That humans and cats can hear different portions of the auditory spectrum is a matter of each's specific conditioning. That we conceive there to be a continuity between the respective limits of feline and human hearing, and characterize that abstraction as degrees on a spectrum of auditory frequencies is also a matter of conditioning, of reducing complex ***discrete and yet interdependent conditions*** into a conceptually encompassing and singular condition.[7]

Karma (action) is defined as the activity of body, speech and mind (***kāya–vāk–manas***), particularly when such activities arise from or involve ***intention*** (***cetanā***). Conditioning, whether already embodied (***saṃskāra***), freshly activated (***vedanā***) or currently enacting (***tṛṣṇa***), repeats itself perpetually unless the seemingly ineluctable linkage between one act as cause and another as effect is broken.

For Buddhism, conditioning is always conditioning of an action by another action, that is, it must be karmic. Whenever Buddhists dabble in ontological categories, the unfailing criterion of what is to be considered *real* is

that the object or event under consideration must be active, actual, discharging an effective, observable function (*kāraṇa*).[8] Kāraṇa comes from the same root as karma, *kṛ*, 'to act, to do', and corresponds nicely with the Western philosophical term 'efficient cause'.

I – Enclosured–Actuality and Excelling–Referent–Actuality ***(saṃvṛti–satya, paramārtha–satya)***

Two corollaries to this emphasis on efficient causality are noteworthy: (i) The positing of any ontological or ontic entity which is incapable of producing a demonstrable effect in the world of experience is thereby precluded; (ii) This emphasis is crucial for a proper appreciation of certain key terms and concepts. For instance, the term *sat* is usually rendered 'existence', 'truth', 'reality', etc., and its cognate terms, *sattva, satya,* etc.; are similarly interpreted (e.g., 'being' and 'truth' respectively). However if we take *sat* to mean 'actual', then we might translate *sattva* as 'that which is actual', and *satya* as 'actuality'. We will examine the term *satya* momentarily, specifically the two types of satya which Buddhism discusses incessantly, viz. *saṃvṛti–satya* and *paramārtha–satya*. But first *sat* and *asat* should be made clear.

If *sat* means 'actual', then its opposite *asat* means 'not–actual'. Non–actual carries the double implication of being either *non–existent* or *potential,* and the Sanskrit word *asat* does carry both of those senses as primary meanings. This has led to all sorts of seemingly philosophical riddles about the relation of *sat* to *asat,* which are only puzzles because of this semantic ambiguity. For instance, did *sat* arise from *asat* (i.e., did something come from nothing, can an existent be produced by a non–existent), or do they produce each other? If we take the terms to mean 'actual' and 'potential' then the answer to both

questions would clearly be "yes", since actualities arise from potentialities, and actualities and potentialities are mutually dependent. This riddle occurs not only in the Indian tradition (e.g., ***Chāndogya Upaniṣad*** III.19.1 and VI.2.1) but we find it also in the Tacist classic ***Lao Tzu*** (chs. 2 and 40).

Satya means 'actualities' or a fixed region wherein certain actualities transpire. Hence the infamously mistranslated ***saṃvṛti–satya*** and ***paramārtha–satya,*** which continue to be represented in English texts by 'conventional (or relative) ***truth***' and 'Absolute (or Ultimate) ***Truth***' respectively, may finally cease to be misconstrued as "truths" and more appropriately be understood as two vantage points from which actualities are seen, viz. 'closure' (the literal meaning of ***saṃvṛti***) and 'that which exceeds reference' (***paramā*** + ***artha***).[9] ***Paraṃ***– is the superlative form of the prefix ***pāra***.

An examination of the words themselves, rather than immediately assuming we recognize what they refer to, is in order.

According to Monier–Williams,[10] ***pāra*** means, in part:

> far, distant, remote (in space), opposite, ulterior, farther than, beyond, on the other or farther side of, extreme; previous (in time), former; ancient, past; later future, next; following, succeeding, subsequent; final, last; exceeding (in number or degree), more than; better or worse than, superior or inferior to, best or worst, highest, supreme, chief...
>
> exceptionally, ***paraṃ śatam,*** more than a hundred, lit. 'an excessive h[undred], a h[undred] with a surplus,...
>
> strange, foreign, alien, adverse, hostile... other than, different from,... left, remaining,... concerned or anxious for (loc.),... another (different from one's self), a foreigner, enemy, foe, adversary,...
>
> m. or n. the Supreme or Absolute Being, the Universal Soul, [in the] Up[aniṣads]; R[āmāyaṇa]; P[urāṇas];...
>
> N[ame] of a sound in the first of its four stages... a partic. measure of time...
>
> remotest distance,... highest point or degree... any chief matter or paramount object...
>
> the wider or more extended or remoter meaning of a word,...

(in logic) genus; existence (regarded as the common property of all things)...

afterwards, later; (with abl.) beyond, after (e.g. ***param vijñānāt***, beyond human knowledge...).... [square brackets and sectioning mine]

These disparate meanings arise from a common logic. ***Pāra*** most fundamentally denotes 'other', 'otherness', 'the other that is across and away from me'.[11] Through a phenomenological description of the Other, we can flesh out the semantic field of ***pāra***. Note how the description which is to follow parallels the dictionary definitions listed above.

Pāra qua other is applied to what is other in space or in time. As I am my own locus, my own center, I always find myself in the middle of my own experience, such that the further away something is from me–as–center, the more 'extreme' I regard that thing. Its extremeness, its remoteness may approach or exceed my horizon. It is the other such that distance locates me and the other, a distance which grows vaster as the other becomes more explicitly other. It is an other for whom even intimacy implies a moving through or displacing of distance, rather than its elimination or absence.

The other, in so far as it is truly other, may always go beyond my cognitive horizon. I no longer see or hear or smell, etc. some object, either due to a shift in my attention, an alteration in the location of my center vis–à–vis that object (either I have moved or the object has moved or been moved), or by some obstruction imposing itself between me and the object, such that my cognitive horizon no longer extends to the object.[12] It is now outside my immediate perceived–field, and thus beyond my ken (***paro–kṣa***).[13] Since the knowability of an object is here defined in terms of spatial proximity -- I am near it (noetic space), it is near me (noemic space), and nothing interposes a hindrance or impediment (i.e., spatiality as the locus of the presence or absence of an

obstruction) -- this is the 'other' in space. But the same logic may also be applied to temporality: nearness or proximity means recent or imminent, remoteness and distance mean distant past, ancient, or distant future, the two extreme ends of time. What is like me is 'now' or 'contemporary'; the other is the past or future totally outside my cognitive arena.

The other is what is beyond my grasp, both my spatial and temporal grasp, unless I make an effort to appropriate it. Were no effort needed, it would not be other, it would be "me." ***Cognition is nothing else but appropriation of the other.*** This precisely is the meaning of ***vijñapti–mātra*** for Yogācāra. Hence we say of an object which appears in consciousness that it is "given", viz. given to me through cognitive appropriation.[14] Through cognition, I give myself experience; cognition appropriates sensations by generating objects to be taken and a self in whom the booty can be placed and stored (***ātma–dharma–upacāro hi vividho yaḥ pravartate, vijñāna–pariṇāmo'sau***... Triṃśika, v. 1; ...***grāha–dvayasya anuśayas***... ***ibid.,*** v. 26). Cognition is always an appropriative effort.

Through discipline I may be able to control and focus my attention; I can endeavor to place myself in proximity to that towards which I intend, viz. my goals, my aims; but what manner of obstacle, what ***āvaraṇa,*** prevents full, immediate, unrestricted cognition? What blocks omniscience? Temporal and spatial distance alone? Or does another obstacle fill the gap, intrude within the distance? Is distance the condition for obstructions or are obstructions the condition for distance? Is there any space other than the space ***between*** me and all else? It is in this region, the spatiality and temporal distance between noema and noesis, between lived–body and perceived–field, between self and other, body and mind, identity and difference, one and many, right and wrong, etc., that notions such as ***ākāśa*** (spatiality), ***rūpa*** as resistance and obstruction, as well as

Heidegger's *Zwischen,* Merleau-Ponty's *chiasm,* and countless other interstitial constructs are generated. These are the 'meanings' with which we attempt to plug up the gaping, frightening abyssal region; the order which conceals the chaos; the buttresses and supports for stable identities in the face of torrential, variational, involuntary differings and changes. This problematic opening between the so-called 'subject' and the so-called 'object', between self and non-self, us and them, may be depicted as an unbridgeable gulf (e.g. as demanded by theistic religions maintaining a radical separation and discontinuity between God and man, and often by extension between the 'true believers' and the heathens or infidels), or conceived of as occupied by a mediating substance or space (e.g. *ākāṣa*), or as a place of chiasmic, dialectical intersections (Hegel, Merleau-Ponty), or even as the non-place of *différance* (Derrida).[15] For Yogācāra this region is defined simply as the cognitive construct (*parikalpita*) of the appropriative economy (*upādāna*) of noetic grasper (*grāhaka*) and the noemae which are grasped (*grāhya*).[16]

The other before me and the other behind me, each exerting an opposing pull on my center, are constituted as a felt presence in the me-as-center, a presence marked as *tension.* As the oppositions increase, so does the tension. One method for alleviating this felt tension is to render the center, the 'me', invisible, such that the tug of war between the oppositions, though in actuality intersecting and located *through* my center, in effect comes to be viewed as taking place without me, besides me, outside me, transcendent to my center.[17] It happens within me or without me, and it seems independent of my presence, though constituted in and constitutive of my presence. The oppositions assault me from in front and behind, the right and the left, above and below, either pulling such that my center is drawn and quartered, or pressing in, such

that what lies beyond me crushes me with its gravity, an oppressive weight which intensifies as the oppositions draw nearer to my center. If my center is invisible, absent, then the oppositions seem to pull and press on themselves, not on me, and the perceived tensions seem overcome. This gravity which both weighs in on me and pulls me toward my furthest surroundings, which extends and overextends me toward my own liminality, insofar as it is constitutive of my presence, and even my awareness of myself as presence, and insofar as it can only be comfortably present when I make myself invisible,[18] i.e., absent, I come to think of it as greater than myself. In this, the originary scene of mystical experience, the locus of the *coincidentia oppositorium,* I eclipse myself in order to uncover what constitutes myself. The tension from the oppositions through which my center located itself as center, as mid-way point, disperses. The distant oppositional foci with which I initially discovered myself in conflict, now, like stars for navigation, re-emerge as if they were self-constituted. Through my self-eclipse, my original bifurcational projections have now reified themselves as my gods! My self is no longer the pained locus of weighty oppositions, it is now as large as the field I project. An eclipsed self must hide its center, as Chuang Tzu said, "in the world".[19]

As 'that which is over me' and 'me' vacillate -- each constituting the other in turn, my field contextualizing me, and my cognitory power generating my field -- each assumes an importance and value in terms of the other, i.e., *on the other's terms.* My values arise as I become other to myself, in the act of self-eclipsing that arises from self-alienation. Nothing is more alien to or more constitutive of my self than value. It is not only the Upaniṣads and Indian epical legends which esteem this taming of oppositions through the ultimate reversal of self-as-other, calling this reversal "divine". The eclipsing of the self allows the

seemingly 'fixed stars' of the firmament, i.e., one's cultural context, to emerge and shine most brightly and to offer astrological as well as nautical guidance through the oppositional sea of life. But this divinization was never more clearly expressed by any system than by the "*ātman* (self) is *Brahman* (ultimate socio-cultural-cosmological context)" concept for which the Upaniṣads are famous. I am as large as the context I project and through which I am projected.

Through a thinking produced by the friction of rubbing opposing ideas together, *valuative thinking* arises. The extremes, higher or lower than me, better or worse than me, that towards which I aim, and that remote region as inescapable as my own horizon; values are at once my projection and my context. I measure them against myself, and myself by them. Just as the constitutive oppositions affirm my self by becoming transcendent to me, so do values become *my* values by standing outside me -- either as that towards which I project myself, as does Sartre in *Being and Nothingness,* or as a more or less fixed firmament within which I can locate and steer my own worth. I fix, affirm and find myself in terms of the other. I alter and modify myself because of the other, and so that by changing I become other to myself. The self that was is no longer the self I am, which is no longer the self I will be. Each self is eclipsed by those prior and subsequent to it, just as the self in each moment eclipses its predecessors and successors. My self is constituted of its own alterity.

Pāra- signifies not merely the other, but the other's remoteness as well. For Jaimini, it denotes "the wider or more extended or remoter meaning of a word", i.e., not the meanings which lie close at hand, but those more distant, connotative, those meanings which lurk at the periphery of a word's definability, those implicatory significances which prevent words from being simple signifiers that refer by a one-to-one code to any single corresponding signifieds. *Pāra-*

marks the marginality and embodied alterity of any word, an alterity which challenges the claim of any word to belong to or to indicate any single thing or referent. *Pāra*– announces the movement of meaning and ambiguity at a word's margins, opposing the centrality of logo–centrism, denying each word its claim to a center, to a svabhāva (own–essence). It is that which tends to point a word beyond itself, towards other significances, other meanings, other words, other referents. But by calling this *"pāra"*, the word's center implicitly becomes privileged over its margins, despite the contingent, contextual production of that center by its margins.[20] The actual movement by the word to interchange and interplay with other words is devalued and made secondary to whatever centrality can be assigned to a particular meaning (and such assignments are rarely innocent, but rather symptomatic of metaphysical biases), thus elevating and privileging the logocentric function of a word, that which the referentialist wishes to keep near to hand, and tolerating the word's margins only as remote prospects. In other words, clarity is claimed for the center, and ambiguity is exiled to the remoter regions where it will not challenge the word's stability.

It is well known that in any categorial enterprise, the integrity of a category only appears indubitable in the midst of the category, but that when one approaches that category's limits the actual demarcation lines always grow ambiguous and suspect, whether the line is plant vs. animal, life and death, taxonomy vs. morphology, conditioned vs. unconditioned, or whatever. The limit case is inevitably problematic. When pressed to their logical conclusions, to their extremes, their limit cases, all categories collapse or grow problematic. At best the limits mark provisional distinctions, but never absolute separations. Nāgārjuna reduced every variety of Indian metaphysics to the pained primal screams which underlie the masks of metaphysical categorial systems, and in the same stroke

demonstrated that the pain behind the scream only arose from the frustration of the desire that there be such ontological categories to wear as masks, when in fact the categories were mere cognitive projections, unsuccessful cathexic efforts and dukkhic displacements.

In Western theology, lacking anyone with Nāgārjuna's consistent rigor to deconstruct and critically challenge the accepted categories until Hume and Kant, the collapse of categories was admitted but circumscribed by assigning the collapse to a region which could be sealed off such that the fallout from the implosion would be contained and not leak out to contaminate or destroy the cosmological, metaphysical, economic and political structures built upon those categories. It was only in God, the Scholastics admitted, that categories such as essence and existence become inseparable; but, they reasoned, God is a region apart, perhaps supralunar, where our supposed inviolable laws of nature are utterly discontinued and a different system of laws, those directly of His nature, which is radically other than ours, obtain. Hence what obtains in the case of God has no bearing or logical affinity with what obtains in our sublunar world. He is the other that both necessitates and yet protects us from the collapsibility of our categories.

But the limit case is just that, the case which marks the limit, the margin, the circumference which circumscribes what is within my horizon and what lies outside. I measure the radius by how much effort is needed to reach the circumference; the remoteness of the other is measured by how much effort is needed to establish and maintain intimacy. Effort is measured by the amount of frictional heat (***tapas***) generated by resistance (***pratigha***) to my intentionality (***manas***). The more friction and resistance the greater the effort.

By measuring and demarcating the periphery of the other, the line

which marks the difference between self and other, I have simultaneously defined my own limits. That which is within the line, i.e., between the circumference and the center, is me and mine. What lies outside the line is other, alien, outside my ken. If at all related to me, it is as a transcendental condition. The inside of the outer line, the periphery, acts as a mirror; the gaze which stares out, only cognizes its own reflection, perhaps distorted by the distance from center to periphery back to the center again. And the gaze does not actually originate in the center, nor at the periphery. It is always already gazing. What lies outside the circumference lies beyond reference. Reference is a systematic aiming of peripheral mirrors toward each other, in such a way that the gaze must move from one to the other. It must follow the path and logic of the mirrors' direction. Though the mirrors are set in the periphery, the gaze which follows their reflective trajectories traverses whatever regions it is inclined towards; it may even pass once or repeatedly through the center while getting from one mirror to the next.

As suggested in the last chapter, Buddhism, rather than subscribing to a theory of a final eschatological limit,[21] on the contrary, proposes that limits be explored, the conditions which constitute them be uncovered, and that finally limits are seen not as limits, but as transparent margins through which existential and experiential horizons and fields are generated. What grounds the ability of one horizon to enclose and subsume other horizons is not a transcendental metaphysical entity or condition, but rather marginality as the condition for conditionality itself. Reference only occurs within the space/time circumscribed by the margins, and what lies without remains non-referential, incapable of being indicated. Non-referentiality, in this context, does not signify an extra-circumferential region. What lies outside a particular margin may simply be another circumscribed region, another psychosophic closure whose rules of

reference operate only within its closure. Such a chain of closures, intersecting and perhaps overlapping at their margins, inscribes the possible life-worlds into which one may be repeatedly 'reborn'. The walls or margins between them are opaque, obstructed, and each region is encompassed such that it presents itself to itself as the only possible and actual region. Non-referentiality does not so much transgress a marginal line -- 'transgression' would mean that no matter what sort of violence is done to the line, once the line is crossed it must reinstate itself; elsewise the crossing was not a transgression but the construction of a new limit -- as render that line transparent. This should not be understood as merely enlarging the area of the closure, but rather a making transparent of both the conditions through which margins are constructed as well as the actual margins themselves. For instance, space (***deśa***), i.e., area capable of being partitioned, dissolves into spatiality (***ākāśa***), the conditional matrix in which space occurs. Spatiality itself dissolves into its conditional matrix, consciousness. And consciousness dissolves into the temporality of its contingency, i.e., that it can exist and then not exist. Temporality dissolves into transparent marginality.

Param– is the superlative of all this.

Monier-Williams offers the following for ***paramā***.[22]

> ...most distant, remotest, extremest, last... chief, highest, primary, most prominent, most excellent, worst... (with abl.) superior or inferior to, better or worse than... highest point, *extreme limit*,... very much, *excessively*, excellently, in the highest degree. [emphasis mine]

The preceding descriptive phenomenological reading of the dictionary definition of ***pāra–*** indicates the vast array of senses (*Sinnen*) in which the 'other' is encountered through a single Sanskrit word. Unfortunately it is the Vedāntic implication, i.e., the Absolute Other, which pervades modern interpretations. This derivative meaning is compounded when the term

paramārtha is discussed.

Artha literally signifies *that towards which an intentionality intends,* and thus can be translated as "referent", "meaning", "wealth", "goal", "purpose", "a thing", "sense object", etc., depending on context.[23] Paramārtha is thus understood in the Vedāntic reading as 'the ultimate, supreme referent and goal', the fulfilment of Dharma, Absolute Reality. Whereas, according to them, what we normally think of as the world is in reality *māyā,* a creative misinterpretation of what is, what really is lies beyond our cognitive errors, and these errors, when deciphered, also point towards what lies beyond them. This 'beyond', this 'what really is', they call paramārtha. It is a synonym for Brahman. Obviously, since Buddhists deny any such thing as a Brahman, their notion of what 'really is' must differ from the Vedāntin's.

The notion of 'other' emerges in significant places in Buddhist thought. The Pāli texts refer to Buddhism itself as the raft which can ferry one from "this shore" of dukkha to "the other shore" (*nibbāna*). The notion of a saṅgha, or 'collectivity' in which humans can shed their caste and class discriminatory distinctions, and be judged simply by their abilities and efforts, where animal rights are vigorously protected, etc. bespeaks a profound ethical and political sense of the 'other', a sense which unfortunately became obscured when, to safeguard royal patronage, Buddhism relinquished both its political voice and its political activism.

Perhaps the most famous Buddhist utterance involving *pāra* is the dhāraṇī at the end of the Heart Sutra:

gate gate pāra-*gate* pāra-*saṃgate bodhi svāhā.*

Gate is the past tense of 'going' and means 'gone'. This evokes, among many significant associations, the *gata* in Tathāgata (epithet of Buddha), which raises

one of the most famous undecidable etymological puzzles in Buddhism. ***Tathāgata*** can be broken down either as ***tathā*** + ***gata*** or as ***tathā*** + ***agata***. ***Gata*** means 'come', and ***agata*** means 'gone'. ***Tatha*** (or ***tathā***) means 'just so', 'thus', and is derivative of the indexical ***tat*** (that, this). Thus Tathāgata may be interpreted as either 'thus–come' or 'thus–gone'. ***Gate gate*** means 'gone, gone' but also carries the sense from tathāgata of coming, of a movement marked more by erasure than by traversing distance. It is the 'gone' of going over the horizon. Gone over the horizon, and then the horizon itself is gone. As the horizon is traversed, there is no horizon and no one crossing it. To go beyond the limit is to forever alter that limit's perimeter. ***Pāra–gate*** may mean 'gone beyond', or 'gone over' or 'gone to the other' or 'other–than–gone'; ***pāra–saṃ–gate*** uses ***saṃ–*** (all together, inclusive) to signify that 'all together have gone over' or one has 'altogether gone over'. ***Bodhi*** means to be illumined or awakened; with the horizon gone, the sun can neither rise nor set, it simply illumines. ***Svāhā*** is a mantric obeisance.[24] To para–phrase: Gone beyond going, so utterly gone that one awakens in a boundless here, hallelujah!

Param + ***artha*** signifies what is other than, what exceeds, what is on the other side of referentiality. It marks the referent, the object of my intentions, of my intentionality as being remote, previous, subsequent, evaluative in positive and negative extremes, something alien, something opposite of my expectations.

It signifies at once 'the ultimate referent' and 'utter non–referentiality'. Buddhism embraces this double meaning, relishing the ironical manner in which the two senses oppose and cancel each other: An ultimate referent cannot be beyond referentiality; the non–referential cannot be referred to, either ultimately or in any other way. The excelling referent, that which excels and exceeds every other referent, is finally no referent, no thing at all. While ordinary referents lie behind

and separable from the words which point to them, the ultimate, most excelling 'referent' renders the very process of referring superfluous.

This oppositional ambivalence is preserved in the Chinese translations of paramārtha-satya. The older version used by Kumārajīva, Paramārtha (the translator), etc., is *chen-ti* 真諦. *Chen* means 'real, true', and renders *paramārtha*. *Ti* means 'to judge, to examine into, to research', and renders *satya*. Hence it literally means 'the reality discovered through investigation', but, by reducing the meaning of *ti* in Buddhist contexts to 'truth' (it is also used for the Four Noble *satyas*), it usually becomes glossed as 'real truth'. Hsüan-tsang translated *paramārtha* (*-satya*) with *sheng-yi* (*ti*) 勝義諦. Sheng (fourth tone), means 'to conquer', 'victorious' (and thus also is used for *Jina* 'the Conqueror'), 'to excel', 'last, as opposed to present or current',[25] and renders *param*. *Yi* is used to translate *artha*, and in this context means 'meaning', 'basic point', 'purport', 'referent'.[26] *Sheng-yi* thus could mean either 'what conquers and excels meaning' or 'excelling referent'. Meaning (*artha*) is conquered, overcome and vanquished, as one becomes victorious over referentiality. 'Excelling referent' captures the ambiguity, since it may be read as 'the referent which excels' or as 'that which exceeds reference'. *Chen-ti* lent itself to ontological and metaphysical misappropriations, and for certain streams within Chinese thought, particularly the pre-Hsüan-tsang Chinese Yogācāra schools, and elements within Hua-yen and T'ien-t'ai,[27] it became hypostatized as absolute reality which, on the one hand was beyond reference or language, and on the other hand, was a convenient mode of discourse for supporting whatever ultimate claims these schools wished to make. Hsüan-tsang's term was intended as an alternative which would avoid those misreadings. We will argue later that Hsüan-tsang deliberately retranslated previously translated texts precisely in order to redirect

the Chinese reader from the conceptual detours which previous translators had erected.[28]

To help clarify the terms paramārtha and paramārtha-satya, we now turn to their companion terms *saṃvṛti* (or *vyavahāra*) and *saṃvṛti-satya*.

Saṃ- once again implies 'totality, completely, all together'. *Vṛti* comes from the root *vṛt* which means[29] "to cover, screen, veil, hide, surround, obstruct... to ward off, check, keep back, prevent, hinder, restrain."[30] *Vṛīt* means "surrounding, enclosing, obstructing"; *vṛitā* means "concealed, screened, hidden, enveloped, surrounded by, covered with... stopped, checked, held back, pent up (as rivers)... filled or endowed or provided or affected with"; and *vṛiti* means "surrounding, covering,... a hedge, a fence, an enclosed piece of ground or place enclosed for partic. cultivation."[31]

Another meaning of *vṛt* is "to choose, select, choose for one's self, choose as (*-arthe* or acc. of pers.) or for (*artham* or dat., loc., instr. of thing),... to choose in marriage, woo,... to ask a person (acc.) for (acc.) or on behalf of (*kṛite*),... to solicit anything (acc.) from (abl.),... to ask or request that".[32] As discriminative, evaluative selection it marks the enactment of a decision. The 'decision' is constructed out of binary alternatives, and involves a possessive, appropriative recipient. One decides either for oneself, i.e., for one's own gain and profit, or for the gain and profit of another.

Vṛit means[33]

> to turn, turn around, revolve, roll (also applied to the rolling down of tears),... to move, to go on, get along, advance. proceed,... to take place, occur, be performed, come off;... to be, live, exist, be found, remain, stay, abide, dwell (with *ātmani na*, 'to be not in one's right mind;' with *manasi* or *hṛidaye*, 'to dwell or be turned or thought over in the mind;'...) ... to be in a partic. condition, be engaged in or occupied with (loc.)... to be intent on, to attend to (dat.)... to stand or be used in the sense of (loc.)... to act, conduct one's self, behave towards,... to act or

> deal with, follow a course of conduct,... show, display, employ, use, act in any way,... to have illicit intercourse with,... to cause to turn or revolve, whirl, wave, brandish, hurl,... to produce with a turning-lathe, make anything round (as a thunderbolt, a pill &c.);... to cause to proceed... take place or be or exist, do perform," etc.

Evocative of the Ṛg Vedic dragon Vṛtra, who guards the underground, underwater caverns of the Asat, preventing all the beings in Asat from coming into existence (Sat, i.e, actuality) until the hero Indra slays it, vṛtti implies the spinning around, circling, which, when stuck (as in the case of Vṛtra), implies blocked, pent up potentialities or problems, but, when allowed to actualize, develops and systematically operates (***pravṛtti***).[34] The circularity of movement, in terms of how the mind karmically repeats itself, Yogācāra calls ***citta-pravṛtti***. Overturning or reversing the karmically generated basis on which this system keeps 'spinning' they call ***āśraya-parāvṛtti***, 'overturning the base.' These terms will be discussed more fully elsewhere.

Saṃ-vṛt again means "to cover up, enclose, hide, conceal,... to shut, close (a door),... to put together or in order, arrange,... to ward off, keep back, restrain, check,... repel."[35] The derivative term ***saṃvara*** means 'keeping back, stopping; a dam, mound, bridge, the act of covering or enclosing or concealing'. Another derivative term, ***saṃvāra***, implies a choking off, and means "covering, concealing, closing up,... compression or contraction of the throat or of the vocal chords (in pronunciation), obtuse articulation;... an obstacle, impediment."[36]

Saṃvṛta, which is sometimes confused with ***saṃvṛti***, (and therefore sometimes substitutes for the latter in texts), carries similar meanings, to wit,[37]

> covered, shut up, enclosed or enveloped in (loc.), surrounded or accompanied or protected by..., well furnished or provided or occupied or filled with,... concealed, laid aside, kept, secured,... restrained, suppressed, retired, withdrawn,... well covered or guarded; contracted, compressed, closed (as the throat),... hidden, ambiguous (but not offensive...);... a secret place,... a closed condition,... ***saṃvārya***, mfn. one

who conceals what ought to be concealed.

For *Saṃvṛti* Monier-Williams offers the following (and I am citing the complete entry):[38]

> *Saṃ-vṛtti*, f. closure, Suśr.; ŚārṅgP.; covering, concealing, keeping secret, Śiś.; Sarvad.; dissimulation, hypocrisy, Amar.; obstruction, H.Yog.; -mot, mfn. able to dissimulate, Śiṣ.; Subh.

It signifies a closure, an enveloping or surrounding which conceals, covers; to dissimulate;[39] or obstruct. "Dissimulate", according to *Webster's Seventh New College Dictionary*, (p. 242) means "to hide under a false appearance: DISSEMBLE, to engage in dissembling." An obstructive, concealing envelopment which dissimulates is suggestive of, among other things, the freudian systematic description of defense mechanisms, the neurotic rechanneling of unresolved, obstructed psychic energies, which, if obsessive, may become all enveloping. For Freud, neurotic symptoms express current repetitions of some originary traumatic experience which the neurotic revisits again and again indirectly through the construction of an interpretation of present experience such that the dynamic forces of the originary trauma become active. The neurotic forces current experience, as it were, to re-create the scene and tensions of an unresolved past experience; but always indirectly, i.e., neurosis dissimulates current eruptions from their evocational origins. The neurotic symptom and its cause may be so thoroughly dissimulated that years of analysis may be required to expose the etiological connection. Further, the deeper the trauma, the more extensive and profound this coloring of contemporary experience will be. At the point where the constructed interpretation of contemporary experience entirely displaces actual conditions, neurosis becomes psychosis.[40] Saṃvṛti is a nightmarish psychosis from which Buddhism proposes to awaken us.

Edgerton takes issue with the etymology 'covering', and instead

offers:[41]

> (= Pali sammuti...) ***convention, general (popular) acceptance*** or ***belief; 'common sense'; conditioned, exoteric, dependent, limited truth*** or ***knowledge,*** often in contrast with paramārtha [emphasis Edgerton's]

He also notes that the tradition has defined it as a synonym for ***prajñapti.*** We will reflect on that later. He also cites a number of passages which treat saṃvṛti as "***consent*** in the sense of a formal vote (of the saṃgha)." This last sense is the one which overlaps with ***vyavahāra,*** which means 'acting, doing, general usage, custom, ordinary life, common practice, a transaction, mundane intercourse, legal proceedings, the ways of the world, convention, consensual agreement,' and so on.[42]

Edgerton proffers this reading as an equivalency for the Pāli saṃmuti. Kalupahana has more recently argued, based on his reading of the Pāli suttas, that ***paramattha*** should be understood in the sense of ultimate fruit, and ***sammuti*** as ***vohāra,*** i.e.,[43]

> The Buddha also recognized that views about good and bad, purity and impurity, are in most cases relative conventions (*S*[***utta***] ***n*** [***ipāta***] 878–894). According to the same text, good (***kusala***) and bad (***akusala***) are conventions that vary depending upon contexts (***sammutiyo puthujjā, Sn*** 897). These are the ways of the world (***loka***), often characterized as ***sammuti, vohāra*** (*D* [***īgha Nikāya***] 3.232) or ***paññatti*** (*S* [***aṃyutta Nikāya***] 4.39–40). [square brackets mine]

Again we see the synonymity of saṃvṛti and prajñapti (paññati).

Edgerton, Sasaki and Kalupahana all agree that the primary meaning of saṃvṛti is 'conventional, everyday affairs,' and not 'closure', basing their claim on the Pāli etymology.[44] This should not distract us from taking note of the following: For better or worse, sammuti was Sanskritized as saṃvṛti which invokes the notion of closure. How the term was understood and used in the Pāli tradition may help us study the Mahāyānic appropriations and reinterpretations of

the term, but the earlier meanings cannot replace or erase the later meanings. Though the term sammuti occurs in the Pāli literature, it receives relatively little if any attention, and was considered to be far less important doctrinally than a plethora of other terms and concepts. The same most definitely cannot be said for Mahāyāna, where, following Nāgārjuna's reduction of the traditional Four (noble) satyas to two (MMK 24.8–10), the notion of the two satyas remains central to virtually all Mahāyānic enterprises. Hence we must look to how the Mahāyānists used the term saṃvṛti, how it functioned in their texts, in order to understand its meaning.

We have seen that the dictionary suggests three basic senses: (1) closure or enclosure, (2) consensual agreement, and (3) the conventional and ordinary. Candrakīrti confirms this. He[45]

> defines *saṃvṛti* as *'Samantādvaraṇam saṃvṛtiḥ'*, meaning 'completely covering'....
> This etymological interpretation is included in the Candrakīrti definition of *saṃvṛti*, which has the following three aspects:
> 1. *Avacchādana* (covering).
> 2. *Anyonyasamāśraya* (mutual relationship).
> 3. *Lokavyavahāra* (daily activities) or *saṃketa* (agreement).

For him, saṃvṛti is that of which śūnyatā is predicated. Correctly understanding that the ordinary is neither inexistent, nor self-existent, while not imagining that śūnyatā or "the absence of self-existence in [the ordinary] itself exists like a thing (*kāṃcid bhāvataḥ*)", constitutes the paramārthic understanding of saṃvṛti.[46]

This said, what is saṃvṛti? Sthiramati, the Yogācāra commentator, in his *ṭīka* to *Madhyānta Vibhāga,* offers a different threefold explanation, one couched in cutting ironic, brilliant phrases.[47] The three he gives are *prajñapti–saṃvṛti, pratipatti–saṃvṛti* and *udbhāvanā–saṃvṛti*. His definitions are worth examining carefully. We will look at them in order, and then together.

[1] Prajñapti–saṃvṛti:

Saṃvṛtir–vyavahāraḥ, prajñapti iti abhidhānam. Arthābhāve' bhidhānamātreṇa vyavahāraḥ prajñapti–saṃvṛtiḥ.

"Saṃvṛti means vyavahāra,..." We have already noted that these three terms, saṃvṛti, vyavahāra and prajñapti, were traditionally treated as synonyms, so at this juncture Sthiramati seemingly is only ieaffirming the traditional definition, and so seems to be offering little more than an edifying tautology. Hence, for the moment, we leave these three terms untranslated, since we as yet have no clue as to how to enter his tautological space. Fortunately, our first clue arrives immediately. He continues, "prajñapti means to 'signify' (***abhidhānam***)." Abhidhānam means to assign a name, to express in language, to signify something with a word. It implies the power of words to point at or indicate that which is not a word. Hence he is saying prajñapti is the power of language to assume a referential role, the power of words to act as signifiers. Immediately he points out that these signifiers are groundless, that there are no corresponding signifieds to which they point or of which they are predicated. "The signifier is utterly (***abhidhāna mātreṇa***) without any existent referent (***artha abhāva***)." The supposed referent (***artha***) of the signifier is utterly (***mātreṇa***) absent (***abhāva***). When this is the case, i.e., when words, expressions are acting as signifiers, pretending to signify and indicate something, but that which they are attempting to indicate is absent in spite of the act of signification, then this is "the conventionalized arena (***vyavahāra***) of prajñapti–saṃvṛti," i.e., the closure of interlocked signifiers devoid of any signifieds.

For Sthiramati the problem of signification is not exclusively linguistic; it is psycholinguistic, and thus symptomatic of all cognitive activity. But for now, note that he need not be claiming that all linguistic or cognitive acts are a priori

referent-less, but only that some cases necessarily are, and it is these which he is labeling prajñapti-saṃvṛti. As discussed in the last chapter, when a multitude of factors are simplified heuristically so that a word or phrase is substituted, that simplified emblem is a prajñapti, a designation, an assigning of a name, a signing, or act of sign-ifying. Prajñaptis are necessary, if not always sufficient conditions for comprehending anything sign-ificant. To formulate doctrine is always to indulge in prajñapti.

> Saṃvṛti means vyavahāra; prajñapti means to 'signify' (*abhidhānam*). [If] the signifier is utterly without any existent referent, [then this is] the conventionalized arena (*vyavahāra*) of prajñapti-saṃvṛti.

Saṃvṛti is vyavahāra. The 'enclosure' encloses a life-world, an existentially complex region, and that life-world (vyavahāra) may be thoroughly and purely nominalistic (prajñapti), which is not to reduce experience to utterance, but to question the underpinnings which language presupposes in order to function. Does the object that I name need to be real apart from my naming of it, or does the sheer act of naming it somehow empower it? Does the object's 'realness' depend on its extra-linguistic ontological existence, or might its power (*śakti*) to function be simply a by-product of the intentionality which cognizes it (as in the case of an hallucination)?

Nor should we think of prajñapti in terms of single words or individual objects. Prajñapti does not simply mean the interpretive projection of a single word or phrase, but involves the imposition of concepts, models, paradigms, rubrics, abstractions, imaginative constructions, in short, all manner of constructed interpretations onto experience such that the imposed supplement supplants what it supplements. The parameters of the life-world are determined by convention, by accord, i.e., communally; they are never private. That they are public means that they are communicated and communicable, i.e., they are radically linguistic.

The referential signifiers insist on being firmly attached to their projected teleological referents. To live in a life-world filled with communicative projected meanings Sthiramati calls ***prajñapti-saṃvṛti***.

[2] Pratipatti-saṃvṛti:

> ***Avidyamāne'rthe'rthābhiniveśaḥ. Pratipattistaya vyavahāraḥ pratipatti-saṃvṛti.***

This definition, which is more concise than the previous one, needs to be broken down. Starting with the term pratipatti, two or three slightly different senses should be distinguished. First of all, it means 'behavior, putting something into practice, performance, a manner of doing something', or praxis, and often connotes 'good behavior', that is, behaving well according to standards or putting standards into behavioral action. It also connotes an action which leads to some consequence; it also implies doing an action precisely because it leads to a particular consequence. Since the standard by which or for which one acts has already been set, pratipatti may be understood as an 'acquiescence', an affirmative 'concession' or 'admission'. It also is frequently used in Buddhist literature for 'treading the correct path' (prati-pāda), i.e., self-development by adhering to and following the course prescribed by Buddhist doctrine. This last sense carries an ironic edge here, however.

Avidya simultaneously evokes the notion of basic nescience (***avidyā***), as well as meaning here 'not known' (a-vidya) or 'not existent'.[48]

Māna- can be taken in several ways: as 'mental' (***manas***), as bloated self-concern, i.e., 'arrogance' or 'pride' (***māna***), etc. But here it is probably also to be understood in the sense of ***mānāpya***, i.e., 'the state of being or making oneself agreeable'. 'Making oneself agreeable' conveniently overlaps with pratipatti's sense of 'acquiescing', 'conforming'; and mānāpya even carries the monastic sense of

making oneself 'agreeable' through actions like penance, i.e., contrite acquiescence. Hence pratipatti and mānāpya in such close proximity will evoke in a monastic reader (the original primary audience), perhaps only subconsciously, a sense of one's assenting to abstract, external principles or standards. It also reinforces the Pāli etymology of sammuti which implied 'thinking together', communal decisions, community agreement.

We may read ***arthe'rtha*** as 'referring to non-referent', i.e., indicating a referent which does not in fact exist. It may also be read simply as 'referent qua referent'. If we break the phrase up differently, so that (1) māne– refers to the self as appropriator, i.e., a noetic intentionality which grasps its object (artha) as 'mine', and (2) artha stands for any intentional object, then ***māne'rthe–*** means 'mine and my objects'. The second arthe, meaning 'referent' would then give the phrase the sense of "taking 'mine and objects' as referents."

Abhiniveśa means 'attachment, grasping, stubbornly holding on to a thing or idea.'

> When general behavior involves attaching to 'my object', [although it is] an inexistent referent, that is the conventional arena of pratipatti–saṃvṛti.

It might also be rendered: "General behavior (even supposedly good behavior, such as penance or following the 'correct path', etc.), when it ignorantly and arrogantly attaches to referents as if they were actual referents, as if they were 'my referents', this is the conventionalized arena of pratipatti–saṃvṛti."

Again, if interpreted in the light of the first verse of the ***Triṃśikā,*** this passage would mean that the lived–world (***vyavahāra***) of pratipatti–saṃvṛti is the world where appropriators (***māno–***) and what they appropriate (***artha***), noesis and noemae, are taken to be real substrative entities, where not only is the appropriational circuit marked by attachment, but the circuit itself is generated

and fueled by attachment (*abhiniveśa*) to the notion that such 'subjects and objects' are real -- when in fact they are not (*avidya... arthe'artha*). The appropriational circuit characteristically involves arrogance, pride (*māna*) and ignorance (*avidyā*) -- suggestive of the three root problematics, hatred (*dveśa*), appropriational intent (*rāga*) and misconception (*moha*), respectively. This is the life-world of behavior, of performance, of group-doing, of *practice* (pratipatti); just as the the previous saṃvṛti was the life-world of its theory. I leave the reader to work out other readings and connotations, and move on to the last type of saṃvṛti described by Sthiramati.

[3] Udbhāvanā-saṃvṛti:

> ***Tathatā diśabdair nirabhilāpyasya dharmadhātoryā saṃsūcanā sodbhāvanā. Tayā dharmadhātor vyavahāra udbhāvanā-saṃvṛtiḥ.***

Ud means to arise, to cause to exist, and ***udbhāvana*** means (1) 'the act of raising up'; (2) 'an announcement or communication'; (3) 'making visible or manifest.' It may also mean (4) 'to ignore, to neglect or disregard, inattention.' That Sthiramati is primarily invoking sense (2) is clear from what he says; but he also insinuates the other three meanings as well. (1) implies that any linguistic (or cognitive) act is constructive. Similarly (3) implies that language makes what is abstract, what is non-cognizable by the five senses conceivable, and hence cognizable by the sixth sense, the mind. Ideas become 'visible, manifest'. Such linguistic trickery always involves risks (viz. 4), notably ignoring or neglecting to pay attention to the substitution of a referent for a word, a projection for an existent, a signifier for an object, a prajñapti for a certain network of conditions, etc. Substitution and displacement invariably involve ignoring or suppressing some crucial aspect of the matter at hand; a heuristic cannot function if one insists on paying attention to its ineluctable difference from the thing it is supposed to represent.

> By using the word (***śabdair***) 'tathatā' (Suchness, just–as–it–is–ness), the not–reducible–to–words (***nirabhilāpya***) dharma–dhātu[49] is indicated (***saṃsūcanā***) and communicated/made visible [etc.; ***sa*** + ***udbhāvanā***]. Following [the word] directly to (***tayā***) the dharma–dhātu is the conventionalized arena of udbhāvanā–saṃvṛti.

Sensation cannot be reduced to words, but certain words may lead us to sensation, as anyone who reads good evocative fiction knows. Sthiramati, it seems to me, is here proposing not just an upāyic theory of language (using expedient heuristics), but is attempting to ground a theory of mythological language. He is attempting to account for the possibility, effectiveness and validity of heuristic language as such. Tathatā does not seem to be understood here as an equivalent for dharma–dhātu; yet it is a word which though semantically and referentially unrelated to dharma–dhātu nonetheless *flows directly in a straight line* (***tayā***) to it. One word leads to another, but not in what can be called a proper referential manner. The significatory relation is neither literal nor figurative. Dharma–dhātu stands for the signifieds that conventional signifiers (prajñapti, etc.) never directly indicate. These are not special signifieds, but the dhātu (existential region) of dharma (experiential components). In other words, dharma–dhātu is precisely what is constitutive of experience, but given in and as experience (and hence, not transcendental). Dharma–dhātu is the ordinary world of experience shorn of misleading interjective misinterpretations. The flowing from tathatā to dharma–dhātu, linguistically speaking, does not offer a literal theory of reference or signification, but a strange mythological language: not quite symbol -- since the line is direct, not indirect -- and nowhere near a literal semantic relation. This is again ironic, since Sthiramati must be aware that the example he has chosen, ***tathatā,*** is an abstract nominal form of the indexical ***tat,*** which indicates the direct (***tayā***) pointing to (***saṃsūcanā***) "this". However, this is not the place to explore further into Sthiramati's odd, and

perhaps unique theory of language.[50]

What is clearly upāyic about this type of saṃvṛti and what most clearly differentiates it from the other two is that this one is thoroughly provisional. It is a disposable means, a raft which should be discarded when one reaches the other shore. It is this means which brings one to paramārtha (for Sthiramati, paramārtha and dharma-dhātu are synonyms). Communication, language, conventionalisms can make evident what otherwise remains unnoticed. This saṃvṛti is like a map, laying out indicators of a region in such a way that access to the actual region is facilitated. It is a life-world where language has the power to make things happen (***udbhāvanā***).

But another model lurks beneath this threefold model. Sthiramati's distinctions, as novel as they are, are informed by another model, one which we discussed in the last chapter. The structural premise of the current model is the trialectical praxis of śīla, samādhi and prajñā. The correspondence between the two models is informative.

The most obvious correspondence is śīla with the second saṃvṛti, i.e., pratipatti-saṃvṛti, since that definition carried strong vinayic overtones. Again notice the ironic, perhaps sarcastic tone of Sthiramati's view of vinayic vyavahāra.

Etymologically prajñā corresponds to prajñapti-saṃvṛti, both sharing the word prajñā. His characterization of the epistemic and linguistic process as an attempted concretization of theory, though groundlessly performed in a referential vacuum, may give an indication of his thoughts on contemporaneous developments in Buddhist thought, namely a more rigorous epistemological, linguistic and logical approach, which, as Candrakīrti later reiterated, often lost sight of its intended goal (artha).

Samādhi, then, must correspond to the last saṃvṛti. But how? This

saṃvṛti is the place where a constructed, conventional emblem, if rightly considered, dissolves into its provisionality, revealing what was to be understood. This saṃvṛti is progressional; it points, and yet never loses sight of its conventionality, its provisionality. Unlike 'false' pratipatti, which only reinforces the fundamental attachments while pretending to offer a path away from them, the udbhāvanā–saṃvṛti capitalizes to the fullest on the heuristic capacities of conventionalization. To participate in the play of language without becoming its victim is samādhi.

If these correspondences are accurate, then we need to account for why prajñā is listed first, and not last. Hidden between the lines is an ironic critique of Buddhism. Śīla, with its strictures and meritorious/demeritorious reward and punishment cosmology, is mere conventionalism, and a fraud. Prajñā, as Sthiramati is here characterizing it, is sheer rampant nominalism, language busy erecting imaginary houses on foundationless lots. Samādhi for the Yogācārin ('Yoga–practitioner') is the domain in which language freely and effectively operates, where it has shed its literalism and its logocentric pretensions. In terms of value, then, samādhi should reasonably top the list. Moreover the three saṃvṛtis can be seen dialectically as a development through theory (prajñapti, prajñā), practice (pratipatti, śīla) and praxis (udbhāvanā, samādhi), and thus 'theory' would necessarily have to listed first.

But a more significant reason may be responsible. The repositioning of prajñā as first in the list (rather than third) is a sign, ironically, of its ascendancy above the other two factors. Sthiramati may either be confirming and repeating the privileging of prajñā, as was conventionally done at that time, or he may be critiquing that privileging, and making a counter–argument to privilege or at least re–value samādhi. Given that his comments about ***prajña***–pti–saṃvṛti treat it in

less than extolary fashion, it seems likely that he is being critical. We will return later in this chapter to the issue of the privileging of prajñā, but first saṃvṛti and the two satyas still require further clarification.

Sthiramati's Yogācāric formulation is in concert with Nāgārjuna's Mādhyamika, though an examination of that relation is beyond the scope of this work.[51] Nonetheless, the Mādhyamikan contribution to the issue of two satyas and its relation with Yogācāra should not be overlooked.

Almost immediately after Hsüan-tsang's return to China, the dividing lines between Yogācāra and Mādhyamika in India became less clear, though some form of polemic continued to be waged by each against the supposed doctrines of the other. For instance "by the middle of the eighth century Madhyamaka works show signs of a more explicit attempt to include Yogācāra elements in a Madhyamaka synthesis."[52] Even earlier, one can view the rift between Bhāvaviveka and Candrakīrti as a dispute over the infiltration of Yogācāric theory into Madhyamakan expression, Candrakīrti's attacks being aimed at the most epistemo-psychological, i.e., Yogācāric, aspects of Bhāvaviveka's thought (e.g., the notion of ***ekacitta,*** 'one mind'). Even Candrakīrti himself did not escape Yogācāric influence, and passages such as the problematic commentary to MMK 15.2 amply illustrate this.[53] On the other side, Yogācārin thinkers not only shared the Prajñāpāramitā literature with Madhyamakans, but many of the important Yogācāric writers, such as Sthiramati, wrote commentaries on Mādhyamika works. Further, Yogācāra took Madhyamakan critiques very seriously, and in response gradually jettisoned many of their controverted doctrines, e.g., ālaya-vijñāna, the hundred dharmas and abhidharmic categorization, etc. Both schools developed by mutual borrowing and mutual criticism. While Candrakīrti's style of Madhyamaka rejected any proffering of syllogistic arguments, Bhāvaviveka's Madhyamaka

advocated their use. In the development of logical and epistemological method, the fusion of the Madhyamaka and Yogācāra is most apparent, since it was the Yogācārin tradition, starting with Vasubandhu and developing through Dignāga, Dharmakīrti, etc., which fashioned the logical and epistemological style of 'Buddhist logic'. By the time of Śāntarakṣita, the intermixing had became so thorough that it is hard today to say whether he is primarily Yogācārin, Madhyamakan, or perhaps even a Sautāntrika hybrid. And here, in the arena of epistemological issues and the construction of epistemological methods, the two schools most nearly intertwined. Whether to take the two satyas as primarily epistemological or ontological notions is still argued by scholars today. The implications of adopting either stance are significant.

The distinction between an ontological and an epistemological reading of the two satyas was rarely if ever clearly maintained by Buddhist thinkers. Frequently, especially when used in epistemological discussions, the two satyas suffer from a drastic reductionism, with saṃvṛti-satya signifying delusive or incorrect cognitions, and paramārtha-satya signifying genuine or 'enlightened' cognition. Not only are these two types of cognition differentiated, but the reduction is taken one step further, and the 'object' or 'objects' of either cognition also becomes differentiated. Delusive cognition yields a delusive object, and genuine cognition cognizes a genuine object

Whenever epistemology begins to talk about delusive vs. genuine cognition, appearance vs. reality, it is talking ontology.

Ontologies either assert unique particulars or they assert one unique particular. An ontology must either be of this world, i.e., account for, participate in and contribute to its diversity, or else it must be radically other than the world ot common divaricational experience. In either case, the ontology is founded on a

dichotomous assertion and involves bifurcational, discriminatory and radical differentiation. On the one hand, if it is divaricational and pluralistic, differentiation constitutes its intrinsic nature. On the other hand, if the ontology proposes non-divarication, its non-differentiality so radically differs it from the ordinary world that this rift, this dichotomy itself becomes so constitutive of its essence that the dichotomy must be admitted as its formal cause. Because experience is pluralistic, admitting of many distinct contents, at distinct moments, in distinct ways, etc., ontologies are either explicitly and intrinsically pluralistic, or they are grounded on the radical and absolute dichotomy of diversity over and against 'the ONE true reality'. If the dichotomy is not adequately accounted for, such that something non-differential could be maintained in spite of its obvious, profound difference from the diversity of the sensorium, then to further posit this radically distinct and different nature as non-difference would be nonsensical, a non sequitor. If a reality is so radically different from how it appears, what accounts for this difference?

The genius of Advaita-Vedānta was not in its positing of a non-differential Brahman, but rather in Śaṅkara's brilliant appropriation of the Buddhist critique of cognitive discrimination, from which he developed his theory of ***māyā*** as ***adhyāsa*** (supplemental displacement). Śaṅkara attacked differentialism in an attempt to prove that difference itself is a distorted supplementary displacement, a 'dissimulation' of what actually admits of no other, what is non-differentiable. He attempted to logically prove that 'difference' was an incoherent and invalid category. For him that which is non-dual and without difference substantially and essentially self-identically and tautologically self-abides. It is Brahman.

On the other hand, the Buddhists attacked cognitive

differentiationalism in order to highlight that the distinctions we hold most dear are the symptoms of our deepest problems and anxieties. They are fantasy projections, wishes and desires seeking fulfilment, not actual, real things demanding our acknowledgement. Buddhists might describe the problem in the following terms. Cognitive differentiationalism serves to sharply and rigidly etch boundaries *between* things, and these projected boundaries are a necessary cause for any theory of svabhāva, 'own-being': essential, self-defining nature. Without sharp delineations between one thing and another, it would be impossible to posit a distinct essence (*svabhāva*) to either. A thing can have a unique essence only if the thing itself is unique, if the boundary between it and other things is firmly and clearly etched. Essentialism, in turn, encourages us to ignore the conditional interchange or śūnyatā which actually does account for there being a world (*paratantra*). Once we can maintain the coherence and validity of svabhāvic entities, which are as eternal as the (platonic) ideations that conceive them, we can then posit that our own true self (*ātman*) is likewise eternal, and our deepest fear -- impermanence and death -- has been conceptually, if not actually, overcome. Our fantasies distract us, they 'dissimulate' our anxieties, our duḥkha. We create a cognitive construction with which, to slightly pervert Pascal's wager, we try to bluff death. Buddhism's critique of cognitive differentiationalism was designed to call this bluff.

Vedānta used the Buddhist critique of differentialist cognition to assert and affirm a single ontological substance at the base of all appearances. The Buddhists used the critique to negate that and similar substances.

But how do we deal with the differential world of experience if all our differentiations are suspect and perhaps baseless? Like Sthiramati, we may learn to exploit the provisional conventionalisms of communicatory interchange, rather

than being their victim. But can the actual world, if there is such a thing, be indicated in any way, despite the ban on differentiation? Buddhism proposed three answers. One was the two satya distinction, another was the notion of tathatā, and the last was the theory of apoha. We will deal with tathatā later in this chapter. An adequate discussion of apoha would take us beyond the scope of this work.

If paramārtha as a mode of discourse (*vyāhāra*) seems to guarantee that something can be said, what is that something?[54] Initially, Buddhists referred to what can be said in sensory terms, e.g., ***ekarāsa,*** experience neutralized of pain-pleasure conditioning has "one taste".[55] Ekarāsa converged with notions of tathatā and dharma-dhātu, and soon, for any Buddhist who wanted one, the carefully constructed non-ontological discourse of the Buddhist critique was providing a full-blown ontological language, complete with Absolutes and teleological Realities. Nāgārjuna, who must share in the responsibility for this development, since it was often his words which were cited as scriptural authority for these latter-day metaphysical claims, nonetheless clearly tried to abort this entire mutation with statements such as MMK 18.10-11:

> ***Pratītya yad yad bhavati na hi tāvat tad eva tat/***
> ***na cānyad api tat tasmān nocchinnaṃ nāpi śāśataṃ//*** 10
> ***Anekārtham anānārtham anucchedam aśāśvataṃ/***
> ***etat tal lokanāthānāṃ buddhānāṃ śāsanāmṛtṃ//*** 11

which Kalupahana translates:[56]

> Whatever that arises depending upon whatever, that is not identical nor different from it. Therefore, it is neither annihilated nor eternal. [10] That is without a variety of meanings or one single meaning, it is not annihilation nor is it eternal. Such, it is reminisced, is the immortal message of the Buddhas, the patrons of the world. [11]

Kalupahana is translating ***artha*** as "meaning". Whatever conditionally and dependently arises, that cannot be indicated either as a single or as multiple

referents (artha). There is neither one underriding reality, nor is reality the aggregation of absolutely discrete, multiple singularities.

Although rarely recognized as such, Nāgārjuna uses and ratifies the tri-dhātu model described in chapter two, particularly the meditative program of the ārūpa-dhātu. The movement from 'infinite spatiality' to 'infinite consciousness' to 'nothing' to 'neither with nor without associative-thinking' is directly analogous to the movement through the 'four alternatives' to the cognitive reductions (e.g., highlighting prapañca in stark relief) to śūnyatic negations to the neither/nor aporia of Madhyamic silence. Let's flesh this out a little.

The influence of the kāma-loka diminishes through the rūpa-loka, where 'objects' are characterized by their mutual 'resistance' (***pratigha***), their mutual obstruction. Even as the dichotomous extremes of vedanā are being neutralized (***upekṣa***), things are still ultimately constituted by their mutual resistance, by their boundaries, by the lines which are drawn between them. In ārūpa-loka the resistance, the mutual obstruction disappears into limitless spatiality, the matrix and ground of the possibility that there be any distinctions whatsoever.

To move from rūpa-dhātu to ārūpa-dhātu is analogous to moving from the conceptual space of fixed, absolutistic positions to the matrix of conceptual possibilities, viz. the four alternatives (***catuṣkoṭi***).[67] Instead of viewing 'possibility' through the metaphor of etheric spatiality, Madhyamaka considers 'possibility' in terms of the four propositional alternatives. The cosmological and meditational contexts of the model are sublimated in Mādhyamika. The soteric intent of the ārūpa-dhātu's cosmological and meditational strata becomes subsumed in a new soteric intent: The laying bare of the systematic myths and arguments with which we hide from anxieties. Abandoning the metaphor of a progressional ladder which

the seeker climbs, the focus becomes the undermining of the proliferation of linguistic, theoretical masks (***prapañca–dṛṣṭi***). The explicitly psychological character of Early Buddhism shifts in Madhyamaka to a demonstration of the feebleness and incoherency with which we rationalize and become entrenched in our prejudices, such that the propensity to self–justify one's own prejudices in any and every sphere, from religion and politics to cosmology and economics, from musical tastes to food preferences, from the grandest ideals to the basest habits, from metaphysics to social structure, in all spheres, is irrevocably undermined.

Mādhyamika seeks to demonstrate that all views (***dṛṣṭi***) are false views, that all views arise through the use of the four alternatives (all positions are simply fortified attachments to one of the four alternatives), and that the four possibilities are inherently self–contradictory and thus fallacious. To master the four alternatives, then, is to master the possibilities of any and all positions. Since positions, like rūpa–dhātu, are constituted by mutual resistance, animosity and aversion (***pratigha***), Nāgārjuna astutely attacks this foundational condition, the intersticive lines which bifurcate all extremest positions. 'Extreme' here means at either end of a pole, at either extreme; and since all positions are constituted by mutual opposition, all positions, insofar as they define themselves through their opposition or relation to an 'other' position, are extreme. To define themselves entirely apart from any other position, if not utterly impossible, still presupposes (i) other positions from which to be non–differentiated, and (ii) the opposition between self–contained (internal) and relational (external) explanations.

Positions are perspectives (***dṛṣṭi***) or points of view (***darśana***), arising from and feeding into experience (***gocara***). All possibilities are grounded in cognition (***vijñāna***), and cognition's propensity to super–intend, its insistence that there be possibilities so that it may express preferences and attach to these, in

turn is grounded in its radical contingency, a contingency it imparts as an essential quality of everything it directly purveys. Only because cognition is variable, i.e., able to change and alter, can it entertain cognitional possibilities. Were it constant such that no difference in either content, mood, or focus ever occurred, not only would cognitions of the world disappear,[58] but cognition would be entirely divorced from any and all possibilities since an unaltering cognitive faculty could not keep track of or respond to an altering, changing sensorium. Its contingency is its variability, and its variability is the source of its possibilities. The realization of this contingency is analogous to moving from limitless spatiality (the open possibilities of any position and the raw possibility that there be positions) to limitless consciousness (the cognitional economy in which positions occur and operate),[59] to the 'nothing' which undergirds it. All cognitions are contingent, not only in the sense of human mortality, but because they could always be otherwise. Though I see a grey object at this moment, at some other time I may see something else. Had some other object been at hand, or had the light, or my eyes, or any number of conditions been otherwise, even at this moment I would be seeing something else. Cognition depends upon the cognitive object, the cognitive organ and the cognitive consciousness which arises through their contact. If one argues that while cognition is contingent for the reasons stated, on the other hand consciousness is not contingent, since its phenomenological structure, e.g., to be appropriative, to have horizons, to locate itself in a perceptual field, etc., are not contingent, but necessary, essential features of consciousness,[60] then the Buddhist would remind us that its very existence is contingent. The structure of consciousness is not self-defined; it, like consciousness, arises dependent on other cognitory conditions. It is thorroughly contingent. Consciousness, the sheer fact that "experiencing" takes place, is

neither permanent nor eternal; it arises in one moment dependent on conditions, and then ceases. In another moment, another consciousness arises. That one moment conditions the next can be metaphorically expressed as a consciousness-stream (***citta-santāna***), which, like Heraclitus' river, because it is moving and changing, never retains any fixed identity beyond the moment.

Nāgārjuna, then, follows the tri-dhātu model. Conative (a.k.a. kāma-loka) and cognitive (a.k.a. rūpa-loka) barriers are attacked, exposing the conditions which provide the barriers (attaching to any of the four alternatives, a.k.a. ārūpa-loka). The psycho-cognitive-linguistic basis for these conditions, viz. ***prapañca***, ***vikalpa***, etc., is attacked by marshalling the force of the nothing, the contingency, exposing all positions to the sheer fact that they could have been otherwise, and if logically coherent would be. The incoherency of all positions is precisely their contingency, i.e., that each embodies its own contradiction and undoing at its core in some essential way. Essence ***as*** essence provides its own problematic; it establishes itself on the grounds of its own erasure. Linguistically, all 'necessary' statements are contingent, since all statements as statements imply and are contextualized by their contrary, their inverse. Language, and especially logic, doubles reality: for every x there logically inheres an affirmation ***and*** a negation, a true and a false. Its essence is never apart from this duplicity. The two-valued logic which Nāgārjuna employs (or deploys) is a formal statement of contingency: yes or no, true or false, like so or otherwise. The negational flavor of Mādhyamika, which has terrified its opponents and prompted them to mislabel it as 'nihilism' (usually as an excuse for not having to deal with the thrust of Mādhyamikan arguments), derives from the ārūpa-dhātu's 'nothing'.

The nothing gives way to utter marginality, to 'neither associative-thinking nor not-associative-thinking'. Similarly the 'Diamond

Truth–shredder' negational logic of Nāgārjuna gives way to aporetic living, to the indeterminacy which is freedom. Mādhyamika is frequently characterized as holding the 'neither–nor' position. If Mādhyamika was consistent, this would be impossible. However statements by Nāgārjuna, Candrakīrti and others can easily be construed this way: e.g., MMK 18.11, "without many meanings or a single meaning..."; or 25.10,[61] "The teacher has spoken of relinquishing both becoming [***bhavasya***] and other–[than–] becoming [***vibhavasya***]. Therefore, it is proper to assume that freedom is neither existence nor non–existence"; etc. Candrakārti writes:[62]

> Is there then no reasoned argument (***upapatti***) for the wise?
>
> How could we say whether there is or there is not? The higher truth, for the wise, is a matter of silence (***tuṣṇīṃbhāva***). How then would everyday language, reasoned or unreasoned, be possible in that realm?

He also writes:[63]

> Therefore all things are not to be taken either as devoid of being or as non–devoid; individuals are neither real beings nor unreal beings; this is the middle way.

Clearly he is taking the neither/nor formula as equivalent to the middle way (***madhyama***). And elsewhere he characterizes the neither/nor formulation as the most approximate to the 'truth', formulated for those penultimate to full Awakening.[64] One could offer apologetic interpretations of such passages, but, there they are.

The penultimate -- whether conceptual, samādhic, or linguistic -- is characterized in both the tri–dhātu model and Mādhyamika as neither/nor, a neither–nor which is hulled from a series of radical negations.

Marginality, as 'neither saṃjñā nor asaṃjñā' (ārūpa–dhātu) or 'neither bhāva nor abhāva' (Mādhyamaka), becomes the penultimate realization. In the

Theravādin tri-dhātu model the highest ārūpa-jhāna enables the samāpattis which lead to the attainment of arhatship. In Madhyamaka, the neither/nor position becomes the least abhorrent propositional stance, the most correct way of saying something short of silence, the expression for and by the understanding of those just short of full Awakening. Marginality here means primarily the recognition of a margin without reifying that margin as the perimeter of a closure.

But Candrakīrti's first passage concerning the 'higher truth' and 'everyday language' returns us to the issue at hand, the problem of the two satyas.

Despite the fact that ***paramārtha*** should not to be considered as something radically other to ***saṃvṛti,*** i.e., it signals more an epistemic shift of focus than a different set of ontological referents, again and again Buddhists could not resist entertaining and espousing dichotomous misinterpretations. For instance, in China before Hsüan-tsang's day, during the Liang Dynasty (502-557), the two satyas were already thoroughly separated and ontologized.[65]

In a similar vein Broido traces out the following problematic in Indian and Tibetan Mādhyamika:[66]

> There is... the familiar though unclear Madhyamika relationship in which ***vyavahāra-satya*** is the basis or the means for the attainment of paramārtha-satya (MK XXIV.8, MMV VI.80 &c.). This vyavahāra-satya is usually identified with saṃvṛti-satya. This identification gives rise to many... problems...
>
> The idea that ordinary everyday cognition is ***really*** (***paramārthatas, samyag-***) delusive, and that some quite different kind of cognition is ***really satya*** (paramārtha-satya) is an ancient one in India. The oldest sense of "vyavahāra-satya" is perhaps just that of ordinary everyday satya. [Broido has made no attempt yet to define 'satya'] The question arises as to how paramārtha-satya is possible... [Nāgārjuna at once denies that there can be any single or any series of ordinary cognitions which cause one to attain paramārtha-satya (MK XXIV.8), and yet] according to him, it is ***only on the basis of ordinary everyday cognition*** that paramārtha-satya is possible....

> [emphasis Broido's] [T]o spell this connection out Candrakīrti [made] use of the notions of levels (*avasthā*) and stages (*krama*), distinguishing between saṃvṛti-satya for the ārya [nobles] and for the pṛthagjana [ordinary folk] and between saṃvṛti-satya and *mere* saṃvṛti (*saṃvṛti-mātra*). In this way "saṃvṛti-satya" acquired a sense different from the normal one of "vyavahāra-satya".... Saṃvṛti-satya became the preserve of more advanced practitioners (bodhisattvas &c.) and was seen not merely as a necessary condition for paramārtha-satya, but as its cause. Treating the connection as causal (e.g. MMV VI.80)... introduces new problems; for instance it becomes difficult to understand what VI.23 could mean by saying that saṃvṛti-satya is delusive (*mṛṣa*). These problems were never properly resolved by Candrakīrti.
>
> In Tibet... the connection between the cognition of ordinary people and the saṃvṛti-satya of the āryas, which had been weakened by Candrakīrti, was now disrupted; the break in the chain of causal stages, which we already saw with Nāgāruna, has [sic] reappeared....
> Tsong-kha-pa held that it is implicit in Candrakīrti's theory of two satyas that two different senses of *satya* have to be kept in mind and distinguished, in addition to the straightforward one connected with ordinary veridical cognition. According to Mi-bskyod rDo-rje and Padma dKar-po, this disambiguation claim is little better than an admission that the interpretation is internally incoherent. [square brackets mine]

A little later Broido spells out some implications using the famous rope/snake analogy.

> It may help to illustrate the Sanskrit and Tibetan vocabulary... if we outline the standard Indian example of a delusive perceptual situation, the rope/snake illusion. This example is normally treated from the point of view of the cognition of the ordinary person (pṛtagjana, byis-pa) and in terms of normal linguistic and other conventions (vyavahāra, tha-snyad). In conditions of poor illumination, at night perhaps, a person sees what is in fact a rope, but mistakes it for a snake. The non-existent snake is sometimes said to be an *abhūtavastu*; seeing it, the person may become nervous, and generally on this basis (*ālambana*, BHS [Buddhist-Hybrid Sanskrit] *ārambaṇa*) all sorts of mental activity (*abhūta vastu nimittārambaṇa manasikāra*) may occur.[67] This perceptual situation and/or the associated cognition and/or the object of knowledge (*jñeya*, shes-bya, here the non-existent snake) and/or the referent of the cognitive state (*jñeyārtha*, shes-bya'i don, here probably the imagined snake) may all be said to be *delusive* (moṣa, mṛṣa; slu-ba, brdzun-pa). The idea of these English, Sanskrit

> and Tibetan words is always that although there appears to be a snake, in fact there is none; although the situation seems to yield knowledge of a snake, in fact it does not. The opposite of these words is *veridical* (satya, bden-pa); *these* words apply to perceptual situations and their referents &c in those cases which do, in fact, yield the knowledge which they seem to yield. As I said, the normal use of the rope/snake example is in the context of ordinary cognition. But it is also used *as a simile* for the delusiveness (*moṣa* &c) of ordinary cognition from a "higher" transwordly (lokottara, 'jig-rten-las 'das-pa) point of view. Paramārtha-satya, then, as our texts will say, is what is *really* (paramārthatas, don-dam-par; samyag-, yag-dar-par) non-delusive (apramoṣa &c) or veridical (satya); and as Tsong-kha-pa emphasized, there is the problem of saying coherently what this means. Here the rope/snake does not help much. For while we can make more explicit what it is for a cognition to be conventionally veridical (vyavahāra-satya, tha-snyad-kyi bden-pa), this explication is concerned with the relationships *among* ordinary everyday cognitions, and does not provide us with any basis for going outside the ordinary everyday realm to something else. This difficulty has made Nāgārjuna's assertion that vyavahāra-satya is the basis for paramārtha-satya into a puzzle for all later writers on Madhyamaka and has motivated the many attempts to introduce a notion of saṃvṛti-satya distinct, in some nontrivial sense, from ordinary everyday cognition or its referent.

Even with Broido's careful and sensitive reflection on the terms and the controversy,[68] Nāgārjuna's sense escapes him, as it apparently escaped some important Indian and Tibetan Buddhists before him. Like them, he assumes that some definitive separation of the two satyas is necessary. He construes Nāgārjuna's statement that "it is *only on the basis of ordinary everyday cognition* that paramārtha-satya is possible" to mean that saṃvṛti-satya is a springboard from which one jumps into the depths of paramārtha-satya. Saṃvṛti becomes something provisional that is elsewhere or elsewise to paramārtha. They are regarded and treated as radically separate items.

Let us examine Nāgārjuna's actual words:[69]

> *Vyavahāram anāśritya paramārtho na deśyate/*
> *paramārtham anāgamya nirvāṇaṃ nādhigamyate//*

> If not based on the conventional (*vyavahāra*), paramārtha cannot be explicated (lit. 'taught').
> If not comprehending paramārtha, nirvāṇa cannot be attained.

Notice that the term used here is *vyavahāra*, not *saṃvṛti*, which, since the context of the passage is a discussion of the two satyas, indicates that for Nāgārjuna the two terms, saṃvṛti and vyavahāra, were basically interchangeable, despite conflicting claims to the contrary proffered in the subsequent tradition. Broido's interpretation of this passage, that paramārtha is only *possible* on the basis of saṃvṛti may be confusing a point about language for an ontological claim. Nāgārjuna does not seem to be saying that paramārtha *as such* depends on saṃvṛti; but merely that the linguistic expressions which will introduce and make coherent *the notion of* paramārtha depend on a commonly accepted conventional linguistic system – or else communication of any sort would be impossible.

While this kārikā seems to be little more than a statement that in order to achieve nirvāṇa one must comprehend paramārtha, the understanding of which is grounded on the establishment of linguistic and conceptual conventions, nuances of this passage generated material for controversy and debate ever since. Candrakīrti's illustration that saṃvṛti is like a container which holds the water (paramārtha) for the one who desires water, reinforces the impression that saṃvṛti is merely a provisional outer husk for some substantially separate, more highly valued, essential quencher of human thirst (*tṛṣṇa*).[70]

Moreover Broido seems to presuppose that this separation must mark an opposition, since the only justification he offers for reading satya as 'veridical' is that this is the opposite of the terms he has associated with saṃvṛti, and he virtually considers satya and paramārtha to be tautological synonyms ["Paramārtha-satya... is what is *really* (paramārthatas...) non-delusive (apramoṣa) or veridical (satya)"]. Saṃvṛti-satya is differentiated from saṃvṛti-mātra by the

fact that the former is observed, more or less, from the paramārthic perspective. 'Veridical' is a clever, but thoroughly untextual proposal for either satya or paramārtha. This is all the more disappointing since he shows elsewhere in this article that he has a keen sense of the *textual* and *philosophic* nuances of a number of critical terms, as well as an ability and willingness to wrestle with the problems that arise when attempting to give due attention to the competing demands made by textual and philosophic concerns.[71] Both demand fidelity, though their demands may be mutually exclusive; conversely, sometimes only a keen philosophic sensibility will be able to open up a text's philological dimensions.

The assumed separation of paramārtha and saṃvṛti leads to the assumption that not only are they separable perspectives or ways of viewing things, but that their objects also differ. No matter how paramārtha and saṃvṛti are interpreted, as ontology or as epistemology, they are invariably associated with how experience is cognized and understood, and thus for epistemological coherency the 'object' of either kind of cognition or understanding should be defined. Almost immediately this question becomes confused (by Broido and some of his sources) with the question of genuine vs. delusive cognition, as if the question of saṃvṛti and paramārtha paralleled the notion of a fregian *Bedeutung* (referent), viz. distinguishing true from false. Given such an dichotomous assumption, paramārtha necessarily must be 'true', which leaves saṃvṛti to bear the burden of falsehood.

This lies at the core of Broido's stated difficulties with Candrakīrti's text ("it becomes difficult to understand what VI.23 could mean by saying that saṃvṛti-satya is delusive"). If saṃvṛti-satya is delusive it should not be the cognitive object of a paramārthic vision, though elsewhere Candrakīrti and subsequent commentators make that claim.[72] But the demand that both claims

cannot be properly offered at one and the same time revolves around a lack of semantic clarity as to the use of 'delusion' (*mṛṣā*) in this context. 'Delusive' may be interpreted either as (a) the context and value of a cognition, such that a delusive cognition is by definition ***a mistaken cognition*** -- the cognizer either cognizes an object which is not actually present, or else fails to cognize an object which is; or it signifies (b) the actual property of a type of cognition or perspective, such that the distortions or so-called delusory factors of the cognition are recognized as such. In this case the cognition, though involving a 'distorted representation', remains clear about the fact of the distortion; it is an ***accurate, non-mistaken cognition*** whose content happens to be a distortion and recognized as such. For instance, when one knows a particular drawing is an optical illusion, one may still perceive the 'illusion' while no longer being *fooled* by it.

For example, the famous illusion where a pencil or straight stick is partially submerged in water produces the perception of a discontinuity between the unsubmerged and the submerged parts. The part in the water bends away at a different angle than the part above the water. To be 'fooled' is to think that what one sees is an accurate presentation of the condition of the pencil; this leads to interesting riddles when the pencil is gradually and repeatedly raised and lowered into the water. The pencil is continuously transformed by its baptism! Yet whatever part leaves the water returns to its pre-baptismal shape. Once we realize that the changes we perceive reflect the conditions by which the pencil is perceived rather than the pencil itself, we may begin to investigate the 'truth' of the illusion. One 'truth' of the perception is that water and air refract light differently, and that their seemingly shared transparency is not shared, but causes us to overlook that they will deliver light to us differently. The media, not the

pencil have changed. But, unless we are thorough naive realists, we probably already knew that at the beginning, though we forgot to consider it, or perhaps we didn't 'scientifically' understand the media's refractive properties. But because of this illusion we discover and now know this to be the case. Hence the 'truth' of the illusion is that it demonstrates that for human vision the transparency of air and water are not equivalent.

Similarly one may recognize a lie for what it is, which turns it into a kind of truth. When, for instance, a woman lies about her age, she has at the same time told us a truth, or indeed several truths: What value she places on various ages, such as youth, etc.; How she wishes to be considered by others; Her sense of self-security or lack of it; Her wish to be or be perceived as younger than she actually is; etc. If one knows how to look, the false proposition accurately and truthfully expresses a great deal about the woman. The lie expresses a truth.[73]

Broido is aware of these issues. He discusses the options outlined above as (a) (mistaken cognition) and (b) (cognition with distorted content recognized as such), and understands the need to "distinguish between a delusive referent and one experienced as delusive" (p. 43). He also recognizes that separating the two satyas leads to a correlative separation of their 'objects'. Tsong-kha-pa sometimes argued that though the referent-objects (***artha***) for saṃvṛti-satya and paramārtha-satya might be different, the artha's ***dharmin*** (lit. 'what holds a dharma') was the same in either case. Broido translates the following passage:[74]

> So what is the point of analyzing saṃvṛti-satya as attained by delusive cognition (MMV [Madhyamakāvatāra] VI.23)? It is attained by a conventional means of knowledge [****vyavahāra-pramāṇa***] which assesses a delusive object (artha). Out of the previously explained two svabhāvas or svarūpas, paramārtha-satya is the one which assesses

> the real object (artha) by means of a reasoned cognition and so reaches it, and this is explained under the verse "***vikalpitam yattimiraprabhavāt***.." [MMV VI.29]. It is said that (of these two svarūpas) the one which is attained by a conventional means of knowledge which sees a delusive object (artha) is saṃvṛti-satya. Though the substrata [dharmin] attained in paramārtha and saṃvṛti-(satya) are spoken of separately, ***they are attained as one and do not arise as two.*** [emphasis Broido's; square brackets mine]

To follow Tsong-kha-pa's line of thinking, which met with much criticism in Tibet, the question of ***where*** to separate the two satyas becomes crucial. As perspectives they are distinct; and though their objects are superficially different, on a deeper, seemingly metaphysical level, the 'substrata' of these objects are identical. Since the almost universal understanding of paramārtha-satya took it as necessitating a culminating vision which was non-dual, the two satyas had to be ultimately identical as well as perspectivally different. The ***Saṅdhinirmocana Sūtra,*** which probably introduced many of the concepts which later were considered characteristically Yogācāric such as tri-svabhāva, already wrestled with this issue, but managed to avoid this type of ontological speculation.[75]

If Broido's reading of Tsong-kha-pa is correct, then this metaphysicalized, substrative realm of identity is all that prevents Tsong-kha-pa from being labelled a dualist.[76]

> "...it is a brute fact that there are two kinds of object (artha): the ordinary one attained by a conventional cognition, and the "awareness-particular" (ye-shes-kyi khyad par, *jñānaviśeṣa) which is attained in paramārtha-satya; and so, since there are two kinds of object, there must be two kinds of cognition which cognize them.... [Since] Tsong-kha-pa insisted [that Saṃvṛti-satya and paramārtha-satya as] two cognitions do have separate referents (artha) – even though they may be aspects of one and the same substratum (gzhi) – the balance of the evidence seems to be that he [Tsong-kha-pa] did regard the two cognitions as separate.

The cognizer and the cognized are different in cognition, but substratively identical!

We have cited Broido's text at length for several reasons. First, it has efficiently brought us into proximity of the basic issues. Secondly, his text does not merely state the problem, but also exemplifies it. Third, his formulation contains some undeveloped seeds which we can sprout here.

His article provides some useful semantic distinctions which help clarify the disputes which arose from differing interpretations of the two satyas.[77] Rather than discuss those interpretations further, which were all later than Hsüan-tsang's visit to India, let us move into what is typically Yogācāric in his exposition, though he neither identifies nor seems to recognize it as such.

The rope/snake analogy is usually used to explain and clarify the Yogācāra tri-svabhāva theory. But here we will only examine a Sanskrit term (or compound of terms) which he offered in his exposition, and unpack some of its significance. Re-citing what was quoted earlier:

> The non-existent snake is sometimes said to be an ***abhūtavastu***; seeing it, the person may become nervous, and generally on this basis (***ālambana***, BHS ***ārambaṇa***) all sorts of mental activity (***abhūta vastu nimittārambaṇa manasikāra***) may occur.

He has alluded to possible connotations of most of the terms, but he has not explicated them precisely, and certain terms, such as ***nimitta***, he ignores altogether. Let us examine the phrase ***abhūta vastu nimittārambaṇa manasikāra*** carefully.

Abhūta signifies the projection of a non-existent entity onto a locus, or projecting something into a locus in which it is not present, such that we perceive it to be present there (though it is not). Hence it means more than simply an inexistent or non-existent object. It also involves (i) the place of projection, (ii) the desire producing the projection; (iii) the recognition that the so-called 'non-existent' projected object is only one factor of the abhūta. The

point is that the so-called abhūta-object need not necessarily be something a priori inexistent, such as impossibilities or chimeras like round squares, unicorns, etc. For the snake to be abhūta does not mean that snakes per se are inexistent; such a claim would obviously be absurd. Moreover, the ***power*** of the so-called illusion -- namely that one goes through all the physical and emotional fears and discomforts when encountering an imaginary snake as one would if encountering a real snake; the encounter is identical, only the ontological status of the referent of the experience is different -- arises from the fact that we take the not-really-a-snake to be a real snake. Since we know snakes are dangerous, even lethal, our fear of dying impels us to devote all our attention to the 'snake'. Investing this attention allows the 'illusion' to grip us, to hold our attention, to grab and keep our attention. It is an illusion because, though dangerous snakes may be lurking elsewhere, the rope which is frightening us is not one of them. Abhūta simply means that an object which seems to be cognized in such and such a place does not in fact actually exist ***in that place***. The ***abhūta-parikalpa*** or 'imaginative cognitive construction of inexistents [such that they occupy the place of "reality"]' is a key Yogācāra doctrine.[78]

Vastu is one of the many Sanskrit words usually translated as 'object', and its semantic spread covers everything from 'thing' to 'substratum of a perception'. Hence its precise meaning must be determined within specific contexts. Here ***abhūtavastu*** means that the object of a cognition is a mere projection, and what seems to (objectively) underlie that cognitive object is inexistent. ***Abhūtavastu*** means that the actual object implied in the cognition is, in fact, absent. The snake, though "perceived", is not in fact present in the locus in which it is being perceived.[79]

Nimitta signifies the characteristic sensorial marks of an object (e.g., a

snake's color or shape, etc.); ***ārambaṇa*** signifies the 'objective–pole' of a cognition, which, Husserl reminds us, is never outside consciousness, but is a formal requirement of consciousness to be consciousness (*Ideen* I). Since consciousness is always 'consciousness of', it must always have an object shaping it. A cognition is, in part, shaped by its content. For someone who is not color blind, a red dress in proper light demands that it be seen as red. The conditions by which a cognition occurs shape the features of that cognition. A clear, unobstructed, spatially proximate, properly lit view of a rope by a calm individual will not yield a snake. These 'content–conditions' which "support" a cognition are the ***ālambana***. As both Husserl and Yogācāra remind us, the function of a content–condition can be as adequately fulfilled by a hallucination, dream or non–veridical content as by a veridical content. In the ***Viṃśatikā*** Vasubandhu argues, for instance, that dreams can cause ejaculation (nocturnal emissions) just as effectively as erotic waking activities.[80] Hence neither the ālambana nor its nimitta need be objectively external to the consciousness which cognizes it for it to function. And since functioning is the Buddhist criterion for reality, we must entertain the interesting possibility that cognitions may be non–veridical and yet apodictic. However, this is not to say that the ālambana must ***necessarily*** be of an inexistent; only that it ***may*** be in some cases.

Manasikāra, from ***manasi*** (taking to heart) [the locative of ***manas*** (intentional mentation)] + ***kāra*** (doing, making), i.e., making the mind intend [in] a locus or 'the activity of mentally making an intentional locus', is usually translated as 'attention', 'mental concern'. How this opening of and involvement in an intentional locus connects with the ***abhūtavastu*** as the displacive appropriation of a locus should be apparent. A place is filled with what is not actually there in such a way that one's attention notices little if anything else. Our imagined

snake, though not actually there, obsesses us.

The compound could thus be paraphrased: what the mind pays attention to and becomes concerned with when the objective-pole's characteristic features are actually projections of things into a place where they do not exist. In other words, when something 'seems to be there' I cognitively and behaviorally respond to it *as there* because I believe something actually is there. Perceptually, emotionally, in every way, unquestioningly I know and feel that that thing is there. The features which I perceive as being objectively there, as well as the characteristic of every perception to have an object or 'objective aspect', are projections or cognitive constructions with which cognition displaces actuality, substituting concretizations of its own needs and fears.[81] Yogācāra and other Buddhists call this cognitive displacement ***vikalpa***.

Having said all this, what, finally, does saṃvṛti mean? Saṃvṛti is a statement, an evaluative categorization of the world (or worlds) of common experience, 'common' both in the sense of communal and ordinary. To say that such a world is saṃvṛti is to say that that world occurs within a closure, within limiting parameters and horizons. Insofar as that closure is constitutive of and constituted by communication, i.e., the intersubjective sharing of intentionalities, it can not be the property of a single solipsistic subjectivity. Though we may say that the world is noetically determined, the source of noesis is, according to Buddhism, never a transcendental subject (***ātman***), but rather an intentionality circuit (***citta-santāna, ālaya-vijñāna***) which conditionally (***saṃskāra, saṃskṛta***) links previous and subsequent experiences. Like Merleau-Ponty's 'circuit of intentionality' noesis and noema or lived-body and perceptual field dialectically and mutually condition each other; neither has primacy.

Saṃvṛti's closure is not imposed from without. The closure arises

through the operations of consciousness and language, or more precisely stated, the activity of consciousness and language is itself saṃvṛti's closure. Language (*vāk*) is the operational functioning of a system of referentiality. On the one hand, each sentence, each word, each syllable, each letter, each seme, is linguistic precisely because it points beyond and outside itself toward something else. It refers, within the context of an utterance, to what it is not, i.e., to a referent which by virtue of being a referent, a signified, rather than a referrer or signifier, must necessarily be something other than its linguistic representative and indicator. On the other hand, each seme, etc., acts as an integral unit, a distinct, discrete unit whose identity is fixed when an invariable relation with that to which it refers is asserted. The word "tree" is, on the one hand, not actually a tree; on the other hand, its semantic identity is fixed and determined by its assigned concomitance with the notion or facticity of trees. The ambivalence of, for instance, the letter "e" in "tree" (which "e"? The first or second?), which is clearly unlike any tree and yet as part of the English language system invariably indicates trees when used in the word "tree", offers a hint at the operation of closure. The act of referentiality implies a simultaneous identity and difference between signifier and signified such that they remain ultimately separable and inseparable from each other at the same time, or else referentiality becomes impossible. Like the paradox of measuring subatomic particles -- if measuring their velocity, their weight becomes undetectable, and vice versa, so that no particle can be said to demonstrably have weight and velocity simultaneously -- in order for referentiality to function, a one-sided choice must be made, which automatically represses the other alternative. Reference, in order to be clear, should avoid ambiguity as much as possible, which also involves repressing variant, marginal and overly connotative meanings. Each repression marks a limit,

the closure of a word's semantic region. In order for a word to refer, it must repress. In order for a relation to obtain between signifier and signified, the act of signification must simultaneously repress and exploit their identity and difference. The signifier shares an identity with the signified that must, by definition, be different from it. Without fixing margins and thus establishing a closure, language cannot function. Without the implicit closure presupposed by linguistic referentiality -- the class logic in which 'these signifiers' refer only to 'those signifieds' and not 'other signifieds', in other words, the closure of a class or set -- a word or seme, etc., could not fix or establish a stable meaning or set of meanings. Language constitutes and is constituted by closure. Contingency and even arbitrariness are displaced by necessary, absolute concomitance. The contingent relation between a signified and its signifier must become an absolute and necessary relation in order for language to carry any power of literal referentiality. A necessary relation is a closed, unalterable relation.

The structure of consciousness operates in a similar manner. In a cognitive act consciousness refers to an object (***artha***). Consciousness (***vijñāna***) is differential. ***Vi***– is similar to the English prefix 'dis–' (e.g., dis–criminate, dis–tinguish, dis–course, dis–cursive, etc.) which connotes the separating out of two things, or producing change through opposition. ***Vi*** + ***jñāna*** is the intentional cognitive activity of being cognizant of an object. What was said above about language is also true of consciousness. Its functioning depends on and produces cognitive closure. Not only does the noema depend on noetic constitution, but the noesis is neither operative nor self–reflective without a noema. The chiasmic ambiguity between the appropriator and the appropriated is both cause and effect of the closure of consciousness. Consciousness establishes its own limits qua objects in order to function; when limitless it becomes 'nothing', as Sartre and the

tri-dhātu model argue. For Buddhism, consciousness, insofar as it depends upon and is conditioned by saṃskāra, is thoroughly dependent on memory, i.e., conditioning from previous experience.[82] The notion of a neutral, synchronically self-sufficient consciousness which cognizes in the present independently of past cognitions would be impossible for them. Past experiences influence and color present experience, and the restrictions this places on the possibility of novel experiences also contribute to the closure. Buddhists are not hard determinists, and thus do not deny novelty -- Awakening would be impossible without it -- but the degree to which one is incapable of novelly interpreting and responding to current situations is the degree to which one is karmically (habitually) determined. The problem of karma, as we will see later, turns on the appropriational nature of the seemingly innocent act of cognitive and/or linguistic reference. Breaking the referential cycle is part, if not all of the cure. As Nāgārjuna said: "When the citta-gocara (intentionality circuit) stops operating, signifieds stop as well." (MMK 18.7) When the process of cognitive referentiality is disrupted, linguistic referentiality is likewise disrupted.

Consciousness, in its own depths, in the very manner in which it operates (***pravṛtti***) is constituted by and through significatory activity, viz. generating signifiers (***abhidhāna***) and signifieds (***abhidheya***) by constructing a margin (***parikalpita***) between them, i.e., imposing what Lacan has called the sign's *barre*.[83]

In an important creative re-reading of Ferdinand de Saussure's discussion of the linguistic sign as a signifier (Sr) which refers to a signified (Sd), graphically representable as Sd over Sr $\frac{Sd}{Sr}$, divided like a fraction by a line or bar (fr. *barre*),[84] Lacan has focused attention from the Sr and Sd per se back to the line which itself signifies their significatory relation. For Lacan this line

represents the repressive margin between conscious and unconscious activities, both of which are thoroughly linguistic. One of the examples given by de Saussure for how the Sr signifies a Sd involves the word "tree" signifying a tree. In his text a simplistic drawing of a tree stands for the Sd, while the French word for tree, *arbre,* stands for the word. Lacan playfully reminds his reader that *barre* (i.e., the bar or line which both separates the Sr from the Sd and marks their significatory relationship) and *arbre* are anagrams, suggesting that the identity and difference between Srs and Sds mark a psychoanalytic economy, a repressive sundering via dissimulation, which is symptomatic of fundamental anxieties. For Lacan, the rearrangement of the letters in an anagram is emblematic of the way the unconscious rearranges conscious content, for instance, in dreams, freudian slips or neurotic displacement. Language and consciousness converge through a referentiality which both presupposes and establishes the line of closure, the line which is neither identity nor difference and yet which must be the identity and difference of what lies above and below it. Lacan insists, finally, that there is no independent agent called "the unconscious." The line marks the margin of repression, such that to focus on what is above the line involves suppressing and 'forgetting' what is below the line, and vice versa. Pushing memory out of view by exiling it to the forgotten, ignored side of the line is the activity of the unconscious. The unconscious is the product, not agent of an act whose oppositional components, viz. the parts above and below the line, are both linguistic and thus conscious. For Lacan as for Buddhism, language and consciousness are inseparable from closure.

Saṃvṛti means whatever occurs within the closure. The walls of the closure, to return to an image sketched previously, are mirrors aimed at each other, and directly or indirectly aimed towards the center. Saṃvṛti is the mirrored

envelop in which consciousness folds back upon itself. Consciousness' self-referentiality, guided by the reflective paths of the mirrors, may be extremely indirect, and may thus incorporate all sorts of side-images and reflections. Significantly, the Sanskrit term for 'projection of consciousness' is ***pratibimba,*** which literally means 'reflected image, image in a mirror'.

The mirrored closured walls are not solipsistic constructions, but products of communal consent. Consciousness, in its very operations, constitutes the obstructions (***āvaraṇa***) which enclose and encircle it. As the seeming source of its own closure, it appears to itself as self-validating, self-justificatory, or to put this in social terms, communal assent comes to be accepted as the prerequisite and guarantor of certainty. For any conventional decision to become binding and regulative, its contingent origin must be at least partially repressed and forgotten, and it must assume the status of a law which always already was the case, and thus demands obedience.[85]

Saṃvṛti, then, is the tyranny of judgement, the measurement of self by other, and other by self. Peer pressure, societal belonging, such that an individual stabilizes his own identity in terms of one or a series of communal identities which he appropriates, so that he/she ***belongs*** to that group, and it to him/her; the seeing of oneself through another's eyes; altruism and selfishness; etc., all this is saṃvṛti. The actuality of such a world, its facticity in the light of the conditions by which such a world is given is saṃvṛti-***satya***. Paramārtha-satya is the clear seeing of the actuality of saṃvṛti, i.e., saṃvṛti made transparent. It is paramārtha-satya or the 'actuality' of paramārtha because it is detached from saṃvṛti rather than caught up in the complex, obscured actualities of saṃvṛtic horizons. By "detached from" I don't mean that it is separated from or elsewhere than saṃvṛti, but only that it views saṃvṛti dispassionately (***virāga***), devoid of

appropriational intent.

The two satyas should be understood as two distinct views of what seems to be the case: Saṃvṛti–satya determines 'what seems to be the case' through cognitive and linguistic referentiality, i.e., through the criteria of closure; paramārtha–satya sees 'what seems to be the case' *as closure* but not *by closure*. In other words the two satyas are: (1) The world as it actually functions and is cognized within the conditioned psychosophic closure, and (2) What is actually the case, what is simultaneously beyond reference and the ultimate referent of what appears otherwise from within the closured perspective. This latter ***satya*** is not an ontologically transcendent truth, but rather simply and utterly what happens to be the case, which, like sensation, remains forever uncontainable by the closure of linguistic referentiality.

If what was argued about the tri–dhātu model in the last chapter is correct, namely that final margins do not mark a jumping off point to the radically and utterly other, but rather involve the uncovering of the conditions by which margins are constructed, making them and the conditional factors of which they are an instantiation transparent; then this observation should be instructive for the current case as well. Paramārtha would not signify crossing the threshold of something utterly unlike what appears to be the case (***ābhāva***) – and Mahāyāna Buddhists insist that not an iota of distinction can be drawn between saṃsāra and nirvāṇa – but rather the very transparency of that margin.

At this point we need to be reminded that for Buddhism there is no such thing as a fixed, extra–sentient cosmology into which sentient beings are made to wander. The world, any world, is a karmic projection. The world is not as it is prior to our involvement and actions within it. But it is not simply that our actions outrightly and utterly create the world *in toto*. If absolutely

everything were a karmic byproduct, escaping karmic closure would be impossible. Here, as everywhere where Buddhism carefully thinks through its position, a middle way was sought. Exactly where to draw that middle line was disputed by the various schools, and many of the issues argued in the ***Kathā-vatthu*** reflect this problematic,[86] indicating that these disputes were already schismatic in the first few centuries of Buddhism. The Yogācārins' psychosophic focus signals their own attempt at resolving this tension. They were not interested in what the 'world in itself' might be, but rather how we karmically interact with the world, and, if that karmic interaction is the root human problematic, how precisely does it occur, by what law or economy does it become problematic, and how might it be cured? For them the interactive modality was karmic and interpretive; saṃsāra is saṃvṛti. To see, to experience interpretation *as* interpretation, and thus understand whatever is actually the case is paramārtha. Thus in order to understand what saṃvṛti-satya and paramārtha-satya signify and how they function in Buddhist thought, we must understand what karma is.

II – Karma: General Description

For Buddhism, karma is the prajñaptic term that came to signify all the determinants which manipulate and direct the course of sentient beings' existence. However karma was not always accorded such a preeminent role. Initially Buddhists saw karma as only one of many determining factors which influenced the course of one's existence. Eventually all the determining factors were reduced, in one way or another, to karma.

Karma means 'action, doing, deeds' from the root ***kṛ*** 'to do'. In a Buddhist context, karma denotes the cause and effect relations which obtain between an act and certain other acts which have preceded and will succeed it,

particularly if any of those acts can be classified as ***kuśala*** (advantageous, beneficial, 'morally good') or ***akuśala*** (disadvantageous, harmful, 'morally bad'). In a moment we will discuss the significance of the ***kuśala–akuśala*** distinction, but first the causal, sequential nature of karma needs to be examined.

An act performed in the present is, in part, a consequence or effect of other acts which preceded it; it is also possibly a cause or contributing factor to some subsequent acts. For instance, learning to write involves all the previous actions which bring the learner into a situation where he can be taught to write. Depending on how rigorously one wishes to trace out the causal sequence, one could limit a description of these causes to such antecedent acts as (i) going to and arriving at the place of learning, (ii) procuring writing implements and materials on which to write, (iii) the learner becoming instilled with some sort of motivation to learn, (iv) familiarity with the language which will be written, and so forth. Each of these could be further subdivided into countless distinct acts -- e.g., arriving would involve the many little acts, including breathing, walking, taking each breath, each step, looking where one is going, etc., which all together are glossed by the words 'going to and arriving at', such that breathing is a (partial) cause of walking, which is a (partial) cause of looking at what one is looking at, etc. The other activities could be further subdivided on similar lines. In a more microscopic view, chemical, biological, molecular, subatomic, etc. factors would also need to be examined as causal contributors, since the actions occuring in each realm (chemical actions, molecular actions, etc.) contribute to and condition the behavioral 'action'. Moreover, in a more expansive view, the antecedent 'actions' would include the discovery, development and refinement of writing, including writing styles, calligraphy, literary history, pedagogical history, the development of writing materials from etchings to papyrus to silk to paper, etc.; preceding actions

would include the development of language -- both in the learner and among humans in general -- and previous experiences holding and manipulating writing utensils (such as crayons for doodling or mankind's prehensile grasping), as well as all previous acts of learning which will now influence this particular learner's capacity to learn something new. And these lists could be expanded to virtual infinity. Similarly, each act involved in learning how to write will bear fruit each and every time the learner subsequently sets out to write. Whether the learner jots laundry lists or becomes a writer of the greatest novels of his/her century, all these subsequent actions are dependent upon the actions involved in learning to write. The causal history of writing, in fact, cannot be separated from the history of reading, which is equally complex, since writing and reading are of one fabric, each impossible and meaningless without the other. Furthermore, if the learner–turned–writer's writings are read and influence others, the causal chains resulting from this disseminatory expansion are also traceable and dependent upon the initial acts of learning to write. If the influenced reader subsequently also becomes an influential writer, or even if the reader influences himself or any one else in any way as a result of having read the learner–turned–writer's writing, the chain continues. And these are just the explicit causal chains. Uncountable other conditions, from political scenarios to mood swings, each with their own causal nexus, are also implicitly active in each and every so–called "simple act". Thus a seemingly simple act, such as taking a pencil in one's hand or typing at a keyboard, in fact marks the intersection of dizzyingly complex causal chains.

What this means is that each and every act occurs within dense, far–reaching contexts, and those contexts largely determine that act. Causal chains are diachronic, and yet they synchromically intersect with countless other causal chains. Although Buddhists tend to differentiate proximate from remote

conditions (*hetu* and *pratyaya* respectively), technically speaking they do not accept the notion of 'cause', especially if by this one means a 'sufficient cause.' Buddhists instead propose a theory of conditionality, the precise definition of which varied from school to school.[87] Each moment marks the intersection of a conditioned series of actions (bodily, verbal and mental) and the dynamics of the series tends to be temporal, historical. Each act, then, is the embodiment of a history: cultural, linguistic, sectarian, biographical, and so on. Each act is constituted by the intersection and actualization of various histories through a body. In fact, the 'body' is precisely that which is produced by the intersection of causal histories, whether a 'body of work' such as a writing *corpus,* or the sentient body which enacts prior conditioning as it is being conditioned and conditions situations around it. A body is neither an inanimate thing nor something insentient nor an isolatible entity; rather it constantly inter-acts with its environment, it constitutes a perspective, or a configuration of perspectives on the fields in and of which it is constituted.

In terms of the above example of 'writing', the act of writing a text brings together and actualizes a multitude of histories and the resultant text has neither a single author (except in the prajñaptic sense) nor is it an independent text. Its 'author' is merely the occasion for the histories' intersection, i.e., a prajñaptic locus that has no voice, no contribution to the text other than participating in the intersection and actualization as the locus in which (histories of) ideas, (histories of) writing, (conceptual and material histories of) material composition, etc., converge. The author is the 'place' of the text, but only as it is being written.[88] Once written, the text has its own body, embodies its own set of intentionalities, and carries on its own commerce with its readers. The text constantly interacts with other texts, other histories, such that its own history

continues to unfold, just like our bodies, our speech, our cognitions continually interact with their environments, producing our continuance, our personal 'history'. We move through and eat, wear, admire, destroy, nourish, manipulate, fear, etc., our bodily field. We converse with and think about ourselves and each other, both of which are located in our bodily field or what the ***Bhagavad Gītā*** calls ***dharmakṣetra*** ('the field of cultural coherence'; lit.: the field of dharma). The greater the tension and play between the constitutive histories, i.e., the more they seem to oppose each other, the more power the text embodies (the same principle applies to the tension between the histories which a reader brings to the text and the histories which the text inceptually embodied and has continued to accumulate).[89]

Like texts, personal karma is intertextual, intersubjective. My actions affect you, and vice versa. But since karma was most frequently used by Indian schools as a model for establishing the moral accounting of individuals, i.e., how one's current moral actions will inevitably be requited by later moral consequences, the notion of 'collective karma' awaited such works as Vasubandhu's ***Vimśatikā*** for adequate elaboration.[90]

By defining karma as the action of body, speech or mind -- ***kāya, vāc, manas*** -- the Buddhists were making an important claim which will later prove to be the ***raison-d'être*** for Yogācāra.[91] The significant contexts of an action qua karma are mental, cognitive, not material. As discussed in the previous chapter, a sheer action devoid of cognitive intent is called ***krīya,*** not karma. For the Buddhist not only is speech or language (***vāk***) cognitive, but the body (***kāya***) too is understood as a ***sentient body,*** that is, a sensing, feeling, aware, cognitional body, or to borrow the phenomenologists' term, a 'lived-body'.

To avoid terminological confusion, in this context I shall restrict

"mental" to (the karmic modalities of) ***manas***, and use "cognitive" to denote the subsuming of body and speech within the 'cognitive' arena. Thus karma is thoroughly and exclusively 'cognitive' (since the cognitive invariably involves the mental), which is not the same as saying that it is entirely 'mental'. If this distinction seems odd in English, it should be kept in mind that while it may be terminologically clearer in Sanskrit, conceptually even there it still requires some elucidation, since terms such as ***manas***, ***kāya***, and ***vāc*** are open to more than one interpretation within the Indian traditions. 'Cognition' as I will be using it includes all three karmic modes while 'mental' is restricted to the first mode only.

For us 'cognitive' implies that bodily and verbal actions arise from and produce intentions. Karmic actions, whether cognitive in the broad sense or strictly mental, therefore are always intentional, and the karmic dilemma is a dilemma of intentionality. 'Intentional' implies 'desire', intending or desiring toward something. Significantly, the Yogācārins defined the ***ālaya–vijñāna*** as non–intentional (i.e., prior to manas; also: ***upekṣa–vedanā***, ***anivṛtā***, ***avyāktam***, etc.; cf. ***Triṃśikā*** v. 4), meaning it was karmically neutral, i.e., a recipient of karmic residue but never the actual karmic agent (since it was not an agent–self). The non–intentional status led to some definitional difficulties, however, such as whether its neutrality meant that it was pure in itself, or whether it needed to be overcome and erased. In China Paramārtha declared the ālaya 'defiled', and posited a ninth pure consciousness (***amala–vijñāna***) which supplants it upon Awakening. The various Chinese Yogācāric schools of that time (sixth century) debated in earnest whether the ālaya was itself pure, partly pure and partly defiled (requiring that the defiled parts be eliminated), or whether it was completely defiled (requiring that it be utterly destroyed). As we shall see in a later chapter, the ***Ch'eng wei–shih lun's*** solution takes a middle ground, but not

without incurring some doctrinal inconsistencies of its own.

Incidentally, in the word *'cognitive'*, the *-gn* root (e.g., *gnosis*) is cognate to *-jñā* (*jñāna, vijñāna,* vijñapti, and so on). 'Cognitive' involves cognition, a knowing, a being conscious of, a *co-gnoscere* ('coming to know'), an acquaintance or cognizance which, though not exclusively mental in the sense of *manas* (which will be discussed in later chapters), is none the less sentient, conscious, and, thus in some sense, 'mental'.[92]

The mental/cognitive distinction is important because Yogācāra will argue not that all reality is 'mental' (the classic idealist position), but rather that the *idea* that there exists something which is at once extra-mental and yet knowable and cognizable, is absurd and chimeric. What we *think* is extra-mental is actually within our cognitive horizons; cognition is by definition horizonal (*bhutakoṭi*) and nothing can exist or be known (*vidyate*) outside cognition. When Yogācāra made *citta* pre-eminent over *manas, rūpa, mano-vijñāna,* etc., they were in part attempting to effect a similar terminological distinction. Karma, inasmuch as it depends on *intention* (*cetanā*) and thus implies some sort of cognizance or sentiency, is intimately connected with consciousness, and that function of consciousness, viz. its connection and involvement with karma, is titled *ālaya-vijñāna* by the Yogācārins. The Pāli texts had already afforded its synonym *citta* a privileged, special position, as Ergardt's *Man and His Destiny* amply illustrates, and Yogācāra merely followed suit.

The three worlds (tri-dhātu) produced by karma are utterly cognitional. While only the ārūpa-dhātu could be argued to be exclusively 'mental' (since it involves the complete absence of rūpa), the other two dhātus are clearly also cognitional fields in which the drama of existential embodiment is played out. The three worlds, which in Buddhist jargon indicates any and all possible worlds , is

intimately linked with karma and cognition. More than linked, they are utterly dependent on karma, they are produced by karma, by actions. When Vasubandhu says that the three worlds are nothing but vijñapti (***Mahāyāne traidhātukam vijñapti-mātram vyavasthāpyate.*** Viṃ. 1, ***vṛtti***), he is actually saying that they are karmically constituted, as subsequent arguments in that text show. He is not arguing for metaphysical idealism. However while karma and the tri-dhātu are absolutely mutually dependent such that each could not exist without the other, cognition (jñāna) is detachable from them, and there is, according to Buddhism, such a thing as a non-karmic cognition, e.g., the cognition of an arhat or the omniscience of a Buddha. Since it is not at all clear what it would mean to have a cognition apart from the three worlds, one may argue that even a detached cognition is of the tri-dhātu. However, it may be precisely this implication, viz. that Awakened cognition still requires that there be a triple (hence karmic) world, that spurred the later Buddhist epistemologists to argue the validity or non-validity of ***nirvikalpa-jñāna*** (knowing devoid of conceptual constructions) and ***nirākāra-jñāna*** (cognition devoid of representational images). As we shall discuss presently, the issue of cognition, knowing, was always quintessential for Buddhism; Awakening is considered a cognitive act! Without its theories of karma and cognition, Buddhism would be without a soteric dimension. Epistemology is the necessary cause of Awakening.

The most rudimentary of cognitive experiences is, according to the skandha theory, vedanā, pleasurable, painful or neutral experience. Through the repetitive conditioning of pain and pleasure, we acquire our karmic habits. 'Habit' means the automatic, unthinking repetition of an action -- repeatedly performing a conditioned action. Breaking a habit, if the habit is deeply entrenched by thorough conditioning, generally requires more than a simple act of will or decision;

often entire behavioral constellations and associations related to the habit must be reorganized. For example, overeaters or smokers often need to consciously restructure more than basic eating or smoking activities. Those habits spill over into so much other behavior that trying to eliminate only the problematic habit without also restructuring other concomitant behaviors would likely be unsuccessful. From the karmic point of view, the distinction between addiction and habituation is merely one of degree, not of kind. Drug addicts have habits which are more deeply *embodied* than, for instance, a daily coffee drinker, but the structure and dynamics of both types of habits are basically the same. While with our Cartesian models we tend to differentiate 'habit' from 'addiction' by saying that the latter is 'physical', meaning it arises from and abides by material causes rather than mental causes (and arguably should be treated, or made to cease by same), from the Buddhist viewpoint any habit -- precisely because it involves an intention or series of intentions which have become embodied and thus automatic, no longer requiring or even responding to intentions -- is karmic whenever it is a true addiction.

To say that a physical addiction is "more deeply embodied" than a psychological habit may seem contradictory to the Buddhist emphasis on karma being primarily, or sometimes exclusively mental. However, physical addiction almost invariably is accompanied by psychological dependency, so that such simple distinctions are difficult to maintain. In most cases the addiction begins precisely because the addictive agent affords pleasurable (hence psychological) rewards, the 'physical' addiction arising only later. For instance, what makes heroin such a problematic drug is that it produces a very pleasurable state; if it produced unpleasant or painful effects there would be little temptation for anyone to chance becoming addicted to it in the first place. A single use of heroin or

cocaine will not make one an addict. But seeking the repetition of the pleasure (***vedanā***) of the drug experience instills the desire (***tṛṣṇa***) to procure and appropriate (***upādāna***) more of the drug and its effects, until it becomes an actual impetus, a behavior pattern (***bhāva***). In other words, one first psychologically craves the drug, and later embodies that craving as physical addiction, thus making the physical addiction a deep-level by-product of the initial psychological habit. Admittedly, drug- and other types of addiction do not always transpire this neatly, and this only indirectly addresses the question of how something physical might be called karmically 'deeper' than something mental. The danger of giving this type of response is that the conclusion might be that physicality itself is a by-product of mentation, i.e., rūpa derives from nāma. While Buddhaghosa seems to entertain that line in his ***Visuddhimagga,*** and certain passages in the Buddhist scriptures might lend themselves to such a reading, and certain doctrines reinforce it (e.g., ***mano-māya-kāya*** or 'body fabricated by mind'), I do not think that this is the correct interpretation of Buddhism. The mental inevitably comes first and foremost, especially in karmic contexts, though the relation between karma and the material realm is far from unambiguous. I will offer what I understand to be the Yogācāra position later.

As we saw in the last chapter, vedanic experience is embodied as conditioning, and this latency is called saṃskāra (P. saṅkhāra). The latency predisposes one to act or react in certain ways to certain situations. What we usually call 'intention' or 'will' is merely the surfacing of these latencies as dispositions, inclinations to do or choose some action over another. Hence in the Nikāyas and Abhidhamma, saṅkāra is equated with ***cetanā***, 'volitional intent'. Gethin writes:[93]

The ***nikāyas*** define ***saṃkhāras*** primarily in terms of will or volition

> (*cetanā*); they also describe them as putting together (*abhisamkharonti*) each of the *khandhas* in turn into something that is put-together (*saṃkhāta*).[94] In this way *saṃkhāras* are presented as conditioning factors conceived of as active volitional forces. *Cetanā* is, of course, understood as *kamma* on the mental level [A III 415], and in the early *abhidhamma* texts all those mental factors that are considered to be specifically skilful (*kusala*) or unskilful (*akusala*) fall within the domain of *saṃkhārakhandha*.[95] Thus it is that the composition of *saṃkhārakhandha* leads the way in determining whether a particular arising of consciousness constitutes a skilful or an unskilful *kamma*. All this accords well with the *nikāyas'* singling out of *cetanā* as characteristic of the nature of *saṃkhāras*.

We shall see again later how *saṃskāra* is treated as the pivotal skandha. At this point, we simply take note that karma, particularly mental karma, intention/volition, the conditioning and the conditioned (*saṃskāra, saṃskṛta*, P. *saṅkhāra, saṅkhāta*), kusala and akusala (S. *kuśala, akuśala*) and the arising of consciousness all converge in saṃskāra, and fundamentally configure and are configured by saṃskāra.

Through this saṃskāric mulch, past experiences condition present experiences, which in turn are conditioning future actions. The succession of actions which constitute a life are strung like pearls on a karmic continuum.

But if present actions are determined by prior actions, are current enjoyments or displeasures necessarily and exclusively caused by previous pleasurable and unpleasurable experiences? When asked this question by Sīvaka Moliya, the Buddha replied[96]

> Certain experiences (*vedyita*), Sīvaka, arise here originating from bile,... from phlegm,... from wind,... resulting from the humours of the body,... born of the changes of the seasons,... of being attacked by adversities,... of spasmodic attacks,... of the coming-to-maturity of an action (*kamma-vipāka*). And this ought to be known by yourself, Sīvaka, that certain experiences arise here as originating from bile,... as born of the coming-to-maturity of kamma. And this is considered as truth by the world, that certain experiences arise here as originating from bile,... as born of the coming-to-maturity of kamma. Now, Sīvaka, those

> recluses and Brahmins who speak thus, who hold this view: "Whatever a human being experiences, whether pleasure, or pain, or neither pleasure nor pain -- all this is by reason of what was done in the past," they go beyond what is personally known, and what is considered as truth in the world. Therefore, I say of these recluses and Brahmins that they are wrong.

F m this passage we learn:

(1) the claims which one makes about karma must be supportable either by personal experiences or through common knowledge. To violate those epistemic constraints is to be "wrong". This doesn't mean that these are two equally valid means of knowledge (***pramāṇa***). Buddha's point is that if one is ***not*** speaking from personal experience (the *only* sure-fire ***pramāṇa*** for Buddha), ***and*** what one says contradicts common experience and what is generally agreed upon, then on what grounds can one make such claims or believe such ideas? General knowledge is no equal or substitute for personal experience, but if one lacks personal knowledge in some area, one has no ground upon which to controvert general opinion. What is derived neither from personal experience nor from common knowledge cannot come from a reliable source. Therefore it is suspect at best, and probably 'wrong'. The sequence of the passage is (i) 'X is the case', (ii) you should personally 'know' that 'X is the case', (iii) it is common knowledge that 'X is the case', (iv) therefore those who assert -X are wrong.

(2) No one at that time thought that *all* of one's experiences were determined by past experiences. No one, including Buddha, thought that karma was all-determining. Karma did not denote a deterministic model of human behavior.

(3) There were other recognizable and identifiable causes, aside from karma, for old age, sickness and death. "Bile..., phlegm..., wind..., bodily humours...., seasonal changes..., adversities..., 'spasmodic' attacks" as well as ***vipāka-kamma***

contribute to present pleasant, painful and neutral experiences. Buddha was not making extravagant claims; he was not advocating a psychologistic reductionism. Psychological conditioning was only part of the human problem. Technically, we may even question whether ***vipāka–kamma*** and the saṃskāric re–enactment of ***vedanā*** are treated as synonyms is this passage. Based on virtually every other Pāli text which could be brought to bear on that question, we would have to answer that they do indeed act as synonyms.

Point (1) is intriguing in its own right, especially in the way it anticipates medieval developments in Buddhist epistomology, but for now points (2) and (3) demand our attention. Point (3) in particular raises some thorny issues for Buddhism. If the etiological, though mediate 'causes' of sickness, old age and death are, as ***pratītya–samutpāda*** and Buddhist doctrine insist, desire and nescience, and the overcoming of desire and the eradication of nescience are sought as means to overcome the dukkha of impermanence (sickness, old age, death), such that "accomplishing what needed to be accomplished, doing what needed to be done"[97] carries one beyond dukkha to become ***amata*** (lit. "deathless"),[98] what are the implications for this standard version of the Buddhist project of the admittance, in this passage, that 'sickness, old age and death' may have other causes? Is the Buddhist mārga only for those whose problems (dukkha) are psychological in origin, but not others?

It may be argued that this is exactly the domain in which Buddhist thought locates itself. For instance, parallels with Stoicism have not gone unnoticed by modern scholars, and many contemporary interpretations of Buddhism either deliberately or inadvertantly make it out to be a kind of stoicism.[99] Does Buddhism aim merely at developing a change of 'attitude', i.e., a psychological reorientation to the world, or do Buddhist transformative soterics

aim at something more radical? Do they, in effect, involve an radical reconstruction of the entire manner in which one engages the world, a reconstruction whose radicality involves altering the world along with the one engaging it? It seems that this question underlies the entire critique of so-called Hinayāna by Mahāyāna, though it was poorly formulated and articulated by them. A mere attitudinal change is restricted. It is private, personal, subjective; it effects no *social* change or justice. One saves oneself in a manner which remains impervious to the needs and plight of others, since its private, subjective nature makes it inaccessible to others. But true Awakening should involve, Mahāyāna would claim, an active re-engagement with the world, a fulfilment of the Bodhisattva vow that one's own achievements are meaningless unless they translate into assistance for others. As remarked earlier, initially Buddhism exhibited a powerful sense of social justice and reform, a sense which took shape in the world, for instance, by offering actual social alternatives to the stiffling and encompassing Brahmanical society and Caste structure. Cognitively, as well, Awakening involves a different manner of engaging the world of experience, specifically a manner of cognition which is non-appropriational. However, institutionally speaking, Mahāyāna, like Hinayāna, failed to maintain in practice the disjunctive alterity between pre- and post-Awakening manners of engaging the world. In the name of patronage, it sold out its socially transformative voice.

Regardless, Buddhism cannot be reduced to a set of attitudes, theories or perspectives. If anything, it is the incessant criticism of such reductions that makes Buddhism what it is.

As interesting and germane as an investigation into this issue might be for our current discussion, such an endeavor must await another occassion. What we must discuss, however, is the degree to which Buddhism can be called

psychologically grounded or even a psychologism. Buddhism, inasmuch as it concerns itself primarily with an analysis of and therapeutic prescription for the human condition, considers psychological matters –– including perception, epistemology, knowledge, belief, motivation, interpretation, behavior, etc. –– of the highest importance, and my term 'psychosophic' aims at emphasizing that. But this is not the same as admitting that Buddhism is a form of psychologism. Psychologism, most simply defined, is the reductionistic claim that psychological factors are the ultimate explanatory tools for understanding anything. Buddhism is not a psychologism. Even Yogācāra, which does propose to reduce karma and the entirety of the triple world to cognitive factors, is not a psychologism. This is because the point of Buddhist analysis is not the reification of a mental structure or theory of mind, but its erasure. Vasubandhu highlights the closure of cognitive horizons not because such a closure is either desirable or unalterable, but because the closure can only be opened once its all–encompassing complexity and ubiquity is understood and recognized. Yogācāra uses psychologistic arguments to overcome psychological closure, not to enhance it.

Labeling Buddhism as a psychologism presupposes that other, non–cognitive spheres can be demonstrably valid and independent of cognition, and thus cognition should be contextualized as a single, less than all–inclusive sphere amongst the other spheres of reality. This notion is asserted, predicated, defended and affirmed or denied *in cognition* and it is presupposed in the mind. To determine its status as either in or apart from cognition is again an act performed in cognition. As do some modern thinkers, Buddhists maintain that only a posteriori knowledge is valid or possible; a priori claims are claims which mask, ignore or are unaware of their presuppositions.

This issue is extremely familiar to Western thinkers, and frequently is

argued in relation to the status of 'mathematical objects', generally conceded to be the most ideal, necessary concepts we have. Mathematical relations are said to be timeless and true regardless of when or even if they are discovered by humans. Hence they are not contingent, not dependent on any temporal relation. Or are they? Whether a so-called mathematical object (e.g., a triangle) – and perhaps more importantly, its *properties* – has a reality independent of the mathematician that discovers it, such that the properties of a triangle are eternally true whether they had been discovered or not, and we, as humans, can merely acknowledge or acquiesce to their eternal truth but neither create nor alter them; or whether mathematical objects are simply human conceptual constructs, derived from experience, perhaps distorted or idealized (e.g., in ontic space and time no perfect circle exists), such that mathematics is an utterly temporal and historic phenomenon, an historical accretion; this debate has been argued countless times in countless ways. It was one of the issues that separated Frege from Husserl. Frege embraced the former position, while Husserl leaned toward the latter (actually, his position is complex and ambivalent). The charge levelled against Husserl and his phenomenology by the followers of Frege, viz. that phenomenology is only another form of psychologism, stems from this issue.[100] Husserl, of course, rejected that label and attacked psychologism on other grounds. Merleau-Ponty later pressed the counter-attack and argued that mathematical objects are indeed historical.[101]

The point for our discussion is that 'psychologism' and 'eternal essentialism' tend to constitute opposing poles. Since Buddhism rejects essentialism (*svabhāva*), its critics will respond with the charge of psychologism. Since essentialists conceive of, argue for and then religiously believe in what they conceive to be extra-conceptual, Buddhists retort that conceptions are never

located anywhere else than within cognitive horizons, including the conception of a conception. Tellingly, the eternalists rarely shrink from calling their eternal, independent–of–cognition entities "concepts" (*Begriff*) or "ideas" (*eidos*), though they deny temporal origin to these entities. They concede that these 'objects' are mental, but for them mental connotes an eternal realm of eternal, immutable ideal ideas (though, to be fair, many contemporary Analytics are embarrassed by Frege's obvious Platonism). For Buddhists ideas are thoughts which arise, abide, decay and cease from moment to moment dependent on conditions. Like all conditioned things, they are impermanent.

Further, we may ask: Does the definition (essence) belong to the thing defined or to the one proffering and using the definition? While Husserl vacillated, arguing first in *Ideas I* that the essences obtained from phenomena through the phenomenological method belonged in an important sense to the things themselves, and then later in *Cartesian Meditations* arguing that the essence expressed and uncovered a transcendental self, Buddhism consistently denied that either the subject or the object were originary or primary. Instead of primary substantial entities, they envisaged only chains of conditions. A 'definition' is neither essence nor product, but rather a sedimentation of the nominalistic process (*prajñapti*) which accompanies and contributes to cognition (*vijñāna*). This is prapañca.

When instead of realizing that one sees X *as* Y, and instead argues and believes that X *is* Y, this is vikalpa or prapañca, or linguistic and cognitive projection (*pratibimba*).

The fundamental 'error' or problem, according to Buddhism, is not ontological, but epistemic, cognitive. And cognition is driven by intention; cognition also expresses intention (i.e., projection).

III – Karma: The Circuit of Intentionality

Karmic action is consequential action, action which receives its significance and meaning from those consequences which follow from it, which arise as a result (direct or remote) of its occurrence. Karma thus not only transmits the past to the present, by influencing and shaping current actions in the light of what has gone before. As historicality it is revisionistic, since the meaning of a current act is derived from consequences which will only occur later, in the future. The present, the immediate moment of action, becomes an open field (***kṣetra***) in which the determinative influences of the past and future collide; the karmic present merely signifies chains before and after, chains in which it constitutes a link. The link may mark a kind of durational continuity between a prior and a subsequent chain, or it may link chains in the manner of a train–track switch, shifting the trajectory of a past chain into a seemingly non–contiguous, dissimilar future chain, and vice versa. As the point of linkage between chains, it may unite otherwise entirely disparate chains, revisionistically giving the disparities relationally common histories, or a common destiny. And the link marks a double causal flow; the future flowing toward (and through) the present into the past, and the past pushing through the present into the future.[102] Karma, thus, is thoroughly temporal.

Each action is involved in a rigorous, complex economy with its own past and future. The 'value' which accrues to an action within this temporal structure is a moral, ethical value. If an action leads to 'good' results, it is a good action, and inversely, a bad action is one which leads to 'bad' consequences.

As might be expected in systems which prize efficient causality over other forms of conditionality, the criterion for determining the meaning of 'good'

and 'bad' is at once utilitarian and pragmatic. Actions are what they do, and if they produce benefits and advantages they are 'good', ***kuśala***. If they prove nonbeneficial, harmful, disadvantageous, then they are 'bad', ***akuśala***. If action P is an immoral act, it is immoral not because there is something intrinsically wrong with it as such, in itself; P is immoral because consequent Q ineluctably follows from P, and Q is harmful, ***akuśala***. In recognition of the conditional relation between P and Q, P may also be called ***akuśala***. However, perusal of Abhidhammic texts quickly dispels the notion that there exists any simple correspondence between the value of an act and its consequent. A number of permutons are possible. For instance, past action R, which was akuśala, may give rise to present action S, which is neutral (***upekṣa,*** i.e., neither kuśala nor akuśala), whose influence on future action T is as yet indeterminate (***avyākta***). Or past action M, which was indeterminate, by somehow combining with action N, which is kuśala, effects current action O to be likewise kuśala, and predisposing future action P to also tend toward kuśala. In fact, a significant percentage of abhidharmic literature basically concerns itself with mapping important Buddhist terminology in terms of kuśala, akuśala, avyākta and vipāka, which is to say, abhidharma functions as, or codifies a 'karmic map'.

In terms of temporal relations between actions, various combinations of kuśala, akuśala and upekṣa in relation to vipāka are theoretically possible. The defining characteristics (***lakṣana***) of specific *types* of situations and contexts (***dharmā***) determine the actual configuration. This categorization, then, is both rational and empirical. In order to develop the prescriptive, ethical guidance implicit in the Buddhist analysis of the human condition, all these possibilities were eventually traced out and codified, down to the smallest detail. The resulting maps are collected in Abhidhammic/Abhidharmic texts. It would not be unfair to

categorize texts such as the *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha* as the systematic classification of Buddhist terms and concepts in terms of kuśala and akuśala. Abhidharmic literature typically consists of (1) a listing and defining of the basic components required for Buddhistic analysis (skandhas, dharmas, bhūtas, etc.), generally grouped categorically (ex.: *viprayukta-dharmā*) or functionally (ex.: *āyatanā* and *dhātu*), (2) classification of those components in terms of their kuśala or akuśala efficacy, and (3) an account of how manipulation of (2) results in Awakening. Not every abhidharmic text exhibits all three moves. Some are concerned with only one or another aspect; but they are all contextualized by their implicit presupposition of this tripartite movement. One categorizes in order to effect some karmically efficient corrections in one's karmic trajectory, and these corrections should ultimately lead to the complete and final overcoming of the karmic problematic.

We will not here enter into an examination of the intricacies of such classificatory schema. For our purposes, it is sufficient to note:

(1) That such endeavors are basic to the Buddhist project, particularly for an analysis of karma.

(2) That this project becomes one of the chief aims and activities of the Abhidhamma and Abhidharma literature, in whichever Buddhist schools deliberated with such literature.

(3) The value and meaning of one's actions, and by extension, the value and meaning of a life lived as or through those actions is determined by these distinctions.

(4) Any Buddhist school, if it attempts to be systematic, must locate itself within this criteriology, and be prepared to announce and explicitly recite which actions are kuśala, which are akuśala, and which are karmically neutral, and give reasons

for so classifying each action.

(5) The foundation of the prescriptive aspect of Buddhism is here, and Buddhism's claim to soteric efficacy is rooted in the correctness or insufficiency of this style of karmic analysis.

This last point is important. It is no accident that where, for various reasons, a Buddhist school rejects this style of karmic analysis, it must also relinquish claim to a large segment of Buddhist soterical rhetoric. For instance, Mādhyamika and Ch'an, once they have jettisoned karmic classification, are compelled to utter such non-soteric pronouncements as "no one obtains nirvana" or "there is nothing to attain", etc. Simply put, without karmic analysis any Buddhist soteric claim would be without foundation and incoherent. The curious claim/argument of Mādhyamika and Ch'an is that karmic analysis itself is incoherent! Buddhism, as such, must tread the middle way between these opposing options: If the analysis is overly reified, Buddhism degenerates into a determinism which further ensnares rather than liberates. If the analysis is rejected *in toto* and immediately, then one must thrash around without motivation or method, and, at least on one level, explicitly denounce and disclaim the goal/purpose/motive that is in fact immediately in-forming and necessitating the disclaimer. Honesty folds over into itself, away from itself. The allegorical foundation for this 'dis-honest' swerve is presented in the first part of the Lotus Sutra, viz. ***upāya***. Subsequently, the notion of upāya is invoked every time a swerve from the actual, from the historical, from the presentative needs to be rationalized and justified. T'ien-t'ai, e.g., justifies Pure Land as an upāyic necessity, and Buddhism justifies its own institutionalization by an appeal to this same sense of 'upāyic' necessity.

Karma, then, is not only a causal theory or account of actions, an

account through which the present action decenters and echoes in, as well as being echoed by previous and subsequent actions. It is a systematic criteriology by which actions receive their value, their 'karmic' meaning. Time moves, and each moment of action is merely transitional, on the way to future (or past) moments. Karma never arrives at itself, since to instantiate a karmic result (*vipāka*) usually requires or produces an action (karma), which necessitates future events in order that its vipāka reaches fruition. Action, karma, is a ceaseless relay team, a handing off of consequences from one durational situation to another. Its movement cannot be dammed (some schools will argue that it may be temporarily dammed), but its trajectory can be modified. The trajectory of akuśala-karma can be transposed into a kuśala-karmic trajectory. One's actions can ethically improve, which is to say that one's actions will lead to more and more beneficial consequences. Obviously the inverse can impede one's ethical development. Beneficial trajectories may be derailed, or converted into disadvantageous trajectories. The actual mechanics of this give and take economy vary from school to school, but insofar as they are karmic, the trajectories arise from activities of body, speech and mind, and it is through these factors that trajectories may be altered. Through *action* in the lived-world as a living, gesturing, cognating, communicative body, one's ethical situation en-acts. This 'situation' is neither strictly internal nor determinatively external. It is constituted through a dense, intricate economic karmic interchange, a 'circuit of intentionality'; and the diaphenous margin which arises *between* the lived-body and the lived-field is the birth-place of consciousness -- or, as Buddhist terminology would put it, through the contact of a sense organ and a sense object, consciousness arises. In the Yogācāra school the complexities of this economy are metaphorically (*upacāra*) gathered into the image of a 'warehouse'

consciousness, *ālaya*–vijñāna, which is given the nickname *vipāka–vijñāna,* the consciousness which handles the fruitional economy. The influence (*vāsanā*) and seeds (*bījā*) of all experiences traffic in and out of the ālaya, which stores them until conditions 'put in their orders', and the stored influences and seeds are shipped out in the form of new experiences.

Invariably karma is described in mechanistic terms. The concomitance from cause to effect is invariable, and each action invariably produces precisely its just desserts. By understanding karma as a *mechanical* process, interpreting its dynamics in a precise, mechanical way, it thereby becomes conducive to theoretical classification. Since B always and everywhere follows from A, and C from B, etc., the relation between A and C can be easily mapped. Mechanistic models, which function by a two–value logic system (in the Buddhist case an intermediate 'neutral' case is frequently added), tend to serve a will to univocality. In the case of karma, the mechanistic interpretation of action makes the meaning of an action theoretically univocal, nonambiguous. An action's meaning is simply and directly determined and defined by its result (*vipāka*). Seemingly ambiguous cases, i.e., actual situations which present themselves ambiguously, are, if properly analyzed and understood, nonambiguous. They need only be properly analyzed, viz. classified in terms of advantageous/disadvantageous consequences, and their singular value becomes apparent. No action can be examined in isolation, since all actions are thoroughly contextual. The relation between action and context, gestalt and Ganzfeld, then, is neither ambiguous nor vague. It is mechanically precise.

This univocal analysis is prescriptive and therapeutic inasmuch as it arises from a need to know what to do, how to cure and be cured, what to cure, how specifically to intercept a karmic trajectory and put it on a more beneficial

course, and so on. It remains therapeutic only insofar as it actually works; thus such classificatory criteriological enterprises become meaningless abstractions if divorced from the pragmatic praxis for which they are designed.

Leaving aside the array of issues and problems such a brief description of the mechanics of karma might suggest, we turn instead to an issue which must be clarified in order for us to understand Yogācāra. The issue in question is the relation -- or lack thereof -- between karma and rūpa. In order to understand the Yogācāric move which is usually interpreted as the rejection of external objects in favor of a 'consciousness alone is real' idealism, we need to understand what, even prior to Yogācāra, the basic understanding of rūpa was. Once we know the place of rūpa in Buddhist soterics, the rationale and purport of the Yogācāric move will become apparent.

IV - Karma and *Rūpa*

As noted in the last chapter, rūpa as a category is not without some ambiguity. As noted above in this chapter, it is always cognitional, and sometimes mental. As such, karma is always intentional, always an action that somewhere and somehow involves consciousness (*vijñāna, citta*) in some capacity. What is the relation between rūpa (materiality) and the cognitive intentionality (*nāma*) of karma? Does Buddhism address what Western philosophy has labeled the mind-body problem, and if so, with what results? If not, how was it avoided, and with what consequences?

Distinguishing the five skandhas into nāma and rūpa might suggest a mind-body split, but careful analysis does not bear this out. First, rūpa means *both* materiality and sentient materiality. Rūpa signifies, e.g., a visible object both insofar as that object is material and insofar as that object is visible, sensorial.

It is never a materiality which can be radically separated or isolated from sentiency. Such a non-empirical category would appear ludicrous to the Buddhist. Its ability to be sensed is not accidental, but rather precisely its essence. The Pāli tradition manages to avoid substance-quality metaphysics, even in relation to 'matter'. Rūpa is not a substratum or substance which has properties of sensibility; it functions as sensibility, perceivable physicality. 'Matter', just like everything else, is finally defined in terms of its function, what it does, not what it *is*. Rūpa is sensed, since it is itself sensorial. Nyanatiloka Mahathera, discussing how rūpa is treated in the Abhidhamma, writes:[103]

> Matter is viewed here only as a division in the range of cognizable objects, and as one among the constituents of so-called Personality, misconceptions about which it is the Abhidhamma's task to eliminate...

Secondly, the sensorial nature of rūpa is born out by the categorization of rūpa as the Four Great Happenings (*mahābhūta,* usually mis-translated 'Great Elements') as not simply Earth, Water, Fire and Air, but rather as sensorial qualities, viz. Solid, Liquid, Heat and Motion. Rūpa is defined by sensorial -- and not metaphysically materialistic -- typologies.

Let us examine what the Abhidhamma texts actually say. The *Dhammasaṇgaṇī* 595 states, and the *Vibhaṅga* (sec. 33) repeats verbatim:[104]

> "All form" (*sabbaṃ rūpaṃ*) is:
> [1] not 'root-cause' (*ahetu*), [2] not concomitant with 'root-cause', [3] disassociated from 'root-cause' (*na hetu*), [4] involves conditions (*sappacayaṃ,* lit: 'with or having condition'), [5] conditioned (*sankhataṃ*), [6] rūpic (*rūpiyaṃ* or *rūpam eva*), [7] mundane (*lokiyaṃ*),
> [8] with *āsavas* (*sāsavaṃ*),[105] [9a] with the fetters (*saṃyojaniyaṃ*),[106] [9b] with the ties (*gantha*),[107] [9c] with the floods (*ogha*),[108] [9d] with the Bonds (*yoga*),[109] [9e] with the obstructions/hindrances (*nīvaraṇa*),[110] [10] perverted (*parāmaṭṭhaṃ*),[111] [11] appropriational (*upādāniyaṃ*), [12] (associated with) mental disturbances (*sankilesikaṃ*), [13] (karmically) indeterminate (*avyākata*),
> [14] without mental-object (*anārammaṇaṃ*), [15] not a mental-concomitant (*acetasikaṃ*), [16] disassociated from

consciousness, [17] neither karmic–result (***vipāka***), nor productive of karmic–result, [18] not mentally–disturbed (itself, but capable of being) associated with mental–disturbances,[112]

[19a] not 'with initial mental application' or 'with subsequent discursive reasoning' (***na savitakka–savicāraṃ***), [19b] not 'without initial application, but subsequent reasoning only', [19c] neither 'initial application nor subsequent reasoning', [20] not accompanied by intense joy (***pīti***), [21] not accompanied by pleasurable happiness (***sukha***), [22] not accompanied by neutrality (***upekkhā***),

[23] not capable of being abandoned or eliminated by either perspectival orientation or cultivation (***dassanaṃ, bhāvanā***),[113] [24] not having a root–cause (***hetu***) capable of being abandoned or eliminated by either perspectival orientation or cultivation, [25] neither accruing nor dispersing (re: rebirth and death), [26] neither of discipleship (on the seven supra–mundane paths) or beyond, [27] trite and insignificant (***parittaṃ***),[114] [28] characteristic of the desire–realm (***kāmāvacaraṃ***), [29] [not][115] characteristic of the form–realm (***rūpāvacaraṃ***), [30] not characteristic of the formless realm, [31] is 'Included' (***pariyāpannā***, i.e., mundane and subject to appropriation),[116] [31] not 'Unincluded' (***apariyāpannā***), [32] no fixed or determined [consequences or results] (***aniyatā***), [33] not tending to be liberating,

[34] presently arisen (***uppannaṃ***), [35] cognizable by the six cognitive modes (i.e., the six senses), [36] impermanent, [37] subject to decay.

I have added the numbers, and have grouped them to facilitate our discussion. The texts just list the items. The items on the list follow fairly closely the order of topics presented in the ***Dhammasaṅgaṇī*** as a whole, and thus offer a sort of resume of the book. For that reason we cannot unpack this list exhaustively, since that would require unpacking the entire text, not just this section. The purpose of this section of the ***Dhammasaṅgaṇī*** is to show exactly where rūpa fits into the categorial grid of the Abhidhamma, so its meaning entails a full exposition of that grid. This would take us too far afield, but several salient points should be noted.

[1] through [5] define its status as participating in the realm of conditions. By ***hetu*** this text does not mean 'cause' or 'primary condition' in

general, but rather a specific list of hetus, viz. *rāga, dosa, moha* and their opposites. Rūpa has nothing whatsoever to do with these, the basic etiological sources of dukkha, as well as their antidotes. It is utterly irrelevant to the soteric dynamic field which Buddhism addresses. Despite its karmic irrelevancy, it remains an important component of experience, and thus the text endeavors further descriptive analysis.

It functions by way of conditions, causes and effect, and is conditioned. It is important that this be stated overtly, because later in the matrix rūpa will start to share context with the transmundane realm and the unconditioned realm (nirvāṇa), since the former is at the fringe and the latter is radically other than the karmic order. The reminder here that rūpa, though akarmic, functions in causal patterns -- aside from being faithful to experience -- makes it clear that whatever it might have in common with those realms, it is nonetheless entirely 'conditioned'. [6] and [7] reinforce this.

[8] through [13] define what it does or does not contribute to the saṃsāric dilemma. Although it is connected with the entire list of karmic problems (*āsavas,* fetters, etc.), [18] shows that it does not itself 'suffer' from these problems, it only contributes to them by proximity. For instance, while rūpa does not appropriate anything, it can be appropriated. Significantly, as [13] and [32] indicate, even though karmic problems may implicate rūpa, rūpa itself is entirely and utterly karmically neutral. It is neither produced by previous karma [13], nor will it lead to ineluctable karmic consequences [32]. [17] makes the same point. It is irrelevant to the entire process of vipāka, which is again to say it is altogether irrelevant to the karmic process.

[14] through [18] attempt to define aspects of its relation to cognition. Though itself the objective component of a cognitive act, it forms or takes no

mental-object (*ārammaṇa*). This is an interesting distinction, since later Indian schools will argue the status of the *ālambana*, i.e., Is the 'support' for the cognitional object external to, or referred to by the cognition (i.e., is it an external 'object')?, or Is it constructed by cognition (*vikalpa, kalpanā*, etc.)? At least here we see that if rūpa is the cognitive 'support' which does not itself cognize, this would avoid an infinite regress of supports. [15] and [16] classify rūpa as neither consciousness nor *caitta*, (the 'felt texture' or 'ambiance field' of a cognitive moment), thus defining its otherness from the *nāmic* skandhas. The *Dhammasaṅgaṇī*, in fact, is primarily concerned with elucidating the system of eighty-nine 'classes of consciousness', which involves fifty-two 'mental concomitants' (*cetasika* or *caitta*). In the appendices I have listed the Vaibhāṣika and Yogācāra lists of seventy-five and one hundred dharmas respectively. Their lists developed from the Theravādin list under discussion here, and the reader can see what they deemed as caittas. For the Theravāda lists Nyanatiloka's *Guide*... (pullout between pp. 12 and 13) can be profitably examined.

To say that rūpa is neither citta nor caitta is not to say that it is apart or separate from the perceptual realm, the sensorium, as [35] makes plain. It means that rūpa is not reducible to the *mental* realm. As pointed out previously, that does not entail that it also be non-cognitive.

[19] through [22] indicate, interestingly, that rūpa cannot be reduced to the characteristics of the rūpa-dhātu. The relation and distinction to be drawn between rūpa and rūpa-dhātu need not detain us here, though it is not without its controversies and interpretive oppositions. Here we simply note that none of the mental reactions one acquires or loses in the rūpa-dhātu, including the neutrality that comes at the final stage, have anything to do with rūpa itself.

[23] through [33] reiterate the basic fact that rūpa is entirely foreign

and irrelevant to the Buddhist task. Buddhist praxis, whatever it eliminates or overcomes, whatever it achieves or accomplishes, has nothing to do directly with rūpa. The mārga, the methodology, only concedes that rūpa is mundane, and desire appropriates it [28, 31, etc.]. While its susceptibility to being appropriated can complicate one's karmic problems [8–12], rūpa cannot remedy those problems in any way [23, 24, 25, 26, 31, 33].

Rūpa, moreover, has no distinctly purposeful connection adhering to its involvement in the rebirth–death cycle [25]. Rebirth involves, according to Buddhist definition, the coming together of nāma and rūpa, and death is their dissolution. But rūpa is entirely indifferent (= irrelevant) to the process of saṃsāra. This is a consequence of its karmic irrelevancy. It should be pointed out that this fact, the irrelevance of rūpa for the problem if rebirth, is thoroughly suppressed by Buddhaghosa in his commentaries and in his original works. His *Visuddhimagga* is a long meditation and interrogation of the question of how, karmically, do nāma and rūpa come together to begin a life. How do they carry over from life to life and moment to moment? For him, rūpa *is* vipāka, it is a karmic result, produced by intentional actions. He is not entirely without scriptural foundation, since the texts do discuss the relation of karma and rūpa, but as we have just seen [17, etc.], to declare rūpa a vipāka is problematic, if not in fact 'heresy'. We will return to this problem momentarily.

[34] implies that rūpa arises from conditions, and is always and only in the present (past or future 'forms' can only exist in memory or imagination, which are mental, not 'material' activities). [35] overtly and explicitly declares that *all* six senses cognize rūpa, and that its popular linguistic affinity with 'visible object' or 'tactile object' is merely metaphoric; it pervades the six-fold sensorium.[117] [36] and [37] remind us why attachment to rūpa is futile: impermanence and decay.

Significantly, and for obvious reasons, the text does not say 'subject to death'. Rūpa may not die, but it does not quite survive either.

Though this matrix seems eminently reasonable, serious tensions threaten its coherence. If rūpa is as vigorously and radically disassociated from the mental realm as [14–16] imply, by what means does it enter into proximity with the karmic problematics [8–13, etc.]? Is the distinction which was drawn earlier between cognitive (bodily and linguistic) and mental karma sufficient to carry this problematic? Rūpa is made to wear two hats: it is at once sensorial, cognitive, within the purview of eye–consciousness, ear–consciousness, and so on up to mental–consciousness (mano–vijñāna), and at the very same time emblematic of an entirely alien and remote etiology, a sign of all that is not sensorial, conscious, karmically derived and driven. It follows the same logic, the same grammar as the psycho–logical, cognitive functions, which is to say, it arises and ceases by an order of conditions, in a systematic fashion. It arises, like thought, from the concatenation of proper conditions, and disassembles by their dissolution. But its ceasing, unlike ours, is not a death. Rūpa and the karmic world run a parallel course which never really becomes parallel. Rūpa's impermanence is interminable, a kind of eternal flux. Unlike the cognitive individual who may terminate his saṃsāric journey by 'entering' final nirvana, rūpa has no telos, no terminus, no finality -- and no problems!

Such ruminations on the implications of this formulation of rūpa -- and they could be extended and deepened -- problematize Buddhism itself. There is, in fact, an undercurrent discernible in a number of Pāli texts which intimate that the Buddhist solution to the problem of duḥkha may be something like identifying with rūpa or at least the rūpic–style of dynamics. To become 'neutral', 'irrelevant' to the karmic process, to become outside or alien or radically other to

the root-problems (rāga, dveśa, moha), and so on, is to 'solve' them. But rūpa, according to this text, is not even 'neutral' or 'indifferent' [22]. It cannot be anthropomorphized like that.[118] Just as nirvāṇa resists anthropomorphic images. 'Rūpa' is utterly mindless, though sensorial.

It may be fair to say that despite the apparent complexity and sophistication of this system, at this stage Buddhism is still a form of naive realism. That an object can be radically other than consciousness, in terms of origin, function, structure, etc., and still be cognized by consciousness did not seem to them to be a problematic proposition. Perhaps their notion that something *can* be both sensorial and utterly mindless, if rigorously pursued, might lead one to produce a strong, coherent epistemology capable of adequately addressing and responding to the typical epistemological dilemmas which recur again and again as challenges to such a complacent assumption. If so, the Theravādins failed to develop it. Later abhidharmic systems, reacting to vastly more sophisticated and sensitive epistemological reflections, will rethink and reformulate the problems and the categories. To oversimplify, the Sarvāstivāda school will attempt a type of realist metaphysic, complete with substances (*dravya, vastu*), essential natures (*svabhāva*), qualities (*guṇa*), etc. Not only will rūpa substantialize, but even the mental dharmas will become essential, substantial, substrative 'reals'. This metaphysic will be attacked by Mādhyamika (not only for its substantialism, but for its metaphysicality) and Sautrāntika (who will collapse the entire metaphysical field into a single moment), as well as by others. The Yogācāric reaction was to simply reason:

(1) The fundamental human problem, the problem which Buddhism addresses and cures, its central, fundamental concern, is karma.

(2) Rūpa has nothing whatsoever to do with karma, except insofar as it becomes

an object of appropriation and attachment (*upādāna, grāhya*).

(3) This means the so-called rūpa which is considered to be karmically neutral, in fact, is neither actually neutral nor rūpa, but instead an appropriational, and hence cognitive, mental construct. This construct *is* karmically active.

(4) Therefore, rūpa can and should be ignored, since it, at best, is irrelevant, and at worse masks the psycho-cognitive appropriational activities which perpetuate the karmic problem.

Had we more time and space, this process could be diachronically traced out through the succeeding generations of texts. But such an ambitious, though crucial enterprise must await another occasion. Instead I shall try to bring into sharper focus the key issues which shaped the development of Yogācāra.

Above we noted that for Buddhaghosa rūpa could indeed be considered vipāka, despite the explicit claims to the contrary which we saw in the Abhidhamma texts. While the texts seem to insist that rūpa is not vipāka, i.e., it is not a karmic result, and that the causal chains of rūpa and the mental and cognitive (i.e., karmic) causal chains are radically distinct without any overlap or crossover, there are some texts which throw some ambiguity and confusion into this neat picture. The *Dhammasaṅgaṇī,* which we have been examining, offers us such an example.

The section on rūpa is divided into parts. The part we have cited presents rūpa as 'singular terms' (*ekakaniddeso*), and the succeeding parts present rūpa as 'double terms' (*duvidhena rūpa-saṅgaho*), 'triple terms', and so on, up to 'elevenfold terms'. While discussing the 'triple terms', the following statements are made. Asking what sort of rūpa is 'external and grasped at', the text answers:

> [746] Woman-faculty, man-faculty,[119] life-force-faculty, or whatever other rūpa *exists through karma having been wrought,* whether it be in the spheres of visible shape, odor, taste, or tactile, in the spatial or

> fluid element, in the integration or subsistence of rūpa, or in bodily nutriment. [emphasis added]

As for rūpa which is external but not grasped at, the text says:[120]

> [747] The sphere of sound, bodily and vocal ***viññatti,***[121] the lightness, plasticity, wieldiness, decay, and impermanence of form, or whatever other rūpa ***exists which is not due to karma having been wrought,*** whether it be in the spheres of visible form, odor, taste or tactile, in the spatial or fluid element, etc....

Clearly, rūpa here is divided into that which is 'wrought' by karma and that which is not. The text gives no clue or insight into how, suddenly, rūpa may be considered as a karmic result, a vipāka. Buddhaghosa treats the notion of kammically–produced rūpa as a given. He writes:[122]

> 'Related to a cause' (re: our [4], above: ***sappacayaṃ,*** 'involves conditions') means: matter sprung from kamma is caused by kamma, that sprung from nutriments, etc., is caused by nutriments, etc.

And again:[123]

> In 'not due to kamma having been wrought,' matter sprung from another cause than kamma has been taken. In 'due to kamma having been wrought' only matter sprung from kamma has been taken.

Aside from this definitional tautology, he offers no clue as to ***how*** kamma might produce a rūpa. In fact, while discussing the two viññatis,[124] Buddhaghosa is careful to note that though they are discussed as 'sprung from consciousness', in the 'ultimate sense' (parāmattha) it is only the dhammas on which the viññatis depend that can accurately be called 'sprung from consciousness', not the viññatis themselves. One wonders why the same qualifications and caution were not tended to the claim of 'rūpa from kamma'?

This issue is not insignificant. Since the text allows one to maintain either that rūpa is or is not a karmic product, and there is no more basic concept for Buddhist soterics than karmic production, the positions different schools took

on this issue become momentous. We can see a clear demarcation between the Theravādins and the Andhakas in the ***Kathā Vatthu*** drawn precisely on this point.

Their respective positions on a wide range of topics all follow from whether they consider rūpa to be vipāka or not. Theravāda insists that rūpa is not vipāka, while the Andhakas (and Sāmmitiyas) claim that it is.[125]

Theravāda argues that rūpa lacks the necessary properties of a vipāka, viz. it is not vedanā, nor conjoined with vedanā, nor with mental reaction, nor with consciousness in its many phases, etc.; in other words, it lacks the 'mental' or cognitive prerequisites of a karmic 'result'. The Andhakas and Sāmmitiyas retort that just as consciousness and its concomitant attributes are rightfully considered to be vipāka, since they arise through actions done (kamma), so should rūpa which arise through actions done be considered vipāka. Clearly, their response begs the textual question.

Similarly, they dispute whether earth/land can be considered vipāka or not, and they split the same way, with the Theravādins saying "no" and the Andhakas saying "yes".[126] Again, the Theravādins argue that earth/land lacks all nāmic properties, while it possesses qualities foreign to a vipāka, such as the ability to expand, contract, be cut up, broken, bought, sold, located, collected explored, be common to everyone, etc. They also argue whether it is a vipāka of collective karma, or whether many can 'share' the land owned by a world-monarch (i.e., do others share in his vipāka?). The Andhakas finally reply that there is action (kamma) to gain dominion over the earth, and action to gain sovereignty on the earth, and thus, the earth is a result of action. What is at issue here is not the metaphysics of rūpa, but instead its karmic status, which for the Andhakas simply means how it functions in the grasper–grasped dynamic. If it contributes

to an appropriational economy, if it spurs the desire to appropriate, to gain power, to possess, to construct and expand a self through its appropriational desires, then it is karmic. If land becomes that which people struggle to possess, to dominate and be sovereign over, then land is a 'product' of those actions. This prefigures Yogācāric thinking.

Another argument sheds some light on the Theravādin understanding of vipāka. Disputing whether old age and death are a result of action, the Andhakas predictably maintain that they are, but the Theravādins do not respond with an outright denial.[127] They agree that vipāka does influence old age and dying, however, it is not the sole cause: *ūtū*, the 'physical order', also contributes. Vipāka, they claim, is unlike other mental states (nāma-khandha), and therefore it is not strictly mental.

This is an interesting confession, considering their insistence during other arguments that vipāka should be deemed nāmic. But they fail to expound further how these two 'orders', the cognitive (nāma) order and the physical order, intermix and precisely influence each other. They digress into a discussion of past vs. present kusala and akusala. We already know that the kusala/akusala categories apply to kamma, but this still does not account for the rūpic, or 'physical' dimension.

On their side, the Andhakas also display some sloppy thinking here. They argue, if karma conduces to the deterioration and curtailment of life, then their claim that old age and death are vipāka is true. This would be to take a contributing or even necessary cause to be a sufficient cause, which is invalid. What their argument does make clear is that the physical order, for the Theravādins, is not really vipāka, i.e., it is not kammic. The interrelationship of nāma and rūpa remains as problematic as ever.

Several more points need to be made before we move on to our next topic. The Theravādins were perhaps not entirely as unsophisticated as I have been trying to depict them. A move which occurs from time to time in the Nikāyas becomes normative for Abhidhammic texts. Recognizing that the importance of rūpa per se rests primarily in its being a sensorial object available for sensorial contact and cognitive (as well as physical) appropriation, most abhidhammic discussions that treat the five-fold skandha scheme displace the term ***rūpa*** with the term ***phassa*** (skt. sparśa), 'contact', lit: 'touch'. The emphasis, the focus of the discourse, thus, moves to cognition, the hows and whys of perception and cognition, the appropriational and karmic interplay with the sensorium. Again and again the list becomes '***contact***, pain–pleasure–neutral sensation, associational thinking, embodied–conditioning and consciousness', instead of '***rūpa***, pain–pleasure–neutral sensation...,' etc. Such is the case in the opening sections of the ***Dhammasaṅgaṇī***. Section one lists all the kusala dhammas, and where the five skandhas are listed, phassa replaces rūpa. Each of the five skandhas are discussed, one by one, at the beginning of the text. Sec. 2, which begins this ostensive overview of the five skandhas, in fact, offers a definition of phassa, ***not*** rūpa (the definition and discussion of rūpa doesn't occur until later, in the part of the text we discussed above, in a division of the text devoted entirely to rūpa, disconnected from the skandhic discussion by substantial intervening material); sec. 3 defines vedanā, and so forth. The seeds of the rigorous epistemological investigations which Buddhism later unleashed on all of Indian thought were planted here, in this simple, but astute displacement. It prefigures and sets the stage for the Yogācāric subsumption of rūpa into cognition.

A second displacement must also be noted. Not only does the

abhidhamma systematically substitute sensorial contact (lit. 'touch') for rūpa, but the fourth skandha, saṃskāra (embodied–conditioning), is systematically displaced by ***cetanā***, (volition, intentionality). Cetanā, inasmuch as it involves the mental determinations which shape and result in actions, is thoroughly kammic. Rather than emphasize the aspect of latency which 'embodied–conditioning' forefronts, the emerging of conditioning from its latency in or as conscious decisions, apparent predilections, conscious volitions, etc., becomes highlighted by the term ***cetanā***. This move triggers two important consequences.

First, Theravādin accounts of unconscious, latent processes becomes inadequate. All explanation becomes surface, what is consciously present now and now only. For instance, in the ***Kathā Vatthu*** they argue, against the Andhakas, that outbursts of ***anuśaya*** (latent biases) cannot take place unconsciously.[128] For an ***anuśaya*** to be 'unconscious', they claim, that would mean that an anuśaya would have to be either rūpa, or nibbāṇa, or the five sense organs, or the five senses. For them, these categories and these categories alone are unconscious, i.e., devoid of nāma.. This classificatory insistence, no doubt, is a by–product of the displacement of saṅkhāra by cetanā, i.e., replacing 'unconscious movement' with 'volitional manifestations'. They nonetheless, perhaps incoherently, maintain a series of 'potentials' which the arhat may real–ize, i.e., according to them, an arhat's cognitive ability is always enlightened even when he does not manifest that particular ability at some given moment.[129] How potentials, or even more pointedly, the latencies (anuśaya) are understood, where do they reside, by what mechanism are latencies and potentials stored and brought back to the surface, etc., remains unanswered by the Theravādins here. The 'unconscious', with the exception of the four 'non–consciousness' categories listed above (rūpa, nibbāṇa, and sense–organs and objects), is only real for them

at the moment it is actually being cognized, which is to say when it is conscious; latent, embodied motivational and predispositional forces are only recognized by them when they emerge in the form of conscious volitions. This flattening out of the models of mental process led to theoretic difficulties. Kalupahana in his *Buddhist Psychology* argues that Early Buddhism (viz. his version of what the authentic Buddha taught) did not have a theory of the unconscious, that such theories were a later, unfortunate distortion of Buddha's teaching. An examination of the texts, however, might suggest a different scenario. What was originally a theory of an unconscious economy (***āsava, anuśaya, kleśa, saṃskāra,*** etc.), in the process of abhidhammic codification, became a conscious economy, a conscious stream which was purely surface, no depth; but this 'economy' failed both to account for what lay outside the surface, or to explain ***on*** what the surface rested. The victory of the metaphysics of presence -- the 'now', apparent and conscious over the latent, embodied and unconscious -- tipped the balance of the doctrinal scale, tilting it away from its 'middle way'. Negational discourse (ex.: Mādhyamika) arose as a corrective. Critics confused its method for its message, and interpreted it as a form of nihilism. The metaphysics of absence proved no less problematic. This dilemma, even at the early, pre–mahāyānic stage, led some schools to posit substrata (substantial and otherwise) as compensation. Yogācāra offered the ālaya–vijñāna as a solution, and was hard pressed to differentiate it from an essential substratum. This will be examined in a later chapter.

Second, cetanā makes the intentionality of consciousness thoroughly explicit. Consciousness is neither static nor passive, but ever actively intending, willing toward its objects. And this willing is never neutral, but always karmic. Intentionality itself becomes synonymous with karma. To overcome karma, then,

involves overcoming intentionality. Since consciousness and intentionality are also synonymous, this means that consciousness too must be overcome. However, Yogācāra will add an interesting element to this formula. The ālaya-vijñāna will be defined as lacking intentionality, i.e., a non-intentional form of consciousness. However, it too must be overcome. Hence, intentionality, while symptomatic of deep-seated problems, is not the root or the most deep-seated. The karmic dilemma goes deeper. Exactly how this is worked out will be discussed in a later chapter.

Meditative intent (samādhi), focused as cetanā, rivalled prajñā in some camps as the most efficacious means of dealing with the karmic dilemma. These camps argued that insight (prajñā) alone is insufficient. It must be actualized, put into play in the world, in the situation it purveys. It intends its own betterment, its turning from akusala to kusala habits. But, again mārga, methodology holds the key. Since the problem concerns action and method, the question of 'how' to en-act, of praxis, becomes paramount. Hence prajñā must be conjoined with upāya.

V – The Privileging of *Prajñā*: *Prajñā-pāramitā*

The pairing of prajñā and upāya emphasizes that not only are means (upāya) also ends -- since the purpose of Awakening, especially in Mahāyānic thinking, precisely involves acquiring the ability to Awaken others by means of upāya -- but the ends (prajñā) themselves are simply means, since prajñā is the necessary condition for performing upāya. Moreover, Buddhist texts often treat prajñā -- as opposed to jñāna -- as a 'means' for acquiring knowledge, rather than as the end-product itself.[130] Buddhist texts resonate with a profound ambivalence on the problem of means and ends. Like Taoism, which had to

'explain' how one acts without acting, or tries without trying (*wu–wei*), Buddhism often felt compelled to account for how its 'goal' was not teleological, or how one achieves desirelessness (***apraṇihita***) without finally desiring it.[131]

The ambivalence between means and ends engendered major Mahāyānic controversies, emerging in various doctrinal and formulaic contexts, from Nāgārjuna's argument that if the Unconditioned (***asaṃskṛta***) can be attained by fulfilling conditions (***saṃskṛta***) then it cannot be considered Unconditioned, to the Ch'an debate between Sudden vs. Gradual Awakening and/or practice. The tension and dissonance is often in evidence even between different works by one and the same author. For example, Candrakīrti's so-called Prāsaṅgika version of Mādhyamika displays this tension when comparing his two major works: the ***Prasannapadā*** (his commentary on Nāgārjuna's ***MūlaMadhyamaka kārikās***) can be read as a virulent and rigorous attack on the use of means to establish and achieve ends, while on the other hand, his ***Madhyamakāvatara*** contextualizes his critiques of other schools as part of an exposition on the development of the means of the Bodhisattva Path/Practice (mārga), i.e., the cultivation of ***prajñā–pāramitā***.

This ambivalence between means and ends can be brought to the forefront by focusing on the key term ***prajñā–pāramitā***. Since, at least in India, this term is synonymous with the advent of Mahāyāna, a close look at both parts of this compound term may be helpful for tracing some of the changing contours of Buddhist thought.

First, note that prajñā is singled out as the factor around which the pāramitās are oriented, which is to say that it is by or through prajñā, and for the purpose of developing prajñā that one practiccs the pāramitās. The significance of assigning this special status to prajñā will be discussed presently.

The term prajñā–pāramitā is usually rendered in English as '*Perfection* of Wisdom' which accurately reflects the Sanskrit grammatical structure of ***pāramitā*** as an abstract noun connoting a completed or accomplished set of conditions. However, in Buddhism one ***practices*** the pāramitās as a means of both self– and other–improvement. One progresses along the Buddhist mārga (path ***qua*** method) by practicing the pāramitās and one also offers aid to other sentient beings by means of the pāramitās. This would suggest that, based on meaning rather than grammar, it might also be translated as ***perfecting***. One actively engages in the 'perfecting' of ***prajñā*** (or perhaps ***through prajñā***) rather than abiding in a static state of 'perfected' ***prajñā***.[132] There are reasons for preferring a philosophical rather than philological translation of this term.

While in English 'perfection' implies an accomplished state, a non–variative fixed state, 'perfecting' suggests an ongoing process. The notion of prajñāpāramitā, as used in Buddhist literature, straddles both possibilities. The term 'perfection' lends itself to a kind of essentialism (which, as we will see, despite repeated Buddhist refutations of essentialism, nonetheless frequently and problematically crept into Buddhist thought) while 'perfecting' suggests a kind of process or progressionalism (which also had its Buddhist advocates and opponents).

At this point two important but distinct issues have emerged, and both need to be addressed. The first is the privileging of prajñā and the implications of that move. Secondly, the conflict of interpretations signalled by the essentialist vs. the progressionalist controversy must be sorted out and clarified. The first point basically concerns developments in India, while the second point, though already addressed in India, re–emerges as a critical problem in China, and as such is most germane to the subject–matter of the present work. Since the argument I

wish to set out here is complex, and will require lengthy evidence, it will be presented in four parts. In order to give a concrete sense of the elaborate centrality of 'knowledge' and examine the issue of essentialism vs. progressionalism, we will (1) quickly cite the six pāramitās, (2) examine the inordinate importance given to one of its terms, viz. prajñā, (3) examine correlative developments in some detail, and (4) finally return to the essentialist vs. the progressionalist controversy. This will, albeit indirectly, hopefully help explain the emergence of the notion of prajñā–pāramitā as basic 'cognitive soteric methodology'. By offering non–Mahāyānic formulae which likewise envision a kind of prajñā–pāramitā, we will be suggesting that this development, though characteristic of Mahāyāna, nonetheless reflects a similar orientation in non–Mahāyānic Buddhism.

The fourth of the Four Noble Truths, viz. mārga, is often summarized as the Noble Eight–fold Path (***aṣṭāṅgika mārga***), which is:

[1] correct view (***samyag–dṛṣṭi***);

[2] correct conceptualization (***samyak–saṃkalpa***);

[3] correct speech (***samyak–vāk***);

[4] correct action (***samyak–karmānta***);

[5] correct livelihood (***samyag–ājīva***);

[6] correct effort (***samyag–vyāyāma***);

[7] correct recollection/mindfulness/remembrance (***samyak–smṛti***); and

[8] correct meditation (***samyak–samādhi***).

Mahāyāna Buddhism in effect reduced[133] the Eightfold Path, which was a cornerstone of early Buddhist thought, to Six Pāramitās. The six[134] are:

[1] giving (***dāna***);

[2] behavioral discipline (***śīla***);

[3] patient tolerance (***kṣānti***);[135]

[4] energetic effort (***vīrya***);

[5] meditative contextualization (***dhyāna***); and

[6] cognitional insight (***prajñā***).

If we substitute samādhi for dhyāna, the fifth term of the pāramitā list, we immediately notice that the three members of our trialectic scheme, śīla-samādhi-prajñā, become explicitly highlighted (viz. the second, fifth and sixth pāramitās). There have been various approaches for matching up the eight parts of the Eightfold Path with the three trialectic factors, and similarly the three factors have been applied to the six pāramitās.[136] What is important for our purposes is not to review or criticize those attempts, but merely to note that the attempts have all been made because both the Eightfold Path and the Six Pāramitās were unfailingly seen as extensions of the trialectic factors, which in turn were invariably considered foundational. These attempts at systemic coherence presupposed the grounding centrality of śīla, samādhi and prajñā.

As pointed out earlier, the development of the pāramitā system in Buddhism finally raised prajñā above śīla and samādhi, and this privileging was marked by the production of the ***prajñā-pāramitā*** literature which both ushered in and consolidated the Mahāyānic Buddhist schools. Of all the perfections/ perfectings, the sixth one, viz. the perfecting of prajñā, became explicitly the most crucial.

Prajñā's ascendancy to importance manifested on many fronts. For instance, in the ***Milindapañha*** (*Questions of King Milinda*), which may roughly be dated at near the time of the earliest Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras,[137] Buddha begins to be treated as omniscient (***sabbaññutā***)[138] despite the fact that in the earlier texts, such as the ***Tevigga Sutta*** of the ***Dīgha Nikāya,*** Buddha explicitly rejects

possessing any such capacity. In the eyes of these later Buddhists, Buddha's cognitive mastery, as well as the range of that mastery, became greatly extended.[130] Since Buddha had become the example *par excellence* for Buddhists to imitate and emulate, this shift reflected a significant change in Buddhist practice. The mārga was now seen as a pursuit of cognitive mastery.

Similarly, the Mādhyamika school focused on avidyā (nescience, ignorance), particularly as expressed through its cognitive corollary, dṛṣṭi (theoretical perspectives), as the cardinal problematic that needed to be overcome. Life's problems arise, according to this view, due to insufficient cognitive acuity, or, more precisely, due to over-reliance on inappropriate cognitive constructions. This school also drew inspiration and authority from the Prajñā-pāramitā Sūtras. Many Prajñā-pāramitā texts were pseudepigraphically attributed to this school's founder, Nāgārjuna, even though a good number were written centuries after he died. Buddhist legend holds that Nāgārjuna recovered the Prajñā-pāramitā Sūtras from the Dragons (nāgās) who kept them concealed at the bottom of the ocean. This implied that the Prajñā-pāramitā literature contained vital teachings which had been hidden since the time of Buddha, i.e., the privileging of prajñā reflected the hidden, latent core of the original Buddha's teaching, though concealed until Nāgārjuna uncovered it.

Correlatively, concepts and terms involving the root *-jñā* (knowing, knowledge) became increasingly dominant within Buddhist discourse -- e.g. ***vijñāna, prajñapti, vijñapti, prajñā, jñāna,*** etc. -- and Buddhist praxis became increasingly concerned with correct cognition and theories of knowledge. All these developments are symptomatic of the privileging of prajñā. Yogācāra emerges amid the revisionistic readings of Buddhist doctrine which this privileging entailed. Like Mādhyamika it too grounded itself in the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras. Also like

Mādhyamika, Yogācāra focused on the overcoming of a cognitive problematic -- which they labeled *vijñapti* -- as the crucial and basic concern of Buddhist soterics.

Privileging prajñā in this manner signaled a change in the way the notion of 'Awakening' (*bodhi*) had come to be conceived. Increasingly it began to revolve around epistemic issues. Prajñā and jñāna no longer simply denoted means or conditions for attaining Awakening,[140] but began to serve as powerful, frequently cited synonyms for Awakening itself. The focus of Buddhist praxis narrowed, and Awakening became primarily and explicitly seen as some sort of *cognitive* acuity, a Seeing of reality as it truly is (*tathatā*). The language of the early Nikāyas, which was frequently more psychological than technically epistemological, was displaced by a rigorous philosophical and epistemological language. The descriptions of Awakening as 'overcoming the *āsavas*' or drying up the flood of deep-seated affective disorders, gave way to discourses aimed at reorienting or deconstructing the fundamental cognitive structures through which we attempt to perceive, evaluate and relate to ourselves and the world.[141] Consequently śīla and samādhi came to be seen more and more as prerequisites for prajñā rather than as factors in parity with it.

Signs of this change, of an equivalence between Awakening and a sheer cognitive act, already appear in the *Kathā-vatthu,* the fifth book of the Theravādin Abhidhamma. The *Kathā-vatthu* is a repository of controversial doctrinal opinions argued amongst some of the leading pre-Mahāyāna schools. Tradition (and most contemporary scholarship) holds it was composed following Aśoka's Council of Patna, ca. 246 B.C.E., as a record of actual debates which occurred at that council, though the possibility of later additions has to be considered. Its form typically consists of: (i) a controversial doctrinal position is

stated, (ii) the arguments advanced by non-Theravādin schools are cited (the various schools are usually identified in the commentary, not the main text), (iii) the Theravādin rejoinder is offered, and (iv) sometimes the debate continues for extra rounds. While the Theravādin tradition would maintain that their own position invariably triumphs, an impartial reader may readily conclude that on more than a few occasions the opponents' argument displays greater merit. The text is an invaluable source for the study of Buddhist doctrinal development, particularly in the early schools.

The question arose as to whether ***ñāṇa*** (S. ***jñāna***), 'knowledge', is or is not equivalent to ***vimutti*** (S. ***vimukti***), 'liberation'.[142] The Andhakas[143] claimed the two were equivalent; in other words, 'knowing' itself constitutes liberation. The Theravādins, still resistant to this new claim, attempt to rebut it. They counter on the ground that to equate ñāṇa with vimutti does not adequately distinguish between different types of knowledge (***ñāṇa***), and that only one specific type of ñāṇa may appropriately be deemed equivalent to liberation. The commentary clarifies the distinctions:[144]

> Four sorts of knowledge (or insight, ñāṇa) are grouped under knowledge of emancipation [***vimutti–ñāṇa***], to wit, [1] insight or intuition, [***ñāṇa–dassana;*** 2] path–knowledge, [***magga–ñāṇa;*** 3] fruit–knowledge, [***phala–ñāṇa;*** 4] reflective knowledge [or 'reviewing–knowledge' ***paccavekkahana–ñāṇa***]. In other words, emancipation considered as (1) freedom from perceiving things as permanent or persisting, or through perceiving the opposite [i.e., things as impermanent and non–persisting]; (2) the severance and renunciation effected by the Paths [i.e., 'methods', ***magga***]; (3) the peace of fruition [***phala paṭissaddhi vimutti***]; (4) contemplation of emancipation as such. [all square brackets mine]

The gist of the Theravāda argument is that only the third, viz. the peaceful liberation (***paṭissaddhi vimutti***) which is the fruit or effect (***phala***) of the path/method, can properly be called 'liberation'; the other three ñāṇas fall short of this. It should be noted that this fourfold scheme was elsewhere expanded by

the Theravādins into more complex enumerations of ñāṇa, such as is found in Buddhaghosa's ***Visuddhimagga***.[145]

The four ñāṇas cited from the ***Kathā vatthu*** commentary become subsumed in the last three 'stages' of the seven stages which Ñāṇārāma extracts from the ***Visuddhimagga***.[146] An summary of these stages will prove useful for later, when the comparable Yogācāric formulations will be discussed.

The fifth of these seven stages,[147] 'purification by ***knowledge*** and vision of what is path and not-path' (***maggāmagga*** ñāṇa ***dassana visuddhi***), establishes one in correct meditation through 'knowledge by comprehension' (***sammasana ñāṇa***) and by overcoming the 'ten secondary mental disturbances (which pervert) insight' (***dasa vipassan 'upakkilesā***). Interestingly, aside from the tenth 'disturbance', the list of 'secondary disturbances' involves terms which one usually finds in a list of positive qualities. They are: (1) illumination (***obhāsa***), (2) knowledge (***ñāṇa***) [!], (3) enjoyment (***pīti***), (4) calmness (***passaddhi***) [which is cognate to ***paṭissaddhi,*** 'peacefulness', i.e., the type of ñāṇa which Theravādins accept as equivalent to vimutti !], (5) happiness (***sukha***), (6) zealous worship and proselytizing (***adhimokkha***), (7) energy (***paggaha***), (8) assurance and confidence (***upaṭṭhāna***), (9) equanimity (***upekkhā***), and (10) attachment (***nikanti***). The tenth

> is latent in [the other nine] imperfections. The unskilful meditator conceives a subtle attachment to his insight which is adorned with such marvelous things as illumination; thus he is carried away by craving, conceit and view. The skilful meditator uses his discerning wisdom [ñāṇa ?], and frees himself from the influence. (p. 42)

The sixth stage, 'purification by knowledge and vision of the way' (***paṭipada ñāṇa dassana visuddhi***), clarifies the three 'mundane' (***lokiya***) 'total understandings' (***pariññā***), which are:

(1) **Fully understanding the 'known'** (***ñāta pariññā***), which includes comprehensive

knowledge of the individual characteristics, functions, causes, etc. of all dhammas; technically, this involves the first four stages.

(2) **Fully understanding through investigating** (***tīraṇa pariññā***), which includes the fifth and the beginning of the sixth stages. Here 'knowledge' proceeds from individual dhammas (the subject matter of the previous 'total understanding') to their general characteristics, viz. that they are all impermanent, dukkha, and without-self.

(3) **Fully understanding through abandoning** (***pahāna pariññā***), which proceeds through the remainder of the sixth stage. It

> involves the systematic abandoning of defilements by the method called substitution of opposites (***tadangappahāna***), i.e. by the development of particular insights which eclipse defiled erroneous notions from the mind. (p. 44)

The method of erasure through opposites is retained in Yogācāra and called ***pratipakṣa,*** 'antidote' or 'counteracting'.

The sixth stage is further subdivided into eight (or nine) stages of knowledge (***ñāṇa***):

(i) Knowledge through contemplation of arising and ceasing (***udayabbayānupassanā ñāṇa***), which is the culmination of (2) above, and corresponds to the first ñāṇa listed in the ***Kathā vatthu*** commentary. Everything is seen as impermanent, dukkha, and not-self; as rūpa and nāma (i.e., the khandhas); and as arising, abiding and ceasing. The false prajñaptic unities are deconstructed into their conditioned components: this insight is called ***ghana-saññā,*** 'perception of the compact'. The four types of 'false unities' are: (1) compactness as a continuity (***santati ghana***), (2) compactness as a mass (***samūha ghana***), (3) compactness as a function (***kicca ghana***), and (4) compactness as a cognitive-object (***ārammaṇa ghana***). In other words, by viewing the discontinuous as

continuous, by taking an aggregation to be a 'whole', by believing that functioning involves durational continuity and relational continuity of agent and product, and by amalgamating discrete perceptual spheres into trans-sensorial objects, we impose a conceptual 'compactness' onto experience. Under careful meditative scrutiny, these prajñaptic 'compacts' deconstruct. In this stage, for instance, one discerns that

> The characteristic of impermanence is concealed by continuity. The characteristic of suffering is covered up by the change of postures [since the physical discomfort of holding a specific seated posture for long stretches of time is the most immediate form of 'suffering' of which the meditator is aware]. The characteristic of not-self is overcast with compactness. (p. 47)

(ii) Knowledge through contemplation of dissolution (***bhaṅgānupassanā ñāṇa***), which is the beginning of (3) above. At this stage not only does the object of meditation 'dissolve' (due to impermanence), but the meditator also reflects on the reflective-thought itself, such that it, too, dissolves. Since both the cognitive object as well as the reflective apprehension of that cognition 'vanish', as it were, leaving no trace, either latent or apparent, this arrests the production of saṅkhāras.

(iii) Knowledge through 'appearance as terrifying' (***bhay'upaṭṭhāna ñāṇa***), in which the ubiquitous dissolutions become terrifying. Here one's understanding of impermanence moves beyond intellection and observation, and enters the existential, affective sphere. With everything dissolving, all possibilities of continuity, stability, grounding or denial of death become radically inaccessible, and one has nowhere to turn and nothing to hold on to. The terror of this abyss eventually subsides by concertedly observing it.

(iv) Knowledge through contemplation of danger (***ādīnavānupassanā ñāṇa***), in which the meditator realizes that these terrifying dissolutions (as well as what

is dissolved) arise from saṅkhāra, and that it is saṅkhāra that perpetuates the wheel of saṃsāra. Realizing the 'dangers' of embodied–conditioning and conditioning itself (P. saṅkhāra and saṅkhāta; S. saṃskāra and saṃskṛta), detachment arises, which leads to

(v) Knowledge through contemplation of disenchantment (***nibbidānupassanā ñāṇa***). This is a critical stage in which the meditator finds everything, including his practice, distasteful and annoying. A deeply nihilistic sense overcomes him; everything is meaningless. He becomes restless and agitated.

> [The teacher] should recognize that the real source of the meditator's dissatisfaction is his insight into the dangers of [saṅkhāras], and that this discontent has only been ***displaced and transferred*** to other things. (p. 53f; brackets and emphasis mine)

The saṅkhāric latent, subconscious proclivities, resisting the disclosing and dissolving gaze of the meditator, mobilize defense mechanisms which deflect that gaze.[148] Since the saṅkhāras thereby stubbornly persist, the restlessness continues into

(vi) Knowledge through desire for deliverance (***muñcitukamyatā ñāṇa***). The intense unease accompanying the nihilistic restlessness, once it is seen as deriving from embodied–conditioning (***saṅkhāra***), engenders a desire for resolution of all tensions.

(vii) Knowledge through contemplation of reflective–thinking (***paṭisaṅkhānupassanā ñāṇa***) involves bringing the affective back into a cognitive, intellectual realm. One's theoretical knowledge is now fully 'lived–experience'. Thinking is no longer abstract, but fully experiential. What was abstractly known before (e.g., impermanence, etc.) now becomes directly and fully known and understood. Just as an older student returning to the university after years in the 'real' world may appreciate and understand things better due to his experience, so

does the meditator here achieve a deeper understanding of Buddhist theoretics due to his lived–experience of the problematics arising from saṅkhāra's influence.

(viii) Knowledge through 'neutralizing' embodied–conditioning (***sankhār'upekkhā ñāṇa***) arises with the understanding of ***suññatā*** (emptiness), which in the Theravādin context means

> that everything is void of self or what belongs to self.... ***Suññamidam attena vā attaniyena vā.*** [***Majjhima Nikāya,*** II, 263].
>
> ...Reflection on [saṅkāras] now goes on effortlessly.... The object presents itself to the reflecting mind without any special effort. It is as if the mind is propping up its objects.... Even if an attractive or repulsive object is presented to him...it will simply roll away from his mind without stimulating greed or hatred. There is equanimity [upekkhā] at this stage because the meditator ***understands objects in terms of the four elements.*** Owing to the absence of defilements, the meditator's mind seems pure like an arahat, though at this point the suppression of defilements is only temporary, effected by the 'substitution of opposites' through insight. (pp. 56–57) (brackets and emphasis mine)

Note that in this stage two distinctly Mahāyānic themes are given prominence. The idea of emptiness, though here restricted to 'self and what belongs to self', both in reference to one's self and another's self, becomes the hallmark of Mādhyamikan discourse. The notion of an equanimous mind which, like a mirror, reflects all objects as they are without appropriational over– or undertones, and which, especially in Tantric texts becomes associated with Rūpa, became an important component of Yogācāric thought. Again, the pratipakṣa (antidotes) are mentioned.[149] Understanding objects to be merely the four elements can only be efficacious for achieving ***upekkhā*** if rūpa is karmically neutral. Like a materialist who rids his world of psychological ghosts by stripping them of ontological status, the meditator here becomes detached from the reward and punishment, pain and pleasure of experience by

noting that these experiences are no more than the transpiring of material causal networks. Without his embodied-conditioning coloring his perceptions, he sees the causal chains clearly. Since embodied-conditioning is only temporarily arrested at this stage, the able meditator moves on to the next stage.

(ix) Conformity knowledge (*anuloma ñāṇa*) stabilizes the previous eight 'knowledges', and establishes the beginning of the Thirty-Seven Factors of Awakening.[150] At this stage he understands conditioned things (*saṅkhāta dhammā*) well, and begins to *infer* as to the Unconditioned (*asaṅkhāta* = *Nibbāna*). This leads him to the threshold of the final, supra-mundane stage. This threshold is called 'Insight Leading to the Emergence [of the Supra-mundane Paths]' (*vuṭṭhānagāminī vipassanā*), which is threefold: (i) fully matured knowledge about the neutralization of embodied-conditioning, (ii) conformity knowledge, and (iii) Change-of-Lineage Knowledge (*gotra bhūñāṇa*). The meditator 'transforms' from the lineage of ordinary worldlings (*puthujjana*) to the lineage of a 'noble one' (*ariya*).[151] This change constitutes a middle position between the mundane (*lokiya*) knowledges which precede it and the supra-mundane (*lokuttara*) Paths/methods which will presently arise.

In the seventh and final stage, the object of meditation no longer is conditioning (saṅkhāra and saṅkhāta), but Nibbāna. No longer merely 'inferring' it, the meditator cognizes it directly. This stage, called 'Purification by Knowledge and Vision' (*Ñāṇa dassana visuddhi*), has four levels, each of which is subdivided into two parts, a path/method (*magga*), and the Fruition (*phala*) of that magga.

> The Path lasts for only a single moment of consciousness, whereas the Fruition occurs for either two or three mind-moments. (p. 65)
> ...Each Path arises only once... [and] has its own particular range of defilements to burst. When a path arises, immediately, *by the power of knowledge,* it bursts the defilements within its range. (p. 67)

(brackets and emphasis mine)

The four Supra-mundane Paths are:

> The Path of Stream-entry, breaks the three fetters of personality-view [*ātta-diṭṭhi*], doubt, and clinging to rules and rituals. One who passes through this Path and its subsequent Fruition becomes a Stream-enterer (*sotāpanna*).... He has entered the stream of Dhamma, is forever liberated from the possibility of rebirth in the four lower [Kāma-dhātu] planes, and will at most be reborn seven more times in the human or heavenly worlds before reaching the final goal.
>
> The second Path, the Path of Once-return, does not eradicate any defilements completely but greatly reduces the roots -- greed [*rāga, lobha*], hatred [*dosa*], and delusion [*moha*]. One who dies as a Once-returner (*sakadāgāmi*) will be re-born in the human world only one more time before attaining deliverance.
>
> The third Path, the Path of Non-return, bursts the two fetters of sensual desire [*rāga*] and aversion [*paṭigha, dosa*]. One who passes away as a Non-returner (*anāgāmi*) will not be reborn at all in the sense-sphere realm [Kāma-dhātu]; he is reborn only in the higher Brahma worlds where he attains final deliverance.
>
> The fourth Path, the Path of Arahatship, eradicates the five subtle fetters -- desire for fine-material existence (in the Brahma worlds), desire for non-material existence (in the formless worlds), conceit [*māna*], restlessness [*uddhacca*], and ignorance [*moha*]. The Arahat or liberated one is free from all bondage to the round of saṃsāra. He lives in the full attainment of deliverance. (p. 67, square brackets mine)

Recalling the four ñāṇas cited in the commentary to the ***Kathā vatthu,*** clearly the second and third types, viz. knowledge by the severance and renunciation effected by the Paths as well as the crucial 'Peace from Fruition' (*phalam paṭipassaddhi vimutti*) occur in these stages. The fourth ñāṇa corresponds to the 'Reviewing Knowledge' (*paccavekkahana ñāṇa*) which follows each Fruition.

> This Reviewing Knowledge takes [saṅkhāras] as its object, not Nibbāna as do the Fruits and Paths. (p. 65)
>
> After Fruition there occurs reviewing knowledge. With this knowledge the meditator reviews five things: the Path, its Fruition, the defilements abandoned, the defilements remaining, and Nibbāna. Such is the case for Stream-enterers, Once-returners, and Non-returners. But the Arahant has no review of remaining defilements as he has cut

them off entirely. (p. 68, square brackets mine)

This lengthy overview of a Theravādin meditative system has highlighted the following points for us:

(1) We have seen how the four knowledges mentioned in the ***Kathā vatthu*** were expanded and/or incorporated into a much larger system of knowledge-acquisition. They occur in the sixth stage, subsection (i), and in the various divisions of the seventh stage. Had our overview been even more inclusive, many more types of knowledge would have been cited.

(2) The unmistakable concern of virtually the entire system is the ferreting out of embodied-conditioning (saṅkhāra, saṃskāra). This is due to the importance of conditioning for the Buddhist theory of karma. Meditation in this context simply means making one's unconscious, latent conditioning, i.e., saṃskāra, accessible to conscious scrutiny and intervention through procedures which sharpen, focus and alter the mind (citta). It is thus a kind of self-psychoanalysis that employs intellect and reason (knowledge) to cure what seemingly functions unreasonably.

(3) As such, the Thervādin system displays the symptoms and signs of having privileged ***ñāṇa,*** though in a manner more categorially specific than occured in Mahāyāna. the stages, paths and fruits are characterized by what stands as their ultimate cognitive objects: saṅkhāras or nibbāṇa. Awakening involves the correct cognition of the correct cognitive object.

(4) We have noted several features of this formulation which are more than a little suggestive of issues that also arose in Mahāyānic thought. We shall return to their Mahāyānic counterparts in later chapters.

(5) This reemphasis on embodied-conditioning again makes the uncovering of unconscious processes prominent. The earlier Theravādin privileging of presence has been, of necessity, modified and perhaps entirely overthrown. If Buddhaghosa

is indeed the author of the commentary of the *Kathā Vatthu,* then he has reinterpreted Theravāda doctrine in the light of Yogācāra thought. That the Theravādins in his and all subsequent generations found these Yogācāric solutions to their doctrinal difficulties so appealing shows that the Yogācāric formulae were not alien to their way of thinking and that the Yogācāric solutions were indeed pursuasive and effective.

(6) This expansive systematization of knowledge becomes synonymous with the attainment of the goal of Buddhist practice. Discussing the 'concentration with immediate result' (*ānantarika samādhi*) which invariably follows from each Fruition, Ñāṇārāma writes, "This indescribably keen concentration enables wisdom to cut through the range of defilements and purify the mental-continuum." (p. 68) Knowledge and wisdom become the primary agents of Awakening. Śīla and samādhi are relegated to secondary importance; they establish the conditions for prajñā (or jñāna). One the one hand, knowledge is product, while śīla and samādhi are the means. On the other hand, knowledge eventually becomes both the ends and the means. Buddhist soterics, even in this late Theravādin formulation, revolves entirely around producing 'liberating knowledge'.

VI – *Tathatā*: Essentialism or Progressionalism?

But what exactly does such knowledge come to know? What is its object (*prameya*)? In the Theravādin system just described, the actual goal or object of the practice is described, if at all, in negative terms. There are specific types of knowledges concerning specific situations on the path, and one acquires and outgrows them as one progresses. But a characterization of the final telos, the final object of knowledge is stunningly absent. One reaches the arhat stage, which is marked by the *absence* of saṅkhāras, and almost immediately one is past

that; one becomes reflective, retrogressively reflective, one looks back. The text states that the proper object here is nibbāṇa, not saṅkhāras. But how can nirvāṇa be a cognitive object or meditative object, which is to say, a contributary *condition* to cognitive acts, and yet be considered 'unconditioned' (*asaṅkhāta*)? Can a condition be unconditioned? What sort of knowledge is that all-important knowledge, the one for which the entire path and the subsidiary knowledges were directed, the one which contextualizes and gives meaning to the path itself, the one which marks the terminus, the one of which it is said upon achieving: "he has done what was to be done"?

As mentioned in the last chapter, the Theravādins referred to this 'knowledge' not only in negative terms (absence of embodied-conditioning, nibbāṇa, deathless, the absence of kamma, kilesa, āsava, etc.). They also used the term ***yatha-bhūtam,*** 'just as it is', or 'just so as it becomes'. We also cited a Pāli passage which suggested the term ***tathatā,*** often translated 'suchness' or 'thusness'. In Mahāyāna the term ***tathatā*** assumes a pivotal, prominent place, and signifies the knowing which is free from any and all obstructions and interference. The original imperative to see things as they actually are (***yathabhūta***) rather than how our desires incline us to perceive them was reinforced with the emergence of the term ***tathatā*** as the catch-all word signifying everything positive which Buddhism offered as ultimate.

Tathatā, an abstract noun form of the indexical ***tat*** (that, this), indicated the immediate, direct knowing of anything or everything. Though some texts claim tathatā is non-conceptual (***acintya***) and non-linguistic (***anabhilāpya***), nonetheless it invariably is treated as inseparable from knowledge (***jñāna***).

The hypostatization of the indexical ***tat*** ("this", "that") first as ***tat***-hāgata ("such as came" and "such as gone"; the cardinal epithet for the

Buddha), then as *tat*–hatā (just as it is–ness), and finally as *tat*–hāgata–garbha (Tathāgata–womb) occurred as a consequence of the Buddhist attempt to force language to point directly at non–linguistic reality. Though they tried to 'index' words responsibly, to silence the prajñaptic problematic by recourse to indexicality (*tathatā*), the index itself was mistaken for what was to be indexed, and once more Buddhist gazes fixated on the finger and forgot about the moon. Yet, even the final hypostatization, the Tathāgata–garbha, is considered the *active functioning* of one's potential for Buddhahood. It indicates, points to, marks the trajectory toward the realization of tathatā.

Indexicality mustn't however be confused with referentiality. Though both terms denote a tripartite relation, in which a signifier signifies a signified, referentiality privileges the referent side of the formula, while indexicality focuses on the inseparabilty of the indicator (name, word) from the indicated (linguistic referent). Referentiality presupposes and insists on an outside, a beyond, a non–linguistic space in which true meanings ultimately reside. Indexicality merely points out that one name refers either to another or to itself placed elsewhere, as, for instance, when the index of a book lists the locations elsewhere in that or companion books where that word/name occurs, and, sometimes, in what context. Referentiality, then, denies that it is a closed system, while indexicality focuses on the movement within its closure. *Tathatā* is that form of indexicality in which the indicator and the indicated fail to stand over and against each other, in which the movement toward referents collapses, with only the indication of absence/presence. Unlike the Theravādin metaphysics of presence, tathatā is methodologically grounded in śūnyatā, which is to say that neither presence nor absence, being nor non–being, existence nor non–existence receive priority. Perhaps the most common metaphor is the mirror: it neither welcomes things as

they come in nor cries after them when they leave. It reflects all things equally, without bias or prejudice, without desire or aversion, without separation between itself and that which it reflects.[152]

But, as we saw above in our discussion of Sthiramati, even tathatā, simply in virtue of its being a word, is taken as a signifier referring to something. Indexicality, properly understood, can neither be indexed nor restricted to a linguistic domain, since it is the condition and possibility of those moves, not an item within their economies. Insofar as tathatā acts like a word, however, it places itself within those economies. As a referent, tathatā has frequently been misunderstood and mistaken for a sacred, objective telos, rather than correctly viewed as the śūnyatic erasure of that form of desire which expresses itself teleologically.

Tathatā should not be considered an ontological term if, following the usage since Plato, 'ontological' involves that which is *opposed to* 'appearance'. Tathatā means seeing everything, *including* so-called appearance, as it is. As countless Buddhist texts repeat, tathatā does not so much involve the eradication of delusion as such, as much as it involves seeing delusion *as delusion*.[153] Rather than denoting an immaculate, transcendental realm absolutely devoid of cognitive misapprehension, the term tathatā invokes a comprehensive (in both senses: encompassing and comprehending) experience of the full range of lived-experiences. When a delusion is recognized as a delusion, in an important sense it no longer functions as a delusion. Instead its delusive power is neutralized and it is understood simply as a phenomenon. A phenomenon, however, the Buddhist sees as a complex web of conditionality. Thus, properly understood, tathatā is synonymous with pratītya-samutpāda, i.e., conditionality.

Though tathatā is that which is known (*jñeya*) through the instrument

of prajñā, properly speaking it is not an 'object' of knowledge (*prameya*), since it always already includes and involves the conditions through which it is constituted, or as Husserl would say, the noema is never independent of noesis but always noetically constituted. Noetic functions, when looked at such that they in turn become noemata, inevitably become displaced by and through that reflective act.[154] The looker who sees himself, always sees a 'looker' other than the original looker, just as one who looks at his own reflection in a mirror sees only that reflection, but not the one looking at it. Noesis, *while it is actually functioning,* is always (in Husserl's sense of the term) transcendental. The sheer, immediate seeing of things as they are (*tathatā, yathābhūtam*), however, must remain inclusive of the noetic constituents without either (i) reducing them to noemata, or (ii) allowing them to remain transcendental and thus not immediately given. Hence, while inclusive of the noetic–noemic structure, tathatā cannot be reduced to it, much less to one or the other component of that structure. As sheer knowing (*jñāna*), tathatā is epistemic, though not (proscriptively) epistemological. Incapable of being either objectified or subjectified, it defies ontologization.

We are now ready to return to the question that prompted this diversion, namely, should *prajñā–pāramitā* be understood as connoting an essentialistic understanding of tathatā or should it be understood as connoting an epistemic process? As noted above, both positions have had their adherents within the Buddhist tradition. Since this controversy stands at the heart of the East Asian appropriation of Buddhist thought, and has determined many important parameters for the doctrinal developments in China, Korea and Japan, closer examination of its features will prove helpful to our discussion. Yogācāra, in particular as disseminated in China, polarized around this opposition, and in

part Hsüan-tsang's project can be seen as a systematic refutation of the essentialist position as advocated by Paramārtha and others. Chapter Five will consider this in more detail.

If Awakening, at least provisionally, is considered to be a goal, and sheer knowing is that goal's necessary (and perhaps sufficient) condition, the question arises: Is the goal something essentially existent, such that the epistemic method (***jñāna-mārga***) uncovers it; or, does the method subsume the goal, such that the goal's provisionality is exposed, revealing not an essential truth, but rather an insight into the epistemic process itself? In the first case, knowledge (***jñāna***) will be considered the means or agent of attaining some-***thing*** which in itself is impervious to or indifferent to the vicissitudes of epistemological approaches, though made accessible through such approaches. In the second case, nothing relevant exists outside or apart from the dynamic, progressive sphere of knowledge; Awakening here would mean knowing (***prajñā, jñāna***) becoming transparent to itself. Again, the former implies an absolute, objective Truth, while the latter implies a progressional unfolding which never posits anything apart from the process itself.

In Buddhistic terminology, the former (the Essentialist) posits Buddhahood as a distinct realm, distinct precisely because it is accessible only to Buddhas, and hence somehow essentially other than the realms accessible to the remainder of sentient beings. At best, non-Buddhas might contain a germ or seed (***tathāgatagarbha***) that offers the ***potential*** of entry into the distinct Buddha-realm, but they are considered non-Buddhas precisely because they have not yet actualized this potential. Here, as in other philosophical contexts, essentialism inscribes itself through the discourse of 'potential/actual'. Buddhahood and its corollaries, tathatā, sambodhi, etc., would signify an ultimate,

transcendental Reality.

The latter (the Progressionalist) would argue that the process of Awakening can never be separable from the Bodhisattva path[155], and that (i) the pre–Awakening striving, (ii) the Awakening realization and (iii) the post–Awakening aid offered to other sentient beings can never be seen apart from the saṃsāric process in which that path occurs; moreover, saṃsāra is able to proceed only in virtue of its emptiness (***śūnyatā***).[156] The full career of the Bodhisattva is nothing other than this process. During (i), the Bodhisattva's progress is largely determined by saṃsāric and saṃskāric conditions, though efforts are made to overcome these determinants through theory and practice. During (ii), theory and practice converge, such that the inseparability of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, or process (***pratītya–samutpāda***) and emptiness, infuse the whole of the Bodhisattva's life–world. The remedied process continues and disseminates in (iii).

Practical considerations also arise from this problem. If Awakening unfolds through a process, then to some extent this unfolding is temporal. These temporal aspects necessitate that practice towards Awakening be gradual. If, on the other hand, a ready–made transcendental realm already exists, then what is essential about Awakening remains entirely separate from temporal considerations, and entry into it may be 'sudden', i.e., nondependent on any temporal considerations.

Even in the early texts, one can find signs of this ambivalence between sudden vs. gradual Awakening. In the ***Potthapāda Sutta*** of the ***Dīgha Nikāya,*** Buddha explains the sequence of meditations ascending through the tri–dhātu. When he reaches the description of the ārūpa–dhātu, his discussion of each of the first three levels of this dhātu -- viz. ***ākāsānañcāyatana, viññāṇañcāyatana,*** and

ākiñcaññāyatana -- concludes with the refrain:[167]

> Thus also is it that through training one idea [***saññā***], one sort of consciousness [***viññāṇa***], arises; and through training another passes away....

The final ārūpya transition, the one from ***ākiñcaññāyatana*** to ***nevasaññā–nāsaññāyatana,*** is described, in part, as follows:[168]

> So from the time, Potthapāda, that the Bhikkhu is thus conscious in a way brought about by himself (from the time of the first [jhāna]), he goes on from one stage to the next, and from that to the next until he reaches the summit of consciousness.[169] And when he is on the summit it may occur to him: "To be [associatively] thinking at all is the inferior state. 'Twere better not to be [associatively] thinking. Were I to go on conditionally-compounding[160] (***Abhisaṅkhareyyaṃ***) [associative] thought, these ideas, these states of consciousness, I have reached to, would pass away, but others, coarser ones, might arise. So I will not conditionally-compound [associative] thought any more." And he does not.[161] And to him neither [associatively] thinking any more, nor conditionally-compounding, the ideas, the states of consciousness, he had, pass away; and no others, coarser than they, arise. So he enters abhisaññā nirodha (the cessation of associative thought). Thus it is, Potthapāda, that the attainment of the cessation of conscious ideas [***saññā nirodha samāpatti***] takes place ***step by step*** [emphasis mine].

The refrain cited above, "that through training one idea [***saññā***], one sort of consciousness [***viññāṇa***], arises; and through training another passes away" does not occur here. The intimate relation between the impermanence of arising and ceasing and the gradual, "step by step" character of its undoing is then brought into highlight:

> Now what do you think, Potthapāda? Have you ever heard, before this, of this ***gradual attainment*** of the cessation of conscious ideas? [emphasis mine]

Potthapāda replies "no", and after repeating the passage just cited he asks the following question:

> And does the Exalted One teach that there is one summit of

consciousness, or that there are several?

Considering the fact that according to what Buddha has just said the 'summit of consciousness' is not the pinnacle of practice, but merely the foundation from which one jumps off, as it were, into the abyssal dissolution of cognitive chains, this may appear to be a misguided question. Nonetheless, it provides Buddha with an opportunity to explicate further how through a gradual process which is identical to impermanence, one arrives at the overcoming of impermanence. The text continues:

> 'In my opinion, Potthapāda, there is one, and there are also several.'
> 'But how can the Exalted teach that there both is one, and that there are several?'
> 'As he attains to the cessation (of one idea, one sort of consciousness) after another, so does he reach, one after another, to ***different summits up to the last*** [emphasis mine]. So it is, Potthapāda, that I put forward both one summit and several.'

Existential horizonal limits ("summits") coalesce and fixate, then are deconstructed, and then reinstitute new, more inclusive limits. Each limit marks a horizonal, lived-world closure. This deconstructive 'expansion' continues up to the final margins of the ārūpa-dhātu. These margins, constituted by the undecidability of the fourth level -- the sphere of neither with nor without associative thinking (***nevasaññā nāsaññāyatana***) -- as pointed out previously, are fluid, permeable, and thus avoid closure.

Remembering that even the last 'summit' is only a springboard to a deconditioned sphere which the text does not reinscribe within a new 'summit', the apparent point of gradual training would be the progressional deconstruction of ever-broader closures, until one reaches a closure-less (de-)condition. Being closure-less, one is *in,* but not *of* the conditioning determinants of the tri-dhātu. In Yogācāric terminology, to be closure-less means to be without appropriational

involvement, to be devoid of the ***grāhya–grāhaka*** (appropriated–appropriator) structure. One neither possesses nor is possessed by conditions, though one is thoroughly enmeshed in them.

The text then makes the temporal aspect of this gradual training even more explicit:

> [Potthapāda asks] 'Now is it, Sir, the idea, the state of consciousness, that arises first, and then knowledge [***ñāna,*** S. ***jñāna***]; or does knowledge arise first, and then the idea, the state of consciousness; or do both arise simultaneously, neither of them before or after the other?'
>
> 'It is the idea, Potthapāda, the state of consciousness, that arises first, and after that knowledge. And the springing up of knowledge is dependent on the springing up of the idea, the state of consciousness. And this may be understood from the fact that a man recognizes: "It is from this cause or that that knowledge has arisen to me."'

The Saḷāyatana section of the ***Saṃyutta Nikāya,*** at IV, 216, reiterates the same message. A monk asks Buddha to explain the three vedanā, viz. pleasure, pain and neutral, in light of the saying "Whatsoever is experienced, that is dukkha." Buddha responds:[162]

> This saying of mine was uttered concerning the impermanence of conditioned things (***saṅkhāra***).... [It] was uttered concerning the perishable, transient nature of conditioned things, of their nature to fade away and cease.
>
> Now, brother, I have seen that *the ceasing of saṅkhāras*[163] is gradual. When one has attained the first jhāna, speech has ceased. When one has attained the second jhāna, vitakka and vicāra have ceased. When one has attained the third jhāna, zest (***pīti***) has ceased. When one has attained the fourth jhāna, inbreathing and outbreathing have ceased.

Note this text differs somewhat from the description offered previously of the rūpa–dhātu. Whether the fourth jhāna involves an actual cessation of breathing or just a lack of attention to it has been a matter of controversy. The text continues with five stages for the ārūpa–dhātu, making nine (instead of eight)

jhānas all together:

> When one has attained the realm of infinite space, 'associative thinking' of objects has ceased. When one has attained the realm of infinite consciousness, the 'associative thinking' of the realm of infinite space has ceased. When one has attained the realm of nothingness, the 'associative thinking' of the realm of infinite consciousness has ceased. When one has attained the realm of "neither associative thinking nor non associative thinking", the 'associative thinking' of the realm of nothingness has ceased. Both associative thinking and vedanā have ceased when one has attained ***saññā vedayita nirodha*** (cessation of associative thinking and pleasure-pain-neutral feelings). For the brother who has destroyed the āsavas, craving (***lobha***) is extinguished, aversion (***dosa***) is extinguished, radical-misconception (***moha***) is extinguished.

In this manner the text very quickly summarizes the jhānas. Each succeeding stage involves the cessation of the previous stage's characteristics, which, if we follow context, are to be considered saṅkhāras.[164] The āsavas are the saṃkhāric root. Sometimes treated as synonymous with 'nescience' (avijjā, S. avidyā), the first link of the ***pratītya-samutpāda*** chain, āsava is the root condition of saṃskāras. The term signifies the constant 'outpouring' of conditions, but an outpouring which distorts itself through the prism of craving, aversion and radical-misconceptions. Āsava also can mean a cankerous sore, something festering, or the putrification process of fermentation (and thereby also implies intoxication). Thus, it carries strong negative connotations of something diseased festering, oozing, enveloping the mind like an intoxicant.

The text then repeats the nine-part formula, this time beginning "Again, brother, I have seen that the *mastery of* saṅkhāras is gradual. When one has attained the first jhāna, speech is mastered...." and so on, all the way through mastery of moha. In the short summation which closes that passage, six 'calmings' are listed. The four rūpa-dhātu cessations are each counted separately, but the entire ārūpa-dhātu is reduced to one calming, the saññā vedayita nirodha.

The sixth reads: "For the brother who has destroyed the āsavas, lobha, dosa and moha are calmed down."

The passages just examined from the *Dīgha* and *Samyutta Nikāyas* both advocate a gradual path aimed at removing saṃskāric conditioning. The gradual path was explicitly defined as temporal in the first passage; more importantly, Awakened knowledge (ñāna, jñāna) can only arise dependent on temporal experience. But if we turn to another text, the *Kathā–vatthu,* part III sec. 4,[165] we find the Theravādins denying that *vimutti* (liberation) is a gradual process, and instead arguing that it is sudden. Their argument, however, is not that Awakening involves something atemporal, but rather they wish to emphasizes the radical specificity of this particular temporal moment. To claim vimutti is gradual, they argue, would imply gradations. Gradations would imply that at some point, at some moment one might be partly liberated and partly non–liberated, which, they say, is absurd. Liberation, like pregnancy, is an all or nothing proposition. They ask: Is eka–citta (the singular apperceptive vector) already free when it arises, and then in the process of becoming free when it ceases? Both claims, they argue, are patently absurd, violating the temporal sense of the momentary arising and ceasing of citta, and the relation between arising and ceasing and vimutti.

The problem of the process of temporal succession, of what, if anything, continues from one moment to the next, lies at the bottom of this and many similar Buddhist controversies. The 'absurdities' alluded to in their argument are perhaps more clearly recognized in a different, but related argument.[166] Do new skandhas arise *before* the skandhas that are seeking rebirth cease? In other words, what precisely is the relation between a previous and subsequent conditioned factor? How contiguous must conditioned factors be in

order to validly claim that they involve continuity? The greater the contiguity and the more proximate, the greater the continuity; the less contiguous and more approximate, the greater the discontinuity. A cause and its effect can neither be identical nor utterly different. Can they, must they share the same moment? If the temporal gap between them is too large, by what means can they be said to influence each other? If there is no gap at all, if they share the same moment, then there is no succession, and again continuity is thrown into question. But what reasonable position exists between these extremes?

To the question about skandhas, the Theravādins state that if the new skandhas arise before the rebirth seeking skandhas have ceased, then there would be ten skandhas all together, not merely five, which is absurd. Even if one were to claim only a single (or more) specific extra skandha, there would still be six (or seven, etc.) instead of five.

The opponent (the commentary mentions Andhakas) retorts: When the five skandhas seeking rebirth cease, does the Path [automatically] arise?

The Theravādin replies affirmatively.

The opponent then raises the problem of cessation as continuity/discontinuity with: "What! do the dead, does one who has ended his days develop the Path?"

The Theravādin is caught in a dilemma. If the skandhas overlap, then there will be some moment when there will be more than five. If they don't overlap, their discontinuity should, by definition, signal their utter dissolution and extinction, and the Path, defined as what arises when the appropriative skandhas cease (again, the problem of the negative definition) should automatically, spontaneously occur. That would mean that every death is vimutti. Not carrying the presuppositions of a Western eschatological framework, to them such a claim

was patently and utterly absurd (it would make all praxis meaningless, since death would accomplish everything automatically).

Another implication: mere cessation cannot produce the Path. If it could, ***any*** disruption of continuity, any rupture in the temporal, conditioned flow would automatically set one on the Path. While such 'cessations' were helpful, useful, and frequently sought as part of practice (e.g., ***nirodha–samāpatti***), they were never considered substitutes for Awakening. The Theravādin argues[167] that attaining cessation (nirodha samāpatti) is not asaṅkhāra (S. asaṃskṛta, Unconditioned), since it follows from conditions.[168]

The ***Kathā Vatthu*** revisits these issues, in a variety of guises, again and again. What is the duration of consciousness?[169] The Andhakas claim that the duration of consciousness is one day, and in certain deva lokas (heavens) it lasts for an entire life (remember that lives in the deva lokas have beginnings and ends, just as elsewhere). The Theravādin insists that it is momentary, and has only the arising and ceasing characteristics (***uppāda*** and ***vaya, bhanga***), not the characteristic of abiding. The duration of life and the duration of consciousness are never identical, and we certainly don't die with the same consciousness as the one with which we are born. Life is longer.

The same problems arise in such different questions as: Is samādhi confined to a momentary consciousness unit, or is it coextensive with a durational stream of consciousness (***citta–santati***)?[170] Do sensations follow each other in an unbroken fused sequence, or are they radically discrete?[171] The problem of continuity and discontinuity is unavoidable for Buddhists precisely because Buddhism is concerned fundamentally with the question of conditioning. And conditioning is only coherent if some relational continuities obtain between distinct items. Further, the question of conditioning is raised by Buddhists in order to

discover how to disrupt that continuity, how to rupture saṃsāra. Thus not only does the tension between continuity and discontinuity arise out of the incoherency of that opposition -- as Nāgārjuna shows -- but the centrality which that opposition receives in Buddhism intensifies it. The Buddhist project is nothing but the systematic putting into question of the issue of continuity/discontinuity, which rests on the critique of identity/difference or logocentrism/differentialism. Existentially approached, the problem of identity is always a problem in or of time: of mortality, of temporal finality, of the perdurance of moral and social responsibility, of the appropriative war between Time and person (does radical time 'take' man, or does man 'take' the time? Does he existentially appropriate Time by *identifying* with it, as for instance is suggested in the eleventh chapter of the Bhagavad Gītā?), of the continuity or dissolution of *my* identity, etc. To where and to what does my identity extend, and where and by what is it delimited? The 'my' conatively, loudly (yet hidden), exuberantly insists on its continuity; it infects each and every gaze with a professed continuity, an identity that self-evidences itself (*Selbstverständlichkeit*). And by the sheer power of its conative desire that there be continuity, the 'my' privileges the continuous over the discontinuous in every sphere, in every cognition, in every discourse, in every desire. Conation, thus, is always attempted self-perpetuation, as Spinoza and Nietzsche noted. Buddhism is designed to disrupt that economy.

As Mahāyāna Buddhism developed the essentialist vs. progressionalist controversy peaked. One text which preserves the tensions is the Lotus Sūtra. The first half deals with upāya, the provisional, deceptive character of Buddhist doctrine and practice. The 'truths' of Buddhism are mere provisional ploys designed to bring one to a place where ploys are neither necessary nor possible. The second half presents the 'True Buddha', an ahistorical, unborn,

undying, mythologically omniscient and omnipresent Power or Being. Centuries later East Asian schools, such as Tendai and Nichiren, rightly asked and debated which of these two visions of Buddhism contextualized which? If the first half gives the 'truth', then the second half should be seen as an elaborate upāyic ploy. If the second half gives the 'truth', then the ploys of the first half are merely indirect, pedagogical instruments for reaching this truth, for reaching this ontological realization.

Beyond the Lotus Sūtra the essentialist vs. progressionalist opposition is found shaping Buddhist methodology, which is to say, the mārga, the Path. Those taking Buddhism to hold an ontological nature as its essence, who conceive of Buddhism as grounded in Being, develop their essentialism by understanding prajñā-pāramitā as 'perfectION', and posit that perfection as an ontologically primal and definitive 'tathatā'; i.e., a 'suchness' which is the universal, sacred, perfected nature of all things. Suchness becomes a cosmic essence, the primal, originary scene. Buddha is no longer a teacher who perfected himself, but the universal essence of all things, the potential perfection ontologically concealed behind this veil of transmigratory appearance. And yet, the veil and what it veils are united in essence. It is this interpretation which reads Nāgārjuna's statement that not an iota of distinction can be drawn between saṃsāra and nirvāṇa (an epistemic observation) as if it were an ontological claim, a statement of essentialistic identity: saṃsāra *is* nirvāṇa.[172]

On the other hand, those who take the progressionalist stance displace the notions of nature and essence with a theory of perdurance, of continuity which, precisely because it is grounded in neither identity nor difference, can effect progress, betterment (or worsening). Prajñā-pārmitā here means 'perfectING', as that which perdures becomes that which it is not, without ever being totally other

than itself. The path is tread, and as with Heraclitus' river, the foot never truly stands on the same ground twice. The doctrines of the four gatins (stream–enterer, once returner, etc.), the bodhisattva career of ten or eighteen or fifty–two stages (*bhūmi*), etc., all exemplify the progressionalist attitude.

But like the Lotus Sūtra, one way of dissipating the tension is to accept and attempt to harmonize both extremes. Thus hybrids arose: progressive essentialists claimed that one progresses *toward* the essence, and that the progress itself was grounded in the essence (*tathāgatagarbha*); essentialistic progressives mounted elaborate schema in which one ultimately progressed beyond essentialisms by working through them (*tattva, vastu, bhūta, dharma svalakṣana, svarūpa, svabhāva,* etc.). Yogācāra was a case of this last type of hybrid.

Finally, is tathatā, 'indexicality', indicative of liberating universals, or repetitive, reiterative particulars? Given the incompatibility of essentialist universals and śūnyatā, tathatā must remain ontologically open. It is entirely without conceptual (*kalpita, vikalpa, kalpanā,* etc.) ontological commitments.

VII – Implications: *Rūpa* and the Three Worlds, Again

Let us review the meaning of 'progress' through the tri–dhātu. First, one quiets the erotic, appropriative urge and its lived–field (kāma–dhātu), and rises through this sublimation to the rūpa–dhātu. Then, like rūpa, one becomes 'neutral'; or, again, one neutralizes rūpa; or, the stoic commitment that rūpa is neutral (decathexed), follows from the characteristics of its own causality, a causal sequentialism utterly apart from, irrespective of, and oblivious to nāmic appropriational concerns. The meditative mastering of the rūpa–dhātu is capped by upekṣa–vedanā, the neutralization of all affective bifurcations.

With such neutrality, on enters the ārūpa–dhātu in search of the roots

of thinking, the conditions by which cognition occurs. A broad vista opens, a series of expansive, nāmic horizons one by one are mastered and overcome, each in turn becoming the grounding condition for the next horizon, until the sequentialism folds in on itself.

The rūpa-dhātu (with the kāma-dhātu) becomes, in the later, de-cosmologized schools of Buddhist thought, the ***kleśa-āvaraṇa,*** the hindrance and obstruction from emotional and mental disturbances. These obstructions are what prevent us from cognizing what is as it is, or what becomes as it becomes (tathatā). Kleśāvaraṇa, in turn, is grounded in ***jñeya-āvaraṇa,*** the cognitive, theoretic obstruction, identified in many texts as the perspectivality (***dṛṣṭi***) of self (***ātman***). At the root of thinking, its inceptual error consists in assigning self-hood, essences, self-definitions to the objects of thought as well as the thinker. Uproot this obstruction, and only clear, direct seeing, purified of all obstructions, occurs. Many later Buddhist texts echo Jaina rhetoric, saying that with the elimination of obstructions, one becomes omniscient (***sarvajñā***), one's insight radiating, penetrating, illuminating everywhere.

This methodology advises 'detach from rūpa', and then plummet the cognitive depths. Yogācāra took this very seriously, following this advice not only in terms of tri-dhātu meditation, but for establishing the parameters of its phenomenology. Rūpa is indeed jettisoned, and the Yogācāric gaze concentrates and investigates the cognitive depths.

If rūpa is considered to be causally on its own, that is, that the causal sequences of rūpa occur in a domain radically separate from the domain of nāma, such that nāma and rūpa constitute parallel causal chains (not strictly isomorphic in the Spinozean sense, since physical conditions can affect mental dispositions), then detaching from the karmic appropriation of rūpa is nāmically cleansing,

'purifying'. Cleansing the vijñāna-stream (***santāna***) of its karmic 'defilements' (i.e., habitual determinants, predispositions) has always been at the core of Buddhist praxis. Following the stream metaphor, the consciousness stream flows torrentially, driven by karmic motive forces (kleśas, the āvaraṇas, etc.). The flow continues unabated until nonbeneficial karma (akuśala) is transmuted into beneficial karma (kuśala), thereby filtering, purifying the stream's water. Nonetheless it rages on until abruptly, and with finality, it is dissipated in the arhat stage. This helps explain the concern in Early abhidhamma with classifying dhammas in order to ascertain which were rūpic and which weren't.

One of the stated goals of Buddhist praxis in the early texts is to become 'deathless', ***amata***. Remember that Buddha begins his meditation under the Bodhi tree on the night of his Awakening asking "Why is there Death"? The ***pratītya-samutpāda*** formula, according to this account, arose as the answer to that question. Overcoming 'death' was pivotal, and one of the epithets for an Awakened one, was that he/she was ***amata***. What does amata really mean, since it never seems to have been taken in a literal fashion. Buddha and the first generation of arhats die, like all impermanent things, and yet they continue to be called 'deathless'. Let me suggest an interpretation. To be undying means to not arise, to not arise means 'unborn' (***anutpāda***) in the sense of not constrained by conditioning, not condemned to habitually repeat previous experience, to have one's experience determined by the moment by moment 'arising of conditions' (***utpāda***). "I don't die" means (1) there is no self which undergoes death (but this is strictly formulaic, not existential), and (2) it connotes asaṃskṛta, in the sense that Chinese translated that term, viz. ***wu-wei,*** i.e., the non-conditioned spontaneity and freedom of ***tzu-jan***. Further, it meant to not suffer loss due to impermanence, to remain unaffected by loss and gain. Impermanence (e.g., in

terms of rūpa) continues unabated, but it is now upekṣa, i.e., no longer experienced *as loss*. Amata is thus an epistemic change, not ontological. Awakening is thus an epistemic, not ontological transformation!

The term ***anutpada*** (Ch.: *wu-sheng*), non-arising, non-birth, etc. is a clever rejection of the Buddhist attachment to causational (arising-ceasing) theories. Buddha' s formula for the solution of duḥkha took the form: When X does *not arise* (***anutpāda***), then Y also does not arise. Hence non-arising suggested that if avidya, etc., did not arise, then there would and could be no duḥkha, no problems. However, if nirvāṇa itself *is* non-arising, then how does it avoid hypostatization? Candrakīrti, while explaining that ***asvabhāva*** (absence of essential, self-nature) and ***pratītya-samutpāda*** are synonyms, writes:[173]

> As it is said in the verse by the illustrious one, 'Whatever is born of conditions, that is not born; it does not come to be in self-existence. Whatever is dependent on conditions is said to be devoid of a self-existent nature. Whoever understands the absence of self-existence is wise.

With the privileging of prajñā, the ārūpa dhātu in its samādhic function is displaced by epistemology and psychology. Meditation at most becomes a tool for epistemological clarity, for psychological insight. This is most strikingly evident in the blending of the Yogācāra and Sautrāntika schools, where the problematic aspects of Yogācāra doctrine, such as the ālaya (considered by other Buddhists to be too suggestive of a substrative ātmanic self) and the abhidharmic schema (considered too catechismic), are discarded and the logical and epistemological approaches to Buddhism predominate. These changes occurred after Hsüan-tsang's return to China, and thus do not directly concern what we shall be discussing in the following chapters, since he was unaware of them. But he left India at the moment Indian Buddhism was on the threshold of these

changes, and thus the Buddhism he brings back to China carries the seeds of this development. That he was ultimately unsuccessful at introducing this change to China, that he failed to establish a Chinese Buddhist logical tradition, even after translating two pivotal logic texts by Dignāga, may eventually help shed some light on why the ***Ch'eng wei–shih lun*** assumed the important role and position it did in East Asian thought.

In the next chapter we will translate the thirty verses written by Vasubandhu of which the ***Ch'eng wei–shih lun*** is a commentary. In the following chapter we will examine the ***Ch'eng wei–shih lun*** itself.

CHAPTER FOUR

The *Triṃśikā*: Texts, Translations and Notes

The *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* amalgamates ten Sanskrit commentaries on Vasubandhu's *Triṃśikā* ("thirty verses"). Comparing the original verses with the types of commentarial embellishments found throughout the *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* indicates that these commentaries were much more than straight exegesis. Virtually the entire range of Buddhist doctrine was seen by the commentators in these verses. As a concise description of the Dharma, the verses, if unpacked, offered analyses and insights into the most basic as well as the most complex and abstruse of doctrines. Nothing remained unmentioned. Of the ten commentaries, only Sthiramati's survives today in Sanskrit. What we know of the other nine comes to us through reconstructing their apparent positions from the *Ch'eng wei-shih lun*.

Hsüan-tsang originally wanted to translate each of the ten commentaries individually, but his key disciple, K'uei-chi, protested that the plethora of conflicting Buddhist doctrines in China was already insufferable, so that to add to that plethora would only cause further confusion. He beseeched Hsüan-tsang to translate all the commentaries together and indicate which of the opposing positions was correct. At first Hsüan-tsang refused, but when K'uei-chi finally threatened to leave the translation committee and Hsüan-tsang altogether, he recanted and agreed. In the next chapter we will examine the influence this battle of wills exerted on the form and content of the text, and attempt to determine thereby the relative importance the text for Hsüan-tsang and K'uei-chi.

We will show that it was the latter who raised it to the eminence with which it is still regarded.

In this chapter our aim is to put aside, as much as possible, the commentarial interpretations of the ***Triṃśikā*** and to render what the verses themselves say. This wili afford us a much better vantage point from which to inspect the hermeneutic creativity of the ***Ch'eng wei-shih lun***. Aside from Hsüan-tsang's autobiographical travelogue, ***Hsi yu chi*** (Record of Western Countries), and a small poetical work, the ***Ch'eng wei-shih lun*** is the only other Chinese text which could be considered his original work; all his other texts are strict translations. He claimed to have written, in Sanskrit while in India, a long text on the non-difference between Yogācāra and Mādhyamika, but it is not extant. While it may be more accurate to say that he is the editor or redactor of the ***Ch'eng wei-shih lun*** rather than its author, his selection and juxtaposition of passages or paraphrases from the commentaries display more than mere translation and shuffling of commentaries. He produced an in-depth position paper, or, as K'uei-chi was demanding, an encyclopedic Buddhist catechism. We are thus offered a unique view into Hsüan-tsang's thought; the ***Hsi yu chi*** only deals with philosophical issues parenthetically. It is proper that we determine to some extent what the verses themselves say, how Hsüan-tsang read and translated them, before we turn to the voluminous implications they accrued.

The focus, then, of this chapter is Hsüan-tsang's translation of Vasubandhu's verses, and not the commentarial baggage of the ***Ch'eng wei-shih lun*** as a whole. Our examination of the ***Ch'eng wei-shih lun's*** interpretation of the verses will begin in the next chapter. To facilitate the task of this chapter, I have provided the Sanskrit original along with Hsüan-tsang's Chinese translation. I have also included the translations of other scholars to help indicate the range

of possible interpretations. The layout is as follows:

A = Sanskrit text

B = Hsüan–tsang's Chinese translation

C = my translation

D = Robinson's translation

E = Anacker's translation

F = Kochumutton's translation

G = Tat's translation.

(see Bibliography for full references)

D, E, and F follow the Sanskrit (though D seems to have made some use of B's 'interpretation', and E is influenced by D), while C and G follow the Chinese. The endnotes serve as a running commentary.

I have tried in C to reconstruct ***how a Chinese might read*** Hsüan–tsang's text, and have therefore tried to avoid overly relying on the Sanskrit original to elicit its meaning. This was not always possible or preferable, since the Sanskrit text imposes certain definite limits on the hermeneutic possibilities of the Chinese. With the Sanskrit in hand one can usually ascertain rather quickly which Chinese terms are meant to correspond to which Sanskrit terms, and then relying on the Sanskrit, determine a passage's meaning. However, without recourse to the Sanskrit, many of the Chinese passages take on other connotations, and these connotations may not only suggest meanings absent in the Sanskrit, they may even be more apparent to a Chinese reader than the original Sanskrit meaning. The most striking example of this is verse 5, where despite the fact that ***hsing hsiang*** ('nature characteristic') has no clear correlate in Sanskrit (and thus, to harmonize with the Sanskrit text should be read as "is characterized as having the nature of..."), the dichotomous categorial distinction between 'nature'

and 'characteristic' (sensorial, linguistic 'form') becomes definitive for later East Asian Buddhism. Ironically the distinction provides a pivotal rhetorical weapon which opponents of Hsüan-tsang's version of Yogācāra used to denounce it: For example, Fa-tsang, who rose to prominence in part through his denunciation of Hsüan-tsang and K'uei-chi, labelled them *hsiang-tsung* (the characteristic school) and juxtaposed his own 'superior' position as *hsing-tsung* (the nature school).

Nonetheless Hsüan-tsang generally stays very close to the original Sanskrit. The major structural differences consist of (a) displacing parts of some verses to contiguous verses (e.g., the last line of B.4 is the first line of A.5), and (b) changing the order of certain terms within lists (e.g., the first two *dṛṣṭis* in verse 6). Where the Chinese carries the suggestion of a meaning or meanings which differ from the Sanskrit, I have tended to translate according to the Chinese, in almost all cases providing an explanation of the hermeneutic procedures in the notes. Almost always these 'suggestions' in the Chinese version could be made to concur with the Sanskrit. However, my aim is to render in English what Hsüan-tsang's text connotes, rather than construct an 'ideal' version or even to simply render the Sanskrit as if it already accounted for the Chinese version. Significantly, many of Tat's divergences from the Sanskrit meanings become vindicated through this procedure.

Since G is often a very loose, overly expository 'translation', it will only be cited when useful for clarifying something in the Chinese version not apparent in the translations from Sanskrit.

The words which Hsüan-tsang transliterated rather than translated, such as *manas* and *ālaya*, are also given in C transliterated. Occurrences of the terms *vijñāna* and *vijñapti*, along with their Chinese equivalents and my English translations, will be noted through graphic emphases in A, B and C. This will

help highlight these terms to facilitate later discussion.

Triṃśikā Vasubandhu

唯識三十頌 世親

Wei-shih San-shih sung Shih-ch'in

VERSE 1

[A]

Ātma-dharma-upacāro hi vividho yaḥ pravartate /
Vijñāna-***pariṇāmo'sau pariṇāmaḥ sa ca tridhā //*** 1

[B]

由 假 說 我 法　　有 種 種 相 轉
Yu chia shuo wo fa,　　*yu chung chung hsiang chuan,*

彼 依 識 所 變　　此 能 變 唯 三
pi yi shih *so pien,*　　*ts'u neng pien wei san*

[C]

Due to the provisional expressions (*chia-shuo*) "*ātman* and *dharma*," there is the proliferation of their mutual operations [or: *lakṣaṇas* operating][1] (hsiang-chuan).
They [i.e., the various forms of *ātman* and *dharmas*] depend upon consciousness[2] for their alterations.
That which can alter is only three:

[D]

The metaphor of 'Self' and 'Elements', which functions in several ways
Is upon the transformation of consciousness. This transformation is of three kinds;

[E]

The metaphors of "self" and "events" which develop in so many different ways take place in the transformation of consciousness: and this transformation is of three kinds:

[F]

Various indeed are the usages
of the terms *ātman* and *dharma* :
They [all] refer
to the transformations of consciousness;
Threefold is such transformation:

VERSE 2

[A]

Vipāko mananākhyaśca vijñaptir–***viṣayasya ca /***
Tatra–ālayākhya vijñānam ***vipākaḥ sarvabījakam //*** 2

[B]

謂 異 熟 思 量　及 了 別 境 識
Wei yi shou ssu liang,　*chi* **liao pieh** *ching* **shih** [?|]

初 阿 賴 耶 識　異 熟 一 切 種
ch'u a– lai– yeh **shih,**　*yi shou yi ch'ieh chung*

[C]

Called "differently maturing" (***vipāka***[3]), "willing and deliberating"[4],
and "**distinguishing**[5] (***laio–pieh , vijñaptir***) sense–objects (***ching, viṣaya***)"
consciousnesses (***shih***).[6]
The first, the ***Ālaya–vijñāna***
matures–at–varying–times (***vipāka***) all the seeds.

[D]

(1) Retribution, (2) Mentation, and (3) perception of the sense–fields,
Among them, retribution is the so–called store–consciousness, which has all the seeds.

[E]

Maturation, that called "always reflecting", and the perception of sense–objects.
Among these, "maturation" is that called "the store–consciousness" which has all the seeds.

[F]

They are, namely,
Maturing, thinking, and representation of consciousness of object.
There the maturing [consciousness]
is otherwise called the store–consciousness,
which carries the seeds of all [past experiences].

[G] (1) The consciousness whose fruits (retribution) mature at varying times (i.e., the eighth or 'Storehouse' consciousness or Ālayavijñāna); (2) the consciousness that cogitates or deliberates (i.e., the seventh or thought–center consciousness or Manas); And (3) the consciousness that perceives and discriminates between

spheres of objects (i.e., the sixth or sense-center consciousness or Manovijñāna and the five sense consciousnesses).
The first is the ālayavijñāna (i.e., storehouse or repository consciousness).
It is also called Vipākavijñāna (retributive consciousness) and Sarvabījakavijñāna (the consciousness that carries within it all Bījas or seeds).
[It brings to fruition all seeds (effects of good and evil deeds).]

VERSE 3

[A]

Asaṃviditakopādisthāna*–vijñaptikam *ca tat /
Sadā sparśa–manaskāra–vit–sañjñā–cetanā–avitam // 3

[B]

不	可	知	執	受		處	了	常	與	觸
Pu	*k'e*	*chih*	*chih*	*shou,*		*ch'u*	liao	*ch'ang*	*yu*	*ch'u*
作	意	受	想	思		相應		唯	捨	受
tso–	*yi*	*shou*	*hsiang*	*ssu,*		*hsiang–ying*		*wei*	*she*	*shou*

[C]

Unknowable[6] [is what and how] it appropriates[7]
and where it discerns;[8] always with 'sensation' [#9],
'attention' [#13], 'pain/pleasure' [#10], 'conceptualization' [#12], 'volition' [#11],
it corresponds only with neutral[–ized] 'pain/pleasure.'[9]

[D]

Its appropriation and its perception of location are not discerned consciously.
It is always associated with contact, [attention], sensation, ideation, and volition.[10]

[E]

Its appropriations, states, and perceptions are not fully conscious,
yet it is always endowed with contacts, mental attentions, feelings, cognitions, and volitions.

[F]

It has [within itself]
the representations of consciousness
of unknown objects and places;
It is always associated with
touch, attentiveness, knowledge,
conception, and volition.

[G] It is impossible to comprehend completely (1) what it 'holds and receives' (***upādi***). (2) Its 'place' or 'locality' (***sthāna***), and (3) its power of perception and discrimination (***vijñapti***). It is at all times associated with the five mental attributes (***caittas***), namely, mental contact (***sparśa***), attention (***manaskāra***), sensation (***vedanā***), conception (***saṃjñā***), and volition (***cetanā***).
But it is always associated only with the 'sensation of indifference' (***upekṣa***).

VERSE 4

[A]

Upekṣā vedanā tatra–anivṛtā–avyāktam ca tat /
Tathā sparśa–ādayas–tacca vartate srotasaugha–vat // 4

[B]

是 無 覆 無 記　　觸 等 亦 如 是
Shih wu fu wu chi,　　ch'u teng yi ju shih

恒 轉 如 瀑 流　　阿 羅 漢 位 捨
heng chuan ju pao liu,　　a– lo– han wei she.

[C]

It [Ālaya] is non–covered and non–recording.[11]
Sensation, etc. [in relation to Ālaya] are also like this.
Constantly operating like a wild torrent.[12]
[in] the arhat stage [it is] abandoned/neutralized.[13]

[D]

In it, the sensation is indifference and it is pure[14] and morally neutral.
The same for contact, etc. It flows on like the current of a river.

[E]

Its feelings are equanimous : it is unobstructed and indeterminate.
The same for its contacts, etc. It develops like the currents in a stream.

[F]

The feeling therein is that of indifference;
It [i.e., store–consciousness] is unobscured and undefined;
Similarly indifferent are touch, etc.,
And it [i.e., the store–consciousness] is like a torrent of water;[15]

VERSE 5

[A]

Tasya vyāvṛtir–arhattve tad–āśritya pravartate /
Tad–ālambam mano–nāma vijñānam ***mananātmakam //*** 5

[B]

次第二能變 是識名末那
Ts'u ti erh neng pien, *shih* shih *ming mo– na*

依彼轉緣彼 思量為性相
yi pi chuan yüan pi, *ssu– liang wei hsing hsiang.*

[C]

Next, the second that can [subjectively[16]] alter,
this **consciousness** is named ***manas.***
Depending on that [i.e., the Ālaya] it turns around and objectifies it;[17]
its nature is characterized as 'willing and deliberating.'[18]

[D]

Its reversal takes place in the state of Arhatship. Based on it, there functions, with it as object, the consciousness called mind. which consists of mentation.

[E]

Its de–volvement takes place in a saintly state : Dependent on it there develops a consciousness called "manas", having it [the store–consciousness] as its object–of–consciousness,
and having the nature of always reflecting.

[F]

It ceases to exist at the attainment of ***arhattva.***
The consciousness called ***manas***
Has the store–consciousness for its support and object.
It is essentially an act of thinking.

[G] Next comes the second evolving consciousness.
This consciousness is called Manas.
It manifests itself, with the Ālayavijñāna as its basis and support, and takes that consciousness as its object.[19]
It has the nature and character of cogitation or intellection.

VERSE 6

[A]

Kleśais–caturbhiḥ sahitam nivṛta–avyākṛtai sadā /
Ātma–dṛṣṭi–ātma–moha–ātma māna–ātma–sneha–sañjñitai // 6

[B]

四 煩 惱 常 俱， 謂 我 癡 我 見
Ssu fan– nao ch'ang chü, wei wo– ch'ih wo– chien

并 我 慢 我 愛， 及 餘 觸 等 俱
ping wo– man wo– ai, chi yu ch'u teng chü

[C]

[Manas] is always together with the four *kleśas*,[20]
called self–delusion, self–belief/view,
and self–arrogance, self–love;
and the rest, [i.e.] sensation [#9], etc. are together [with it].

[D]

It is always accompanied by four passions which are impure but morally neutral,
Known as notion of self, delusion of self, pride of self, and love of self.

[E]

It is always conjoined with four afflictions, obstructed–but–indeterminate,
known as view of self, confusion of self, pride of self, and love of self.

[F]

It is always associated with four defilements,
Which are themselves obscured and undefined;
Those four defilements are, namely,
Belief in self, ignorance about self,
Pride in self, and love of self.

VERSE 7

[A]

Yatrajas–tanmayair–anyaiḥ sparśa–ādyaiś–cārhato na tat /
na nirodha–samāpattau mārge lokottare na ca //7

[B]

有 覆 無 記 攝　　隨 所 生 所 繫
Yu fu wu chi she,　　*sui so sheng so chi*

阿 羅 漢 滅 定　　出 世 道 無 有
a– lo– han mieh ting,　　*ch'u– shih tao wu yu.*

[C]

[Manas] has the classification 'covered and non–recording (karmically)'.
It follows from where it is born and bound.[21]
[For] the ***arhat***, [during] cessation through meditational concentration,[22]
and [on] the supra–mundane way, it does not exist.

[D]

With those from where it is born, also with others – contact, etc. It doesn't exist in the Arhat,
In the attainment of cessation, nor in the supra–mundane path.

[E]

And wherever it arises, so do contact and the others. But it doesn't exist in a saintly state,
or in the attainment of cessation, or even in a supermundane path.

[F]

It [i.e. ***mano–nāma–vijñāna***] is associated
Also with others like touch, etc.,
Which are all of the same nature
As the region in which one is born.
It does not belong to one in the state of arhatship;
Nor does it operate
In the state of suppressed consciousness,
Nor in the supra–mundane path.

[G] It belongs to the 'covered–non–defined moral species' (neither good nor bad but covered).
It is active in the dhātu or bhūmi in which sentient being is born and to which he

is bound.
It ceases to exist at the stage of Arhatship, in the 'meditation of annihilation' (state of complete extinction of thought and other mental qualities),
And on the supramundane path.

VERSE 8

[A]

Dvitīyaḥ pariṇāmo'yam tritīyaḥ ṣaḍ-vidhasya ya /
viṣayasya-upalabdhiḥ sa kuśala-akuśala-adva ya // 8

[B]

次 第 三 能 變 差 別 有 六 種
Ts'u ti san neng pien, ch'a- pieh yu liu chung

了 境 為 性 相 善 不 善 俱 非
liao ching wei hsing hsiang, shan pu shan chu fei

[C]

Next, the third [***mano-vijñāna***], which can [subjectively][23] alter,
is distinguished into six types:
its nature is characterized as 'discerning objects'.
[It can be] advantageous, disadvantageous, and neither.[24]

[D]

This is the second transformation. The third is the sixfold.
Perception of the sense-field, which is good, bad, or neither.

[E]

This is the second transformation. The third is the apprehension
of sense-objects of six kinds: it is either beneficial, or unbeneficial, or both.

[F]

It is the second transformation [of consciousness].
The third transformation of consciousness
Is the same as the perception of the sixfold object;
It could be good or bad or indifferent in character.

VERSE 9

[A]

Sarvatra-gair-viniyataiḥ kuśalaiś-cetasair-asau /
samprayuktā tathā kleśair-upakleśais-trivedanā // 9

[B]

此	心	所	偏	行	別	境	善	煩	惱
Ts'u	*hsin*	*so*	*pien*	*hsing,*	*pieh*	*ching*	*shan*	*fan–*	*nao*
隨	煩	惱	不	定	皆	三	受	相	應
sui	*fan–*	*nao*	*pu*	*ting,*	*chieh*	*san*	*shou*	*hsiang–*	*ying*

[C]

These [are its] mental associates (***caittas***): the General [#9 – 13],
the Special [#14 – 18], the Advantageous [#19 –29] and
Mental Disturbances [***kleśa***, #30 – 35],
Secondary Mental Disturbances [#36 – 55], and the Indeterminate [#56 – 59].
All three[26] ***vedanā***-s [i.e, pain, pleasure, neutral] mutually interact
[with these six categories].

[D]

And associated with the universal mental (elements), specially determined, and good,
And also with the passions and sub-passions. It has three sensations.

[E]

It is always connected with the ***sarvatragas,***[26] and sometimes with factors that arise specifically,
with beneficial events associated with citta, afflictions, and secondary afflictions : its feelings are of three kinds.

[F]

It is associated with three kinds of mental factors:
Universal, specific, and good;
It is associated, similarly,
with primary as well as secondary defilements;
It is subject to three kinds of feelings, too.

VERSE 10

[A]

Ādyāḥ sparśādayas–chanda–adhimokṣa–smṛtayaḥ saha /
samādhi dhībhyām niyataḥ śraddhā–atha hrīr–apatrapā // 10

[B]

初 遍 行 觸 等 次 別 境 謂 欲
Ch'u pien– hsing ch'u teng, ts'u pieh– ching wei yu

勝 解 念 定 慧 所 緣 事 不 同
sheng– chieh nien ting hui, so yuan shih pu t'ung

[C]

First, the General, [i.e.,] 'sensation', etc.
Next, the Special, called 'desire' [#14],
'confident resolve' [#15], 'memory' [#16], 'meditative concentration' [#17],
and 'discernment' (***prajñā***) [#18];
[their] conditioned occasions[27] are not identical.

[D]

The first are contact, etc. Desire, decision, memory,
Concentration, and intelligence are determined. Faith, conscience, shame,

[E]

The first are contact, etc.; those arising specifically are
zest, confidence, memory, concentration, and insight.

[F]

Of those associates the first, [namely the universal] ones,
are touch, etc.,
[The second, namely] the specific ones,
Are desire, resolve and memory,
Together with concentration and knowledge;
Faith, sense of shame, fear of censure,

VERSE 11

[A]

Alobha–ādi trayam vīryam praśrabdhiḥ sa apramādikā /
ahiṃsa kuśalāḥ kleśa rāga–pratigha–mūḍhayaḥ // 11

[B]

善 謂 信 慚 愧，無 貪 等 三 根

Shan wei hsin ts'an k'ui, wu t'an teng san ken

勤 安 不 放 逸，行 捨 及 不 害

ch'in an pu– fang– yi, hsing– she chi pu– hai

[C]

The Advantageous are called 'faith' [#19], 'shame' [#20], 'embarrassment' [#21];
'absence of greed' [#22], etc., which are the three roots;[28]
'diligence' [#25], 'tranquility' [#26], 'carefulness'[29] [#27],
'equanimity' [#28] and 'non–injury' [#29].

[D]

Greedlessness, with the two others, energy, serenity, vigilance's companion (indifference),
And harmlessness are the good (elements). The passions are lust, ill–will, delusion,

[E]

The beneficial are faith, inner shame, dread of blame.
the three starting with lack of greed [lack of greed, lack of hostility, lack of confusion], vigor, tranquility, carefulness, and non–harming;
the afflictions are attachment, aversion, and confusion,

[F]

The triad of non–covetousness etc., courage,
Composure, equanimity along with alertness,
And harmlessness are [the third, namely] the
  good ones.
The defilements are passionate attachment,
Grudge, stupidity,

[G] The good caittas refer to belief (Śraddha), sense of shame (Hri), sense of integrity (Apatrāpa), the three roots of non–covetousness (Alobha) and so forth [non–anger (Adveṣa) and non–delusion (Amoha),
Zeal or diligence (Vīrya),[30] composure of mind (Praśrabdhi), vigilance (Apramāda), equanimity (Upekṣa), and harmlessness or non–injury (Avihiṃsā).

VERSE 12

[A]

Māna-dṛk-vicikitsāś-ca krodha-upanahane punaḥ /
mṛkṣaḥ pradāśa īrṣyā-atha mātsaryam saha māyayā // 12

[B]

煩 惱 謂 貪 瞋, 癡 慢 疑惡 見
Fan- nao wei t'an ch'en, ch'ih man yi erh chien

隨 煩 惱 謂 忿, 恨 覆 惱 嫉慳
sui fan- nao wei fen, hen fu nao chi ch'ien

[C]

The Mental Disturbances (***kleśa***) are called 'appropriational intent' [#30], 'aversion' [#31],
'stupidity' [#32], 'arrogance' [#33], 'doubt' [#34], and 'wrong perspectives'[31] [#35].
The Secondary Mental Disturbances are called 'anger' [#36],
'enmity' [#37], 'resisting recognizing one's own faults' [#38, lit. 'concealing'], '(verbal) maliciousness' [#39], 'envy' [#40], 'selfishness' [#41],

[D]

Pride, wrong views, doubt, anger, resentment,
Dissimulation, sarcasm, envy, avarice, along with deceit,

[E]

pride, views, and doubts.
The secondary afflictions are anger, malice, hypocrisy, maliciousness, envy, selfishness, deceitfulness,

[F]

Pride, [false] views and doubt.
Anger, hatred, hypocrisy, envy, jealousy, spite along with deceit,

VERSE 13

[A]

Asaṭyam mado'vihiṃsā–hrīr–atrapā styānam–uddhavaḥ /
aśraddhām–atha kausīdyam pramādo muṣitā smṛtiḥ // 13

[B]

誑	諂	與	害	憍	無	慚	及	無	愧
K'uang	*t'ao*	*yü*	*hai*	*chiao,*	*wu*	*ts'an*	*chi*	*wu*	*k'ui*
掉	擧	與	惛	沈	不	信	幷	懈	怠
tao	*chü*	*yü*	*hun*	*ch'en,*	*pu*	*hsin*	*ping*	*hsieh*	*tai*

[C]

'Deceit' [#42], 'guile' [#43], and 'injury' [#44], 'conceit'[32] [#45],
'shamelessness' [#46], and 'non–embarrassment' [#47],
'restlessness' [#48] and 'mental fogginess' [#49],
'lack of faith' [#50] and 'laziness' [#51],

[D]

Hypocricy, vanity, violence, lack of conscience, shamelessness, torpor, dissatisfaction,
Unfaith, laziness, carelessness, forgetfulness,

[E]

guile, mischievous exuberance, desire to harm, lack of shame, lack of dread of blame, mental fogginess, excitedness,
lack of faith, sloth, carelessness, loss of mindfulness,

[F]

Dishonesty, arrogance,
Harmfulness, shamelessness, defiance of censure,
Sluggishness, conceit, unbelief, indolence,

VERSE 14

[A]

Vikṣepo'samprajanyam ca kaukṛtyam middhameva ca /
Vitarkaś-ca vīcāraś-ca-iti-upakleśa dvaye dvidhā // 14

[B]

放 逸 及 失 念 散 亂 不 正 知
Fang- yi chi shih- nien, san- luan pu- cheng chih

不 定 謂 悔 眠 尋 伺 二 各 二
pu- ting wei hui mien, hsün ssu erh ke erh

[C]

'Carelessness'[33] [#52] and 'forgetfulness'[34] [#53],
'distraction'[35] [#54], 'lack of correct knowledge'[36] [#55].
The Indeterminate[37] are called 'remorse' [#56], 'torpor' [#57],
'initial mental application' [#58], '[subsequent] discursive thought'[38] [#59];
(these) two (pairs)[39] are named in two (ways).

[D]

Distraction, wrong judgement, remorse, torpor,[40]
Reflection and investigation are the sub-passions, two pairs in two ways.

[E]

distractedness, lack of recognition, regret, and torpor,
initial mental application, and subsequent discursive thought: the last two pairs are of two kinds.

[F]

Carelessness, bad memory,
Distraction of mind,
Thoughtlessness, remorse, sleepiness,
Reasoning and deliberation,
Are the secondary defilements. The latter two couples, [namely,
remorse and sleepiness, reasoning and deliberation],
Can be of two kinds, [namely, defiled and undefiled].

VERSE 15

[A]

Pañcānām mūla–vijñāne ***yathā–pratyayam–udbhavaḥ /***
Vijñānānām ***saha na vā taraṅgāṇām yathā jale //*** 15

[B]

依 止 根 本 識 五 識 隨 緣 現
Yi chih ken pen shih, *wu* shih *sui yüan hsien*

或 俱 或 不 俱 如 濤 波 依 水
huo chü huo pu chü, ju t'ao– po yi shui

[C]

Depending on and resting in the 'root' **consciousness**,[41]
the five **consciousnesses**[42] accord with the objective conditions projected,[43]
sometimes [the five senses working] together, sometimes not together.[44]
Like waves depend on water [so do these five depend on the ***mūla–vijñāna***].[45]

[D]

On the fundamental consciousness, the five consciousnesses originate according to conditioning factors,
Whether all together or otherwise, as the waves arise upon the water.

[E]

In the root–consciousness, the arising of the other five takes place according to conditions,
either all together or not, just like waves in water.

[F]

Depending on the conditions available
The five sense–consciousnesses,
Together or separately,
Originate on the root–consciousness,
Just as waves originate on water.

VERSE 16

[A]

Mano-vijñāna-*sambhūtiḥ sarvadā-asañjñikad-ṛte /*
samāpatti-dvayān-mūrchanād-api acittakāt // 16

[B]

意	識	常	現	起	除	生	無	想	天
Yi-	*shih*	*ch'ang*	*hsien*	*ch'i,*	*ch'u*	*sheng*	*wu*	*hsiang*	*t'ien*
及	無	心	二	定	睡	眠	與	悶	絕
chi	*wu*	*hsin*	*erh*	*ting,*	*shui-*	*mien*	*yü*	*men*	*chüeh*

[C]

Mano-***vijñāna*** always projects and arises [with the other consciousnesses],
except [for] those born in the non-conceptual heavens [#77],
and [during] the two ***samāpattis*** of no-mind (***acitta*** ; *wu-hsin*) [#75, 76].[46]
[and also in] sleep and total unconsciousness.

[D]

There is co-existence of mental consciousness always except in non-ideation,
the two cessations, and torpor and fainting, where there is no awareness.

[E]

The co-arising of a mental consciousness takes place always
except in a non-cognitional state,
or in the two attainments, or in torpor, or fainting, or in a state without citta.

[F]

The thought-consciousness, however,
Manifests itself at all times,
Except for those [i] who are born
into the region where the beings are in a state of unconsciousness,
[ii] who have entered either of two trances,
In which there is no operation of consciousness,
[iii] who are unconscious by reason
Of sleepiness or faint.

VERSE 17

[A]

Vijñāna-***pariṇāmo'yam vikalpo yad-vikalpyate /***
tena tan-nāsti tena-idam sarvam vijñapti-mātrakam // 17

[B]

是 諸 識 轉 變 分 別 所 分 別
Shih *chu* **shih** *chuan* *pien,* *fen- pieh so- fen-pieh*

由 此 彼 皆 無 故 一 切 唯 識
yu *ts'u* *pi* *chieh* *wu,* *ku* *yi-* *chieh* *wei-* **shih**

[C]

These are the various **consciousnesses** [i.e., the eight consciousnesses] whose
alterity (***vijñāna-pariṇāmo*** ; Ch.: ***shih-chuan-pien***),
discriminates and is discriminated.
Since this and that all are inexistent,
therefore all is **Psycho-sophic closure.**[47]

[D]

The transformation of consciousness is imagination. What is imagined
By it does not exist. Therefore everything is representation-only.

[E]

This transformation of consciousness is a discrimination, and
as it is discriminated, it does not exist, and so everything
is perception-only.[48]

[F]

This [threefold] transformation of consciousness
Is [just] the distinction [between subject and object];
What is thus distinguished,
Does not exist as [subject and object]
Therefore this is all mere representation of consciousness.

[G] The various consciousnesses manifest themselves in what seem to be two divisions:
Perception (***Darśanabhāga***) and the object of perception (***nimittabhāga***).
Because of this, Atman and dharmas do not exist.
For this reason, all is mere consciousness.[49]

VERSE 18

[A]

Sarva-bījam hi vijñānam ***pariṇāmas-tathā tathā /***
yāti-anyonya-vaśād yena vikalpaḥ sa sa jāyate // 18

[B]

由 一 切 種 識 如 是 如 是 變
Yu yi- chieh chung shih, *ju shih ju shih pien*

以 展 轉 力 故 彼 彼 分 別 生
yi chan chuan li ku, pi pi fen- pieh sheng

[C]

Due to the all-seeds **consciousness**,
altering [now] like this [and now] like this,
[and] because of the unfolding of the operating force (*chuan-li*),[50]
discriminating that from that arises.

[D]

For consciousness is the seed of everything. Transformation in such and such ways
Proceeds through mutual influence, so that such and such imagination is born.

[E]

Consciousness is only all the seeds,[51] and transformation takes place in such and such a way,
according to a reciprocal influence, by which such and such a type of discrimination may arise.

[F]

The consciousness contains all seeds;
Its such and such transformations
proceed by mutual influence,
On account of which such and such [subject-object]
discriminations arise.

VERSE 19

[A]

Karmaṇo vāsanā grāha–dvaya–vāsanayā saha /
kṣīṇe pūrva–vipāke 'nyad vipākam janayanti tat // 19

[B]

由 諸 業 習 氣 二 取 習 氣 俱
Yu chu yeh hsi– ch'i, erh chu hsi– ch'i chü

前 異 熟 既 盡 復 生 餘 異 熟
ch'ien yi shou chi chin, fu sheng yu yi shou

[C]

Due to the various karmic 'perfumings'.[62]
[and the] two attachments[63] 'perfuming' together,
[even as what has] previously variously–matured is already exhausted,
again [they] give rise to remaining various–maturings.[64]

[D]

The impressions from action, together with the impressions from the twofold grasping
When the former retributions are exhausted, produce other retributions.

[E]

The residual impressions of actions, along with the residual impressions of a "dual" apprehension,
cause another maturation (of seeds) to occur,
where the former maturation has been
exhausted.

[F]

Once the previous stage of maturation
Has been exhausted,
The impressions of deeds
Along with those of the twofold grasping
Engender the next stage of maturation

[G] Owing to the habit–energy (Bījas or Vāsanā) of previous deeds, together with the habit–energy of the two 'Apprehensions' (Grāhas), as previous retribution (karma of previous existences) is exhausted, Succeeding retribution (maturing in subsequent existences) is produced.

VERSE 20

[A]

Yena yena vikalpena yad yad vastu vikalpyate /
parikalpita-eva asau svabhāvo na sa vidyate // 20

[B]

由	彼	彼	徧	計	徧	計	種	種	物
Yu	*pi*	*pi*	*pien–*	*chi,*	*pien–*	*chi*	*chung*	*chung*	*wu*
此	徧	計	所	執	自	性	無	所	有
ts'u	*pien–*	*chi–*	*so–*	*chih,*	*tzu*	*hsing*	*wu*	*so*	*yu*

[C]

Due to that and that 'everywhere schema–tized',[55]
[one is] 'everywhere schema–tizing' all types of things.[56]
This 'Everywhere schema–tizing what is grasped',[57]
its self–nature (***svabhāva***) is without existence.

[D]

Whatever thing is imagined by whatever imagining
Is of an *imaginary* own–nature, and non–existent.

[E]

Whatever range of events is discriminated by whatever discrimination
is just the constructed own–being, and it isn't really to be found.–

[F]

The subject–matter that is liable
To [subject–object] distinction
By whatever sort of [subject–object]
discrimination,
Is all just imagined nature;
It doesn't exist.[58]

[G] Because of such and such imaginations,
Such and such things are imagined, [i.e., conceived by the imagination].
What is conceived by this imagination (***parikalpitasvabhāva***) has no nature of its own.

VERSE 21

[A]

Paratantra–svabhāvas–tu vikalpaḥ pratyaya–udbhavaḥ /
niṣpannas–tasya pūrveṇa sadā rahitatā tu yā // 21

[B]

依 他 起 自 性　分 別 緣 所 生
Yi– t'a– ch'i tzu– hsing,　fen– pieh yüan so sheng
圓 成 實 於 彼　常 遠 離 前 性
yüan– ch'eng– shih yü pi,　ch'ang yüan li ch'ien hsing

[C]

The 'Depending on others to arise' self–nature[59]
is produced by discriminating[60] conditions.
The 'Round Complete Reality'[61] in that [i.e., the parinispanna *in* the paratantra]
is always remote and detached from the previous [i.e., parikalpita] nature.

[D]

The ***relative*** own–nature is an imagination arising out of conditioning factors.
The ***absolute*** is the latter when it is forever separated from the former.

[E]

The interdependent own–being, on the other hand, is the discrimination which arises from conditions,
and the fulfilled is its [the interdependent's] state of being separated always from the former [the constructed].

[F]

The other–dependent nature, however,
Is the [act of graspable–grasper] discrimination;
It depends for its origin on conditions.
The [absolutely] accomplished [nature]
Is the latter's [i.e. the other–dependent nature's]
Perpetual devoidness
Of the former [i.e. the imagined nature].[62]

VERSE 22

[A]

Ataḥ eva sa na-eva-anyo na-ananyaḥ paratantrataḥ /
anityatā-ādi-vad vācyo na-adṛṣṭe asmin sa dṛśyate // 22

[B]

故	此	與	依	他	非	異	非	不異		
Ku	*ts'u*	*yü*	*yi-*	*ta,*	*fei*	*yi*	*fei*	*pu yi*		
如	無	常	等	性	非	不	見	此	彼	
ju	*wu-*	*ch'ang*	*teng*	*hsing,*	*fei*	*pu*	*chien*	*ts'u*	*pi*	

[C]

Therefore this [i.e. parinispanna] and 'Dependent on others'
are neither different nor not different;
like impermanence, etc. natures,[63]
it is not the case that you don't see[64] 'this' [i.e. parinispanna]
and yet can see 'that' [i.e. paratantra].

[D]

Thus it is neither other than nor not other than the relative.
It must be considered like impermanence, etc. When the one hasn't been perceived, the other isn't perceived.

[E]

So it is to be spoken of as neither exactly different nor non-different from the interdependent,
just like impermanence, etc., for when one isn't seen, the other is.[65]

[F]

For that reason, indeed,
It is said to be neither different,
Nor non-different
From the other-dependent nature.
It is like impermanence, etc.
As long as this [absolutely accomplished nature]
Is not seen,
That [other-dependent nature], too,
Is not seen.

VERSE 23

[A]

Tri–vidhasya svabhāvasya tri–vidhām niḥsvabhāvatām /
sandhāya sarvadharmāṇām deśitā niḥsvabhāvatā // 23

[B]

卽	依	此	三	性	立	彼	三	無	性
Chi	*yi*	*ts'u*	*san*	*hsing,*	*li*	*pi*	*san*	*wu*	*hsing*
故	佛	密	意	說	一	切	法	無	性
ku	*fo*	*mi*	*yi*	*shuo,*	*yi–*	*chieh*	*fa*	*wu*	*hsing*

[C]

Always–already[66] depending on these three natures,
is established the three non– [self] natures.[67]
Hence Buddha's secret intention/meaning is expounded,[68]
[namely that] all dharmas are without [self–] nature.

[D]

The no–own–nature of all the elements was only preached in connection with
The threefold no–own–nature of the threefold own–nature.

[E]

The absence of own–being in all events has been taught with a view towards the three different kinds of absence of own–being in the three different kinds of own–being.

[F]

Corresponding to the threefold nature
There is also a threefold naturelessness;
Referring to this fact it has been said
That there is the naturelessness of all elements.[69]

[G] On the basis of the three natures of existence
Are established the three natures of non–existence (***niḥsvabhāva***).
For this reason Buddha preached, with a secret intention,
That all dharmas have no nature of their own.

VERSE 24

[A]

Prathamo lakṣaṇena–eva niḥsvabhāvo'paraḥ punaḥ /
na–svayam–bhāva etasya iti–apara niḥsvabhāvatā // 24

[B]

初 卽 相 無 性 次 無 自 然 性
Ch'u chi hsiang wu hsing, ts'u wu tzu– jan hsing

後 由 遠 離 前 所 執 我 法 性
hou yu yüan li ch'ien, so chih wo fa hsing

[C]

[the three natures are considered non–natures because]
The first [i.e. parikalpita] always–already is characterized as (***lakṣaṇena***)
not having [self–] nature.
The next [i.e. paratantra] is without a self–originating[70] nature.
The last [i.e. parinispanna] due to its remoteness and detachment
from the previous one's [i.e. parikalpita]
nature of being attached to ***ātman*** and ***dharmas***.[71]

[D]

The first is without own–nature by its very characteristic. The second
Is so because it does not exist by itself. The third is without own–nature.

[E]

The first is without own–being through its character itself,
but the second
because of its non–independence, and the third *is*
absence of own–being.

[F]

The first nature is natureless by its very definition;
the second nature, again, does not come into being by itself,
and this constitutes the second kind of naturelessness.

VERSE 25

[A]

Dharmāṇām paramārthaś–ca sa yatas–tathatā–api saḥ /
sarva–kālam tathā–bhāvāt sa eva vijñapti–mātratā // 25

[B]

此 諸 法 勝 義 亦 即 是 眞 如
Ts'u chu fa sheng yi, yi chi shih chen– ju

常 如 其 性 故 即 唯 識 實 性
ch'ang ju ch'i hsing ku, chi wei– shih *shih hsing*

[C]

The 'Excelling Referent' (***paramārtha***[72]) of these various dharmas
again always–already is 'truly–like [this]' (***tathatā***).[73]
Because its [(non–) self–] nature is always like [this]
its real nature[74] always–already is **Psychosophic closure.**

[D]

Because it is the absoluteness of the elements and their suchness,
Because it is 'so' forever. It alone is perception–only–ness.

[E]

It is the ultimate truth of all events, and so it is "Suchness", too,
since it is just so all the time, and it's just perception–only.

[F]

That from which all elements have their ultimate reality,
[Is the third naturelessness,]
It is also called suchness,
Because it remains always as such;
That is itself the state [in which one realizes the meaning]
Of mere representation of consciousness, too.

[G] This supreme truth about all dharmas (***dharmaparamārtha***), is also
Bhūtatathatā (***chen–ju***, genuine thusness, absolute reality),
Because it is immutable, remaining constantly thus in its nature. This is the true nature of Mere–consciousness (***vijñaptimātra***).

VERSE 26

[A]

Yāvad vijñapti-mātratve vijñānam ***na-avatiṣṭhati*** **/**
grāha-dvayasya-anuśayas-tāvan-na vinivartate **//** 26

[B]

乃	至	未	起	識	求	住	唯	識	性
Nai	***chih***	***wei***	***ch'i***	**shih,**	***ch'iu***	***chu***	**wei-**	**shih**	***hsing***
於	二	取	隨	眠	猶	未	能	伏	滅
yü	***erh***	***ch'ü***	***sui***	***mien,***	***yu-***	***wei***	***neng***	***fu***	***mieh***

[C]

But if reaching [a point in which] has not yet arisen a consciousness,[75]
seeking to abide in the **Psychosophical-closure** "nature",[76]
[there remains] torpor [i.e. inertia] from the two attachments
[to ***ātman*** and ***dharmas***]
which is not yet able to be destroyed.[77]

[D]

So long as consciousness does not remain in the state of representation-only,
The residues of the twofold grasping will not cease to function.

[E]

As long as consciousness is not situated within perception-only,
the residues of a "dual" apprehension will not come to an end.

[F]

As long as consciousness does not abide
In the realization [that the subject-object designations]
Are mere representations of consciousness,
The attachment to the twofold grasping
will not cease to operate.

[G] As long as the consciousness (of wisdom) has not arisen to seek to abide in the state of Vijñaptimātratā,
The 'attachment' and 'drowsiness' (***anuśayas***) arising from the two 'apprehensions' (***grāhas***) cannot, as yet, be suppressed and obliterated.

VERSE 27

[A]

Vijñapti-mātram-*eva-idam-iti-api hi-upalambhataḥ /*
sthāpayann-agrataḥ kim-cit tanmātre na-avatiṣṭhate // 27

[B]

現 前 立 少 物 謂 是 唯 識 性
Hsien ch'ien li shao wu, wei shih wei- shih *hsing*
以 有 所 得 故 非 實 住 唯 識
yi yu so te ku, fei shih chu wei- shih

[C]

In front of yourself, you establish a small understanding,[78]
the so-called 'Psychosophical closure "nature"';
because [you are] taking 'something' to be attainable/attained
it is not really abiding in [seeing through] **Psychosophic closure**.

[D]

Even in recognizing 'it is representation-only'
of whatever you make stop before you, you fail to remain in 'that only'.

[E]

And so even with the consciousness: "all this is perception only",
because this also involves an apprehension,
For whatever makes something stop in front of it isn't situated in "this-only".[79]

[F]

One does not abide in the realization
Of mere representation of consciousness
Just on account of the [theoretical] perception
That all this is mere representation of consiousness,
If one places [= sees] something before one.

[G] As long as one places something before himself and, taking it as an object,
Declares that it is the nature of Mere-consciousness,
He is really not residing in the state of Mere consciousness,
Because he is in possession of something.

VERSE 28

[A]

Yadā tu–ālambanam jñānam na–eva–upalabhate tadā /
sthito vijñāna–mātratve ***grāhya–abhāve tad–agrahāt //*** 28

[B]

若 時 於 所 緣　　智 都 無 所 得
Jo shih yü so yüan,　　*chih tou wu so te*

爾 時 住 唯 識　　離 二 取 相 故
erh shih chu **wei- shih,**　　*li erh chü hsiang ku*

[C]

If, at [some] moment, *in* the objective conditions,[80]
[Awakingly–] knowing (*jñāna*) nothing whatever is attained/acquired,[81]
you, at that moment, are abiding in '**consciousness–only**',[82]
because [you are] detached from the characteristics[83] of the two attachments.

[D]

But when consciousness no longer recognizes an object,
Then it rests in representation–only, because when there is nothing to grasp, there is no grasping.

[E]

When consciousness does not apprehend any object–of–consciousness,
it's situated in "consciousness–only",
for with the non–being of an object apprehended, there is no apprehension of it.

[F]

One does abide in the realization
Of mere [representation of] consciousness
When one does not perceive also a supporting consciousness,
For, the graspable objects being absent,
There cannot either be the grasping of that,
[Namely, the grasping of the supporting consciousness].

VERSE 29

[A]

Acitto'nupalambho'sau jñānam lokottaram ca tat /
āśrayasya parāvṛttir–dvidhā dauṣṭulya–hānitaḥ // 29

[B]

無 得 不 思 議　是 出 世 間 智
Wu te pu– ssu– yi, shih ch'u– shih chien chih

捨 二 麤 重 故　便 證 得 轉 依
she erh ch'u chung ku, pien cheng te chuan– yi

[C]

Non–acquirable,[84] non–conceptual
is the supra–mundane Awakenly–knowing.
Because [it] neutralizes the two crude barriers,[85]
[it] immediately realizes and attains the 'reversal of dependence'.[86]

[D]

It is without thought, without cognition, supramundane knowledge,
Revolution of the basis through elimination of the two kinds of denseness,

[E]

It is without citta, without apprehension, and it is super–
mundane knowledge;
It is revolution at the the basis, the ending of two kinds of
susceptibility to harm.

[F]

That indeed is the supramundane knowledge
When one has no mind that knows,
And no object for its support;
It follows the revulsion of basis
Through the twofold removal of wickedness;

VERSE 30

[A]

Sa eva–anāśravo dhātur–acintyaḥ kuśalo dhruvaḥ /
sukho vimukti–kāyo'sau dharmākhyo–'yaṃ mahā–muneḥ // 30

[B]

此	即	無	漏	界	不	思	議	善	常
Ts'u	*chi*	*wu–*	*lou*	*chieh,*	*pu–*	*ssu–*	*yi*	*shan*	*ch'ang*
安	樂	解	脫	身	大	牟	尼	名	法
an	*le*	*chieh–*	*t'uo–*	*shen,*	*ta*	*mu–*	*ni*	*ming*	*fa*

[C]

This is always–already the uncontaminated realm,[87]
non–conceptual,[88] advantageous, constant,
the peaceful and blissful[89] Liberation–body,[90]
[what the] Great (Śakya–) Muni [= Buddha] called Dharma.

[D]

It is the uncontaminated, inconceivable, good, immutable and blessed realm,
The Liberation body (i.e., Dharma) of the great sage.

[E]

It is the inconceivable, beneficial, constant Ground, not liable to affliction,
bliss, and the liberation–body called Dharma–body of the Sage.

[F]

That itself is the pure source–reality,
Incomprehensible, auspicious and unchangeable;
Being delightful, it is the emancipated body,
Which is also called the truth [–body] of the great sage.

A PHILOSOPHIC INVESTIGATION OF THE *CH'ENG WEI-SHIH LUN*: VASUBANDHU, HSÜAN TSANG AND THE TRANSMISSION OF VIJÑAPTI-MĀTRA (YOGĀCĀRA) FROM INDIA TO CHINA

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Volume II

CHAPTER FIVE

The *Ch'eng Wei–Shih Lun* and the Problem of Psychosophical Closure: *Yogācāra* in China

In this chapter, we will first look at important trajectories in Indian and Chinese Buddhism which can be seen intersecting in the *Ch'eng wei–shih lun*. After seeking out those contexts, both in India and China, which shaped Hsüan–tsang's career, we will then discuss Hsüan–tsang's response to the Buddhism of his day. Our aim is to properly contextualize Hsüan–tsang's project as a whole in order to locate with some clarity the place of the *Ch'eng wei–shih lun* in that project. Having set the Sinitic context, we will then rejoin the discussion begun in the previous three chapters, and examine carefully the relevant positions defined and debated in the *Ch'eng wei–shih lun*. It served, as noted in the previous chapter, as a kind of catechism, and as such contains, organizes and evaluates a vast range of Buddhist doctrinal minutia. Stylistically it is at once concise -- sometimes to the point of elliptical obscurity -- and redundant -- rehearsing and rerehearsing terms and models in one permutational aggregation after another.

Due to the size and complexity of the *Ch'eng wei–shih lun* our treatment can in no way be exhaustive. We will instead (1) summarize how the *Ch'eng wei–shih lun* treats the Thirty Verses, (2) discuss some of the less familiar doctrines and paradigms used throughout the *Ch'eng wei–shih lun*, and (3) investigate the significance of the concept and experience of *vijñapti–mātra* (*wei–shih*). As this last issue stands at the core of the Yogācāric system, particularly as expounded in the *Ch'eng wei–shih lun,* an adequate understanding

of *wei–shih* is the unavoidable prerequisite for any serious reflection on that system. Whether Yogācāra is or is not a form of idealism, whether the goal of Yogācāra is the reification or erasure of mind and consciousness, in what way or ways does Yogācāra intend its texts to be read, interpreted and used, etc.; the answers to all serious questions of this sort depend on what one understands *vijñapti–mātra* to signify. This chapter will have been successful if, by its conclusion, the reader will be able to address these and similar questions in a manner consistent with Hsüan–tsang's Yogācāra.

I – The Seven Sub–Trajectories

As Buddhism trickled into China via the Central Asian trade routes, it came dressed in a variety of garbs. Pious businessmen with portable altars for worshipping a variety of bodhisattvas and deities introduced a devotional, practice–oriented Buddhism. Pious monks representing various schools and Buddhist interpretations from various regions[1] brought and translated Buddhist texts. While non–Mahāyānic Buddhism apparently predominated in Central Asia,[2] in China Buddhism was almost exclusively Mahāyānic. The earliest 'schools', depending on limited access to Indian thought –– limited by the number and quality of translated texts, and the language abilities of translators (many 'translators' apparently spoke or wrote little or no Chinese; they expounded a text, and their disciples and translation committees would render those expositions into Chinese) –– constructed positions whose vestigial slogans indicate a closer affinity to Taoism than Buddhism.[3] The first clear–cut Chinese schools were probably those groups which have come to be called the Prajñā schools. They will be discussed shortly.

The dissemination of Buddhism in China leading up to the T'ang

produced a variety of schools and positions, and inevitably contradictions and conflicts between them arose. If there is one Dharma, why are there so many conflicting schools, texts and doctrines?[4] This was the underlying, pressing question which all Chinese Buddhists in the sixth and seventh centuries attempted to resolve. Hsüan-tsang's project, as well, should be seen in this light.

The T'ang dynasty (618–906) dawned during Hsüan-tsang's lifetime (600–669). Though Buddhism had already been disseminated in China for over six centuries, it was not until the T'ang that Buddhism became a dominant cultural force. Hsüan-tsang played a key role in that ascendence, even though virtually every major Chinese Buddhist thinker, from Chih-I to Hui-neng, Paramārtha to Fa-tsang, lived within a hundred years of Hsüan-tsang and many were his contemporaries. Often the T'ang is considered to be the Golden Age of Buddhism in China.

By the sixth and seventh centuries Buddhism, both in India and China, had become thoroughly pluralistic. Varying and often oppositional interpretations vied for legitimacy and adherents. The psychosophical trajectory called Buddhism had splintered into numerous sub-trajectories.

Seven such sub-trajectories are particularly worthy of note:

(1) Categorial matrices. Although found throughout all Buddhist literature, this trajectory took two main forms. (a) the Abhidharmic matrices (***mātṛkā***), and (b) the Prajñāpāramitā reworking of those matrices. The categories, or lists, such as the 75 or 100 dharmas, the thirty-seven Factors of Enlightenment, the ten (or seventeen, or fifty-two) Bodhisattva stages, etc., grew more intricate and involved with the passing centuries. Novel doctrinal developments were produced by recombining sets of these lists. In Hsüan-tsang's day the ***sine qua non*** text of this genre was the ***Yogācārabhūmi***. In fact, Hsüan-tsang's

avowed purpose for going to India was to procure a more complete and accurate version of this text, since he believed that all the discrepancies and doctrinal wranglings – which made the Buddhism of the China of his day something less than a harmonious coherent tradition – would be resolved by the complete *Yogācārabhūmi*. A huge text (100 chüan), it is among the first he translated after returning to China.

(2) Reasoning and logic. Although logical acumen is already evident in Nāgārjuna, and even earlier[5], it is not until Yogācāra emerges that logic, particularly syllogistic logic, receives a firm foundation. Vasubandhu's *Vādavidhi*, though still a 'debate' text and not strictly speaking a 'logic' text, takes the first steps which his primary disciple in the field of logic, Dignāga later expands on and develops.[6] Hsüan-tsang introduces Indian logic to China by translating crucial Dignāga texts.[7]

(3) Soteric systematics. Including basic formulations like the Four Noble Truths and the Noble Eightfold Path, but developing into detailed, rich systematics. Like the matrices mentioned above in (1), the key text, particularly for the Yogācāra school, was the *Yogācārabhūmi*. In China, all the important texts were interpreted in terms of soteric systematic enumeration, i.e., the *She-lun, Ti-lun, Hua-yen ching,* etc. were viewed, in part, as step by step guides to enlightenment. Even the critical Madhyamakan negations become soteric systematics, i.e., a hierarchy of soteric achievements, in the hands of their most important Chinese commentator, Chi-tsang. The massive creative work of the T'ien-t'ai foundational thinker, Chih-I, can also be seen as an elaborate and highly original soteric systematic. Not surprisingly, different texts offered different systematics, and the differences were sometimes irresolvable. Resolving, or at least harmonizing the differences became a

primary objective for most Chinese Buddhist thinkers, and the development of Sinitic Mahāyāna must be viewed in this light.

(4) Dialectical–deconstructive critique. Like (2) above, this involves a logical, reasoned approach to matters under its consideration, but unlike debate and logic, its concern is not to construct a more adequate or more accurate description, much less suggest prescriptive axioms. Its aim – whether overtly as in Prasaṅghika Mādhyamika, or implicitly as in the Sautrāntika discussion of time or the Yogācāra critique of 'externality' – is the falsification of whatever theory it takes under discussion. This 'method', first found expressed by the Buddha in the ***Brahmajāla sutta*** of the ***Dīgha Nikāya,***[8] is sharpened by Nāgārjuna and adopted and applied by all subsequent Buddhist schools to attack their Buddhist and non–Buddhist opponents. While the syllogistic tradition never really takes root in China, dialectics are readily accepted and appropriated, in part due to the fact that there already existed a sharp dialectical tradition in China (e.g., Lao Tzu, Chuang Tzu) prior to Buddhism's entry.

Note that (1) and (3) are both classificatory, and thus ***expansive,*** in the sense that they function through the promulgation of ever more divisive distinctions and bifurcations. A categorial approach, by definition, proliferates itself. On the contrary, (2) and (4) are reductive, i.e., they either reduce what they treat to general classes (***samānya***), or else they reduce (false) propositions to absurdity. The subject of a logical proposition can never be a distinct particular, but will always be a member of a general, universalistic class (e.g., a tree can only be the subject of a logical investigation insofar as it participates in categories indicative of what remains outside of or besides that particular tree, such as 'tree–ness', biological and physical laws, etc.; logic deals in general laws, and can only

approach a particular case to the degree that that case is reducible to 'appropriate' general principles). Deconstructing a claim, whether by demonstrating internal inconsistency, by revealing hidden assumptions, by ***petitio principii, reductio ad absurdum,*** etc., reduces a claim and whatever edifice has been made to rest on that claim to an untenable assertion. Inasmuch as it reduces a set of claims to either untenable claims, or no claims at all (depending on the rigor of the critique), it, like logic, is ***contractive.***

(5) Psychologistic reductionism. By fixating on the key problematic as karmic, and defining karma as cognitive and mental (activity of lived-body, language and mentation), Buddhist analysis considers anything ***outside*** the cognitive-mental sphere of experience to be utterly irrelevant and/or indemonstrable. Since karma and intentionality are considered, from the beginning, to be synonyms, all experience, insofar as the gaze upon it is directed by soteric concerns, is reduced to a play of intentionality, a play in which even the subtlest and most sublimated intentionalities are viewed as expressions of appropriational intent (***upadāna, rāga, tanha,*** etc.).

There are, however, two very important non-intentionalistic types of cognition admitted by the Yogācārins. The first is Awakened cognition. The other exception to this intentionality-reduction is the notion of the ālaya-vijñāna. According to Yogācāra the ālaya is non-obstructed (***anivṛtā, wu-fu***) and non-recording (***avyākta, wu-chi***), which means it is non-intentional (cf. ***Triṃśika*** v. 4). This categorization serves several functions: It announces that there is such a thing as karmically neutral experience, i.e., neutral in the sense of the absence of appropriational intent. Most importantly, since the ālaya-vijñāna is the root consciousness (***mūla-vijñāna***) upon which the interaction of the other seven consciousnesses depend, this non-intentionalistic characterization of the

ālaya-vijñāna indicates that appropriationless experience lies at the core of all experience. This, in turn, promises the feasibility and possibility of Awakening -- i.e., if *all* experience, all thought, cognition, etc. were inextricably intentional, and thus bound in and by unalterable (causally and logically) 'necessary' cognitive causal chains, there would be little if any chance of breaking those chains, or put more directly, if experience were utterly determined, freedom would forever be impossible. If all is reduced to consciousness, and consciousness itself is thoroughly conditioned, then Awakening *qua* the breaking of the karmic habitual conditioned chains (*saṃbandha*) would be impossible. The notion of an ālaya-vijñāna free from intentionality answers this difficulty.

However, positing a non-intentional consciousness was not without its perils either. Chinese Buddhists, in particular, drew sectarian lines along the question of whether the ālaya-vijñāna was (i) defiled, (ii) not defiled, or (iii) part defiled and part non-defiled. The *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* argues that (i) and (ii) are extremist positions, and thus opts for a version of position (iii).

This issue is quite vital. On the one hand, it presents the positional and rhetorical critique that Hsüan-tsang levels at his opponents, such as the Ti-lun and She-lun schools and especially Paramārtha's ninth consciousness. On the other hand, it stands at the core of what perhaps is the *Ch'eng wei-shih lun's* major internal inconsistency, which, incidentally also arises by a clear distancing of itself from the actual text of the *Triṃśikā*. By trying to qualify the *Triṃśikā's* claim that the ālaya-vijñāna is destroyed (*vyāvṛti, she* 捨 ; A,v. 5; B,v. 4) by saying that the *shih-t'i* 識 體 ('consciousness itself' ?, 'the essence of this consciousness' ?) is *not* destroyed, Hsüan-tsang has opened a can of worms that includes, among other things, the question of whether Yogācāra is or is not ultimately an idealism. Vasubandhu clearly has in mind that the

ālaya-vijñāna, in virtue of its being one of the saṃskṛta-dharmas (conditioned dharmas) and not asaṃskṛta (unconditioned), must be cut off. Hsüan-tsang's revision of Vasubandhu's position is not done unthinkingly, and in fact entails a radical reappraisal of the notion of asaṃskṛta; specifically that 'unconditioned' does not refer to any real dharma, but rather is a mere prajñapti for tathatā, which itself is a prajñapti.[9]

Linguistic, like mental reductionism carries psychologistic tendencies. Like Husserl the Yogācārins took great pains to distinguish what they did *as a phenomenology* from mere psychologism. This is not always (or we should say, ever) easy. Husserl, for instance, grappled with this distinction throughout his career. In his final work, the *Krisis...*, he returns again and again to the distinctions between psychologism, transcendental philosophy and transcendental psychology. Though he limits psychology (as practiced) to a prescientific naive worldview incapable of transcendentalizing or overcoming its presuppositions of empiricism,[10] he nonetheless concedes[11]

> But if the universal epoché, which encompasses all having-consciousness-of-the-world, is necessary, then the psychologist loses, during the epoché, the ground of the objective world. Thus pure psychology in itself is identical with transcendental philosophy as the science of transcendental subjectivity. This is unassailable....
>
> Pure psychology simply knows nothing other than the subjective; to admit into it something objective as existing is already to abandon pure psychology. [Phenomenology, on the other hand, "can return from the reorientation into the natural attitude"] ...This, systematically developed through the most vigorous of all conceivable methods – that is, the method of transcendental subjectivity reflecting apodictically upon itself and apodictically explicating itself – is precisely transcendental philosophy; thus pure psychology is and can be nothing other than what was sought earlier from the philosophical point of view as absolutely grounded philosophy, which can fulfill itself only as phenomenological transcendental philosophy.

This momentary 'identity' between pure psychology and transcendental philosophy leads Husserl to assert that pure psychology is thus different "from every other positive [and natural] science,"[12] in that it, by definition, eschews the so-called objective or natural world except insofar as that world is a world "for-me", that is, appropriated by and belonging to the subject. If we remind ourselves that perhaps Husserl's most radical insight was 'seeing-through' the notion of "Nature", the immense importance of this confession about the relationship of pure psychology to transcendental philosophy becomes clearer. Earlier in the same text Husserl had written[13]

> Whatever may be the chances for realizing, or the capacity for realizing, the idea of objective science in respect to the mental world (i.e., not only in respect to nature), this idea of objectivity dominates the whole ***universitas*** of the positive sciences of the modern period, and in the general usage it dominates the meaning of the word "science." This already involves a naturalism insofar as this concept is taken from Galilean natural science, such that the scientifically "true," the objective, world is always thought of in advance as nature, in an expanded sense of the word. The contrast between the subjectivity of the life-world and the "objective," the "true" world, lies in the fact that the latter is a theoretical-logical substruction, the substruction of something that is in principle not perceivable, in principle not experienceable in its own proper being, whereas the subjective, in the life-world, is distinguished in all respects precisely by its being actually experienceable.
>
> ...All conceivable verification leads back to these modes of self-evidence because the "thing itself"... lies in these intuitions themselves as that which is actually, intersubjectively experienceable and verifiable and is not a substruction of thought; whereas such a substruction, insofar as it makes claim to truth, can have actual truth only by being related back to such self-evidences.

The Yogācāra position, employing a slightly different vocabulary, is not very different from this. It is in Husserl's notion of a transcendental subject that Yogācāra would be cautious about careless comparisons. If Husserl's notion of 'transcendental' is interpreted merely to indicate self-evidencing (***Evidenz***), then it

would be accepted by at least some Yogācārins, viz. those who accept the third and/or fourth bhāgas, i.e., the ***svasaṃvid-*** (***tsu-cheng*** 自證) and ***saṃvidsvasaṃvid-bhāgas*** (***cheng-tsu-cheng fen*** 證自證分). These precisely are 'self-evidencing' and 'evidencing-self-evidencing' respectively. The four bhāgas will be discussed later in this chapter.

If, however, the transcendental subject (and/or object) is understood as either substrative, as a stable or permanent identity, as an autonomous world-constituting 'self', or in any sense as a 'transcendent' (rather than 'transcendental') entity, then Yogācāra would immediately deny it.

(6) Differentialism vs. non-differentialism. One trend, evident in such schools as the Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika, proffered differentialism as the ultimate descriptive mode, offering such doctrines as atomism, momentariness (i.e., a kind of temporal atomism), and lists of irreducible dharmas or bhūtas. Unique, discrete particulars, each momentary thing self-defining itself momentarily (***svalakṣaṇa***), become the ultimate 'reals' (***paramārtha dravya-sat***). On the other hand, a universe or pluriverse(s) composed of radically discontinuous particularities which cease the moment they arise, which are so violently impermanent that they verge on annihilationalism, other schools saw as extremist. Difference, no matter how radical, becomes incoherent without at least a modicum of 'continuity', even if such continuity is itself identity-less and constituted of difference. Thus a middle way between ***identity and difference*** was sought. Mādhyamika dismissed both categories as incoherent. Yogācāra tread a more restrained route, and tried, with the notion of the consciousness stream (***citta-santāna, ālaya-vijñāna***) to offer an account of 'continuity' which avoided both the identity and difference extremes. While agreeing with Madhyamaka that it is fallacious to

assert that 'identity X' exists such that X is the self-same X at t^1 and t^2, they also insisted that to fall into the opposite position, viz. that no X (or anything) has ever existed, that is to say, that ***nothing exists,*** is just as fallacious. To be sure, Madhyamaka never proposes or accepts this latter negational stance, but by hesitating to say what if anything did exist, their hesitation and silence could and often was construed as a denial of existents altogether, despite Madhyamakan disclaimers and counterarguments. Thus Madhyamaka is consistently miscast by its opponents as 'nihilism.' We will later look at the original way in which Yogācāra proposes a kind of logical 'crossover' between 'exist' and 'not exist' as a way of implementing the 'middle way'.[14]

This grouping may also be delineated in another way, as 'reified differentialism' vs. 'non-reifying differentialism,' that is, the reifiers construct, argue for and maintain a 'substructed' ontology, while the non-reifiers deconstruct attachment to any ontological framework. For the non-differentialists – inasmuch as they agree with all Buddhists that the primary and deepest obstruction to seeing things as they are is the logocentric imputation of 'identity' (***ātman, svabhāva***) into cognition and experience – some sort of differentialism must remain at least provisionally privileged over any identity thesis, no matter how provisional or earnest, in turn, that identity thesis is claimed to be. The absence of identity necessarily invokes suspicion that difference is affirmed. In its rejection of identity (logocentricity) ***qua ātman*** or ***svabhāva,*** Buddhism is committed, by default, to some sort of differentialism. That this differentialism can itself become an extremist trap leads to the 'middle way' attempts at avoiding either extreme.

(7) Progressionalism vs. Essentialism. This opposition, already introduced in

Chapters Two and Three, became the central *differend*[15] of East Asian Buddhism. Readings of (1) and (3) above suggested progressionalism, while the dangers contained in the universalistic propensities of language (2) tended toward essentialism. Ironically, rigorous negations sometimes produced a kind of conceptual 'afterglow', and thus (4) as well had its essentialistic interpreters[16].

These seven trajectories obviously did not always coexist equally in every text or system. But they do markedly converge in Yogācāra. In India, logic and abhidharma converge most noticeably in Vasubandhu's writings, and the ***Triṃśikā***, although predominantly ***āgamic*** (i.e., discoursing from the scriptural rather than logical tradition), clearly is trying to balance both aspects. Sthiramati, in his commentary on the ***Triṃśikā,*** claims that the first sixteen verses, which are the abhidharmic verses, are merely ***upacāra*** (metaphorical heuristics) for describing ***pariṇāma*** (the alterity of consciousness), and that the text shifts gears at verse 17, now offering 'proofs'. Though Hsüan-tsang ostensibly divides the text differently, he, too, when beginning his discussion of verse 17 states that here begin proofs for ***wei-shih*** (***vijñapti-mātra***). By Sthiramati's time, logic was already winning out over the abhidharmic (hence his devaluation of the first sixteen verses as mere heuristics).

Incidentally, this is only one of many examples in the ***Ch'eng wei-shih lun*** where Hsüan-tsang implicitly follows Sthiramati without announcing that he is doing so. K'uei-chi usually seems unaware of these tacit borrowings. The traditional belief, fostered by K'uei-chi's commentary, that Hsüan-tsang has taken Dharmapāla as authoritative and has thus rejected Sthiramati as erroneous becomes suspect when the ***Ch'eng wei-shih lun*** is carefully compared with the Sanskrit version of Sthiramati's commentary, a comparison only possible in this

century because of the rediscovery of the Sanskrit ms. of Sthiramati's commentary to the ***Triṃśikā*** by Sylvain Lévy.[17] This is the only one of the ten original commentaries currently available to us.

It is not as clear as is sometimes assumed which of several positions enumerated on a given issue Hsüan-tsang is actually promoting. Frequently a number (most commonly three) of positions are given without any clear indication in the text proper which position is to be preferred. One cannot infer preferability by order of appearance since sometimes the 'preferred' position is the first one given, sometimes the last, and sometimes no textual indication at all is given, leaving the matter unclear. To resolve the dilemma, one turns to K'uei-chi, trusting that his labels and attributions are accurate. Thus the 'standard' reading of the ***Ch'eng wei-shih lun*** in which the 'correct position' is clearly demarcated and all positions are attributed to their authors, in reality represents K'uei-chi's opinions and assertions, and not an unambiguous reading of the ***Ch'eng wei-shih lun*** itself. Positions attributed to Sthiramati by K'uei-chi (Hsüan-tsang rarely names the source of the positions he presents; readers traditionally turn to K'uei-chi's text for his, i.e, K'uei-chi's labeling) are sometimes hard or impossible to find in Sthiramati's text, and there are a number of significant points integral to the ***Ch'eng wei-shih lun*** which unquestionably come directly from Sthiramati, though not credited to him by K'uei-chi.

Why should K'uei-chi have misled us, or have been mistaken himself? We may only speculate, but one possibility presents itself when we recall that it was K'uei-chi who insisted from the start, with the threat of abandoning Hsüan-tsang and the translation committees altogether, that Hsüan-tsang ***not*** translate all ten commentaries separately, but that he correlate them catechismically and thus state determinately which positions were correct and

which were erroneous. Though Hsüan-tsang resisted and initially refused, K'uei-chi, in the end, got his way. Thus it was K'uei-chi from the very beginning who was concerned above all else with establishing a 'correct' set of doctrinal propositions, not Hsüan-tsang (who believed careful examination of all the texts would demonstrate which positions were definitive). To maintain that attitude, K'uei-chi would have to assert that the set of 'correct views' collected and clarified in the ***Ch'eng wei-shih lun*** are not the arbitrary opinions of Hsüan-tsang alone, but a consistent exposition of an already-established authoritative position, attributable to a single text and/or author. Dharmapāla, then, becomes a label, a handle that K'uei-chi can affix to the set of positions he wished to promote. Since we no longer have Dharmapāla's commentary it is impossible to ascertain how closely the ***Ch'eng wei-shih lun*** follows or doesn't follow it. The nagging suspicion remains that had Hsüan-tsang merely wanted to present a 'correct reading' of the ***Ch'eng wei-shih lun*** and had he believed that Dharmapāla's text was such a reading, he would have simply translated it and left the others untranslated, thus satisfying K'uei-chi (who wanted a catechism) and himself (he wanted faithful renderings of original texts). To undergo the additional problems of editing, correlating, etc., ten texts rather than merely translating one – this is the only time in his career as a translator that he did this! – indicates that he felt strongly that something important, something that the Chinese readers should know, is contained in at least some of those texts besides Dharmapāla's. Otherwise he has undertaken a lot of work to simply present a negative case (or cases) for rebuttal.

What also adds to this suspicion is the curious fact that, according to Hui-li's biography of Hsüan-tsang (T.2053.50), the ***Ch'eng wei-shih lun*** never seemed to have assumed any great importance to Hsüan-tsang. Early in his life

the *Yogācārabhūmi* was important; later in his life he considered the *Prajñā-pāramitā* texts as somehow linked with his own destiny. When the Emperor dedicates the new Ta-t'zu-en monastery to Hsüan-tsang, Hsüan-tsang gives a speech declaring that the destiny of that monastery and the *Prajñāpāramitā* texts he was then engaged in translating were intricately interwoven, that those were to be considered the special texts of that monastery. On his death bed, he chanted the Heart Sutra, an important part of those texts. On the other hand, it is K'uei-chi who held the *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* in particularly high regard and established it as the foundational text of *his* school. In other words, all indications point to the fact that the *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* was important, even crucial for K'uei-chi, while of less importance for Hsüan-tsang.

Dignāga, whose profound influence was just starting to be felt in Indian thought around the time of Hsüan-tsang's visit, radically reoriented Buddhist thinking. For instance, he shifted the notion of *pramāṇa* (criteria for valid knowledge) from 'scripture' and 'reason' – which are accepted in Vasubandhu's writings as well as *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* – to 'perception' and 'inference' (i.e., rejecting 'scripture' or testimony, *śruti,* as a valid *pramāṇa*). After Dignāga, in part due to the new positional possibilities opened up by his epistemology and logic, and in part due to the stinging critique leveled at Yogācāra from other Buddhist schools (cf., e.g., Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatāra,* ch. 6), the Abhidharmic classificatory schemata were converted into an epistemo-psychology, one which from then on constituted a field of discourse which is shared by all Indian (and, subsequently, Tibetan) Buddhist schools: Madhyamaka, Yogācāra, Sautrāntika, etc.[18] By Dharmakīrti's time, which must have been shortly after Hsüan-tsang's visit to India,[19] both the ālaya-vijñāna psychology and the Abhidharma had been jettisoned from Yogācāra thinking in favor of a critical

epistemology which drew heavily on Sautrāntika and Madhyamakan methods. Thus the convergence of Abhidharma and logic in Vasubandhu initially splinters into two types of Yogācāra, the abhidharmic and the logical, with the latter eventually eclipsing the former entirely.

Chinese Buddhism never made the shift from psychology to logico-epistemology. Instead they further developed the psychology into a meta-psychology, an elaborate descriptive and prescriptive examination of the mind. This is partly due to the fact that the forms of Buddhism to which the Chinese were introduced – and which then became definitive – all preceded the important developments in logic that occured in India. Thus, e.g., Candrakīrti's ***Prasannapadā*** was never translated into Chinese; Dharmakīrti, Śāntarakṣita, Ratnakīrti, etc. remained virtually unknown in East Asian Buddhism. This cannot be attributed solely to historical circumstance since monks continued to arrive and translations continued to be made well into the eleventh and twelfth centuries. More recent developments in India continued to reach China via Tibetan and Central Asian contacts (e.g., the Lamaism of the Yüan Dynasty). For instance, Tantra passed right through China in the seventh and eighth centuries, leaving the barest esoteric trace there while engendering the Shingon school which continues to flourish in Japan today.[20] Hsüan-tsang introduced the Indian syllogism to China, but it never caught on. Thus we are forced to conclude that circumstance alone does not explain why the logico-epistemological shift never occurred in China. Rather, we must look to other factors.

This shift was basically alien to Chinese interests and the contemporaneous Chinese thought. Fa-tsang's eventual victory over K'uei-chi for the patronage of Empress Wu – which marked the triumph of Sinitic Mahāyāna over Indian-styled Buddhist schools in China, most notably Hsüan-tsang's

Yogācāra – signaled not so much the arising of a new set of doctrines or teachings as much as a restatement of the old, pre–Hsüan–tsang Buddhist concerns articulated by Paramārtha and others.[21] In rejecting the Buddhism that Hsüan–tsang had brought back from India, China also rejected the roots of the shift that utterly altered the course of Indian Buddhism and the Tibetan Buddhism which was later to follow it. It is at this juncture, more than at any other, that Indo–Tibetan Buddhism and East Asian Buddhism diverge into separate traditions that will go their own ways, progressively sharing less and less common concerns or vocabulary.

These are, then, two crucial moments in which the variety of Buddhist trajectories initially converge and then fatefully part: (1) The convergence (in Vasubandhu) and ultimate eclipsing of the Abhidharmic by Logic (in Dignāga, Dharmakīrti, etc.), and (2) the attempt to bring Chinese Buddhism into line with Indian Buddhism by Hsüan–tsang, which, at least partly because of his failure to instill a willingness on the part of the Chinese to engage in logic and epistemology, failed to establish the conditions there which produced the shift in India from abhidharmic– and ālaya–vijñāna–psychology to logico–epistemology.

For Hsüan–tsang, the Buddhism of his day – and by extension, that which preceded it in China – had seriously deviated from the 'authentic' teachings promulgated in India. His travels had shown him that what lay at the core of the doctrinal incoherencies and the rampant disputes between the schools[22] was not simply due to a few missing chapters from the ***Yogācārabhūmi,*** but rather a systematic misreading and misrepresentation of Buddhist thought, encoded in faulty translations and exaggerated through faulty hermeneutics grounded on those translations. He thus envisioned his mission as a direly needed corrective, to set Chinese Buddhism back on track. The most practical way to accomplish this, he

reasoned, was to (1) re-translate whatever crucial texts had been erroneously rendered – these included not only the *Yogācārabhūmi*, but *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa-sūtra*, *Mahāyāna-saṃgrāha* (*She-lun*), *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya*, *Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra*, *Diamond Sutra*, *Heart Sutra*, and others – and (2) to introduce new or overlooked texts to re-contextualize the reading of familiar texts. The *Ch'eng wei-shih lun*, along with a list of other texts, notably Abhidharma texts and Yogācārin commentaries,[23] are included in this category.

His retranslations achieved mixed results: some of his efforts effectively displaced earlier translations (e.g., his Heart Sutra remained the definitive version[24]), while some have been preserved and are extant, though never reaching sufficient popularity to replace the earlier version(s) (e.g., his translation of *Vimalakīrti* – even K'uei-chi chose to write a commentary to Kumārajīva's version rather than Hsüan-tsang's!).

The last three trajectories mentioned above are clearly discernible in Chinese Buddhist thought. The psychologistic reduction, infused by a deeply ingrained native tradition culled from Mencius and Chuang Tzu, becomes the normative underpinning for all Sinitic Mahāyāna.[25] The plethora of Yogācāric theories which dominated Chinese Buddhist thinking in the sixth and seventh centuries – certainly the most innovative period for Chinese Buddhism – all coalesce in the syncretic text *Awakening of Mahāyānic Faith* and its doctrine of One Mind. Though emblematic of the type of psychologistic fallacy that he would eventually challenge and seek to correct, the *Awakening of Faith* apparently deeply impressed Hsüan-tsang. While in India, discovering that no Sanskrit version of the text existed and that no one there had ever heard of it, Hsüan-tsang translated it from Chinese into Sanskrit. That version is no longer

extant.[26] All East Asian Buddhist schools hold the *Awakening of Faith* in the highest regard, and with it, its psychologistic reductionism.

The emergence of a psychologistic reduction, which coincides with a heavily ontologized notion of self, already is apparent in the early Prajñā schools.[27] An insightful article by Whalen Lai[28] outlines these schools. To summarize part of Lai's article: Fa–shen formulates the Pen–wu ('original emptiness') school early in the fourth Century, and (1) interprets 'emptiness' (*wu* 無) as a quasi–neo–Taoist nothingness which has cosmological and metaphysical primacy to *yu* 有 ('being'). (2) For him, emptiness is basically an external matter, since he views the inner self (*shen* 神 lit. 'spirit') as immortal and not empty. Hence this school clearly had a distorted view of Buddhism, since, according to even the most derogatory Mahāyānic rhetoric, even the 'Inferior Vehicle' knows that the self is empty. Though Lai doesn't mention it, this obviously bespeaks the Taoistic motives behind the early Chinese acceptance of Buddhism, viz. to help clarify and realize (practice) Taoist cosmology as a soteriology and to become an immortal (*hsien* 仙). Buddhism was seen as providing in detail and with precision the *means* -- meditation, chanting, yoga, etc. -- for achieving the Taoist goals. The key Taoist texts, such as *Chuang Tzu* or the alchemical treatises, were notoriously ambiguous and difficult. They exhorted and insisted that one should accord with Tao, act 'without acting' (*wei–wu–wei* 為無為), be a True Man, a sage, practice 'mind–fasting', etc., but exactly how one might accomplish any of this was left to the reader's imagination.[29] The Taoist texts, and Mencius as well, had already determined that the basic soteric and ontological region in which man achieves his ultimate realizations is in the region of mind (*hsin*) qua nature (*hsing*).[30]

As for Fa–shen's oppositions, the pairing of full and empty – while

privileging the empty and equating the full with form – is already established in the Lao Tzu.[31] While Taoism placed form and emptiness in a disymmetric dialectical relation of inseparability, Buddhism ultimately went a step further, positing the absolute non-difference between form and emptiness. Emptiness and form are identical, they share the same referent, though they may be conceptually distinguished. Lao Tzu's empty/full dialectic becomes the Buddhist deconstruction of dialectical tension. Distinguishing the empty from the full took several rhetorical forms, of which the most significant in the Buddhist context[32] was the question: "What does 'form is emptiness' mean?"

In response to the Pen–wu school, Min–tu retorts that the self also is empty. Moreover, he argues, Buddhist emptiness is not nothingness, and can't be reduced to Taoist categories. The Prajñā schools –– and later Tao–an and Hui–yüan as well –– didn't wish to concede this. Despite the doctrinal soundness of Min–tu's points, amazingly, his objection was 'refuted' not by either logical or scriptural counterpoint, but through the use of *ad hominem* slanders.[33] Despite the ad hominem dismissals, the force of Min–tu's Hsin–Wu ('Mind–empty') school was double–barreled: Since it was clearly based on and in concert with the available literature of that time and, as Lai contends, it was persuasively argued, it thus compelled those in the Pen–wu school to adjust and modify their arguments. Lai's article chronicles these attempts. At each turn the 'modifiers' attempt to reassert *shen* or some form of immortal, eternal self (e.g., *shen pu–mieh* 'spirit is not destroyed').

The schools which arose in response to this conflict were:

(1) Huan–hua school 幻化宗 (Lai translates this as "illusion school"; but it could be rendered 'Māya school'), which claimed that *shen* was immaterial, hence not subject to arising and ceasing, and thus paramārthically immortal.

(2) Yüan-hui school 緣會宗 ('confluence of conditions') which rather Hināyānically argued that the confluence of conditions causes 'being' (lower truth) and the reduction to emptiness is the Highest truth.

(3) Shih-han school 識含 ['subsuming of consciousness'] which

> cleverly distinguishes ***shih*** (consciousness, or ***hsin,*** mind) from the higher ***shen*** (spirit). It either proposes ***Shih-han,*** that is, the world of objects is subsumed (***han***) under the function of consciousness (***shih***); or ***Han-shih,*** that is, such a consciousness is subsumed (***han***) under the spirit. . . it is clear that the ***hsin*** that is emptied is the deluded mind and that a transcendental ***shen*** always remains as the immortal soul and guarantor of enlightenment, as ***paramārtha***.

(4) Chi-se school 即色 which argued a kind of Chuang-tzu-like 'going along with forms.' Lai argues ***chi*** should not be read as the copula 'always-already', but in its secondary sense of 'according with.' Reviewing Seng-chao's critique of Chi-se (as well as other critiques) Lai shows that this school did not see the identity of form and emptiness, but merely thought that emptiness can be found in forms, insofar as forms do not self-create (i.e., this school rejects the Kuo-hsiang thesis of ***tzu-jan*** 自然 as spontaneous self-generation), but are dependent on other things. However they do seem to argue that 'consciousness is always consciousness of'. Emptiness as causal dependence is much closer to actual Buddhist positions formulated in India than were the theories of any of the previously mentioned schools.

Hence the Prajñā schools grappled with concerns that established the course of Chinese Buddhism, ***viz.*** the efforts to accept and affirm an immortal mind-self-nature, and the appropriation and dispatching of Buddhist rhetoric for that purpose. Again and again the passages Lai quotes begin with insightful, faithful Buddhist positions (the Shih-han school in particular seems very close to the authentic Yogācāra position, if it would let go of ***shen***), only to

hermeneutically twist and contort those positions into heretical, onto-metaphysical positions, which Chinese Buddhism unfortunately never fully abandons. One also sees much of the later Chinese Buddhist rhetoric already emerging in slogans such as 'elevating the origin and repressing the subsequents', etc.[34]

The subsequent development of Buddhism in China is better known, i.e., Kumārajīva, Seng-Chao, San-lun, Northern and Southern Ti-lun, She-lun, etc. Regardless, too much space has already been devoted here to pre-*Ch'eng wei-shih lun* history. In terms of the *Ch'eng wei-shih lun,* only two of these later developments are vital to keep in mind:

(1) Virtually every Chinese school in the century preceding Hsüan-tsang as well as in his own century was either Yogācāric (She-lun, Ti-lun, Ch'an *qua Laṅkāvatāra* school, etc.) or strongly Yogācāra-influenced (Pure Land *qua* Maitreya cult, T'ien-t'ai, Hua-yen, Chi-tsang's reading of the San-lun and other texts). The frequently offered formula: T'ien-t'ai comes from *Mādhyamika* and Hua-yen comes from Yogācāra is too simplistic, to the point of being wrong and misleading. Garma Chang, *op. cit.,* shows persuasively that the Madhyamakan notion of śūnyatā as an interpretive entry into the Heart Sutra's famous line "form is emptiness, emptiness is form" lies at the heart of Hua-yen, and exerts a greater influence there than the Yogācāra theory of 'mind-only'. I have elsewhere argued that Chih-I was as influenced by Yogācāra as he was by Mādhyamika, and that, e.g., his famous formula, 'provisional, empty, middle', though explicitly addressing Nāgārjuna's *Mādhyamaka kārikā,* 24:18, is actually Chih-I's fourfold formula which he derives from the Yogācāric Trisvabhāva theory (the 'four' involving a doubling of paratantra as either parikalpic or pariniṣpannic).

(2) All these schools, especially those textually grounded in Paramārtha's translations, had deviated from genuine Buddhism according to

Hsüan-tsang, and thus his efforts aimed directly and indirectly at supplementing and displacing these supplementary, displacive misreadings of Indian (and thus 'authentic') Buddhist thought.[35]

As for developments within Sinitic Mahāyāna, which is to say, those schools which were establishing themselves around the time Hsüan-tsang lived, we see the dialectic between differentialism and non-differentialism in such things as the T'ien-t'ai notion of 'a single thought-instant in three thousand worlds' and Hua-yen's mutual interpenetration of all particulars. In the latter especially, great pains are taken to give a rigorous account of how all distinct, unique events or things (***shih shih*** 事事) interpenetrate, such that they constitute a whole, a totality, but without sacrificing one iota of their uniqueness.[36]

The Sudden vs. Gradual controversy most clearly and explicitly articulates the progressionalism vs. essentialism dichotomy as it concerned Chinese Buddhism.[37] But in strictly Yogācāric terms the issue lies elsewhere: Does nature (***hsing*** 性), whether Buddha-nature, mind-nature, or whatever, have an 'essence' (***svabhāva,*** in Chinese ***tzu-hsing*** 自性 , lit. 'own-nature' or 'self-nature'), or is the notion of 'nature' merely a provisional, prajñaptic (***chia ming*** 假名) device devoid of any real, fixed essence? While all Buddhists, to remain consistent with Buddhist doctrine, should accept the latter description and reject the former, some nonetheless hypostasized nature, particularly the nature of mind and consciousness reifying it as an essence. Some statements in Hsüan-tsang's ***Ch'eng wei-shih lun*** lend themselves to this interpretation, though in the main he seems to have taken great pains to challenge the essentializing tendency present in the Chinese Buddhism of his day.

The most striking instance of his 'essentialism' is his use of ***hsiang hsing*** 'characteristic and nature' in his translation of the ***Triṃśikā,*** as noted in

Chapter Four, n. 18 (cf. vs. 5, 8, etc.). These lines which distinguish *hsiang* from *hsing* – though no such corresponding terminology occurs in Sanskrit – have become foundational for East Asian Buddhism. Not only Tat, but Wing-tsit Chan as well insists on the extreme significance of this distinction.[38] In fairness to Chan and Tat, it should be pointed out that Hsüan-tsang made the distinction between *hsiang* and *hsing* deliberately, and even accounts for it in the *Ch'eng wei-shih lun*. At Ch.5:11A-B, commenting on a line in v. 8, he writes:

> Next, there are the words: "DISCERNING PERCEPTUAL-OBJECTS IS ITS NATURE AND FUNCTION." [see previous chapter for a translation that stays closer to the Sanskrit] This pair discloses the self-nature and activity-characteristic (*hsing hsiang* 行 相)[39] of the six consciousnesses. The Consciousnesses take DISCERNING PERCEPTUAL-OBJECTS as their self-nature, and again their 'activity-characteristic' (*ākāra*) is precisely the functioning (*yung* 用) of that [nature]...

Hsüan-tsang has converted the Chinese paradigm of t'i-yung (structure and function) into svabhāva and ākāra, taking the latter term as *an activity*, as a *hsing*. That he spends time generating categories such as these, rather than explaining why he has translated *vijñapti* in the second verse as *liao-pieh*, while here he has used *liao* to translate *upalabdhi*, as if *vijñapti* (lit.: cause to be known) and *upalabdhi* (perceptually grasp) were synonyms, is methodologically problematic. Earlier, he had already defined the seventh consciousness, manas, in terms of svabhāva and ākāra (ch4:18A.3-6; Tat, p. 286, VP p. 254):

> The [fifth] verse says [of manas]: "WILLING-DELIBERATING IS ITS NATURE AND CHARACTERISTIC." [see previous chapter for a different translation] This pair discloses the self-nature and activity-characteristic (*hsing hsiang*) of this consciousness. Manas takes WILLING-DELIBERATING as its self-nature, and again its 'activity-characteristic' is precisely the functioning of that [nature].

He has used the same phraseology for both. Both passages go on to state that this distinction is what allows different *names* to be assigned to these

consciousnesses, i.e., these 'natures' and 'functions' define these consciousnesses as unique, as different from the ālaya-vijñāna and each other. Manas, like the Sāṃkhyan *buddhi*, is reflective, while mano-vijñāna and the five sense-consciousnesses discern and discriminate cognitive objects.

Ironically, this very distinction became one of the major rhetorical weapons used by Fa-tsang against Hsüan-tsang's school, calling them "[the mere] fa-hsiang" school against his own Sinitic "fa-hsing" school. The Fa-hsing, or Dharma-nature school, came to include all Sinitic Mahāyāna, viz. T'ien-t'ai, Hua-yen, Ch'an, and even Pure Land, while the Dharma-Characteristic school, exclusively the interpretation and texts of Hsüan-tsang and K'uei-chi, are disparaged as 'pseudo-Hinayāna', a ridiculous pejorative charge which nonetheless one still finds frequently repeated by modern Japanese scholars.

In one form or another, all these trajectories converge in the *Ch'eng wei-shih lun*. Given its large size and its even larger scope, we will not be able to deal with all the trajectories, but have had to make judicious choices. For instance, abhidharmic disputes, important and integral to the *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* as they are, will remain relatively ignored. Only those products of the trajectories which are of the greatest philosophic importance will be examined. Hence what will be explored will be those portions of the text that bear on:

(1) the question of idealism (yes-or-no?), or what precisely is or isn't the case according to *Ch'eng wei-shih lun*: What is a human? A sentient being? Tathatā? Consciousness(es)? Perception? The status of objects? Externality? Closure? Intersubjectivity?

(2) What passes for an argument? A proof? Criteriology?

(3) The soteric systematics, with emphasis on *systematics*, especially in terms of philosophic grounding and justification (i.e., reasonability). Thus we will only be

discussing the eight consciousnesses and one–hundred dharmas in passing or as needed (following Sthiramati's suggestion that they are *upacāra*), and the same applies to the Three (non–) Self–natures theory, though to many these theories *are* Yogācāra. On the contrary, by shifting our focus away from these models onto the philosophic concerns addressed by the text, a more informed and responsible interpretation of those models will become possible. The task I have set out to achieve here is to recover the original orientation of the *Ch'eng wei–shih lun* sufficiently to facilitate an accurate reading of those models. In other words, this work might be seen as a prolegomena to the foundational Yogācāra models, not their definitive exposition. Rather we are focusing on whatever clarifies the philosophic issues.

More could be said about these sub–trajectories and their effect on the *Ch'eng wei–shih lun,* but we will now let that slip into the background as we begin to look more closely at the *Ch'eng wei–shih lun* itself.

II – Alterity: *Pariṇāma*

The thirty verses of the *Triṃśikā* can be grouped as follows:

(1) Verse 1
Statement of the basic thesis, viz. that what we experience as self and other, me and things, subjective and objective cognitive vectors (*ātman* and *dharma*), etc., are actually linguistic displacements (*upacāra*) produced by threefold alterations (*pariṇāma*) of consciousness (*vijñāna*).

(2a) Verses 2–4[40]
The ālaya–vijñāna

(2b) Verses 5–7
Manas

(2c.1) Verses 8–9
Mano–vijñāna

(2c.2) Verses 10–14
A listing of the caittas, i.e., the General, the Particular, the Advantageous (*kuśala*), the basic and secondary Mental Disturbances (*kleśa* and *upakleśa*) and the Indeterminate (*aniyata*)[41]

(2c.3) Verse 15

The Five Sense-Consciousnesses: They depend on the root consciousness (***mūla-vijñāna*** = ālaya-vijñāna), and they sometimes work in tandem, sometimes not

(2c.4) Verse 16
Conditions in which mano-vijñāna does or does not occur

(3) Verses 17-19
Recasting ***pariṇāma*** (alterity) in terms of discrimination (***vikalpa***) and karmic conditioning (***vāsanā, grāha-grāhya, vipāka,*** etc.)

(4) Verses 20-24
The Three (non-) Self-natures (***tri[a]svabhāva***)

(5) Verse 25
The reduction, ***qua*** paramārtha, of everything discussed so far, first to ***tathatā*** ('just-as-it-is', 'truly-like [this]') and then to ***vijñapti-mātra-tā*** (psychosophic-closure-ness)

(6) Verses 26-30
Descriptions of the five stages of realization[42]

The ***Triṃśikā,*** and consequently the entire ***Ch'eng wei-shih lun*** seeks to discuss one thing: ***vijñāna-pariṇāma,*** the alterity of consciousness.[43] Hsüan-tsang subtly introduces a terminological distinction in the first verse whose full import will not become clear until the ***Ch'eng wei-shih lun's*** commentary to v. 17.[44] The Sanskrit says: ...***vijñāna***-pariṇāmo ***'sau*** pariṇāmaḥ ***sa ca tridhā.*** The first ***'pariṇāma'*** is locative, the second nominative. Hsüan-tsang inscribes this grammatical distinction into the Chinese by rendering the first as ***so-pien*** 所變 and the second as ***neng-pien*** 能變. ***Pien*** means "to change; to ***alter;*** to transform; metamorphosis;..."[45] and here stands for pariṇāma-in-general. Pariṇāma means 'change, alteration, transformation into,' etc.[46] The ***neng-so*** distinction in Chinese, here used to denote the distinction between nominative and locative, has two primary senses: (1) ***Neng*** means 'ability to, capability for' and thus signals the active case, while ***so*** signals the passive case; and/or (2) ***Neng*** denotes the agent of an action, the subjective, active doer while ***so*** denotes the recipient of an action, the objective, passive field manipulated by a doer. ***Neng-pien*** would then imply 'he who alters', 'that which alters', 'that which has

the ability to alter', and *so-pien* would indicate 'what is altered.' Since *so* also means 'place', 'locus', it is an appropriate indicator of the locative. However, Hsüan-tsang's choice of the opposition between active and passive, doer and what is done (*neng-so*), subjective and objective, creates a much neater distinction in Chinese than the distinction between locative and nominative would suggest in Sanskrit.[47] What is actually at issue here?

Two key terms in the first verse, *pariṇāma* and *pravartate* (i.e., *pravṛtti*), most likely were taken over by Yogācāra from Sāṃkhya. In Hindu thought,[48] both terms connote an evolutionary, developmental cosmology or ontology. The world as we experience it 'evolves' from *prakṛti* (i.e., the three guṇas) and *pariṇāma* and *pravṛtti* describe important elements of that process. Sāṃkhya was still a vigorous school in the seventh century, and Hui-li's biography reports major debates between Hsüan-tsang and Sāṃkhyans.[49] One may detect some anxiety on the part of Yogācāra as to its theoretic proximity to Sāṃkhyan thought. Great pains were taken to distinguish the 'incoherency' of the svabhāvically conceived prakṛti that Sāṃkhya advanced from the non-svabhāvic ālaya-vijñāna which Yogācāra affirmed. The crucial distinction was whereas prakṛti was at once eternal and unchanging while somehow connected to and even *identical* with the changing world, ālaya-vijñāna was constituted of a series of mental moments neither absolutely identical nor absolutely different from the moments which preceded and followed them. Like a stream (*santāna*), the moments perdured without either fixed identity or such radical difference that mental continuity would go unaccounted for. The mental continuum *altered* every moment.

Whereas for Sāṃkhya *pariṇāma* involved a theory of evolution, of things evolving out of a primordial nature (*prakṛti*) whose essence remained

unchanged even as the equilibrium of its modifications (*guṇas*) fluctuated, the Yogācārin use of the term implied no such evolutionary or developmental theory. For Yogācāra *pariṇāma* meant sheer alterity, the radical self-otherness through which each cognitive moment constitutes itself as itself (*svalakṣaṇa*) precisely by being other than it was or will be momentarily. Its self *is* its self-otherness. Its uniqueness refers directly to its self-difference as well as its difference from what is other to it, since, inasmuch as it is momentary, it is always becoming different from itself – which is to say, that the 'it' and the 'itself' of this sentence do not refer to an enduring substance or identity or substratum, but rather assign a linguistic constant (*upacāra*) heuristically to a flow of 'altering' variables.

Evolution, even development, implies direction, a going toward, a movement toward some purpose, the achievement of some significant organizational improvement. Alterity (*pariṇāma*) need not involve such directionality, it need have no direction (though that is not absolutely precluded). Rather it is constituted of durational *projectories,* i.e., trajectories constructed through projections. While a projection may denote a single event, or the constitution of a single object, or a single goal (to take on a project, in the Sartrean sense), a projectory requires duration, such that it subtends any number of distinct projections through and within its movement. A goal, a telos may only arise within a projectory. But these projectories, though internally constituting goals, such that they seem to have direction and purpose, when viewed from without, are seen to be utterly without direction, a view shared from within at the culminating moment in which a goal is achieved. Though the tension of anticipation has been relieved, though the desire and the goal finally coincide, the victory, the achievement is instantaneously hollow.[60] Another projectory must immediately be installed to conceal the abyss. For Buddhism, projectories are

saṃsāra, the cycle of duḥkha. Disadvantageous and disturbing projectories (*akuśala, kleśa*) may be supplemented and displaced by soterically advantageous projectories, though ultimately these are as empty and saṃsāric as those for which they are the antidote. The arising of a soteric directionality in place of directionless projectories is called *cittotpāda* (*fa-hsin* 發心), 'arising [of a soterically directional] mind'.

Projectories, in virtue of the manner in which they are constructed, involve closure, since the durational trajectory must close itself off from whatever might distract or deter its directionality (the alternative is to lose its 'identity'). *By defining themselves teleologically, projectories automatically relinquish their full range of possibilities.* Rather than facing the future as a field of infinite possibilities, all potentialities are yoked and constrained toward approaching whatever goal is set up on the horizon. To be a great musician, in virtue of the requirement that one practice many hours a day, involves a personal closure; for during those hours one *cannot do something else,* and thus some other potential, some other talent lies undeveloped. After many years, the other talent, indeed perhaps many talents, may have atrophied to the extent that its (their) realization and actualization remain no longer possible – that is, what was possible has been sacrificed and is no longer possible (many possibilities have been reduced to one, and the one achieved only at the expense of the many). The pursuit of a telos, while perhaps the necessary condition for achieving that telos, always involves the denial and putting out of operation of the possibility of many more teloi. This *fore*–closure of possibilities always already arises at the instant a projectory arises, and thus marks the inscription of every projectory within its own closure, and each closure as the horizonal inscription of a projectory.

Since a consciousness stream incorporates many projectories, the

structural absoluteness of each projectory's closure often goes unnoticed; perspective shifts from one projectory to another – in another sort of dance of alterity – thus avoiding the claustrophobic horizon of any singular closure.[51] When conflicting projectories cease to mutually interpenetrate (i.e., allow perspectival shifting back and forth between them) and instead crash head–on, the consciousness–stream, forced to identify itself simultaneously with opposing identities, opposing teloi, is thrown into crisis. That we live always amid crisis–provoking trajectories, even when the crises remain latent, Buddhism labels ***duḥkha***.

Alterity 'operates', i.e., it spins around (***pravartate***).[52] ***Pra–vṛt (–vartate)*** means to roll or go onwards, set in motion or going, issue, originate, arise, be produced, be intent on or occupied with; round, globular; circulated (as a book); going to, bound for; happened, occurred; purposing or going to, bent upon (dative, locative or compound); giving or devoting one's self to; inclination or predilection; conduct, behavior or practice. While ***pravṛtti*** connotes a 'rolling towards,' a becoming intent upon, a reaching for, a happening or occurrence that will lead to a tendency, that will take on a projectorial trait, ***pariṇāma*** implies an aporia, a movement unsure of its direction. ***Pari–*** means 'round, around, about; fully, abundantly, richly; ***against, opposite to***.[53] ***Nam*** (the root) means[54] to bend or bow; ***to turn away, to turn toward;*** to aim at, to yield to. Pariṇāma is a rich turning about of many directions, a pursuing and yet aversionary movement. Its conative quality also announces a deep alterity. When engaged, it can go in either direction. When reflecting on the ***meaning*** of a direction, i.e., questioning 'why' to go that way instead of this, it may produce ambivalence.

Before ***fa–hsin*** can occur, i.e., before one can collect, marshal, nurture and 'moisten' the pure seeds that lie latent in the consciousness stream,[55]

'projectoriality' must be disclosed, at least sufficiently to allow the thought, "I can do otherwise; I can alter or exchange projectories." This insight – which, by placing 'choice' at the core of the possibility of freedom, marks Buddhism as fundamentally a system of 'ethics' – initiates the soteric project, ritually notarized in Mahāyāna with the Bodhisattva vows. ***Fa–hsin*** is the determinative initiation (***niyata–raśi***). 'Initiation' here signifies to initiate, begin, to bring to inception, to start to make something happen (***pravartate***). The saṃsāric trajectory – which is a karmic concatenation of multiple projectories – becomes absorbed, changed, altered. ***Fa–hsin*** names the beginning of a soteric projectory, a projectory which 'begins' precisely because it installs an otherness to other trajectories, and an inbred ability to perpetually become other to itself, i.e., an ability to change, to develop, to engender sequential change aimed at a telos. It is alterity through and through. ***Fa–hsin*** marks the end of randomness, directionlessness to the projectories through and within which one lives; and it marks the beginning of a directive, purposeful movement. It installs what for Buddhism is the only genuine telos, anuttara–saṃyak–saṃbodhi. Fa–hsin's alterity achieves a focus, a focal point, a soteric direction – but, unlike non–genuine teloi, its directionality aims at the cancellation of its own telos.

Generally we aim at, and become frustrated either by falling short of a goal, or by the post–climax, the after–effect of having achieved it. Buddhism attempts to pre–empt this frustration by (1) promising from the beginning that the telos is self–cancelling, and (2) by clarifying from the outset that the absolutely necessary condition for achieving the goal is losing the desire to achieve the goal – but losing it within the context of mārga, which is to say, within a methodology that itself has a telos, a trajectory guided by and aimed at its final cause. Thus mārga means methodology, but a methodology that has a direction, a soteric telos.

Nonetheless this is a telos whose most essential ingredient is nothing other than the negation of teleology, teleological thinking and all forms of life driven by teleological premises. Nirvāṇa is the cessation of teleology, not because the 'goal' has been reached so that one need no longer strive for what has already been accomplished (hence the Zen rhetoric of 'nothing attained', etc.), but rather it is such because the affective and cognitive problems which generate the teleological (= appropriational) mode of existing for a world such that a world exists for me (***grāha–grāhya***) have altogether been uprooted.

Between the first verse in Sanskrit and its Chinese rendition an alterity has emerged. ...***Vijñāna***–pariṇāmo ***'sau*** pariṇāmaḥ ***sa ca tridhā.*** Robinson translates this line "...is upon the transformation of consciousness. This transformation is of three kinds." Justifiably, even though the first ***pariṇāma*** is locative and the second nominative, he considers them to refer to the same referent, the same 'transformation.' Grammatical alterity – though altering a word, turning a root seme into a semantic element in a sentence, giving it differing sounds and graphic shapes, 'evolving, developing' words from their root (***pariṇāma, pravṛtti***) – deals with an identity continuance that survives changing verbal forms. Nominal declensions, verbal case endings, gerundival constructions, in short, the full range of grammatical alterations – for which Sanskrit has a particular genius – announce language itself as a field of alterity.[56] Stated paradoxically, ***pariṇāme*** (loc.) and ***pariṇāmas*** (nom.) are different yet the same, or neither different nor the same.

In Chinese, as noted above, an opposition is created: The locative becomes ***so–pien*** (what is altered) and the nominative becomes ***neng–pien*** (that which, or he who alters). An active/passive, subjective/objective bifurcation has been installed in the ambiguous space between the alterity of the two ***pariṇāmas.***

This initial opposition is highlighted by another dyadic opposition, *pi* and *ts'u* ('that' and 'this'). To paraphrase the first verse: 'That', i.e., the proliferation of the mutual turning around (*hsiang chuan* = *pravartate*) of what derives from the upacāric 'self' and 'dharma', depends on consciousness *qua* 'what is altered' (*so-pien*). Consciousness, in its capacity as passive, as acted upon, as a locus on or in which cognition occurs, is *that* upon which the 'provisional expressions' (*chia-shuo*) interact, proliferating a cognitive world in which self and things are located. 'This' able-to-alter (consciousness) is only threefold. 'That' points out the passive, objective perceptual field of consciousness (*pi... so-pien*); 'this' introduces the active, subjective conscious agent (*ts'u neng-pien*). The active, subjective consciousness is threefold, viz. the ālaya-vijñāna, manas and mano-vijñāna.[67] If we interpret *so-pien* as noema and *neng-pien* as noesis, this might be taken to imply that these three 'active' consciousnesses take caittas (noemata) as their passive field. However, this can hardly be, since we later learn in the *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* that the consciousnesses take each other as objects.[68] Thus, technically speaking, each of the three must be both *so-pien* and *neng-pien*. What then is the issue for Hsüan-tsang? Why has he introduced this additional translational alterity?

The answer comes with the *Ch'eng wei-shih lun's* discussion of v. 17. The verse reads:

> *Vijñāna*-pariṇāmo *'yam vikalpo yad-vikalpyate/*
> *tena tan-nāsti tena-idam sarvam vijñapti-mātrakam//*

The alterity (*pariṇāma,* this time rendered in Chinese as *chuan-pien*) of the consciousnesses (Hsüan-tsang has made them plural in Chinese – *chu-shih,* though *vijñāna* is singular in Sanskrit) discriminates (*vikalpa, fen-pieh*) what is discriminated (*yad-vikalpyate,* so-*fen-pieh*). The second part of the verse, in

Chinese, translates as "since this and that are all inexistent, therefore all is psychosophic-closure."

Sthiramati reads the verse differently, putting the break after the first *vikalpo,* which gives the sense: Pariṇāma-vijñāna is vikalpa. Whatever is discriminated, that does not exist. Therefore everything is vijñapti-mātra. Though stylistically questionable in terms of disrupting the meter, his reading is intellectually satisfying. He has turned the verse into a syllogism:

(i) 'alterations of consciousness' is discrimination;
(ii) what is discriminated does not exist (as such independent of discrimination);
(iii) therefore everything is, strictly speaking, nothing but consciousness (i.e., conscious discriminations).

In syllogistic fashion he has generated a tautology, viz. that 'alterity of consciousness' is 'nothing but psychosophical closure', the important middle term being the minor premise, to wit: the denial of external, substantial 'existence' to whatever is produced by discrimination. In other words, this is an argument which though reminiscent of Kantian epistemology, is actually more radical, more extreme. It claims an exclusively noetic constitution of cognitive (= discriminative) experience. It is tautological in the sense that Sthiramati has said 'alterations of consciousness' are 'consciousness', but it is not merely tautological inasmuch as it *explicitly* rejects the influence of something *outside* consciousness as responsible for those changes. Discriminations are epistemically produced, they arise from consciousness; they are not ontologically determined correspondences of 'things out there' (and hence the habit by some scholars of using the Kantian term *Vorstellung,* re-presentation, to denote the Yogācāra cognitive theory is misleading).

Hsüan-tsang reads the verse differently. Discrimination and that which is discriminated (implying once again the *neng-so* distinction), as they

dialectically interact, interchange, are themselves consciousness' alterity. In this verse Hsüan-tsang terminologically conflates ***pariṇāma*** and ***pravṛtti*** by translating pariṇāma as ***chuan-pien***. ***Chuan,*** which in the first verse translated ***pravartate,*** means to turn around, to revolve, to spin. Alterity (***pien***) means spinning in place, flipping over, which implies now noetically constituting a noema through discrimination, and then flipping again and making the previous noesis a noema for current discrimination. ***Fen-pieh,*** literally 'to apportion into distinct parts,' and ***so-fen-pieh,*** 'what is (passively, objectively) apportioned into distinct parts,' mutually condition each other, mutually turn around on each other. That 'turning' ***is*** the alterity of consciousness, which is to say, it indicates the same proliferative dynamic as the 'self and dharmas' of the first verse. What was primarily linguistic (***chia-shuo***) there has become cognitive here. But why is Hsüan-tsang ***altering*** the words?

The ***Ch'eng wei-shih lun*** states:[59]

> We have already examined discrimination (***fen-pieh***) [in terms of] the characteristics of the three [consciousnesses that are] 'able-to-alter' (***neng-pien***), regarding them as that upon which the two divisions (***bhāga, fen***) of 'what is altered' (***so-pien***) depend.

The subjective, active side (***neng***) is thus threefold – ālaya-vijñāna, manas, mano-vijñāna – while the passive, objective side (***so***) is twofold – the noetic-noemic components of cognition. But as the text continues we see that the darśana-, nimitta-bhāga distinction is also applied to or derived from the ***neng*** side of alterity.

> 'What are altered' dependent on consciousness (***yi shih so-pien,*** 依識所變 ***vijñāna-pariṇāme,*** i.e., 'consciousness-altered'), namely the provisional expressions (***upacāra***) 'ātman and dharmas,' are not distinct, real (***shih*** 實 , ***dravya,*** substantial) existents, but [to show] that these are all only [indicative of] the existence of consciousness, the verse says:
>
> THIS IS THE CONSCIOUSNESSES TURNING-AROUND AND ALTERING, DISCRIMINATING AND DISCRIMINATED;

SINCE THIS AND THAT ARE ALL INEXISTENT,
THEREFORE THEY ARE ALL
NOTHING-BUT-CONSCIOUSNESS (psychosophic-closure).

"THE CONSCIOUSNESSES" refers to what was previously described as 'the three (ways in which) consciousness alters (*neng-pien shih*)' and "THAT" [refers to] their caittas.

[1] All that is 'able-to-alter' (*neng-pien*) appears as two bhāgas, viz. the darśana-bhāga (the 'seeing part', the noesis) and the nimitta-bhāga (the 'cognitively-produced part', the noema).[60] So the term *pariṇāma* (*chuan pien*, TURNING-AROUND AND ALTERING, 'alterity') is set up.

[2a] The darśana-bhāga of 'what is altered' explains the term "DISCRIMINATION" (*vikalpa, fen-pieh*), because it is characterized as noesis (*grāhaka, neng-chü* 'grasper').

[2b] The nimitta-bhāga of 'what is altered' is termed "[what is] DISCRIMINATED" (*so-fen-pieh*) because it noetically constitutes (lit.: "sees") the noema (*grāhya, so-chü* 'what is grasped').

For this reason [although] those ātmans or dharmas [may be asserted or believed to be] real (*shih*) apart from the consciousnesses 'that are altered' (*vijñāna-pariṇāma*), they are all determined to be non-existent. Since apart from noesis and noema (*neng so chü, grāhaka-grāhya*, grasper-grasped) there are no distinct things (*wu pieh wu ku* 無別物故) [or no distinguishing of things], thus there are no existent real things apart from these two characteristics. Therefore everything, whether conditioned (*yu-wei, saṃskṛta*) or unconditioned (*wu-wei, asaṃskṛta*) [i.e., any of the 100 dharmas], whether real (*shih*) or nominal (*chia* 假),[61] none is apart from consciousness.

This reinforces Sthiramati's point that cognitive distinctions reflect an epistemic, not an ontological source.

The word(s) "NOTHING-BUT" (*mātra, wei*, in NOTHING-BUT CONSCIOUSNESS) [serves to] deny that there are any real things apart from consciousness, and not [to exclude or claim that] the caittas, etc., are apart from consciousness.

K'uei-chi assigns this interpretation of the verse to Dharmapāla. What does this position maintain?

The subjective-active pariṇāma and the objective-passive pariṇāma of the first verse have been expanded. We could chart this as:

Consciousnesses =
(1) What alters (*neng–pien*) => (2) What is altered (*so–pien*)
(2a) vikalpa = darśana–bhāga = grāhaka
(discrimination = 'seeing–part' = grasper)
(2b) vikalpyate = nimitta–bhāga = grāhya
(discriminated = 'sense–mark–part' = grasped)

What is curious so far is that both the noetic and the noemic sides of cognition are grouped with 'what is altered,' i.e., consciousness as passive and objectified. The darśana–bhāga – which would seem to be an active, subjective constituent of perception – is classified here as a passive, objective product of the threefold active 'alterers.'[62] In other words, that aspect of cognition which we would call 'subjective', the perceiver, is being treated here as an objectified by–product of activities amongst consciousnesses (viz. ālaya–vijñāna, manas, mano–vijñāna) that can neither be reduced to simple subjective nor object components. This will shortly lead us into a labyrinth of categories, but let us momentarily put this and the chart aside and examine "Dharmapāla's" statement. It will plunge us directly into the core question of the *Ch'eng wei–shih lun's* relation to idealism.

Dharmapāla (if this 'position' accurately reflects his lost text) claims that apart from the grasper–grasped relationship there are no distinct things. Why should this be? Does he mean that distinctions are affectively motivated by the need to grasp; or, perhaps, the need to grasp actually generates distinct things? The coherency of Dharmapāla's reading of this verse hinges on this claim, and thus, we should examine it carefully.

First, he has equated 'existent real things' (*yu shih wu* 有實物) with 'distinguishing things' *or* 'distinct things' (*pieh wu* 別物). Much rides on how we interpret *pieh* in the latter phrase. It lends itself to both an ontological and an epistemological reading. If read as a verb, i.e., as "distinguishing," then the emphasis is epistemic. If read as an adjective, i.e., as "distinct," then the emphasis

would appear to be ontological. Since no grammatical principle leaps to our assistance in determining which reading to prefer, each being equally plausible, we turn to the full context of the argument in order to see if some clue is forthcoming.

Dharmapāla argues that since there can be no distinct things apart from the economy of noesis–noema, and nothing real exists outside of these two characteristics, nothing whatsoever exists apart from consciousness. His point hinges on the word *shih* 實 (real). *Shih* etymologically means 'full, solid, real, substantial.' Hsüan–tsang often uses it to translate *dravya*, 'substance'. Hence the argument here would be that there are no real, solid substantives which can be determined (*ting* 定) a priori through and within consciousness to exist independently of consciousness. Since the question of determination itself arises in consciousness, and would have to be settled within consciousness, to posit something that is determined *in and by* consciousness as being outside of or radically apart from consciousness would be methodologically problematic, if not completely absurd. Hence, if the argument is epistemological, it is valid; consciousness cannot declare its own determinations to be other than *its own determinations* without undermining the epistemological foundation of that declaration. If the argument pretends to be ontological, it merely begs the question. It becomes an unsupported assertion that consciousness, and not external objects, is responsible for whatever actual 'real' distinct objects appear in cognition. Hence, if this is designed to argue for ontological idealism, it is a poor argument. Finally, if the argument is taken merely to be an example of the 'psychological reduction,' then, while it may be valid, it would nonetheless be strictly tautological.

The question of whether to read *pieh*, and by extension the entire

passage as an epistemological, ontological or psychological argument seems grammatically undecidable. But, if my characterization of the force of the various readings of the argument is correct, the epistemological reading becomes preferable. No thing cognized within consciousness can be declared in and by consciousness to be otherwise than consciousness. Since by definition everything knowable must be knowable through consciousness, nothing knowable can be declared as 'real' apart from consciousness. Notice that this argument does not entail the further stipulation that consciousness alone exists while objects do not, but merely that the ***externality*** of any cognized objects is an illusion which arises ***within*** consciousness. In the phrase 'external object', what Yogācāra challenges is the sense of 'external', not the notion 'object' per se.

Looking at what follows in the ***Ch'eng wei–shih lun*** reinforces this reading.

> Another (Nanda?)[63] explains ***pariṇāma*** (*chuan–pien*) thus: The internal consciousnesses spin around (*chuan*), projecting (***hsien*** 現) the characteristics of what seem to be ātman and dharmas as external perceptual–fields (***viṣaya, ching*** 境). It is precisely this 'alterer' (***neng chuan–pien*** 能轉變, i.e., noetic constituter) that is termed DISCRIMINATION (***vikalpa, fen–pieh***), because it prajñaptically discriminates (***chia fen–pieh***) [by ascribing] svabhāva to the three dhātus, citta and the caittas. The perceptual–field to which it is attached is termed THE DISCRIMINATED (***vikalpyate***, *so–fen–pieh*), which is precisely what is falsely attached to as the 'real' [self–] nature of ātman and dharmas. Due to these discriminative alterations (***fen–pieh pien***) the characteristics of the prajñaptic ātman and dharmas appear as external perceptual–fields.[64] That which is discriminated as the 'real' [self–] nature of ātman and dharmas most definitely does not exist, as has been previously demonstrated [with proofs from both] scripture and reason (***chiao li*** 教理).
>
> Therefore everything is "only existent in consciousness" (***shih ku yi–ch'ieh chieh wei yu shih*** 是故一切皆唯有識), since the existence of erroneous false discriminations is (thereby) ultimately established.[65]
>
> "ONLY" does not deny dharmas as long as they are not separate

> from consciousness, hence the truly empty,[66] etc., also thereby have an existent [self-] nature.... This establishes the meaning (referent, ***artha***) of PSYCHOSOPHIC-CLOSURE (***wei-shih***), which accords with the Middle Way.[67]

While Dharmapāla (the first reading) seems to be denying externality outright, this second reading (Nanda?) seems to bracket it. His internal/external distinction elicits the same objections as Dharmapāla's position, unless, again, his argument is made on epistemological rather than ontological grounds. 'Internal' then should be understood not as an ontological locale. Internal here means 'phenomenological,' i.e., within consciousness. All experience is ***of*** consciousness. But consciousness does not mean subjectivity. Self and things, i.e., ātman and dharmas are ***both*** considered 'external.' Clearly consciousness and 'self' are not synonymous. Autonomy is clearly denied to the objective aspect of experience. Subjectivity, as well, is merely a prajñaptic by-product. What then is 'consciousness'?

'Consciousness' means cognizance, discerning, the awareness which arises due to contact between a cognitive faculty (such as a sense organ) and its corresponding perceptual-object (***viṣaya,*** the objects of which the perceptual-field is composed).[68] There are those discernings which are 'conscious', i.e., aware of what presently appears to it, and those which are 'subconscious', i.e., latent or non-apparent projectories. In either case, discernment involves intentionality, a movement of intent (***cetanā***) toward a referent. The ālaya-vijñāna is an intentionally neutral economy of conscious/subconscious alterities, which appears subjective only when appropriated as such by manas (***Triṃśikā*** v. 6).

The ***Ch'eng wei-shih lun*** continues with two sorts of proofs: ***Śruti*** (textual support) and ***yukti*** (reason). After citing several passages from a number of texts which support the claim of ***wei-shih,***[69] four types of knowledge (***jñāna***) are discussed.[70] These are:

(1) *Hsiang-wei shih-hsiang chih* 相違識相智

Knowledge of mutually exclusive cognitions, which refers to the range of possible ways a single locus may be cognized by different perceivers. If the object originates its own meaning, mutually exclusive perceptions of the identical spatio-temporal locus should be impossible; but, on the contrary, depending on differing karma, i.e., different habits of perception, different types of beings perceive different sorts of objects in the same locus.[71] "How could this be if perceptual-objects are substantially [svabhāvically] existent (*shih-yu* 實有)?"

(2) *Wu so-yüan shih chih* 無所緣識智

Knowledge of consciousness without ālambana, which means that certain conditions, such as dreams, past and future 'objects', mental images, etc., can appear as noema, as mental objects, though obviously an external corresponding object is absent. "Since those perceptual-fields are inexistent, the rest should be as well." This, of course, is a very weak argument. It opens the possibility, but by no means mandates that perceptual fields necessarily be constructed of non-externally-existent objects. That some-x is P does not mean that all-x is P, much less that any-y is P. However, this does give clear examples of cognitions which require no external object, thus 'proving' that an external object is not absolutely necessary for the cognition of an object as external. While consciousness is a necessary condition for such a cognition, an external object is not (giving consciousness an epistemological, if not ontological priority).

(3) *Tzu ying wu-tao chih* 自應無倒智

Knowledge of oneself unimpededly corresponding [to the perceptual-field]. The text is slightly ambiguous, and two plausible readings emerge. The first: If perceiving external objects only involves a correspondence between a subject and an object, such that the 'natural' perception of a naive realist achieves an

authentic cognition of what actually is the case, then liberation would be effortlessly attained even by morons. The second: Direct seeing involves cognitive non-confusion, non-impediment (*wu tien-tao* 無顚倒)[72] between the cognizer and the cognized, which, due to the closure of consciousness, does not characterize the perceptions of the foolish. Such direct seeing, without impediment, is liberation. Hence liberation arises from the overcoming of consciousness' closure. Since a naive realist would not only accept, but enthusiastically welcome the first reading, the second reading seems more likely to express the Yogācārin point.

(4) *Sui san-chih chuan-chih* 隨三智轉智

Knowledge which follows from the threefold-knowledge turn-around. This is divided into three parts.

(4a) *Sui tzu-tsai-che chih chuan-chih* 隨自在者智轉智

Turning-around knowledge which follows from the knowledge of self-mastery [i.e., freedom].[73]

> For the one who has already realized and attained mental self-mastery (cetovaśitā), lands [and things], etc., alter (*chuan-pien, pariṇāma*) according to his desires.[74] If those perceptual-fields were substantially existent [independent of consciousness],[75] how could such alterations be possible?

Does 'mastery' here imply that one's mind actually creates realities independent of one's consciousness (which would defeat the point of the example), or is something being said about one's ability to control how one's mind projects its perceptual-field?

(4b) *Sui kuan-ch'a-che chuan-chih* 隨觀察者轉智

Turn-around knowledge which follows from observation and investigation (*pravicaya*).[76] According to K'uei-chi, this knowledge characterizes the Śravakas

and Pratyeka–Buddhas. Achieving an excellent meditative observatory investigation of dharmas, one observes multiple characteristics appearing before one within even a single object. "If the object is real (*shih,* i.e., independent of consciousness), how could it follow mental alterations (*chuan*)?"

What is changing here? As in the previous case, though more explicitly here, the issue concerns mental control over how one projects an objective sphere. If one passively observed external objects, one could not control the perceptual alterations to which the 'object' may be subjected. Frege differentiated sense (*Sinn*) from referent (*Bedeutung*). While the sense could be altered, or a single referent could have multiple senses, the 'meaning' or referent itself remained absolutely objective and univocal. The referent was always either true or false. Husserl challenged this differentiation, and argued that the object *was* its Sinn, that a phenomena's essence was its Sinn, and though it may have *an* essence, that essence is constituted of multiple senses. In fact, it is the invariant structure which perdures throughout all the sense variations. Hence he proposed a method of eidetic variation, i.e., deliberate proliferation of senses, with which to recover essences. Like Husserl, Yogācāra rejects the notion of a univocal referent independent of sense. They also deny, however, that cognitive variation produces an invariant identity, or essence, or that multiple senses produce a synthetic invariance. ***Pravicaya*** is a kind of Buddhist eidetic variation, an investigational study of dharmas within the context of meditation, that scrutinizes them in terms of characteristics such as impermanence, suffering, non–self, emptiness, arising, etc. The object, as something grasped in cognition, palpably changes as a result of such meditations. An object, for instance, at one time charged with attractiveness, which powerfully instigates longing, may, through pravicaya, be divested of its appeal, so that it henceforth 'feels' (*vedanā*) different.

(4c) ***Sui wu-fen-pieh-chih chuan-chih*** 隨無分別智轉智

Turn-around knowledge which follows from non-discriminative-wisdom (nirvikalpa-jñāna).

> This means that with the arising (***ch'i*** 起) of the realization of the real (***ch'eng shih*** 證實) non-discriminative wisdom, the characteristics of all objects are not projected before one. If the objects are real, why are their appearances (***yung*** 容) not projected (***pu-hsien*** 不現)?

Since ***wei-shih*** is synonymous with ***vikalpa,*** the notion of a knowledge which is ***nirvikalpa*** warns us that ultimately something other than the reification of consciousness and its alterity is the goal.

III - Why Consciousness Is Not Empty

What has gone unremarked so far in this presentation is a crucial subtext. At issue in these and subsequent distinctions is the question: What is real (***shih*** 實)? Throughout the ***Ch'eng wei-shih lun*** the term ***shih*** is contrasted or opposed to two other terms. In the passages just discussed the key opposition was between ***shih*** (real) and ***chia*** 假 (prajñapti, nominal). While ***chia*** usually means 'provisional' in Chinese Buddhist texts, for Hsüan-tsang in this text it stands for prajñaptic (nominal) existence. What exists nominally, the text contends, is not 'real'. Real here means an independent, substantial entity. Prajñapti depends on language, and language is cognitive, hence nominal existence implies dependence on cognition, and thus lacks both substance and independence. This implies that 'real' means to be non-linguistic, substantive and independent. What if anything could be considered 'real' by this criterion? That will be answered shortly.

The other opposition is between ***shih*** and ***hsü-wang*** 虛妄 (or just

hsü or *wang*). *Hsü* means 'empty, hollow, vacuous, open'[77] and *wang* means 'false, erroneous, absurd, reckless.' While prajñapti displays at least nominal, heuristic existence, whatever is 'hollow-false' does not exist at all, though it may appear in certain types of erroneous cognitions to be the case. In the *Abhidharmakośa* Hsüan-tsang uses *hsü-wang* to translate two different Sanskrit terms:[78] (1) *abhūta* and (2) *kalpanā-mātra*. Both terms imply the first of the three (a)svabhāvas, viz. *parikalpita-(a)-svabhāva*, which the *Madhyānta Vibhāga* describes in terms of *abhūta-parikalpa* (imaginatively constructing and projecting something into a locus in which it is not; e.g., seeing a snake where there is only a rope) and other texts, such as *Saṅdhinirmocana Sūtra*, discuss as *kalpanā-mātra* (nothing but imaginative construction).[79] *Hsü* may also translate *mṛṣā* (untrue, false, misleading).[80] *Wang* translates *mithyā* (erroneous, false, deceitful).[81] Hence when they occur later I shall translate *hsü-wang* as 'unreal and false' respectively, though this should only be taken as a sort of prajñaptic shorthand for these terms.[82]

'Real', then, is opposed to either 'nominal' or 'false'. Something real is something existent (*asti*) and substantial (*dravya*).

We left off in the *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* where it had concluded the proofs for *wei-shih* adduced from the authoritative texts. Eventually Buddhist epistemology would accept only perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inferential reasoning (*anumāna*) as valid means for acquiring knowledge (*pramāṇa*), and these changes were only beginning in India while Hsüan-tsang was there. They were not yet institutionalized. Prior to that shift the two acceptable means were scriptural testimony (*śruti*) and reasoning (*yukti, anumāna*). It was Vasubandhu's disciple, Dignāga, after all, who firmly established perception and inference as the two valid pramāṇas, and undermined the status of scripture. The context of that shift was

not merely logical, or epistemological, but in the interest of intertraditional debate (siddhānta). For two rival schools to address each other, they must first have a common language, they must share some common axioms or modes of discourse; otherwise they will talk past, not to each other. What 'reasonable men' have least in common interreligiously is scripture. To cite a scripture which the opponent doesn't accept is a useless, meaningless gesture since that scripture carries no authoritative weight for him/her. To validate a claim from scripture requires inference, i.e., one has additionally to prove the notion of scriptural validity as well as prove any particular claim based on scripture. Scripture is a species of the genus 'hearsay', which is to say, it requires external validation, and that validation will only come from perception or inference. This is the case when speaking to someone *outside* the tradition. When addressing someone *inside* the tradition, someone who accepts the validity of the same scriptures that you do, who expects what is true to not violate what the scriptures – which record 'true sayings' – present, who uses scripture as the limit case of what can be claimed, then you must show that what you propose is neither heterodox nor transgressional. In India after Dignāga, scripture itself was subject to interrogation and 'measurement' by the other two pramāṇas. A claim was not deemed true because it accorded with scripture; rather scripture was deemed true if it accorded with perception and/or reason. Thus a claim is not true because it is Buddhist, but rather it is Buddhist because it is true. In China, Ch'an similarly 'defrocked' scriptural authority, making experience, existential realization[83] the arbiter of doctrine, and not *vice versa*.

To be fair to the *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* and Buddhist epistemology as a whole prior to the shift of pramāṇic grounding, scripture as a means of knowledge functioned primarily as a limiting case rather than as a revelational

fountainhead. For a school or thinker to make a claim that appeared novel and/or odd to the other schools, it became incumbent upon them to show that this claim does not contradict or violate acceptable scriptural statements. The Yogācāra claim of ***vijñapti–mātra*** was perceived by other schools as a novel, odd, even wrong–headed notion, so it was incumbent on the Yogācārins to demonstrate that the idea (i) did not violate scriptural limits, and (ii) that, in fact, scriptural authority could be mustered in support of the claim. Of course, they drew on a range of Yogācāric 'scriptures', especially texts such as ***Saṅdhinirmocana Sūtra, Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, Mahāyānasaṃgrāha, Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras,*** etc., which had strong Yogācāric content.

Some of these texts raise an interesting but presently unanswerable historical question. Many of these texts ***pre–dated*** Asaṅgha and Vasubandhu, indicating that many and perhaps even all of the 'novel' concepts associated with Yogācāra were in fact around for quite some time before either of the two half–brothers founded the school. Where did these ideas come from? From what did they arise? While the answers to these questions are as yet indeterminable, hopefully the discussion in the previous chapters will help show that the so–called Yogācārin ideas arise out of a faithful and close interpretation of Buddhism, as it developed from its inception. They brought to fruition and order notions which were basic to Buddhism from the beginning, such as karma being grounded in the cognitive–mental register, and thus the importance of analyzing cognition, the problem of continuity and discontinuity of self and dharmas, etc.

Returning to the text, the ***Ch'eng wei–shih lun*** now offers 'proofs' based on reasoning (***yukti, li*** 理).[84] This is an important section for understanding what happens elsewhere in the text, and thus bears a careful reading. The text mounts a simple, direct, yet crucial argument.[85]

Each of the five sense organs, such as the eye, ear, etc., has a corresponding consciousness. Visual consciousness and the eye are linked, such that the eye does not see sounds but sees colors and contours. Similarly the ear does not hear colors, but hears sounds. And so on for the other three sense organs (nose, tongue, body) and their corresponding consciousnesses (olfactory–, gustatory– and tactile–kinesthetic–consciousnesses). Each only cognizes perceptual conditions (such as color) that are of its own type; it has no awareness of perceptual spheres apart from its own. Nor do any of the consciousnesses ever actually perceive their respective spheres as in any way apart from themselves, i.e., in the act of perception, the perceptual–field of a particular consciousness must, by definition, be the content of that consciousness, and cannot be 'apart' from it. Since to speculate on cognition is for them merely another form of sensory cognition, one performed by manas or mano–vijñāna, no contrary case can be conceived.

As for the remaining consciousnesses, such as the mano–vijñāna, they are just like the five sense organs and their respective consciousnesses, i.e., each only cognizes perceptual conditions that are of their own type; they have no awareness of dharmas other than those of their own sphere. Nor do any of these consciousnesses ever perceive their respective spheres as apart from themselves.

These immediately cognized ālambana (*ts'u chin so–yüan* 此親所緣) are definitely never separate from their corresponding consciousness.[86] The duality of perceiver and perceived, grasper and grasped, noesis and noema – in each of the consciousness spheres – derives from an originally unitary sphere, in which neither self nor object is given – hence Husserl called them 'transcendental'. The ālambana and ālambaka, i.e., the cognitive supports of the objective and subjective poles, are reflectively separated out of an experience that originally has

only consciousness as its 'locale', not opposing poles or even opposing sides of the same pole. For an object of experience (*ālambana*) to be *of* experience, it must be *in* consciousness.

Hence, the ālambana–dharmas, like the dharmas associated with citta (*saṃprayukta–dharmas,* see appendix, 100 dharmas), definitely are not separate from citta and caittas.

What has this 'reasoned' argument argued? First we must emphasize what it did *not* argue: viz. it did not attempt to give an idealist's argument for objects, things, etc. being 'created by' or made by consciousness. It made no attempt to establish any causal relation between consciousness(es) and its (their) objects. On the contrary, by discussing distinct spheres of consciousness in terms of their respective faculties, it virtually concedes that conditions cause consciousness. We will look a little later at exactly what sort of account of causal dependence the *Ch'eng wei–shih lun* gives. What is argued here, and quite well, is not an ontological, metaphysical or causational idealist theory, but something more modest, and from a Buddhist perspective more important. The argument simply demonstrates that whatever is known, insofar as it must be known through cognition, i.e., through one of the senses or consciousness spheres, is inconceivable apart from cognition. To 'know' it, whether in immediate perception or through some mental mediation, is to have awareness of it *in consciousness.* Nothing whatsoever is known except through sensation, through consciousness. Consciousness is always consciousness of, and whatever is knowable, is thus *of* consciousness. This harks back to Buddha's definition of *sabba* (all) in the *Saṃyutta–Nikāya* as simply the eighteen dhātus. "Aside from these, there is nothing."

The entire argument might be summed up in one word: *phenomenality.*

Whatever is determined (*ting* 定) to be 'real', must be determined as such in and by consciousness, and hence it is phenomenal, never apart from consciousness. The citta and caittas, i.e., the momentary apperceptive vector and its feeling-tonal-fields *are* experience. Nothing occurs apart from them; hence all is vijñapti-mātra. Q.E.D.

This raises the question of whether consciousness itself is 'real'. The Mādhyamikan notion of emptiness would seem to prohibit such a claim. All is empty. But Yogācāra attempts to steer another course through the 'Middle Way' (***mādhyamika, madhyānta***). Hence the ***Ch'eng wei-shih lun*** continues:[87]

Self and dharmas are not existent.	我法非有
Śūnyatā and consciousness are not inexistent.	空識非無
Neither existence, nor inexistence,	離有離無
hence, conducive to the Middle Way.	故契中道

How can the negation of self and dharmas together with the negation of the negation of śūnyatā and consciousness be considered a Middle Way? The ***Ch'eng wei-shih lun*** cites the ***Madhyānta Vibhāga,*** I.2–3 as scriptural ***and*** reasoned proof:[88]

> The Abhūta-parikalpa (*hsü-wang fen-pieh,* lit: 'unreal and false discrimination') exists.
> In this, duality is entirely non-existent.
> In this, only emptiness exists.
> In that (i.e., emptiness) this also exists. [2]
>
> Hence, it is said all dharmas
> are neither empty nor non-empty.
> Existence, non-existence and hence existence;
> this is encountering the Middle Way. [3]
>
> These verses are expressions of defiled paratantra; In reality (*li shih* 理實) there is also a pure paratantra.

We leave aside the significance of the doubling of paratantra for now. The imaginative construction of the unreal, which here Hsüan-tsang has translated as

if it were a species of vikalpa (parikalpa is, after all, a cognate), is in emptiness just as emptiness is in it. Hence neither the abhūta-parikalpa nor śūnyatā definitively define the world as either strictly existent nor inexistent. A dialectical process, from existence (*sat*) to non-existence (*asat*) to a different sense of existence (*sat*), as we see practiced in the Diamond Sutra, constitutes a middle way in which everything can be said to be both empty and non-empty, though in practice, only some things can properly be called empty (e.g., duality), whereas others can properly be called non-empty (e.g., abhūta-parikalpa).

But in what sense can consciousness be said to be non-empty? *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* says:[89]

> [If all is 'only-consciousness'] Why did the World-Honored One teach the twelve āyatanas (i.e., the six sense-organs with the six corresponding sense-objects, of which ten of the twelve are traditionally considered to be rūpa, not consciousness or of a mental category)?
>
> These depend on altered consciousness (*yi shih so-pien* 依識所變). They are not distinct, substantial ('real') existents (*fei pieh shih yu* 非別實有). The two pairs of six were taught in order to enter [an understanding of] the emptiness of self [i.e., to decenter the notion of a central unified self into the conditions which construct that notion], just as the continuity (*saṃbandha*) of sentient beings was taught to refute the annihilationalist view [though, properly speaking, there are no continuing 'identities']. In order to enter [the understanding of] the emptiness of dharmas, again, *wei-shih* (psychosophic closure) was taught, so that you would know that external dharmas do not exist.

Mahāyānic rhetoric repeatedly declares that whereas Hinayāna understands the emptiness of self, i.e., anātman, they erroneously accept dharmas as real, and that the emptiness of dharmas is thus an exclusively Mahāyānic notion. Hsüan-tsang is thus making the Yogācāric notion of Vijñapti-mātra a symbol for Mahāyāna. What is interesting in this exchange is the reduction of the non-mentalistic components of the eighteen dhātus (the 'mental' components, technically, include

not only the six consciousnesses, but manas and mano-dhātu, the former being grouped with the six organs and the latter with the six objects) to their roles in consciousness – precisely because they are empty. But here he does not say they are empty; he says they do not exist, i.e, *external* dharmas do not exist. The word 'external' is pivotal (what would it mean to say that one's internal sensory organs, such as the ear, exists 'externally'?). The question is, external to what? The immediate answer is: Consciousness. And again we see the point is phenomenality, not ontological idealism. What has happened to the standard Buddhist claim that consciousness itself arises from the contact (*sparśa*) of sense-organ and sense-object? Curiously, nothing. It stands, with one radical qualification. The collision of organ and object *is* consciousness. Consciousness is not a third party, a spark set off when two material 'sticks' are rubbed together. Perception itself is intentional, and hence the organ and the object are always already producing consciousness because consciousness is 'producing', intending itself through and towards them.

But if the Mahāyāna view consists precisely of the insight that all dharmas are empty, isn't consciousness, by that view, empty as well?

> No.
> Why?
> Because one is not attached [to it]. What this means is that, dependent on alterations of consciousness, one attaches to false [dharmas as though they were] real dharmas,[90] [though their realness] cannot be attained (grasped, *nopalabdhi*) by [perception or] reason. These dharmas are [the sort] said to be "empty." Because [they are unlike] Vijñapti-mātra-tā (*wei-shih-hsing*, 唯識性 psychosophic-closure-hood) which is [1] not inexistent (*fei wu*), [2] apart from language [and hence not prajñaptic], and [3] realized by the correct knowledges [and hence not 'unreal and false' or chimeric],[91] [therefore] these [aforementioned false] dharmas are said to be "empty."

In other words, if we remember that prajñapti and abhūta-parikalpa were the two

opposites of 'real' (*shih, dravya*), what is 'empty' is such by virtue of its being 'unreal', 'insubstantial', and, as is added here, 'inexistent' (*wu, asat*). More to the point, the term 'empty' is used as a device, as an antidote to attachments which cling to false mental constructions. Since vijñapti-mātra-tā cannot be attached to, i.e., it cannot be reduced to an objectified cognitive object and substantialized, the antidote of 'emptiness' need not be applied. We will see a little later the argument for why consciousness eludes this reification.

Hsüan-tsang remains sensitive to the Mādhyamikan concern that whatever is not emptied may, in fact, undergo the objectification, substantialization, reification and thus conceptual attachment from which Yogācāra is claiming that vijñapti-mātra is exempt. Hence, anew, in language borrowed from Mādhyamika, in fact, one of the very passages discussed above in Chapter Three, Nāgārjuna's ***Mūlamadhyamaka kārikā*** 24:10, Hsüan-tsang reminds us that what is at stake here is not a theory or ontology of 'what is', but a bottom-line recognition of the fact, the facticity of phenomenality.

> If this consciousness were inexistent, that would make saṃvṛti-satya (enclosured-actuality)[92] inexistent; if saṃvṛti-satya is inexistent, then paramārtha-satya[93] would also be inexistent, since paramārtha and saṃvṛti depend on each other to be constructed (*chien-li*).[94]

Simply, to deny phenomenality is to deprive oneself of any and everything, not the least of which is ***any*** basis for knowledge. Without some acceptance of the facticity which is never anything or anywhere other than consciousness, nothing whatsoever can be affirmed, or denied. Knowability, by definition, requires consciousness, an amenability to awareness. Without some basis for knowledge, not a single determination can be made about the form or content of one's experience. Even if one denies any basis to knowledge, one still is incapable of knowing, recognizing, or being aware of that 'ungrounded' world anywhere else than

in consciousness. It is extremely significant that in this passage consciousness is made equivalent to saṃvṛti, that is, cognitive closure. It is a means, not the end of insight. Without consciousness neither a mundane nor a conventional world appears (where would it be?). Without the conventional, enclosured experiential domain, of what would one have paramārthic insight, what would become transparent?

But what if the two satyas are themselves inexistent, vacuous fantasies of some Buddhist's overactive imagination? Aren't they, as well, 'empty'?

> To dismiss the two satyas as inexistent, is to grasp emptiness in a depraved way, [a sickness that] the Buddhas said was incurable.[95] You should know that dharmas are both empty and non-empty.[96] Due to this, Maitreya declared the previous two verses (from the ***Madhyānta Vibhāga***).

As already cited[97] Candrakīrti offers a similar statement:

> Therefore all things are not to be taken as either devoid of being or as non-devoid; individuals are neither real beings nor unreal beings; this is the middle way.

There remains, however, a clear difference between the Yogācāric notion derived from the ***Madhyānta Vibhāga*** and the Mādhyamikan notion expressed by Candrakīrti. While Candrakīrti says that neither being nor non-being may be predicated of 'individuals,' Yogācāra seems to be saying that emptiness ***can*** be predicated of some (not all) things, and non-emptiness can be predicated of other (the remaining?) things. Candrakīrti's statement thus has universal application, whereas the Yogācāra position divides that which can be predicated into two distinct classes. But, examining the ***Madhyānta Vibhāga*** more carefully we see that such simplistic distinctions don't really apply. For the abhūta-parikalpa, though existent, has śūnyatā 'within it'. To say that "no duality is found," though

explicitly intended as a refutation of ***grāhya–grāhaka,*** by implication also puts us on alert that the duality between abhūta-parikalpa and śūnyatā is itself "not found," even while "even in this, that is found." And the ***Madhyānta Vibhāga*** knows that this is the implication. Hence, the amazing aporia of the third verse reiterates not only the actual dual distinction between the abhūta–parikalpa and śūnyatā, but reinforces their non–duality, the elimination of their duality – in language not unlike Candrakīrti's, and equally 'universal':

> Neither empty nor non–empty, thus is everything described; due to its existence (or being, ***sat***), its non–existence, and again its existence, this is called the middle way.

If, at this point, a Mādhyamikan should wish to critique the Yogācārin, the latter could easily retort that the Mādhyamikan should attend to the disparities and lack of precision in his own rhetoric before jumping all over the rhetoric of others – particularly when that rhetoric is not significantly different from his own. Should the Mādhyamikan be willing to jettison the two–satya notion, not only is his (non–)position then placed in jeopardy, but his ability to criticize is also removed – for he can no longer say that he can take on his opponent's axioms to demonstrate their fallacies and thus needs none of his own. In order to appropriate another's assumptions, even for the purpose of falsifying them, one must already presuppose ***vyavahāra,*** i.e., a conventionalized arena of discourse in which meanings are communicable. Without such an assumption, there can be ***no communication.*** And if there is no communication, no one can be critiqued or negated, since, first of all, the negator would be incapable of understanding the position to be negated, and those subject to the negations would be incapable of appreciating the critique. On the other hand, should the Mādhyamikan reply that he will allow the two–satya theory to stand 'un–negated', the Yogācārin can retort that this very two–satya theory itself presupposes an

experiential sphere in which conventional communication takes place. Hence, logically speaking, ***without Yogācāra there can be no Mādhyamika.***

Assuming that the Mādhyamikan objections have thus been satisfactorily silenced, the ***Ch'eng wei-shih lun*** turns to a more pressing issue concerning the manner in which consciousness operates.[98]

> If the rūpic āyatanas are basically consciousness itself (*shih-wei-t'i* 識為體), what accounts for the fact that it discloses itself (*hsien-hsien* 顯現) appearing with the characteristics of rūpa: Homogeneous, firmly abiding, in a continuous series (***sambandha***) that keeps 'turning-around' (***chuan***)?

While what we experience is always experienced *in* consciousness, it is also the case that the contents of consciousness are not experienced *as* consciousness. Rūpa has certain characteristics: Homogeneity, i.e., typological or morphological or phylogenic similarities, etc.; stability (a tree retains a stable appearance across moments, and it presents itself as 'solid', whereas consciousness, by comparison, seems ephemeral); continuity (whereas mind fluctuates from thought to thought, moment to moment, rūpic entities appear to continue causally in a stable, homogeneous fashion). Implied here are the four 'elements': "air" is homogeneous; "earth" is stable, solid; "water" rolls on, flows in a continuous stream; and "fire" illuminates things, making them visible, giving them color (rūpa). How is it that consciousness takes on these 'characteristics' (***lakṣaṇa***)?[99]

> [These rūpic characteristics] arise because of the power (*shih-li* 勢力) of 'names and words' vāsanās (*hsün-hsi* 熏習).

The ***Ch'eng wei-shih lun*** elsewhere lists three kinds of vāsanās:[100]

> (1) 'Names and words' or 'terms and words' vāsanā 名言習氣 which means 'latent linguistic conditioning', which are of two types:
> (1a) 'Terms and words which indicate a referent' (*piao-yi ming wen* 表義名言), which are able instantly to connote (*ch'üan* 詮) a referent through the differentiation of vocal sounds (*yin-sheng ch'a-pieh* 音聲差別).[101]

(1b) 'Terms and words which reveal perceptual–fields' (*hsien–ching ming wen* 顯境名言), which instantly discern (*liao* 了 = *vijñapti* or *upalabdhi*) perceptual–fields (*viṣaya*) as citta and caitta dharmas.

These seeds, planted [in the root consciousness] by 'terms and words' are the causes and conditions of each saṃskṛta dharma.

(2) Self–attachment vāsanā (*ātma–grāha–vāsanā*, *wo–chih hsi–ch'i* 我執習氣), meaning the false attachment to the seeds of 'me' and 'mine'. Self–attachment is two–fold:

(2a) Inherent self–attachment (lit.: 'what one is born with'). This attachment to 'me' and 'mine' is destroyed in the *bhāvana*–[*mārga*].

(2b) Self–attachment from discrimination. This attachment to 'me' and 'mine' is destroyed in the *darśana*–[*mārga*].[102]

These seeds, planted [in the root consciousness] by self–attachment, differentiate self from other sentient beings.

(3) Vāsanās which link existences (*bhāvāṅga–vāsanā*, *yu–chih hsi–ch'i* 有支習氣),[103] meaning the karmic seeds, 'differently maturing' (*vipāka*), carry over (*chao*)[104] from one existence to another in the three worlds. The bhāvāṅga is twofold:

(3a) Contaminated [yet] advantageous (*sāsrava–kuśala*, *yu–lou shan* 有漏善) i.e., actions (karma) which produce desirable (*k'e–ai* 可愛) fruits.

(3b) Disadventageous, i.e., actions which produce non–desirable fruits.

Returning to the previous argument, rūpic characteristics are thus formulated out of linguistic conditioning, which is conditioning that is embodied, either from birth or acquired through linguistic activity. Language, then, is not merely an ephemeral string of sounds or concepts which waft ghostlike through and within the field of concrete experience. That field is itself, in part, linguistic conditioning, embodied language. The cognition of the characteristics of rūpa arises, according to the *Ch'eng wei–shih lun,* through habitual linguistic conditioning.[105] The categorial fixations which we call 'physical sensate stuff' are linguistic projections; the world of experience, as recognizable entities, as experienced, is a case of linguistic embodiment; but the projectorial activity is neither deliberate nor conscious. We are driven to project the world, which is to

say, we are also projected by the world. Birth and death occur within a whirling stream of intentionality (***pravṛtti–pariṇāma, chuan–lun*** 轉輪). Trapped, dragged along by the current, by the torrential flow (***srotasaugha–vat, pao–liu*** 暴流), we seem doomed to be the duḥkhic occasion of an endless flow going nowhere. Or are we? Why does Yogācāra say that consciousness is not empty?

Yogācāra is not interested in doing ontology. While ***vijñapti–mātra*** does invite an epistemological attitude, the epistemological attitude it invites is not the one which constructs methods by which to measure and validate what is. Rather, it engenders an attitude of self–deconstruction, self–examination, predicated on the absence of an ultimate self who either watches or is viewed. It is an invitation to become aware of the psychosophical torrents which proscribe and circumscribe the horizons – as well as vacuous core – of what/where we are. What is at stake in the notion of rūpa for a Yogācārin is not its ontological or ontic status. In either case such a notion of 'rūpa' would reduce experiential content to graspable entities, graspable by a self which is their grasper. Ontic or ontological rūpa invests the perceiver with the power of appropriation (***upādāna***), which is to say, as a case of intentionalistic reference, it is karmic. But all 'grasping' is not equal. Some teloi immerse one deeper in the current, they may even drown one; whereas some teloi, if provisionally and expediently applied, may help extricate one from the cycle, the whirlpool. Thus there is 'value' in different sorts of actions, not because the referents, addressees, addressors, or senses carry ***intrinsic*** value in–themselves, but because the expeditious contextual application of poison may produce the consequence that it functions, in that ***particular*** situation, like medicine. We are thus not cured by the Truth, but by efficacious deceptions. Medicine is poison re–contextualized. Thus the original argument in ***Ch'eng wei–shih lun*** continues:[106]

> [Why do we cognize rūpic qualities?] Because it is the locale (*adhiṣṭhāna*) on which occur the defiled and pure dharmas. That is to say, if [rūpa] were inexistent, then there would be no *viparyāsa*,[107] which would then make for no mixed, defiled and no pure dharmas. This is why the consciousnesses and what seems to be rūpa are projected.

Has he actually said that rūpa is non-existent while consciousness does exist, or that consciousness is the ontological ground (rather than epistemic cloak) of rūpa? On the contrary, *he is positing the inseparability of consciousness and rūpa* ! A line from the *She-lun* is then cited to drive the point home:

> It is like the verse [from the *Mahāyānasaṃgrāha* which] says: "The mark of confusion[108] and confusion itself, it should be conceded, are rūpa-consciousness and non-rūpa-consciousness. If one does not exist, the other can not either."[109]

What sort of consciousness, other than these two, could there be? Rūpa, even if it were ontologically real, would not be known except through consciousness. What is known *as* rūpa is, in fact, the categorial projection onto what is *given* (and which we then – as graspers, appropriators, *grāhaka* – 'take'). Rūpa (i.e., rūpic-consciousness) is the necessary condition for appropriation (*upādāna*). Rūpa here signifies the full sensorium, that which is given *as object* in an act of cognition. Were there no rūpic consciousness, in fact, there would be no non-rūpic consciousness -- which is to say, there would be *no consciousness.* Surprisingly, not only has the *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* refrained from ever explicitly declaring that consciousness *creates* rūpa, it actually argues that rūpa – though a rūpa *in consciousness* – constitutes consciousness.[110] Rūpic-consciousness is a necessary condition for consciousness itself. What then is the distinction between (1) rūpa, (2) rūpic-consciousness and (3) non-rūpic-consciousness?

This delivers us into a philosophical maelstrom no less virulent today than it was fifteen hundred years ago in India and China. What is the material

object apart from our cognition of it? How can one even assert that it 'exists'? To assert or offer proofs always already involves the reduction of that which is to be asserted or proved to the cognitive sphere; i.e., to 'prove' matter, is to reduce matter to a cognitive category, either directly (i.e., offer cognition or cognizability in one form or another as the standard of proof) or indirectly (the domain of proofs is never other than the cognitive domain). The 'belief' in matter may be predicated, made reasonable, made probable, perhaps even made imperative, but matter itself, insofar as it remains truly material, can never be the subject of a (cognitive) proof.

The status of the cognitive object has underwritten Western philosophical thought at least since Descartes. Thinking he had grounded certainty in cognitive self-reflectivity, Descartes tried to jump from the cognitive 'substance' to the other substance, the 'extensional' substance; but, his method and conclusions (the pineal gland!) have proved less than satisfying to virtually every subsequent thinker of note. Spinoza eliminated one aspect of the bifurcation by claiming there was only one substance, and that cogitation and extension were two of the infinite attributes of that substance. But since attributes are, by his definition, "that which the intellect perceives of substance as constituting its essence,"[111] cogitation becomes privileged since extension is grounded in intellect, not materiality. Berkeley explicitly challenged the notion of materiality, calling himself an 'immaterialist,' and Hume challenged the epistemological foundations of material and causal thinking. Kant attempted to reground experience in a real world, but the gap between the cognizer and what he cognizes had now grown so vast, that the object per se, in-itself, was at best vague, unclear, a noumenon. Whatever is clearly and distinctly perceived or conceived (the criterion of 'reality' for the Rationalists) is phenomenal, i.e., a cognitive construction shaped by innate

mental categories and judgements through which all experience is filtered. Hegel declared the 'idea' supreme, that 'reality' amounted to reason itself as a movement of the idea searching for itself such that the 'concept' (involving the three dialectical moments resulting in an *aufhebung*) recoincides with itself. Marx accused Hegel of losing track of material history, and offered the supplement of material dialectics, while Kierkegaard accused Hegel of losing sight of true subjectivity, and offered a 'reality' divorced from objective constraints. Similarly Schopenhauer shifted the 'idealist' focus away from reason, and Protestantized it as 'will.'[112]

Brentano developed the notion of intentionality, which attempted to sort out the array of categorial confusions that had accrued to the question of the status of the cognitive object. In the introduction to his translation of Husserl's *The Idea of Phenomenology,* Nakhnikian writes:[113]

> An intentional act, said Brentano, is always "about" or "of." I think of or about. I desire this or that. And the peculiarity of intentional acts is that their objects do not *have* to exist. An intentional act may have as its object an existentially mind-dependent entity, for example, the *idea* of a mermaid; or its object may be something physical; or it may be an impossible thing such as the round square; or it may be something possible but unactualized, such as a golden mountain. Any mode of mentality (loving, desiring, believing) may have as its object an "intentionally inexistent" entity, namely, an entity that is neither physical nor existentially mind-dependent. The *idea* of a mermaid is, being an idea, existentially mind-dependent. But the *mermaid* which is the intention of the idea is neither a physical thing nor is it existentially mind-dependent. In contrast to this, no physical action requiring an object can be performed upon an intentionally inexistent entity. Kicking a football requires a football; but thinking of a football does not. I may think of a football that never existed. Brentano identified the mental with any intentional state, that is, with any state that *could* be directed to an intentionally inexistent entity.

He supplements this characterization of Brentano with the following footnote:

> This, however, is only one possible interpretation of Brentano's view of

> intentionality as presented in Chapter I of *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*. It is also possible to interpret Brentano as saying that on *every* occasion of a mental act, whether there be a physical thing as referent or not, there is an intentionally inexistent entity; so that, for example, when I desire the apple in front of me, the apple is the object of my desire in the sense of the word "object," namely, as the thing that could satisfy my desire; but there is also another object, the intentionally inexistent apple which in the common and peculiar object in all desires of apples.... The sense-datum is to the intentionally inexistent object what the perceptual object, if there is one, is to the material referent, if there is one, of the intentional act.... Husserl's work... strongly suggests that his conception of the mental is in line with the second interpretation.

The proliferation of ātman and dharmas, indeed! "Sense-data," "intentionally inexistent objects," "perceptual objects," "material referent" – one might be tempted to continue to introduce all the other metaphors and titles for 'cognitive object' in use over the last hundred years: signified, addressee, sense, gestalt, etc. – and they all, including the concept of a "material referent," are cognitive categories.

Above I said that "the 'belief' in matter may be predicated, made reasonable, made probable, perhaps even made imperative." By 'imperative,' I am thinking of 'physical' arguments, such as bodily striking the non-materialist, or withholding food, etc. Broken bones and starvation carry a certain persuasive force. One may even try to argue that these 'arguments' are no longer cognitive reductions but actual physical arguments, but this, of course, is just begging the question. What would make these arguments successful would not be their raw physicality at all, but their cognizability by the addressee of the argument. Lack of food is not experienced; *hunger* is cognized. The symptom pain is not experienced as 'broken bone.' The cognitive connection *qua* presupposed causal theory, etc., is precisely the issue in question. Even were I to strike someone repeatedly, and should that cognizer experience pain concomitant with each strike, that still lacks the force of a proof. Hume and Mill have already demonstrated

that consistency does not produce certainty, but only expectation. Thus its cognizability and its status as an expectation still ground so-called 'materiality' in the cognitive.

To be sure, Yogācāra never claims that rūpa does not exist because it doesn't function (*karaṇā*). Rather it attempts to point out that what we think are external things exhibiting these functions need not be any more real than the seemingly external objects that appear in dreams. They are *not,* however, saying that dreams are entirely fictitious realms with no connection to a 'real' world. Quite to the contrary, the key example offered in Vasubandhu's *Twenty Verses* is a wet dream, which is to say, based on fictitious factors (the erotic imagery in a dream) an actual physical event (seminal emission) has transpired.[114]

What is important about this example is that it is not claiming dream images 'function' solely in terms of or within the dream context. That we respond to dream images *as if* they were actual, real things external to our activity of cognitive projection is obvious. But the example points beyond that. Not only do dream images discharge their function within the context of the dream, they may produce observable effects, physical effects in other realms, other contexts as well. The seemingly physical world to which we respond is like a dream: WE are projecting it, interacting with the turmoils and desires of our own displaced intentionalities. The cognitive object is thick, encrusted with the sediment of projected characteristics, qualities, attributes; it becomes the locus into which we project our universal categories, our assumptions, fears, needs, predilections. In Yogācāric language, rūpa is a case of abhūta-parikalpa. The object is the screen on which the film of our desire is projected. Thus the *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* asked: How, if it is something independent of cognition, can the 'material' object change with the alterations of mind? Nonetheless even as we thrash about in our

dreams, real consequences are being produced elsewhere, in a realm or realms which we can not even dream about until we have awakened. This does not necessarily entail the existence of a transcendental 'other' realms, but rather an awareness of *this* realm devoid of the blindness of cognitive closure. That means to see not just the limited closured horizon within the borders of a projectory, but the conditionally interdependent 'nature' (paratantra svabhāva, ***pratītya-samutpāda***).

But if dharmas are empty, and no substrative self exists which would serve as the source of these projections, from what do they arise?

What is at stake in the *Ch'eng wei-shih lun's* argument is not a causal claim (certainly *not* that consciousness creates rūpa), but rather the inseparability of consciousness and rupa. Rūpa is a 'locale', a locative base (***adhiṣṭhāna***), the location on/in which defilement/purity occur. It is the locus of the fundamental cognitive reversal -- that is to say, it is that about which the most fundamental cognitive 'perversions' (***viparyāsa***), reversals *take* place (i.e., take their place, locate themselves appropriationally). 'Rūpa' is, then, a cognitive reversal – seeing what is *of* consciousness as something external to consciousness. It makes experience a place in which cognitive objects can be grasped, taken, pointed at, referred to and seized. It is the field of appropriation.

Cognizing rūpa is the putting into play of embodied linguistic conditioning. Why language? Language is the sphere of universals, of universal classes, of the cognitive linking of one particular cognitional object with another based on definable identities and differences. What is (the notion of) rūpa if not another case of a universal category into which certain cognitive objects can be collected as class members? When we cognize a 'pencil,' for instance, we collate what appears to our various senses as certain colors, textures, solidity, etc., and

impute into the aggregation an identity such that it belongs to a class of objects named 'pencil.' Moreover, the clarity with which we discern the various characteristics such as color, texture, etc., will also implicate those qualities themselves as universal categories (yellowness, hardness, blackness, etc.). Its 'materiality' is only another genus, another class into which we group our aggregated perception. Whatever offers sensorial or spatial resistance (two material objects cannot occupy the same place at the same time) is thus of the category 'rūpa.' We overlay the particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) with universals, generalities (*sāmānya*), and 'cognize' those generalities *as* the particular.[115] Thus we say that we see 'a pencil,' which is a prajñapti for a complex field of synthesized cognitive conditions; only synthetically, i.e., having defined and prejudged our cognition in terms of a universal class (or universal classes) to which we can associate it (*saṃjñā*), can a 'pencil' appear in cognition. But this 'class' through which the cognition was filtered is not 'real', but a linguistic construction (*prajñapti–mātra*). Rūpa is a case of cognitive displacement (*viparyāsa adhiṣṭhāna*), and the condition for this displacement is embodied linguistic conditioning. Just as with Kant's categories, we are born with certain predilections to cognize in terms of certain universal categories, and these, inasmuch as they are universal, are linguistic. Rūpa, then, is a case of prajñapti.

The distinction between consciousness and rūpa is itself a viparyāsa. "Consciousness and what seems to be rūpa are projected," i.e., experience becomes dichotomized. This dichotomization establishes the anxious gap between cognizer and cognized that we attempt to fill in with acts of appropriation. It is this appropriation which is the ground condition for both defilement and purity, duḥkhic entrapment and liberation – they hinge on the rolling around, the direction of the reversal.

Both rūpa *and* consciousness are projections. Alterity of consciousness turns, rolls, cycles; the moments and movements of history as well as of each individual percipient are constituted and determined in these reversals. Duḥkha and the elimination of duḥkha are its turnings, as is the turning of the wheel of dharma. Yogācāra proposes a soteric resolution to the duḥkhic dilemma through the expedient application of ***pratipakṣa,*** 'antidotes,' 'counteractives,' intellective–affective reversals.[116]

For Yogācāra the root problematic is 'appropriation.' Rūpa is a metaphor for the appropriational dynamics. The same issues are involved here as were discussed previously in reference to the phrase ***abhūta vastu nimittārambaṇa manasikāra.***[117] If we lose sight of the absolute centrality of appropriation as the root Yogācāra problematic, we risk utterly misunderstanding everything that Yogācāra attempts.

In an earlier section the ***Ch'eng wei–shih lun*** states explicitly why, for Yogācāra, consciousness–only is asserted, and equally important, what sort of misunderstanding should be avoided concerning that claim. The passage occurs precisely where the notion of grāhya–grāhaka, noema–noesis, the division of cognition into a grasper and grasped, i.e., an appropriational dynamic, has been introduced:[118]

> Since cittas and caittas depend on others to arise (***paratantra***), they are like a magician's trick, not truly substantial entities (***fei chen shih yu*** 非眞實有). But so as to oppose false attachments [to the view that] external to citta and caittas there are perceptual–objects [composed of] real, substantial entities (***shih yu ching*** 實有境), we say that the only existent is consciousness (***wei yu shih*** 唯有識). But if you become attached to ***wei–shih*** (consciousness–only, vijñapti–mātra, psychosophic closure) as something truly real and existent (***chen shih yu***), that's like being attached to external perceptual–objects, i.e., it is just another dharma–attachment [and definitely not liberating].

The *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* could not have made its claim more explicit. Wei-shih is posited as an antidote to attachment to external objects. Its purpose is the interruption of the appropriational economy, the magic show we take for 'true cognition.'

As we've shown above, consciousness itself is not immediately cancelled because phenomenality must be retained in order for any communication, any knowledge, any method to function. Further, it is not rūpa per se which is rejected, but, as we will see in a moment, *externality*. After examining the *Ch'eng wei-shih lun's* position on externality, we will examine more closely what it is that the *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* argues is real, and what is not.

IV – Externality

The *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* continues by posing the following objection to its position:[119]

> [That] rūpic external perceptual-objects are distinct [entities, is] clearly evident and realized[120] in immediate cognition and is perceived [as such].[121] How can you deny that, and consider them inexistent?

The text replies:

> At the moment [they are] immediately cognized and realized, [one] doesn't attach [to them] as external. Only afterwards, mano-[vijñānic] discrimination falsely produces the notion of externality (*wei-hsiang* 外想).[122] Thus, the perceptual-object immediately cognized is altered consciousness, and is [consciousness's] own nimitta-bhāga, and can be said to exist [in this sense]. Mano-vijñāna is attached to external substantialistic rūpas, etc., falsely schematizing (*parikalp-, wang-chi* 妄計) them as existents. Hence we consider them to be inexistent.

Again, the crucial factor is attachment. In immediate experience, externality as such is not perceived; rather it is retrospectively read into, imposed on immediate experience. This cognitive overlay is not done out of some inexplicable cosmic

flaw (such as Hinduism's *māya*) or because of a neutral cognitive mistake. It is generated by discriminative, appropriational intent. In order for appropriation to appropriate there must be that which is appropriable, i.e., 'external'. Thus in the positing of external objects what, for Yogācāra, is problematic is not the positing of objects as such. The problem lies in positing *externality,* the idea or notion of the external (*wei-hsiang*). Externality is the necessary condition for appropriation.

What is at stake should not be confused or misconstrued as a question of ontological description. Yogācāric 'phenomenological description' does not aim at delineating ontological regions, but rather psychosophical regions. Yogācāra is concerned with *how* and *why* we construct for ourselves, out of our collective karma, the kind of world or *Lebenswelt* that we do. Its ontic or ontological 'reality' is of no particular interest. They are interested in *why* we do ontology, what compulsions drive us to affirm and negate this or that type of world or object. Husserl claimed that his phenomenological method did not deal with real 'facts', empirical entities, but rather aimed at 'essences', invariant structures which had no necessary relation to empirical 'reality'.[123] The essence might be of an imaginary figure (or even a chimera) just as well as of an empirical event. Yogācāra, too, considers imaginary events (*parikalpita*) to be of equal phenomenological interest to whatever may be determined to be non-imaginary (*pariniṣpanna-paratantra*), though, unlike Husserl, they do not seek essences. Given their soteric orientation, they seek to uncover and remedy the conditions given which we bind and condition ourselves to suffer the kind of mental-cognitive tortures entailed in the coursing through saṃsāra.

Because the fundamental human problem is karma, and karma is constituted entirely within and as a cognitive-mental domain, a domain grounded

on intent and intentionality, the only arena of phenomenological interest for Yogācāra is the field of consciousness. While Husserl chose in *Ideen I* to concentrate on consciousness as a specialized region for phenomenological inquiry as one of many possible regions for fruitful inquiry,[124] though a foundational region to be sure, for Yogācāra a soteric investigation of karma could begin or end nowhere else.

What does the denial of externality entail? If consciousness is always consciousness of, everything must be *of* or within consciousness. What exactly, according to the *Ch'eng wei-shih lun,* is consciousness?

Back at the beginning of the text we are given the following definition of the character *shih* 識, which, to anticipate a terminological alterity, is used throughout the *Triṃśikā* and Hsüan-tsang's other writings as a translation for either *vijñāna* (consciousness) or *vijñapti* (lit. 'cause to be known'):[125]

> 'Consciousness' (*shih, vijñāna, vijñapti* ?) refers to 'discerning distinctions' (*liao-pieh*). The word 'consciousness' includes the caittas, since they mutually interact [with it].

First, here as in many other places in the *Ch'eng wei-shih lun,* the text is quick to point out that 'consciousness-only' (*vijñāna-mātra, vijñapti-mātra, wei-shih*) never means citta or a single solitary consciousness, but always includes the caittas, the felt, lived textures and cognitive fields within which cognition occurs and from which its characteristics (e.g., angry, doubtful, attentive, etc.) are inscribed. Consciousness is never apart from its caittas, and thus 'consciousness only' does not mean that only a subjective projector exists; what is discriminated, perceived, objective, etc., also exists, but the term 'exists' will be qualified to include only that which can be experienced (directly or indirectly), i.e., only that which exerts some efficient causal effect which is (in principle) observable can be said to 'exist.' For that reason, the citta viprayukta dharmas (those dharmas not

directly perceived by citta, such as aging and language; cf. appendix) are said by the ***Ch'eng wei-shih lun*** to not be 'real' but rathei prajñapti.

Further, consciousness does not refer to a thing, or a substance, but an activity. The activity is 'discerning, cognizing distinctions'. In ***Triṃśika*** v. 2, *liao pieh* translated ***vijñapti*** and ***shih*** translated ***vijñāna***. I translated *liao-pieh* in the last chapter as 'distinguishing;' it is used there to describe the characteristic function of the sixth consciousness, the mano-vijñāna. In v. 2 it says that ***viṣaya*** ('sense-objects') are what *liao-pieh* discerns.

So the 'definition' runs something like: consciousness and/or discerning means discerning, i.e., vijñapti means vijñapti. Or, ***vijñapti*** and ***vijñāna*** are synonyms. But does this imply that all consciousnesses, ālaya-vijñāna included, are reducible to the sixth-consciousness or its function (discerning, distinguishing sense-objects)? In v. 3, the ālaya-vijñāna is indeed discussed in terms of ***vijñapti***, here translated by Hsüan-tsang by the single character *liao* (discerning, distinguishing). The verse enumerates a number of 'unknowable' (***pu-k'e-chih, asaṃviditaka***) aspects of the ālaya-vijñāna; the locus of its discernments is one of them. Another is its appropriational involvement. This implies that, while like the sixth consciousness it discerns or distinguishes, the locus of such distinctions is unclear. It would be hard to locate that which we ordinarily associate with a perceptual object alongside or amongst these 'unknowables'. Thus, 'discern' or 'distinguish' (*liao*) here does not mean simply the distinguishing of 'distinct objects', but an appropriating into consciousness of that which it perceives (the third unknowable). To cognize, discern is to appropriate; this is the Yogācāra equivalent of the Husserlian phrase 'consciousness of'.

Thus *shih* (***vijñāna*** or ***vijñapti***) means vijñapti (*shih, liao-pieh, liao*). At least one other equivalent for vijñapti is found in the ***Ch'eng wei-shih lun***.

While discussing the classificatory system of the Sarvāstivādins, in particular the Seventy Five Dharmas as explained in the *Abhidharmakośa*, two forms of rūpa are examined: *avijñapti-rūpa* and *vijñapti-rūpa*. The Chinese character used here for vijñapti is *piao* 表 , which means 'to manifest, to make evident'.[126] Altogether then vijñapti is translated as (1) *shih* (know, understand, recognize; consciousness = vijñāna); (2) *liao-pieh* (discerning or distinguishing distinctions); (3) *liao* (discern, comprehend);[127] (4) *piao* (indicate, manifest, make explicit or evident).

Consciousness is consciousness of, which is to say, all experience involves a discerning, appropriational movement. But does the denial of externality thus entail that everything is *located within* consciousness, such that consciousness is a substance within which ontologies may be established or fabricated? Wouldn't that entail that there be ultimately a single consciousness within which everything is located? Should Yogācāra respond affirmatively to these questions, then they would unquestionably be idealists.

But the text seeks to nip this type of misreading in the bud. The *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* affirms the existence of other minds.[128] The opponent, recognizing that acceptance of other minds entails rejecting a solipsistic idealism, asks:[129]

> Since already [you admit] a sense-object different [from your own consciousness, viz. another's mind which can be cognized], how can [your position] be called 'consciousness-only'?

The text responds:

> How extremely opinionated! You have doubts about where to locate [the distinct factors involved in] contact (*sparśa*).[130] How could the wei-shih teaching only espouse a single consciousness? That's not the case. And why not?

Once and for all the most common misconception concerning Yogācāra as an

idealism can be put to final rest. They do not posit any single overarching 'mind' or 'consciousness' as the source or solitary existent of or in the world. There is no 'Cosmic ālaya-vijñāna' of which we are all parts or manifestations. There is no One Mind subtending the universe. The world is populated, according to Yogācāra, by a multitude of distinct sentient beings, each with their own consciousness system (*citta-kalāpa*). The *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* is as explicit on this point as it can be.

> You should examine[131] and alertly listen. If there were only a single consciousness how could the ten directions, sages and ordinary folk, causes and effects, etc., be distinguished? Who would regard [the teachings] and who would espouse them? What [would differentiate] the dharma from its seeker?
>
> Thus, the words 'wei-shih' have a deep meaning. The word *shih* (consciousness, vijñapti, vijñāna) in general reveals that all sentient beings each have [their own] eight consciousnesses, six types of caittas,[132] altered [consciousness] (*so-pien*) *qua* nimitta- and darśana-[bhāgas], distinguishing divisions,[133] and tathatā which is disclosed through the principle of emptiness.
>
> Since consciousness' self-characteristic (*svalakṣaṇa*), [the dharmas] associated with consciousness, the two altered [bhāgas], the three divisions,[134] and the four real natures [of the preceding categories][135] as well as all other dharmas are never separate from consciousness, we have established the [sense in which we use the] term *shih*.

In other words, *vijñāna-vijñapti* designates the inseparability of what is experienced from its medium, viz. consciousness. Nowhere here, once again it should be noted, did the text make any causative or primordial claims. The issue clearly and simply is one of inseparability.

> The word *wei* (*mātra* only, nothing but) is only [used to reveal what is] concealed from the fools who are attached to [the idea that] apart from the consciousnesses there are real, substantial, entitative rūpas, etc.

The denial of externality once again is aimed at overcoming an attachment.

But does denial of externality mean that nothing whatsoever exists

outside of my consciousness? On the one hand, Yogācāra enjoys arguing away the existence of externals, primarily because epistemologically realism is difficult if not impossible to establish unequivocally. Since their opponents become more insistent, more vociferous as the security of their epistemological grounding becomes more remote, it grows more and more obvious that what drives the realist to posit and validate externality is a deep inner anxiety, a psychic need, and not the dry detached attitude which they would like to pretend. Revealing these inner āsavas is the whole point of the Yogācāra analysis. To prove 'only mind exists' as a sort of doctrine or dogma, a position to take because it is the 'correct' position, is to thoroughly miss the Yogācārin's point. By eliminating the projected status of what can be grasped, the grasper as well is thrown into question. Consciousness itself is in and as itself impossible to grasp, rendering it less susceptible to the psychosophic abuses that an external, physical, possessible world is prone to, or even encourages.

The therapeutic effectiveness of this strategy is recounted in the famous (though most likely apocryphal) story of Hui-k'o, who was to become the second Ch'an patriarch, and Bodhidharma (the first patriarch). This story illustrates the sort of soteric power made available by these tactics. Hui-k'o, originally a Confucian scholar, became convinced of the efficacy of Buddhism and became equally convinced that Bodhidharma should be his teacher. He approached Bodhidharma for instruction while the latter was at the Shao-lin monastery, but Bodhidharma was less than receptive.[136]

> In order to prove his sincerity and thus receive the teachings, Hui-k'o stood near where Bodhidharma was meditating and waited for hour upon hour in earnest supplication. Snow began to fall from the cold winter sky, but Hui-k'o was undaunted. Over the course of the evening the snow accumulated to Hui-k'o's knees, but when Bodhidharma finally noticed the supplicant and discovered why he was

> there, the Indian sage only warned him about the difficulty of practicing the "unsurpassable, wondrous path of the Buddhas."
>
> Finally, in a surge of zealous desperation and with thoughts of the trials of former enlightened ones, Hui-k'o took a knife and cut off his left arm, placing it in front of Bodhidharma. Permitted at last, through this extraordinary (if macabre) demonstration of self-sacrifice, to receive the teaching, Hui-k'o asked Bodhidharma: "My mind is not at peace; please pacify it for me."
>
> To this Bodhidharma replied: "Bring your mind here and I will pacify it for you."
>
> Hui-k'o: "I have searched for my mind, but it is completely unobtainable (i.e., imperceptible; or "I cannot find it anywhere")."
>
> Bodhidharma: "I have [now] completely pacified your mind for you."
>
> Although Bodhidharma's final reply might appear as a neat piece of sophistry to a modern reader, it was enough, according to the traditional account, to inspire Hui-k'o to a great realization or enlightenment experience.

According to other early sources, Hui-k'o's arm was actually lost to robbers and not symbolically 'sacrificed,' but the story shows how the intangible, ungraspable characteristic of mind can be used soterically; how its resistance to appropriation may incur ***prapañcopaśama***, the pacification or bringing to rest of the linguistic-cognitive excesses, the anxieties which we see *as* the world in the place of the actual world itself (***abhūta-parikalpita***).[137] Bodhidharma is administering some applied Yogācāra theory, i.e., this instance of Ch'an praxis instantiates the Yogācāric method for realizing the emptiness of mind. Bodhidharma after all was said by tradition to have taken the ***Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*** as his root text, thus indicating that his approach was Yogācāric.

Thus the denial of externality constitutes part of a process, aimed at emptying not only 'the grasped,' but the grasper as well. Neither transcendental object nor transcendental subject survive Yogācāra's phenomenological method.

As we have just seen, Yogācāra does not advocate solipsism. Consciousness is intersubjective; karma is communal. Therefore, the existence of

other minds is affirmed. The above cited passage from the *Ch'eng wei-shih lun*, though worded in a tricky manner, is crucial, since it unequivocally discusses the perception by a consciousness of that which is other (i.e., external) to that consciousness. Not only is no attempt made to reduce 'other minds' to mere projections of one's own, but the very core of Buddhism, the teaching of Dharma by one sentient being to another is made absolutely contingent on there being consciousnesses external to and yet perceptible by other consciousnesses. In other words, the entire point of Yogācāra phenomenology rests on both the necessity and possibility that there be communication between distinct minds. Consciousness, to say it again, is thoroughly intersubjective.

There are many consciousnesses. The text will avoid using the argument that one consciousness views another by inference based on observation of what the other is bodily, physically doing – though that is implied, and becomes later in Dharmakīrti's time the standard Buddhist response to the theory of other minds.[138] Nonetheless, it does portray the mind as a mirror which reflects a world around it. The cited passage walks a thin descriptive line. It implies that something besides the mind is reflected in the mind, but it remains excruciatingly silent about the rūpic status of that something. Other minds are known by what? What is it that one observes as the other? The other's own immediate thoughts to him/herself? Or a more corporeal, gestural, behavioral exhibition of what that other thinks and intends?

The opponent asks:[139]

> [Even if] external rūpa is truly inexistent (*shih wu*), [it is still] possible that perceptual-objects (*ching*) are not within consciousness. [If] other minds really exist (*shih-yu*) [and all that really exists must be perceived, and thus within consciousness], why aren't they ālambana (*so-yüan* lit. 'objective condition'; in Skt: 'cognitive support') for one's own [consciousness, i.e., why aren't they perceived directly]?

> Who says that the other's consciousness is not a perceptual-object for one's own consciousness? We only refuse to say that it is an 'immediate ālambana' (*sākṣāt-ālambana*) [i.e., it is not perceived directly, but indirectly].[140] This means that when [another's] consciousness arises [in your awareness], it is neither substantial [i.e., not tangible, etc.] nor made to function [by you] (*tso-yung*, 作用 *kāritra*). [Your consciousness, when perceiving another mind] is not like a hand, for instance, which immediately/directly grasps an external [tangible] thing , nor like the sun which extends its radiance immediately-directly illuminating external perceptual-objects.

These are interesting illustrations. The first states that consciousness does not 'grasp' (*chih*, appropriate) other minds, implying that minds are intangible. Again we see the text emphasizing consciousness' resistance to being appropriated. The second alludes to the prakāśa model of perception. Prakāśa implies that consciousness shines, radiates, illuminates objects, i.e., perception is not the passive reception of light from visible objects by the eye, or sounds by the ear, etc., but the active illuminating by consciousness of that which is perceived. Consciousness shines on everything, making all appear. But the *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* clearly is rejecting this model. The sun shines (prakāśa) on each object, lighting each up so as to make it colorful and visible. Similarly, an idealist might claim that consciousness illumines objects, bestowing its light (prakāśa) on them; that to perceive something means to shine a mental spotlight on it. But while discussing other minds, minds which are other than one's own consciousness, which operate independently (i.e., they are not made to function or behave as they do by *me*), the text reinforces their independence by reminding us that we don't 'generate' or create other minds (or objects) by illuminating them.

Does this mean that it would be proper to call other minds 'external' to consciousness? Since, as we've seen, the Yogācārins are taking external to mean 'radically separate from consciousness', the answer would have to be negative, not

only because the 'external' consciousness would itself be a consciousness, but because, though in some sense it is independent of me, I still do perceive it, even if not directly. It is not separated from my consciousness, though distinct.

This specialized sense of the denial of externality must be kept in mind if one wishes to correctly interpret the thrust of the Yogācāra argument. Nothing whatsoever, especially if it can be appropriated by conversation or cognition, can properly be said to be radically separate from consciousness. This does not entail the absurd consequence that my consciousness and my consciousness alone has thoroughly and utterly constructed the entire Lived-world in which I locate myself as a self. While there are things that operate in ways that are significantly independent of my consciousness, their independence does not imply externality. I perceive other minds as moved by wills and intents other than my own. But I ***perceive them.*** Does this non-external 'external' mind establish a perceptual pattern that might equally be applied to other things? In other words, if Yogācāra grants that there exist consciousnesses besides my own, which I can only perceive remotely, not directly, then might there not also be other sorts of things and 'perceptual-objects' (***viṣaya***) in my perceptual field whose 'existence' (or intentionality) is likewise independent of me? If so, then all shreds of metaphysical idealism will have been removed from the Yogācāra position.

The text, having rejected the 'grasping' model of perception (like a hand) and the illuminational model (prakāśa), now proffers the Yogācāra model:

> It is only like a mirror, which 'perceives' what appears [within it as] external objects. [This kind of perception is the type we] term 'discerning (***liao***) other minds,' though they can't be immediately-directly discerned. What is discerned immediately-directly is [one's consciousness'] own alterations (***so-pien***). Hence the [***Saṃdhinirmocana***] ***Sūtra*** says: There is not the slightest dharma which can grasp the remaining dharmas; only when consciousness arises does one project/perceive[141] the appearance of that, which is

called 'grasping that thing.'

Does the mirror-mind, then, only perceive itself and other minds, or does it also perceive rūpa, etc.? The very next line, which concludes the argument is:

Other mind is this sort of condition; rūpa, etc. are the same case.

This is tantamount to admitting that rūpa exists independently, though not separate from my mind. It is known indirectly, it is a remote ālambana. How could such a crucial passage have gone unnoticed for so long?

We may look at Vallée Poussin's 'explanation' as an example of precisely how a reading of the ***Ch'eng wei-shih lun*** can itself be precisely an instance of what the ***Ch'eng wei-shih lun*** in its entirety is warning against: viz., the imposition of one's presuppositions onto or into something such that one misreads or mistakes one's (erroneous) interpretation for the thing interpreted. His leading presupposition, which he already announces on his first page, is that Vijñapti-mātratā is idealism. He takes every opportunity available to interpret and translate the ***Ch'eng wei-shih lun*** in concert with that assumption. To be fair, it was the universal assumption of his generation, and thus, had he assumed that vijñapti-mātra stood for some other, non-idealist position, that would have been both surprising and noteworthy. When he arrives at this passage, though, he recognizes that to equate 'other minds' – which are clearly identified as originating and operating independently of the consciousness to which they are other – with rūpa disrupts the idealist position. What does he do?

To support an idealistic reading he offers the following gloss on the meaning of rūpa in the last line:[142]

> The Rūpa which is the ***nimittabhāga*** of the other mind (***de la pensée d'autrui***) (the body of the other, developed from the Vijñāna of the other), and also the Rūpa which is the development of an other Vijñāna of the same person (***de la même personne***). [That is to say:

> the *cakṣurvijñāna (darśanabhāga)* has for an immediate *ālambana* its own *nimitta,* which is a reproduction of the Rūpa developed from the Ālaya-vijñāna.

This is quite fanciful, and partially faithful to the *Ch'eng wei-shih lun*. Indeed, all we know directly and immediately (*sākṣāt*) is the alterity of our own consciousness. This can be illustrated by a physiological example of tactile perception.

Technically speaking, when I 'touch the table' I do not actually feel the table. My feelings, my tactile sensibility *qua* feeling is produced by nerves, and the nerves are *within* my skin, not on the dermal surface. My nerves never come into direct contact (*sparśa*) with the table. My nerves interpret alterations of my skin *as* the texture of an external object, when it is only the inside of my own skin that I am feeling, that I perceive directly. The texture of the table is perceived – but remotely. Knowing another mind (or any rūpa), the *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* is arguing, follows the same pattern. I know of other minds remotely. All I know directly is what happens immediately within my own consciousness. In other words, *consciousness is always and everywhere a case of cognitive closure*. But the closure can never be absolute. What is not *of my consciousness* in the genitive and generative sense (i.e., what does not exist simply in virtue of my consciousness either possessing or creating it) may still exert an influence on me, it may still be perceived remotely, i.e., filtered through my cognitive apparatus. No matter how far away, it may still arise on the surface of my 'mental mirror,' and appear there as of equal depth as everything else reflected/projected (*pratibimba*) there. But before we examine what Yogācāra means with its use of the mirror metaphor, let us further examine Vallée Poussin's gloss.

He recognizes that what is perceived of the other mind is not a

disembodied consciousness, but an embodied behavioral configuration. Now the phrase ***de la même personne*** is ambiguous. ***Même*** can mean 'same', or it can mean 'one's own', i.e., ***même personne*** can mean either that the rūpa is developed by the 'same person', i.e., the perceiver of the other mind, or that it is developed by 'its own person', i.e., the other person him/herself. This is a tantalizing ambiguity, since the first option is unabashedly idealist – in fact solipsistic, a position which we have already seen the ***Ch'eng wei–shih lun*** reject – and the second option opens other possibilities. Vallée Poussin tries to straddle both options. His illustrative example of the ***cakṣurvijñāna (darśanabhāga)*** comes to hinge on a single word: "reproduction". Although he is not specific about whose ālaya–vijñāna has 'developed' the initial rūpa, the perceiver's or the other mind's, the perceiver's perceptual field (***nimittabhāga***) contains as its content "a reproduction of the Rūpa developed from the Ālaya–vijñāna." Assuming he means that the rūpa is produced by the other mind, when I see your 'mind', I am actually seeing a reproduction of the rūpa which your mind has produced. He has made the causative metaphysical argument – i.e., consciousness alone creates the world – despite the fact that, as we noted above, the ***Ch'eng wei–shih lun*** consistently refrains from making such an argument, even when such a claim would expedite its cause. On what does Vallée Poussin base his interpretation?

At the end of his gloss he writes: "See p. 446." If one turns to that page looking for a declarative pronouncement on the ability of the ālaya–vijñāna to create rūpa, one will be sorely disappointed.[143] The discussion underway there concerns ***ālambana–pratyaya***, i.e., what sort of cognitive condition is an ālambana. On Vallée Poussin's page the only mention of 'other minds', much less rūpa being created by an ālaya–vijñāna, comes in the first of three arguments concerning what, if anything, the ālaya–vijñāna takes for an ālambana–pratyaya. The

Ch'eng wei-shih lun will reject this position which it argues is 'unreasonable.' Since this section of the text discusses another significant Yogācāric notion which has been thoroughly misconstrued – the *chih* or hyle that Vallée Poussin and many since have translated, incredibly, as "archetype" – it would be worthwhile examining it in some detail.

V – The Four Conditions

The *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* accepts four types of conditions (*pratyaya*), and discusses them in some detail.[144] They are:

Hetu-pratyaya 因緣 *yin-yüan*
Samanantara-pratyaya 等無間緣 *teng wu-hsien yüan*
ālambana-pratyaya 所緣緣 *so-yüan yüan*
adhipati-pratyaya 增上緣 *tseng-shang yüan*

[1] The hetu-pratyaya include the saṃskṛta-dharmas which directly enact their fruit (effect; *phala, kuo*). There are two types of hetu-pratyaya:

[1a] Seeds (*bījas*) residing in the *mūla-vijñāna* (fundamental consciousness) having the power to 'differentiate' (*ch'a-pieh* 差別) "the advantageous and the defiled, the non-recording, the various realms and lands, etc." This is again subdivided into two types, (i) those seeds which produce the same species as themselves subsequently, and (ii) those which produce the same seeds simultaneously.

[1b] Exactly how to translate this 'causal-condition' is unclear. The Chinese is *hsien-hsing* 現行, lit. 'projecting/perceiving activity.' Tat, following Vallée Poussin renders it "actual dharmas," but neither term means either 'actual' or 'dharma'. Hsüan-tsang used the term *hsien-hsing* to translate a number of Sanskrit terms in his rendition of the *Abhidharmakośa*.[145] These are: *kriyā*-,

vṛt–, samudācāra, saṃmukhī–bhāva, saṃmukhī–bhūta. The semantic range covered by these terms is highly suggestive of a number of intriguing possibilities.

Kriyā means a strictly physical activity which occurs without either intent or karmic consequence. Since for Yogācāra their phenomenology concerns only the karmic realm, *kriyā* seems unlikely here, especially since this type of hetu–pratyaya is defined as the operation of the seven consciousnesses. This would suggest *vṛt,* or more accurately, *pravṛtti,* the turning around and operating of the seven consciousnesses. But Hsüan–tsang has already established other terms in the *Ch'eng wei–shih lun* for *pravṛtti,* so it would not be necessary to inject a new one (though, as we saw with the term *vijñapti,* Hsüan–tsang is not incapable of proliferating terminological correspondences).

Samudācāra means 'a presentation, offering, entertainment (for a guest); proper or correct usage or conduct or behavior; intention, purpose, design, motive'.[146] This term provides everything that *kriyā* lacked! This term is a very reasonable candidate: the seven consciousnesses are like a presentation, an offering, an entertainment for or from the ālaya–vijñāna. The seven consciousnesses are thoroughly intentional, so that 'intention, purpose, design, motive' also serve well descriptively.

But the last term is stunning. *Saṃmukhī* means 'to place facing, to make something one's chief aim'.[147] But the correspondence is not just *saṃmukhī,* but *saṃmukhā–bhāva. Saṃmukhā–bhū* means 'to be or stand face to face or opposite, to be opposed to', i.e., to be *con–fronting.* To project an artha before one, or to confront that which is before one: but which? Both? The term *saṃmukhin* mediates: it means 'a looking–glass, a mirror.' Again, perception is conceived of on the model of a mirror.

We needn't choose between these Sanskrit options. The hetu–pratyaya

may actually implicate them all. If the first type, the bīja hetu-pratyaya involves effects which arise out of one's own ālaya-vijñāna, effects which are of the same 'species' (*tzu lei* 自類) as the seed, then, logically speaking, this other type of causal condition should be either (i) what produces effects which are of a different species than their causes, (ii) causes other than seeds, or (iii) causes arising elsewhere than from the ālaya-vijñāna; or some combination of the three. The text notes that the two interact in three ways: (i) seeds producing seeds, (ii) seeds producing ***hsien-hsing***, and (iii) ***hsien-hsing*** producing seeds. Significantly, ***hsien-hsing*** producing ***hsien-hsing*** is not listed, probably because these would be completely outside the ālaya-vijñāna and thus not cognizable, and thus not producing ***effects in experience, in cognition***. Again we must remember that Yogācāra is doing cognitive phenomenology, not metaphysical ontology. They are talking about effects in experience, not constructing metaphysical causation theories.

[2] The second condition is the ***samanantara-pratyaya***, the immediately antecedent condition. This condition is employed to solve two problems: the problem of continuity, and the problem of what breaks saṃsāric continuity upon entrance into nirvāṇa.

At first the antecedent condition seems like a repeat of the hetu-pratyaya, since it produces repetitions of the same 'species' sequentially, though here the emphasis is on the same species immediately following from its antecedent condition, in contiguous moments. As one condition discharges its efficient causal force, it disappears and is immediately replaced with its effect, a subsequent condition. The disappearing condition, which existed momentarily, is the 'antecedent condition.' This is unlike the seeds, since seeds may operate simultaneously with their effect, while the antecedent condition is always

contiguous but sequentially prior. Moreover the seeds of a species operate at all times, while the antecedent condition is always momentary.

The eight consciousness are likewise not antecedent to each other since they don't conditionally intermix in this fashion (i.e., for example, manas doesn't disappear in order for visual consciousness to arise; the disappearance of one consciousness is not the cause of the others). Like the seeds, the consciousnesses 'continue' through time, and don't utterly disappear (though in a sense they do, since the consciousnesses are neither substances – and hence ungraspable – nor substrata). They structurally and functionally perdure.[148]

> Caittas and citta always operate together, and since they interact in such a way that they harmonize into a single appearance (*tādṛśa*), they cannot be prajñaptically separated or differentiated, and thus their interaction constitutes a samanantara-pratyaya.

The Chinese translation of this pratyaya literally reads: 'same with-no-gap condition', i.e., not the slightest gap intrudes between the disappearance of the antecedent and the arising of subsequent conditions. Cittas and caittas mutually produce each other, but so seamlessly, that they can be called 'antecedent'.[149]

The nirvāṇa issue is addressed as follows:[150]

> When entering (the nirvāṇa) without remainder[151] the mind grows extremely faint and rarified, and is unable to open [another path] or lead the way onward. It cannot produce another antecedent dharma, and so it is not this [sort of] condition.

Continuity, which has engendered the cycle of saṃsāra as well as carried one through the projectory of the stages of the mārga, is here radically and utterly disrupted. All continuity occurs on a background of radical momentariness, but a momentariness that replaces and replenishes itself from moment to moment durationally. The movement ultimately stops once and for all at the 'entrance' to nirvāṇa without remainder.

There ensues a detailed discussion of the ādāna-vijñāna (the 'taking or grasping consciousness', another name for the ālaya-vijñāna) as samanantara-pratyaya. While an impure or contaminated (*sāsrava*) ādāna can engonder a pure or uncontaminated (*anāsrava*) ādāna, the inverse cannot occur, since the Great Mirror Wisdom, once attained, is never cut off. This clearly offers an optimistic, progressional view. By implication, 'good', over countless kalpas, by the law of probability, must eventually triumph. Similar discussions are given concerning the remaining consciousnesses. Since each consciousness has its own sort of object, one of the consciousnesses may be anāsrava while another may be sāsrava. The discussion turns to what conditions are antecedent to which key attainments along the path to nirvāṇa, i.e., which conditions immediately precede which? The background issue is, What condition, if any, is *the* condition for the attainment of nirvāṇa? The answer: *none*! Since nirvāṇa is asaṃskṛta (unconditioned), no condition can be given which would produce it. Thus it is attained negatively, i.e., by cutting off, destroying obstructions. Nirvāṇa is never a presence, and is 'attained' only by making obstructions absent. Non-arising and non-ceasing (*anutpāda-anirodha*), it cannot be produced by any means.

[3] The most important condition for Yogācāra is the *ālambana-pratyaya*, the 'objective-condition condition', to translate the Chinese literally. The *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* initially defines this condition thus:[152]

> The ālambana condition means if there exists a dharma,[153] [it will have such-and-such] an appearance;[154] the mind will sometimes correspond with it (*hsiang-ying*), [such that it will] be cognized and perceptually-grasped.[155]

Again we see the *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* assigning some responsibility for the characteristics of a cognition to a seemingly autonomous dharma or objective-condition. If a dharma exists, it will have its own certain style of

appearance, its own ākāra. If the mind happens to correspond with it (*saprayukta*), that ākāra will be cognized and grasped. Technically, this would be limited to the five types of saprayukta caittas (see appendix). The dharma itself, apparently, is not cognized directly, but is perceptually grasped in terms of its 'appearance' (*ākāra, tai–hsiang,* cf. n. 154). K'uei–chi points out that *hsiang*, which usually stands for *lakṣaṇa* or *nimitta* (images, forms), here stands for the thing–itself (*t'i–hsiang* 體相) and not its image (*hsiang–hsiang* 相象).[156]

> When the correct knowledge is born (*samyagjñāna*), it 'adheres strictly' to tathatā's nature itself.[157] [This knowledge] is neither identical to tathatā, nor is it different.

This means that correct knowledge reveals things as–they–are, though inasmuch as this disclosure is a 'knowledge', it remains to some extent representational – and hence neither identical nor different from the things themselves as they are in themselves. Although the closure has been undone, one still sees things (*sākāra–vāda*). Of course, tathatā is never considered by Yogācāra to be an actual thing, much less an ontological entity. It is, according to the *Ch'eng wei–shih lun,* merely a prajñapti for correct cognition, i.e., a way to characterize authentically seeing things just–as–they–are.

There are two types of ālambana conditions:

(1) the immediate–direct (*sākṣāt, ch'in* 親 , lit: 'intimate, familially related'), and

(2) the remote (*shu* 疏 , lit: 'estranged').

What distinguishes them?

The text gives the following definitions:[158]

> If [what is] given to the cognizor[159] is itself (*t'i*) not separated from it, [i.e., it is] internally cognized and perceptually–grasped[160] as being of the darśana–bhāga (*chien–fen*), [nimitta–bhāga], etc., that you should know is the immediate–direct ālambana.
>
> If [what is] given to the cognizor is itself separated from it (i.e., the cognizor), [i.e., it is] internally cognized and perceptually–grasped

> such that it is considered to have arisen from a hyle,[161] that you should know is the remote ālambana.

In other words, if what is perceived is exhaustively and transparently given through the lived-body (darśana-bhāga) and perceptual-field (nimitta-bhāga), then the ālambana is 'immediate'. If the thing-in-itself is not exhaustively given, but seems to have arisen from a hyle, then the ālambana is remote. What is this hyle?

> Chih 質 means[162]
>
> matter, as opposed to [ch'i, vital force or breath]. Substance, or elements of which anything is composed; stuff; material; constitution. Disposition. Solid; real, as opposed to [wen, fictitious]. To confront; to call to witness.

It is the basic, solid, non-fictitious *stuff* of which things are made. Thus it would seem that the *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* is affirming some sort of material stuff, 'remote' (if not 'external') to the consciousness which perceives it indirectly, at a distance. The translation 'archetype' offered by Vallée Poussin and repeated by Tat would appear to be a deliberate and deceptive effort to preserve an idealist reading by suppressing or altering all textual contrary evidence. But it is not that simple.

The Sanskrit term most likely being rendered by *chih* is *bimba*.[163] *Bimba* means[164] 'the disc of the sun or the moon,' i.e., source-light and reflected light in round, orb form; 'an image, shadow, reflected or represented form, picture, type; a chameleon.' *Bimba-pratibimba* signifies an "object of comparison and that with which it is compared," an 'original and counterfeit,' etc. *Bimbita* means "mirrored back, reflected;" and *bimbinī* means "the pupil of the eye." *Chih* and *bimba* do not overtly overlap semantically, except in their secondary meanings: each has a secondary sense of 'contrasting, confronting, standing over against.'

Putting aside this secondary correlation, which is subliminal at best, why did Hsüan-tsang choose *chih* to translate *bimba?* Was he intentionally attempting to address the idealistic misreading?

The distinction drawn between the immediate and the remote ālambanas comes very close to the distinction drawn by Kant, Hegel, Sartre, et al., between the in-itself and the for-others. Cognition involves the appropriation of 'cognitive objects' by my consciousness. These objects, as appropriated, are 'for-me'; the other's ālaya-vijñāna, for instance, is known by me but not directly. I neither think his/her thoughts as s/he does, nor does my will move his/her body or set up his/her cognitive life. There is inevitably something about the other's mind that remains remote, opaque to me, no matter how clearly I discern his/her mental workings or how deeply I understand him/her. That aspect or aspects of the other's mind which remain remote from me – I don't perceive the world through his/her body, etc. – are the hyle or that person's mind in-itself. What I observe, always partially colored and filtered by the latent 'seeds' that predispose me to cognize my experience as I do, is that aspect of the other's mind that is for-me. But this does not only concern the problem of other minds. Even as I look into my own mind, the same dichotomy arises: there are aspects even of my own mind which remain opaque, which act as hyles, which are in-themselves, which are *chih*. The hyle is the in-itself of what is for-me. Like Husserl's hyle, this 'substance' is not matter in the materialist sense, but rather a cognitive substance, a 'stuff' out of which noemata are constructed. Its ontological status is indeterminable. We will see in a moment how the *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* describes the interaction of these 'conditions'.

The text continues:[165]

All cognizors (*neng-yüan*) have an immediate-direct ālambana

> pratyaya, since they necessarily could not arise apart from [something being] internally cognized and perceptually-grasped [i.e., consciousness is always consciousness of; without an immediate perceptual-object, no cognizor arises].
>
> Some cognizors have a remote ālambana pratyaya, since they do arise apart from [something being] externally cognized and perceptually-grasped [e.g., past or future dharmas, etc.]

Cognition constantly, by definition, involves an inner cognitive sensibility. A cognition ***may or may not have an actual corresponding remote object.*** According to Yogācāra only the present is real. If I am cognizing something immediately present before me, such as another person and his/her mind, then that which I am observing is, inasmuch as I do perceive him/her, for-me (and thus immediate); while inasmuch or to the degree that he/she remains opaque to my gaze he/she is in-itself (and thus remote). Past and future dharmas, on the other hand, are imaginative constructions, mentally produced fabrications which are ***not*** remote objects, but sheer prajñaptic fictions. The ***Ch'eng wei-shih lun*** has displaced the notion of externality with 'remoteness', a remoteness which hinges on an inscrutability, an in-itself-ness.

But the text quickly shows that the key point in the distinction does not revolve around internal vs. external. Some hold the opinion, it states, that the ālaya-vijñāna only has immediate-direct ālambana pratyaya, i.e., experience is entirely subjectively produced through the force of [one's own] karmic causes. Others hold the opinion that it may also have remote ālambana pratyaya, such as when changes (***pien***) in or by another act as a hyle initiating changes within oneself. The text then declares[166]

> There is an opinion which says that both [previous theories] fail to accord with reason. Self and other, (lived) body and (perceptual) field[167] are able to mutually experience each other, since the other's alterations are regarded by one's self as a hyle [and vice versa].
>
> Since reason [indicates] that the other is not experiencing one's

> own seeds, to consider the other's alterations as [an enactment of one's own seeds] does not accord with reason. All sentient beings do not have the same or equal seeds.
>
> One should say concerning this case (of whether the ālaya-vijñāna has) remote ālambana pratyaya, at all stages (whether an ignorant slug or an enlightened Buddha) whether there is or there is not (a remote ālambana pratyaya) is indeterminate.

Hsüan-tsang has brought us into the vicinity of Merleau-Ponty's intentional arc. Though my lived-body can perceive you in my perceptual field, and you likewise can perceive me in your perceptual field, we don't become the same person simply by virtue of sharing reciprocal intentionalities. We can cognize each other, just as one hand can touch the other. More importantly, we can communicate with each other. But I will always be an in-itself for you, while you will be the in-itself for me. And though we may share common intentionalities, there is always a disjunction between us. You are never simply a projection of my 'seeds', nor am I entirely your projection. As I am for you will in part be shaped by your seeds – what you are predisposed to notice, whatever biases, prejudices, or positive expectations you may project onto me, etc. I will inevitably do the same when I perceive you. My seeds are my own, just as yours are your own. Each of us has acquired, utilized, exhausted, nourished, buried, planted, etc. countless seeds, and, for Yogācāra, individuality is defined for the most part by the economic status of one's seeds.

Whether remote 'things' exist is indeterminate; which could mean either that it is indeterminate because it is sometimes the case and sometimes not (the text implies but does not explicitly announce this reading), thus leaving one the task of making the determination for each distinct situation; or, it could mean that the very status of remote conditions is itself indeterminate. As the reader may have noticed, the ***Ch'eng wei-shih lun*** assiduously avoids defining the

ontological status of ālambana or 'remote' objects.

The text then looks at the remaining seven consciousnesses in terms of remote ālambana. Manas, the seventh, prior to the āśraya–paravṛtti, the turning over of that upon which one stands, always has a remote ālambana pratyaya (condition) since it must have an external hyle. Since the manas appropriates the activity of the ālaya–vijñāna as its 'self' (***ātman***), and then clings to that self as its object, and the self is never an 'immediate' cognitive object (because it is merely nominal), the manas is always attached to a remote object. After the āśraya–paravṛtti the remote ālambana (i.e., the ***ātman***) no longer exists. "When tathatā is the [cognitive] condition, there is no external hyle." Again, tathatā is not a thing or entity, but a descriptive term for the activity of cognizing things just–as–they–are. Hence, when we cognize things just as they are, nothing any longer remains opaque. 'Things' are transparent, the in–itself is penetrated, and the opposition between in–itself and for–others no longer applies.

The mano–vijñāna in all stages (from the lowest to Buddhahood; i.e., both before and after the āśraya–paravṛtti)

> operates freely, autonomously (***tzu–tsai*** 自在), and it is sometimes confronted, sometimes not confronted by an external hyle. Whether it does or doesn't have a remote ālambana is indeterminate.
> The five sensory consciousnesses, prior to the āśraya–paravṛtti are crude and gross, and so they must be confronted with an external hyle, and so are determined to have remote ālambana conditions. After the āśraya–paravṛtti stage, it is not definite [when they do and when they don't] have [a remote ālambana], since if the [cognitive] condition is, for example, a past or future [dharma], then they are without an external hyle.

[4] The fourth pratyaya is the ***adhipati–pratyaya*** which is basically a miscellaneous category for whatever conditioned occurrences were left uncovered by the other three. In fact, this grouping is all inclusive and subsumes the other three, and whatever else might be conceivable.[168]

Clearly the most important of the four 'conditions' for our discussion is the ālambana pratyaya. In a later section the following list is given:[169]

> The vikalpas (discriminations) by sentient beings toward each other can be ālambana– and/or adhipati–pratyaya, but not samanantara–pratyaya.

A samanantara–pratyaya involves *immediate* succession of cause by effect in occuring in *virtually* the same temporal and spatial locus. Occuring in an instant, it must remain within each single distinct consciousness stream; I don't have your memories, nor am I suddenly experiencing through your body and you through mine, etc., therefore we don't share this pratyaya. The hetu–pratyaya is not associated with vikalpa at all; it only concerns actual efficient causes, not their products.

> Within a single person the eight consciousnesses between themselves are adhipati–pratyaya. They may or may not be ālambana–pratyaya.

Then a detailed list is offered:

1– the ālaya–vijñāna is the ālambana of the other seven consciousness.
2– the seven are *not* the ālambana of the eighth, since they are not the hyle on which the eighth is based. (cf. 5)
3– the seventh is the ālambana of the sixth, but not the other five.
4– the first six are *not* the ālambana of the seventh.
5– the sixth is not the ālambana of the five, since the five consciousnesses perceptually–grasp (*t'o* 託) only the eighth's *nimitta*. (i.e., the hyle of the five senses are the nimitta of the eighth consciousness, and not external things; while the ālaya–vijñāna is the five's ālambana, they are not its ālambana; cf. 2)
6– the five are the ālambana of the sixth.

Before leaping to conclusions about the apparent inconsistency over the hyle – i.e., earlier the text said that when I perceive another mind as a hyle the other is not reducible to seeds in my own ālaya–vijñāna, while here it seems to be saying that the other would have to be a product of my own ālaya – an important contextual distinction must be taken into account. Previously the text was

describing the basis on which the other is perceived. In the present context the text is describing (1) how one's own eight consciousnesses relate to each other, not their relation to whatever is other than themselves, and more importantly, (2) the context here is vikalpa, not accurate cognition or hetu-pratyaya. Vikalpa, in relation to perceiving the other, precisely means *not* perceiving the other, but being distracted by my own vikalpic projections, i.e., my ālayic seeds. This description is of the closured operation of the eight consciousnesses, not their 'dis-closured' operation.[170]

> The causes and effects of vikalpa are fully established by reason and scripture to conditionally arise mutually between and within the consciousnesses. Being attached to external conditions and then claiming that they exist is useless. [Since] this contradicts both reason and scripture, why would you wish to remain attached to such an opinion?

VI – Mirror Knowing: Soteric Alterations

What function does the mirror model play in Yogācāra thought? We saw above that it is used to explain ordinary cognition. But Yogācāra is a soteric phenomenology, which means that it does not merely describe in order to describe. Description, for them, carries soteric significance. While Husserl, for instance, certainly hoped that his phenomenological method would provide benefits beyond mere description, such as giving a firm philosophical foundation to the 'groundless' European *Wissenschaften,* he does not go so far as to claim that description itself is transformative, or, what would amount to its descriptive corollary, that by means of perfecting the descriptive method that which is described, *viz.* consciousness, would become so radically altered that an entirely new description – perhaps even a new method – would be required. But Husserl's reticence in this regard is symptomatic of Western thought as a whole.[171] The

line between descriptive and prescriptive discourse, between describing what is and prescribing what ought to be, is frequently blurred in practice. But that blurring is never theoretically justified.[172] Put in Kantian terms, the 'pure' and the 'practical' styles of reason remain largely incommensurate, and the 'aesthetic' remains enigmatic.[173]

How does Yogācāra overcome or circumvent this incommensurability? Their phenomenological description is of *alterity:* The alterations of consciousness in terms of its appropriation of cognitive objects, the alterations in projectories as consciousness restructures itself, what alters and is altered as consciousness disassembles and reassembles its habit-projectories (*vāsanā-santāna*), the karmic alterations switching projectorial tracks (tracts, traits, traces) as kuśala and akuśala linkages conditionally displace and substitute for each other, etc. All this is grounded on the radical alterity of consciousness itself, i.e., the absence of an abiding, persistent, unchanging self, which is to say, it (never) rests on a consciousness which is always becoming other than itself, which always *is* other than itself. Alterity is the cognitive counterpart to the doctrinal notion 'impermanence' and the existential horizon of 'death' and personal limits. The upacāras *ātman* and *dharma* are responses to and symptoms of a denial and rejection of impermanence, death and limitation. Yogācāra, as a product of the privileging of the cognitive dimension, tackles the source of this futile denial in cognitive terms. Thus, its description and analysis focus on consciousness and cognition, and it identifies the root problematic as distinctly cognitive: *jñeyāvaraṇa* (obstruction of the knowable). To know clearly, fully, precisely, exactly, without hindrance or obstruction is *buddhi* (awakening, enlightenment, clear intellect).

The alterity of consciousness is, according to Yogācāra, not an

endlessly repeated structure that remains structurally identical while only functionally changing. Its very structure, lacking a self = essence = invariant structure = ***ātman*** = ***svabhāva*** = permanent identity, alters radically, and it is this radical alterity which both causes saṃsāra to be experienced as duḥkha and which provides the conditions that allow consciousness to so change as to no longer either be 'consciousness' or duḥkhic. Nāgārjuna's already indicated this in his ***Mūla Madhyamaka Kārikā***, 25:9:

> ***Ya ājanam-javī-bhāva upādāya pratītya vā,***
> ***so 'pratītyānupādāya nirvāṇam upadiṣyate.***

> That which is the rushing in and out [of existence] when dependent or conditioned,
> this, when not dependent or not conditioned, is taught to be ***nirvāṇa***.[174]

Yogācāra develops an elaborate vocabulary to describe the alterity between rushing in and out of existence conditionally and doing so without conditions (i.e., without appropriational intent). They call the climactic alteration ***āśraya-parāvṛtti***, the overturning of the basis on which one stands, the upheaval of the (false) under-standing.[175] Buddhism is the concerted effort to bring the trajectory of alterities under control (*fu* 伏 , ***viṣkambhana***) in order to fundamentally and decisively extinguish (*tuan* 斷 , ***prahāṇa***) projectorial (i.e., teleological) conditioning.[176]

The *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* lists ten types of tathatā (*chen-ju*)[177] and bases its further discussion on them. They are:

(1) Ubiquitously active tathatā (*p'ien-hsing chen-ju* 徧行眞如). This tathatā is so-called because it is disclosed by the two śūnyatās (of ātman-dharma), such that not a single dharma [anywhere] is excluded.
(2) Most excellent tathatā (*tsui-sheng chen-ju* 最勝眞如). this tathatā is so-called because of all the unlimited [excellent] qualities in all dharmas, it is considered the most excellent.
(3) Excellent flow tathatā (*sheng-liu che-ju* 勝流眞如). This

tathatā is so-called because flowing through the teaching of dharma, [compared to] everything else in the dharma teachings, it is considered the supremely excellent.

(4) Not-categorized by cognitively-reductions tathatā (*wu-she-shou chen-ju* 無攝受眞如). This tathatā is so-called because it is not tied to any category;[178] the self doesn't appropriate it nor may it be grasped.

(5) Without separate classes tathatā (*lei wu-pieh chen-ju* 類無別眞如). This tathatā is so-called because classes are not differentiated, unlike eyes, etc., which have different classes.[179]

(6) Without defilement or purity tathatā (*wu-jan-ching chen-ju* 無染淨眞如). This tathatā is so-called because its original nature is without defilement and so it can't be said that afterwards it has been purified.

(7) The Dharmas non-separated tathatā (*fa-wu-pieh chen-ju* 法無別眞如). This tathatā is so-called because although there are many teachings and Dharmas proliferating and being established, yet they are not different.

(8) Not increasing or decreasing tathatā (*pu-tseng-chien chen-ju* 不增減眞如). This tathatā is so-called because it is detached from the appropriational [economy of] increase and decrease, i.e., it doesn't follow the increasing and decreasing of purity or defilement. This [tathatā] is also called 'the tathatā on which depends mastery of (cognitive) characteristics and (perceptual) fields'.[180] This means that once this tathatā is realized and attained, perceiving/projecting (*hsien*) characteristics and perceiving/projecting fields is completely mastered.

(9) That on which depends mastery of wisdom tathatā (*chih tzu-tsai so-yi chen-ju* 智自在所依眞如), which means if you have already realized and attained this tathatā, you have already attained mastery of unhindered understanding.[181]

(10) That on which depends masteries of Karma (actions) tathatā (*yeh tzu-tsai-teng so-yi chen-ju* 業自在等所依眞如). Once you've realized and attained this tathatā, then all the abhijñās are enacted, as are the dhāraṇāmukhas and samādhimukhas; they are all mastered.

Although already in the first bhūmi one can 'see through' all of them,[182] and yet one's ability to realize and practice it has not yet been fully developed. So that in order to progressively fully develop [complete insight, these ten tathatās], are asserted and established.

These ten tathatās are respectively associated with the ten bhūmis, such that in the eighth bhūmi, for instance, the eighth tathatā is realized, and so on.

Immediately the text introduces six types of āśraya-paravṛtti. It is the sixth which is most important, and K'uei-chi claims that it is this type which the *Triṃśikā* discusses.[183] The text says:[184]

> 6. Vipula-paravṛtti (*kuang-ta chuan* 廣大轉) 'Broad or extensive overturning', which is the Mahāyāna stage. [Unlike the Hinayānists, who strive for exactly the opposite] the great Bodhisattvas act for the benefit of others, neither detesting nor delighting in either life-and-death (i.e, saṃsāra) or nirvāṇa. They are able to fully penetrate and see through the two emptinesses (self and dharmas) [which disclose] tathatā [though the Hinayānist only comprehends self-emptiness]. They utterly cut off the seeds of the jñeyāvaraṇa [the source of both āvaraṇas], and suddenly realize *anuttara* [*samyak sam-*] *bodhi* (unexcelled, correct complete Awakening) and nirvāṇa. They have the excellent profound abilities [to perform any upāya anywhere], and so this is called the 'broad or extensive overturning.'

The *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* then distinguishes four components of the āśraya-paravṛtti, discussing each in turn. They are (1) The method (*mārga, tao*) which turns [the basis] around; (2) The basis which is turned; (3) what is cut off in the turning; and (4) what is attained in the turning. We will now turn to the fourth component.[185]

The fourth is divided into two parts: (1) what is disclosed, uncovered by the turning, and (2) what arises from the turning. What is disclosed is *mahāparinirvāṇa*, which is further subdivided. All we need note here is:[186]

> What's termed 'attaining nirvāṇa,' since it depends on tathatā and is detached from the obstructions and prajñaptis, its 'body' (*t'i*) is always already the pristinely pure dharma-dhātu.

The dharma-dhātu, though sometimes presented through descriptive mystifications, simply and solely means the experiential realm cleansed of prajñaptic misconceptions. It is *this* world perceived directly and immediately just as it is (*yathabhūtam*). Thus nirvāṇa is a prajñapti for clear perception.

'What arises from the turning' is *mahābodhi*, great Bodhi.[187] This

arises from latent seeds which had been prevented from blossoming by the āvaraṇas. These are the Four Knowledges (*jñāna, chih* 智) characteristic in the Yogācāra system of an enlightened one.

Vi–jñāna is converted into *jñāna,* which is to say that 'dis–tinguishing, dis–criminating, dis–cerning' (*shih*) loses its dichotomous, bifurcational nature (the *vi–*) – the dualism here is not simply any and all duality in a vague sense, but specifically the appropriational dichotomy between grasper and grasped, *grāhakā–grāhya,* noesis and noema. Knowing, cognizing becomes immediate, direct – hence the absence of 'remote ālambana. The eight consciousnesses which so far constituted the full extent of Yogācāric phenomenological description are suddenly 'overturned', and displaced by four jñānas.[188]

> (1) The Great Perfect Mirror Knowledge, (*ta yüan ching chih* 大圓鏡智 , *mahādarśajñāna*) associated with the mind (*samprayukta citta–varga*). Separated from discriminations (vikalpa), its ālambana and ākāra are very subtle, difficult to know, [and yet] it doesn't forget, doesn't mis–take the characteristics of any perceptual–object.[189] Its nature and characteristics are pristinely pure, detached from mixed up defilements... [it is] able to project/perceive and able to produce lived–bodies and perceptual–fields, knowing their reflections (*ying* 影 , *pratibimba*)... like a great mirror projecting/perceiving rūpas and pratibimba (material things and their reflections, *se hsiang* 色像).[190]

The most important part of this description might easily be overlooked. That which the mirror reflects is not simply projected mental phantasms... it is *rūpa* ! "Lived–bodies, perceptual–fields, he knows their reflections." Does Yogācāra actually confirm *rūpa* to be 'real'? In an earlier section while determining which of the three (non–) self–natures were 'real' and which only nominal, the *Ch'eng wei–shih lun* says:[191]

> Mind (citta), mental–associates (caittas) and *rūpa,* since they arise from conditions, are considered to be *real existents* (*wei shih yu*). If there were no real dharmas, there would be no prajñaptic dharmas

> either, since the prajñaptic (*chia* 假) depends on a real cause, viz. prajñapti (*shih-she* 施設).

Thus rūpa, because it operates causally, is real. The mirror, as Chuang Tzu already wrote, is both all-embracing and detached:[192]

> The Perfect Man uses his mind like a mirror – going after nothing, welcoming nothing, responding but not storing. Therefore he can win out over things and not hurt himself.

Neither welcoming, anticipating things as they approach, nor pining or running after things when they leave, the mirror simply reflects things accurately and without prejudice or partiality. It 'responds but doesn't store'. The ālaya-vijñāna is also named the 'storage-consciousness' or 'warehouse-consciousness' (*tsang-shih*) because it stores the seeds. To respond without storing, the ālaya-vijñāna must be cut off, the seeds – whether advantageous or disadvantageous – must be exhausted, extinguished; then the mirror-wisdom blooms. The mirror reflects things just as they are. The ***Ch'eng wei-shih lun*** says:[193]

> If, after the birth of Vajropamasamādhi, there no longer exists a perfumable eighth consciousness (the Vipākavijñāna), and if pure dharmas no longer grow and increase, the Bodhisattva has attained Buddhahood. The four Wisdoms will then be in manifestation.

This is the terminus of the progressional path, the culmination of the method, where one "has done what was to be done."

The eight consciousnesses are listed as the first eight dharmas on the list of one hundred dharmas (see appendix). They, and all the dharmas which follow up until the ninety-sixth dharma, are ***saṃskṛta-dharma,*** conditioned dharmas. Since, as Nāgāruna stated, nirvāṇa – i.e., seeing things as they are – means the "rushing in and out [of existence] when... not dependent and not conditioned," the ālaya-vijñāna (***saṃskṛta***) and nirvāṇa (***asaṃskṛta***) are mutually

exclusive. Hence the *Triṃśikā* (A:v.5, B:v.4) says that the ālaya-vijñāna must be cut off (*she*).

To be free of the determination of seeds (in Yogācāric language) means to overcome historical conditioning, to dissolve each and every layer of sedimentation, of embodied history (in phenomenological language). The ālaya-vijñāna is the 'repository-consciousness' (*tsang-shih*) which 'accumulates and stores (*cīyate*) and attaches to (*ālīyante, grāhya-grāhaka, abhiniveśa*)' experience. Its 'repositoriness' signifies the manner in which it is thoroughly pervaded by attachment. Mirror knowledge is its antithesis. Clinging to nothing, it reflects the present as it is, and owes to history only the structure of its constitution; a structure which has been rendered transparent.

Does this jñāna have the same ālambana as the ālaya-vijñāna? The text says:[194]

> When its (cognitive) condition is tathatā, it is nirvikalpa; when its (cognitive) conditions are other perceptual-objects (*viṣaya*), it is grouped with *pṛṣṭhalabdha jñāna* (post-Awakening knowledge); its *t'i* is one, but it is divided into two according to functions. Since [even when] discerning the mundane (*liao-su, vijñapti-saṃvṛti* ?), [this knowing does so] due to having realized tathatā, it is considered [Knowledge] 'After [Complete Awakening] was Attained' (*pṛṣṭhalabdha jñāna,* i.e., post-Awakening knowledge).

The same type of argument is made for the other three jñānas, which are:

(1) *p'ing-teng-hsing chih* 平等性智, *samatā jñāna* (sameness or equalizing knowledge)

(2) *miao-kuan-ch'a* 妙觀察智, *pratyavekṣaṇā jñāna* (wondrous exploring knowledge)

(3) *ch'eng so-tso chih* 成所作智, *kṛtyānuṣṭhāna jñāna* (accomplishing what's to be done knowledge).

Manas becomes the Equalizing Knowledge, i.e., rather than cling to self (*ātma-dṛṣṭi*, etc.), carving up the world into opposing values of me and you, us and them, etc., the equalizing knowledge sees the same emptiness of self and dharma in all things, in oneself as well as in others. Mano-vijñāna becomes the Wondrous Exploring or Investigative Knowledge, i.e, rather than compart-mentalize the world into grasping and graspable entities, as does the mano-vijñāna, this investigative knowledge explores everything in their particularites (*svalakṣaṇa*), devoid of attachment. The five sense-consciousnesses become the knowledge which accomplishes what needs to be done. Even the fully Awakened being acts in the world. Hence the *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* rejects any theories which place either these knowledges or their objects entirely outside the saṃvṛti world. As grounded in tathatā, they are paramārthic; as grounded in saṃvṛti viṣaya, they are pṛṣṭhalabdha-jñāna .

If the overturned consciousnesses as knowledges, ways of knowing, now perceive reality as it is, what is real? Are saṃskṛta dharmas real? Asaṃskṛta dharmas? Tathatā? Citta?

VII – What is Real

Early in the *Ch'eng wei-shih lun,* while reviewing and critiquing the seventy-five dharma system of the Sarvāstivādins (see appendix), some definitive statements are made. The Sarvāstivādins propose to define ***saṃskṛta-dharma*** as a dharma whose essence (***svabhāva***) consists of the four marks (***lakṣaṇa***) of all conditioned things: arising, abiding, decaying, ceasing; and that these marks are thus ***svabhāvic,*** i.e., the essential factor or essence of saṃskṛta. The ***Ch'eng wei-shih lun*** refutes these claims and then says:[196]

Saṃskṛta-dharmas (*yu-wei-fa*), because of the power of causes

and conditions, are originally inexistent (***pen–wu*** 本無), now existent (***chin–yu*** 今無), briefly existent (***chan–yu*** 暫有), and then once again inexistent (***hai–wu*** 還無). [In order to] indicate (***piao*** 表 , vijñapti?) their difference from asaṃskṛta (dharmas, which are not affected by causes and conditions), the four marks are nominally established.

The stage of existence (***yu–wei*** 有位) [from] originally inexistent [to] now existent is termed 'arising.' The stage of arising briefly settling for an instant[196] is termed 'abiding.' While abiding [the dharma] is distinguished from what precedes and follows it (or: its previous and subsequent conditions; i.e., it is ***changing***), and so again it is given a different name [namely, decaying, or 'briefly existing']. Briefly existing, then once again inexistent: When it becomes (again) inexistent, that is termed 'cessation.'

Since the first three are existents, they involve the identity of presence (or, abide in the present);[197] since the last one is inexistent, it abides in the past.

Dharmas, then, are what come in and out of existence, as Nāgārjuna wrote (***ājanaṃ–javī–bhāva upādāya pratītya***). The four marks are nominal labels. The text continues:[198]

'Arising' indicates (***piao***) there is a dharma that previously didn't exist. 'Cessation' indicates there is a dharma that subsequently is inexistent. 'Decay' (in Chinese, lit: 'difference') indicates that this dharma does not congeal.[199] 'Abiding' indicates this dharma briefly exists and functions.

Hence these four marks of conditioned dharmas are simply terms for indication (***ming–piao***); and yet they may indicate different [things]. They may be the nominal four marks of a ***kṣaṇika*** (moment), or for any length of temporal duration nominally established.

First [coming into] existence is termed 'arising.' Subsequent inexistence is termed 'cessation.' The mark of having already arisen and appearing to be sequentially continuous (***saṃbandha***) is termed 'abiding.' And precisely the alterity (***chuan–pien***) of the sequential continuity is termed 'difference' [i.e., 'decay'].

To be 'conditionally real' means to appear durationally (even for an instant) in a conditioned series which at its core perpetually self–deconstructs, whose only consistent 'identity' is ***alterity***. Impermanence, non–self and duḥkha, the three marks of all conditioned things according to the earliest Buddhist texts,

all converge into this one 'characteristic.' Alterity means impermanence; it means no univocal self; it means the radical absence of the least shred of stability and security either in oneself or in the world, and hence *duḥkha*. Alterity is the play of radical difference; and it is 'deteriorative' or productive of 'decay' only to the extent that one possesses the expectation that there exist stable entities and identities such that any sign of instability is a sign of decay; that change itself *is* decadence. Buddhism, properly understood, can abide no conservatism, since there is nothing stable to hold and conserve. At best one may manipulate projectories, but only in order to radically open them up to their own history, their own conditioning.

But some conditioned dharmas are not even real in a conditional sense. The Sarvātivādin next tries to argue that *nāma–pada–vyañjana* (name, sentence, utterance) are independently real substances (*dravya*). The *Ch'eng wei–shih lun* refutes this. In response to a proof text offered by the Sarvātivādin, the *Ch'eng wei–shih lun* responds "this Sūtra doesn't say that different from *rūpa, citta, caittas,* there exists a real [thing] called *nāma,* etc".[200] Notice that rūpa is included here in the accepted group of real things, alongside citta and caittas. The *Ch'eng wei–shih lun* repeats this phrase continuously.[201]

But while accepting rūpa per se, the *Ch'eng wei–shih lun* insists on redefining it.[202] As phenomenologists, the Yogācārins insist that the only rūpa of which we can speak is phenomenological rūpa, which is to say, rūpa that occurs within consciousness. What we perceive *as* rūpa is actually alterations within our perceptual stream, as was noted in the example above on touching a table. Rūpa is admitted; its *externality* is denied. This is a phenomenological reduction, not a metaphysical claim. The distinction between these may be illustrated by returning to the debate between the Sarvāstivādins and the *Ch'eng wei–shih lun*.

There ensues a vigorous debate concerning where in a speech act meaning resides, the Sarvāstivādin trying to locate it in the names, sentences and utterances themselves, and the ***Ch'eng wei-shih lun*** arguing that such theories undermine language's ability to connote, to imply reference.[203]

> If names, sentences and utterances are real existents (***shih-yu***) different from sound (***sheng*** 聲), then they would be like rūpa, etc., [i.e., the referent itself] and not something real (***shih***) which connotes (***ch'üan*** 詮) [something else, viz. a meaning].
> [If, on the other hand] sound is able to produce names, sentences and utterances, then this sound must have tones and rhymes, such as ***ch'ü*** 屈 (bend, oppress) and ***ch'ü*** 曲 (crooked, perverse).

The sense of the last phrase seems to be: A linguistic sound must be different from mere noise; it must have certain characteristics: (1) tone – Mandarin Chinese has four (or five) tones which are crucial for reducing the otherwise impossibly confusing homophonic possibilities created by a language of monosyllabic words; Sanskrit has tones as well (***svara***), i.e., high, middle, low.; (2) rhyming tones, which I take as a set up for the following two characters. ***Ch'ü ch'ü*** on the one hand are homophonic (both uttered in the first tone), and form a compound implying bent or crooked (their shared connotation). But the second term may also be pronounced in the third tone, thus receiving ***a different meaning,*** namely 'songs, ballads', again reinforcing the sense of ***vocal*** intonation and 'rhyming.' The point being made is that meaning is related by and to the human voice (***vāc, yü*** 語).[204]

The argument seems to be: If meaning is found in sounds themselves, then already sound is connotative, evoking and indicating something other than itself. This would make the so-called 'realities' – names, sentences, and utterances – superfluous.[205]

> Since these [sounds already] are sufficient to connote [meanings], of what use are names, etc.?

> If you say that the sounds mentioned above, i.e., tones and rhymes, such as *ch'ü* and *ch'ü*, precisely are the real entities (*shih-yu*) 'names, sentences and utterances' that are different from sound, [this is like saying that] the rūpa (= form = color) which is seen [of the aforementioned, i.e., the visible] physical forms (*hsing* 形) immediately-cognized as bent and crooked, would be different from their rūpic locus, and have their own separate real body (*pieh yu shih t'i* 別有實體).

This displacive ontological proliferation of real 'entities' over and above what is actually experienced is, of course, precisely the problem which Yogācāra seeks to eliminate.

> If you say that the sounds mentioned above, i.e., tones and rhymes, such as *ch'ü* and *ch'ü*, are like the sounds of stringed or reed instruments,[206] which are unable to connote [linguistic meanings], then like those [instrumental] sounds, these would not produce distinct names, etc.

The argument continues, until the text finally insists that meaning must come from the human voice, from human discourse (*vāc*, *yü* = discourse, language, words). Meaning does not reside in distinct, separate entities called 'names, sentences,' etc. Discourse and connotation are inseparable. "Humans and devas universally discern [this to be the case]."[207]

The text then advances the 'correct view'.

> Depending on discursive sounds (*yü sheng*), distinct contexts (*wei* 位 , lit: stages, seats) are differentiated (*ch'a-pieh*) and name-, sentence- and utterance-bodies are prajñaptically established and asserted. 'Names' connote self-nature (*svabhāva*); 'sentences' connote differentiations (*ch'a-pieh*); 'utterances' precisely are the words (*tzu* 字 , usually indicating a *written word*!) on which the other two are supported. Although these three have no 'body' (*t'i*) apart from sound, yet [in terms of] prajñapti they are really different, not the same as sound.

In the connotative sphere they are 'really' different from sound, though they are not different from sound in any 'real' way. Discourse, of course, is one of the three modes of karma (activities of body, discourse and thought). But does the

Ch'eng wei-shih lun understand sound, which is the root of discourse, to be rūpic? Yes, but in the modified sense of rūpa discussed above, i.e., as never separate from consciousness.

Earlier the text critiqued the Sarvāstivādin notion of rūpa. They claim two types of rūpa, (1) rūpa which gives resistance (*pratigha-rūpa, yu-tui* 有對) and (2) non-resistant rūpa (*apratigha-rūpa, wu-tui* 無對). The first is denied by the *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* because it depends on some sort of atomic theory and the *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* points out some of the logical incoherencies of those theories.[208] Then the rūpic theories of other schools are likewise critiqued.[209]

The Sarvāstivādin's non-resistant rūpa is then discussed.[210] It is of two kinds: *vijñapti-rūpa* and *avijñapti-rūpa*. In this part of the text Hsüan-tsang uses *piao* (indication) to translate *vijñapti*. The first is again subdivided into two: bodily vijñapti-rūpa and vocal vijñapti-rūpa. Avijñapti-rūpa is likewise doubled. For Yogācāra these activities - which are rūpic *and* karmic for the Sarvāstivādins - can only be non-rūpic, since they *are* karmic. Vijñapti-rūpa is said to be gestural activity which indicates or conveys its meaning from one person to another. Avijñapti-rūpa is non-indicative, it does not convey its sense. When, for instance one pretends to befriend someone, giving every indication by word and bodily gesture that one is a friend, while in actuality disliking and plotting against that person, the 'intent' which is not gesturally transmitted is *avijñapti-rūpa*. The earlier texts usually discussed these special rūpas in terms of ritual or confession. When one does a certain rite, for instance, the assembly has no way of knowing what sort of intention or mindfulness the actor is performing the rite with. The action itself, they thought, might have karmic consequences. This would be the singular case of a non-intersubjective

karmic act. Such speculation led to all sorts of theoretical 'actions' which were rūpic, and not cognitive.

The ***Ch'eng wei-shih lun*** says:[211]

> The yoga masters,[212] using a prajñaptic conceptual wisdom (*yi chia hsiang hui* 以假想慧),[213] [thought about] the characteristics of gross rūpa, and gradually, progressively divided and split it (*ch'u hsi* 除析) until it could no longer be divided – [this indivisible unit they gave] the upacāra 'the smallest' (lit. 'supremely tiniest,' i.e., atom, *t'ai-wei* 太微). Although this 'smallest' refers to something that has been methodically divided (*feng fen* 方分) until it could no longer be divided, if [you try to] split it further, then all you would see is empty [space], so that it could no longer be considered rūpa. Hence what is called 'the smallest' is rūpa's final limit.[214] Due to this you should know that the rūpas which resist are all perceived/projected (*hsien*) alterations of consciousness (*shih-pien*), and not [actually] achieved 'smallest' units.

This tiniest atom, in other words, is a mental construct devised by a method that draws short of reaching its logical conclusion – emptiness. The 'limit' is a conceptual limit, not a physical limit divorced from the cognitive methodology that produced it. Pushed to its extreme, the method would undermine that which it seeks to establish. In order to ground rūpa in an indivisible unit, that unit must be asserted via a paring down of physical forms to that beyond which they can no longer be divided. That limit itself is only another cognitive construct, so that the atom is deconstructed by the very process through which it is conceived. If a point lacks magnitude, then it is useless as a building block for three dimensional objects. If it has magnitude, it can be further subdivided, since it would necessarily still have distinct parts (top, bottom, one side, the other side, etc.).

> As for what's left, the non-resistant rūpa, [either] it is the same sort of thing [as the resistant rūpa], and thus not a real existent (*fei shih yu*), or it is like the citta and caittas, and hence definitely not really rūpa (*fei shih se*).

We needn't rehearse the full series of arguments here. As might be expected,

they ūill attempt to demonstrate that ūhat passes tor vijñapti– and avijñapti–rūpa are actually strictly mental or cognitive activities (karma). It is mind which synthesizes, which unites discrete moments and things and labels them 'continuous', related, etc. A physical gesture has ***meaning*** only for consciousness. This kind of rūpa ***is caused*** by the mind; but it is precisely the karmic (= intentional) characteristic of this rūpa which so qualifies it, not the metaphysical creativity of a mind.[215]

> [Bodily vijñapti–rūpa should not be considered caused by rūpic conditions, such as the āyatanas, etc.] but rather mind (citta) should be considered the cause. Now as consciousness is altered, the hand, etc., characterized as rūpa arises and ceases in a sequential, continuous series (***saṃbandha***), turning about (***chuan***) agreeably in the space around it, appearing to have movement and activity. Since [what has synthesized temporal sequence, causal sequence, spatial continuity, foreground–background, what has motivated the hand, etc., what has interpreted and collected discrete particular events and given them a durational meaning] indicates and reveals the mind [at work], the term 'bodily indication' (***kāya–vijñapti***) is [only] a prajñapti.

A little later, after refuting both types of rūpa, the ***Ch'eng wei–shih lun*** makes its point explicit:[216]

> [The opponent objects]: The Bhagavat (World–Honored One) says in the sūtras that there are three [types of] karma. You deny the bodily and linguistic karma [while accepting only mental karma]. How can you contradict the sūtras?
>
> We don't deny them, or claim they don't exist. We only say that they are not rūpic. The volition (***cetanā***) which moves the body is what is called bodily karma; the volition which produces speech (***vāc***) is what is called speech karma; the two volitions 'judgement' and 'decision', since they are associated with intention (***yi*** 意), and since they activate and move intention, are called intentional (mental) karma.

Yogācāra reaffirms that karma is intentional, volitional. What moves the body is motive; what produces speech is intent. What synthesizes sounds into meaningful units is always mind. Phenomenologically, the region of meaning always already is inscribed within sedimented structures, i.e., seeds and 'perfumings', and

experience *qua* experience is the conscious discerning of distinctions *qua* meanings.

Does Yogācāra posit some 'true' reality, something transcendental or 'otherwise' than the paratantric conditional (*saṃskṛta*) realm of historical embodiment? What, for them, is *asaṃskṛta* ?

VIII – Is What Is Ultimately Real Itself Ultimately Real?

What are real dharmas? The *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* says:[217]

> The claim that there are unconditioned dharmas apart from rūpa, citta and [the caittas], which are definite real existents, is not supported by reason. There are three types of dharmas determined to exist:
>
> (1) dharmas known through direct perception, such as rūpa, citta, etc.[218]
>
> (2) dharmas whose functions are enjoyed through direct perception. such as pitchers and clothes.
>
> The whole world universally knows that these two types of dharmas exist; they don't need to be established by reason.
>
> (3) dharmas that actively function, such as the eye, ear, etc.; due to their functioning, one realizes and knows that they exist.

For instance, even though the eye can not see itself, the sheer fact that one can see at all demonstrates that one has eyes. This knowledge is inferential, but still directly tied to immediate experience. Thus we see, that even though explicitly the *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* treats scripture and reasoning as the basic pramāṇas, when determining which dharmas are real, perception and inference alone count.

Empirical 'reality' is accepted, not denied. What *is* denied is any claim that we *know* of it or that it exists *for us* anywhere else than *within* consciousness. Empirical 'laws', commonality, causal relations, etc., are all mental constructs, ways of 'knowing.'

> Unconditioned dharmas are not universally known by the whole world as definitely existing, since they lack active functions like the eye, ear, etc. If [one could prove or demonstrate] they had a function, [this action would arise and cease within a temporal sequence, and thus]

> they would have to be impermanent. Hence [the view] that unconditioned dharmas definitely exist cannot be held. However, since the nature of unconditioned dharmas is known, and since that nature is sometimes revealed by rūpa, citta, etc., like rūpa, citta, etc., one shouldn't hold the opinion that apart from rūpa, citta, etc., [there are] unconditioned dharma.

The unconditioned dharmas are non-empirical, by definition, and hence, since the criterion of reality is the ability of a dharma to discharge its efficient causality, they cannot be real. The text then turns to each of the dharmas professed to be unconditioned, such as ***ākāśa*** (spatiality), etc. (see appendix for the seventy-five and one hundred dharma lists of unconditioned dharmas).[219]

> The sūtras say that "the unconditioned dharmas, such as ***ākāśa***, etc., exist."
>
> Generally there are two types:
>
> (1) Depending on alterations of consciousness (***shih-pieh***) they are prajñaptis which one assumes exists. [For instance] one has heard the terms ***ākāśa***, etc., and subsequently one [imaginatively] discriminates (vikalpa) the characteristics of ***ākāśa***. Because the power of these ruminations becomes habitual, the mind, etc., at some point, produces what appears to be ākāśa, etc., projecting/perceiving (***hsien***) the [learned] 'unconditioned' characteristics. Since the projected/perceived characteristics appear without alterity (i.e., they don't change), they are prajñaptically labelled 'permanent' (***ch'ang***).
>
> (2) Depending on dharma-nature (***dharmatā***), they are prajñaptis which one assumes to exist. Tathatā is disclosed by emptiness [of dharmas] and no-self. [This tathatā] is neither existent nor inexistent. The paths of mind and language are cut off; it is neither the same nor different from all dharmas, etc. It is the true principle of dharmas, and so it is called ***dharmatā***.

The Five Saṃskṛta Dharmas are then explained in terms of what they prajñaptically signify.

> Since it is apart from obstructions and obstacles, it is called 'spatiality' (***ākāśa***).
>
> Due to the power of ***pratisaṃkhyā*** (deep understanding), the cessation of confusion and impurity [or heterogenous defilements] is ultimately realized and acquired, and hence it is called ***pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha*** (cessation through understanding).

> [If tathatā] is disclosed, not due to the power of understanding, but because of the absence of any [obstructive] conditions [to block] the pristinely pure original nature, this is termed ***apratisamkhyā-nirodha*** (cessation without understanding).
>
> Since the feelings of pain and pleasure (***duḥkha*** and ***sukha***) cease, it is termed ***āniñjya*** (unperturbed, lit: 'non-moving').
>
> Since ***saṃjñā*** and ***vedanā*** don't operate, it is termed ***saṃjñāvedanā-nirodha*** (cessation of associative-thinking and pain-pleasure).
>
> These five (unconditioned dharmas) are all prajñaptis established in dependence on tathatā; and tathatā also is a prajñaptic name.

This passage is crucial. Tathatā it turns out, is also prajñapti.

Before we pointed out that the ***Ch'eng wei-shih lun*** utilizes an opposition between 'real' (***shih, dravya***) and 'nominal' (***chia*** [***-shih***], ***prajñapti***). Does this mean that tathatā is non-existent, or unreal? Not exactly. The term *is* a prajñapti, but it serves an upāyic soteric function.

> To refute the claim that it is inexistent, it is said to be considered 'existent.'
>
> To refute attachment to its being considered existent, it is said to be considered 'empty.'
>
> So that it won't be called vacuous or illusory, it is said to be considered 'real' (***shih***).
>
> Since reason neither falsifies nor contradicts it, it is termed '***chen-ju***' (lit: 'true-like'; ***tathatā***).
>
> We are not the same as the other schools (who claim) that apart from rūpa, citta, etc. [i.e., the caittas], there exists a real, permanent dharma called by the name of 'tathatā. Instead, [we say] the unconditioned dharmas definitely are not real existents.

In case one became confused by the seeming vacillation indicative of the middle way – to fully affirm or deny would be extreme – the text has reiterated the basic fact: tathatā and the other so-called unconditioned dharmas are linguistic fictions. They can be conjured either by having once heard about them, and then letting one's mind and imagination flesh out the ideas, developing those impressions into actual 'perceptions', i.e, a kind of wish-fulfillment; or by 'disclosing' the dharma-nature which is neither identical to nor different from

actual dharmas. Like tathatā, dharmatā is a prajñaptic device, not an 'ultimate reality.'

> ...To oppose false attachment [to the view that] external to citta and caittas there are real existent perceptual-objects (*ching, viṣaya*), we say that only consciousness exists (*wei yu shih*). If you attach to "only consciousness" as something truly real and existent, that is like being attached to external sense-objects, i.e., just another dharma-attachment.

Tathatā is not a 'real thing, nor is vijñāna/vijñapti. Emptiness is posited as an antidote to attachment; and 'consciousness-only' is charged with the same function.

Psychosophic closure can not be reified. The closure undergoes erasure; the obstructions become transparent. Descriptive discourse crosses over into prescriptive discourse not because of an imperative or imperialistic insistence. Language is brought to its own margins, its own dislocations. The description itself plays the dance of language, it enacts the appropriational urge without which words would fail to seek a referent. The grasper-grasped is exposed immediately and ubiquitously in every moment of cognitive apprehension; the 'given' loses its innocence and is exposed as the 'taken'; the appropriational economy is everywhere revealed for what it is: a consciousness which 'hangs onto' (*ālambana*) whatever it can. Consciousness discerns sense-objects, cognitively embraces them, and then 'dwells' on them.

First externality is challenged. The external is not ontologically significant, i.e., it is not actually external *to* me; it is external *for* me, to define my limits, such that I congeal myself appropriationally.

The very end of the text repeats the salient points one final time:

> The word 'only' (*mātra, wei*) refutes externality, but it doesn't deny the perceptual-fields within...

It is consciousness-only and not 'perceptual-object-only' because consciousness cannot be externalized, whereas objects not only can, but often are. To return us to our own experience, to the intentionality that connects us with our world, to bring us to understand precisely what cognition is, how it functions, and how to smash the closure which narcissistically traps us in our own consciousness, so that we reflect the world like a mirror, rather than our own anxieties and predilections; to uncover and strip away the presuppositions which blind us; for these reasons Yogācāra has offered a phenomenological system for self-analysis. The details of that system, such as the interplay of the various caittas, etc., the antidotal application of the three non-self-natures, have been suggested but far from exhaustively expounded here.

> There are those foolish ones; deluded, they attach to perceptual-objects. Karmic mental-disturbances (*kleśa*) arise, and the [foolish ones] are engulfed and drowned in the [cycle of] birth and death (i.e., saṃsāra). Not understanding contemplating mind (*kuan-hsin* 觀心), who seeks to transcend and detach from it? Out of a deep inner sympathy for those [who suffer thus], the words '*vijñapti-mātra* are expounded, so that you may contemplate your own mind (*tzu kuan hsin*) and be liberated from saṃsāra.

NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE

1 – His *Triṃśikā-vijñapti-bhāṣya* was rediscovered in Nepal in 1922 by Sylvain Lévi, who published it in 1925. The *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* at the end confirms that the original title of Vasubandhu's text was *Triṃśikā-vijñapti* but scholars have fallen into the habit of referring to the text as *Vijñapti-mātratā*. Leslie Kawamura translated Sthiramati's commentary for his Master's Thesis at Kyoto University, 1964, and was kind enough to lend me temporarily both this translation and his Doctoral dissertation, a translation of Vinītadeva's commentary on the *Triṃśikā*. They have been very helpful. See bibliography for published versions and translations.

2 – The label 'idealism' is too vague to be meaningful. It can include *everything* other than materialism. It is the metaphysical idealism of the Bradleyan or Vedāntic kind that I find particularly inappropriate.

3 – Whether this Maitreya is a real person (= human), or a nirmāṇa-kāya manifestation that 'inspired' Asaṅga in some less than (or more than, depending on your perspective) in-the-flesh manner is still argued by scholars. No position on that will be taken here.

4 – The mixing of the two streams already begins in such texts as the Laṅkāvatāra, but Paramārtha and the translators of his day introduced such a strong version of the blend, that it eventually became fundamental for East Asian Buddhism. Part of Fa-tsang's rejection of Hsüan-tsang, and thus the Hua-yen critique of so-called *fa-hsiang* revolves around the absence of tathāgata-garbha in their system.

5 – We will argue later that this text may have assumed its present importance *after* Hsüan-tsang's death; that Hsüan-tsang's successor K'uei-chi gave the text its exemplary value. Cf. Chapter Five.

6 – See previous note.

7 – *The Idea of Phenomenology*, tr. by William Alston and George Nakhnikian (Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), p. 1.

8 – He says it is preferable to 'psyche' because the latter may include or allude to aspects of consciousness which are non-intentional. *Ideas*, tr. by W.R. Boyce Gibson (NY: Collier Books, 1962), Sec. 85, p. 230.

9 – This is a difficult characterization in part because Husserl claims that objectivity itself is noetically constituted.

10 – Ricouer, discussing *Ideas II,* writes:

> At this point in our analysis, the question of the "reality" of the psyche is raised again. If the unformed hyle is the localizable face of consciousness, then is not the whole unity to be found on the side of the body-thing that, somehow, is the place of implantation for this strange reverse side of consciousness? We find once more that [we come to] the problem of the quasi-reality of the psychic... with the resources of a new analysis of the localized psyche.
>
> Husserl presents the problem in the following terms: "How is the content of sensation linked to the constituted thing, and how does the body, which is a material thing, have the contents of sensations in and of itself (*in und auf sich*)?" (II, p. 154). This way of putting the question is striking. The problem is to know what the attribution of psychic qualities to the body understood as a thing signifies. [This is] a question of taking up the physicalistic understanding of the body in order to attribute sensations to it. In what sense does the body have the property of sensing? In what sense does sensibility belong to the body? Thus, the possibility of psycho-physics and psycho-physiology is in question and not the situating of an irreducible existential experience.

In other words, one's own consciousness alone does not solipsistically construct the world. Hence the question arises as to how what is other than consciousness, e.g., the physical body, becomes involved in the conscious, sensorial world. Posed as such, the question is of course very Cartesian. Ricouer continues:

> ...Husserl... considers the psycho-physical problem of the concomitant variations of a series of mechanical stimuli and of a series of localized tactile sensations. The example presupposes that the thing perceived is grasped on the most objective level, since the "stimulus" in terms of physics is related to the body as a field of sensations. Under this condition a relation of dependence is instituted between "states" and "circumstances," which is, as we know, the essential thing for objective thought. And since the field of localized sensations is always occupied by sensations, the variations of the stimulus bring about variations of "states," a permanent "property" of being-affected. Thus, "sensoriality (*Empfindsamkeit*) is constituted entirely as a 'conditioned' or psycho-physical property" (II, p. 155).
>
> Thus, to perceive a body as a thing is also "to co-apprehend" (*Mit-auffassung*) its sensoriality, for certain sensorial fields belong to this body-thing. This belonging is not an existential phenomenon external to the series of appearances but rather is an application of the relation of dependence (*wenn-so*)... Hence, Husserl sees no opposition between the body as a thing and the body as lived through.

> To understand and animate body is to grasp a... concrete unity in respect to which the physical and the aesthetic are only abstractions.

Paul Ricouer, *Husserl: An Analysis of His Phenomenology,* tr. by Edward Ballard and Lester Embree (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967), pp. 62–63. This leads to the problem of intersubjectivity, where the problem of the hyle is now displaced by the problem of knowing another person. Broached in *Ideas I,* expanded in *Ideas II,* deepened in the Fifth of the *Cartesian Meditations* and opened to all of history in *The Crisis of European Sciences,* intersubjectivity becomes pivotal to phenomenological thinking.

11 – *Ibid.,* p. 9.

12 – He reiterates the same basic themes, in greater detail in *Ideas I.* Cf. especially sec. 85.

13 – *Ideas, ibid.,* p. 226.

14 – *Ibid.,* p. 230.

15 – Robert C. Solomon, "Husserl's Concept of the Noema," in *Husserl: Expositions and Appraisals,* eds. Frederick Elliston and Peter McCormick (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977), p. 170.

16 – The references Solomon directs us to as support for his contention are secondary sources, not Husserl's own texts. His note reads:

> See Gurwitsch, "On the Intentionality of Consciousness," in *Studies [in Phenomenology and Psychology* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966]; A. Lingis, "Hyletic Data," in *Analecta Husserliana* (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel, 1972), 2: 96–103...

and he concludes with a reference to Frege's "On Sense and Reference." *Ibid.,* p. 180 n. 23.

17 – Izchak Miller, *Husserl: Perception & Temporal Awareness* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984), p. 135.

18 – "Structure and Genesis in Husserl's Phenomenology," in *Husserl: Expositions and Appraisals,* p. 57.

19 – Cf. *Ideas I,* sec. 85; *ibid.,* esp. pp. 226–227.

20 – How that which we don't intend *intrudes* on us is discussed at great length by Paul Ricoeur in his *Freedom and Nature* (lit: The Voluntary and

the Involuntary, or the Willing and the Unwilling), which will be briefly discussed in Chapter Two below. Izchak Miller, *op. cit.*, p. 136, associates 'impinging' with the noema, pointing out that at any moment a vast array of 'objects' may be impinging, although we don't perceive them all as objects; i.e., some are background while we gestalt others. But cf. p. 129 where Miller characterizes hyle as "constraints," and pp. 52–53, where he characterizes it as an imposition that, e.g., limits my cognition by making a certain object feel smooth, even if I anticipated it would be rough, or vice versa. Thus it in principle serves the function of empirically impelling one to revise one's beliefs and theories. Miller states:

> Reasonable as is its role, the notion of hyle is a component of Husserl's account of perception which is most difficult to accommodate within that theory...

21 – "Structure and Genesis...", *op. cit.*

22 – *Ibid.*, p. 68 n. 13.

23 – Already in his earliest work, *Philosophy of Arithmetic,* he rejected the Platonic interpretation of numbers and mathematical entities as existents or essences apart from experience; for Husserl, mathematical truths are *constructed,* not eternal verities. This is, however, another thorny area where Husserlian scholars lock horns. Husserl attempted to avoid both the extreme of platonism and its opposing extreme of psychologism. Logicists and platonists accused him of psychologism, and psychologistics accused him of logicism and 'realistic platonism.' This is not the place to explore this problem. Cf. J.N. Mohanty's *Husserl & Frege* (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1982), esp. ch 2; Also Emmanuel Levinas, *The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology,* tr. by André Orianne (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), esp. ch. 6.

24 – Published posthumously as *Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution,* in *Husserliana IV,* ed. Walter Biemel (Hague, 1952).

25 – Levinas, *op. cit.*, p. 150f.

26 – Levinas is undoubtedly the leading phenomenological ethicist. His works have not yet received sufficient attention in the States, but this may change. His *Totality and Infinity: an Essay on Exteriority,* tr. by Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969) "distinguish[es] between the idea of totality and the idea of infinity, and affirm[s] the philosophical primacy of the idea of infinity" (p. 26). Subjectivity is presented "as welcoming the Other, as hospitality" (p. 27). While Heidegger only initially saw things ready-at-hand,

Levinas sees the self as embedded in an alien world.

> But the world as I originally experience it is not a logical system [of objective impartial relations]... in which no term takes precedence over the rest. My primary experience is definitely biased and egocentric. I take precedence over the various objects I find around me, and in so far as my experience is normal, I learn to manipulate and control them to my advantage, either as a member of a group which I identify with myself or simply as myself alone. In general, these objects are at my disposal, and I am free to play with them, live on them, and to enjoy them at my pleasure.
>
> Levinas finds that this primordial experience of enjoyment (*jouissance*) has been neglected by Heidegger and other phenomenologists. (p. 12, from John Wild's introduction).

It could be the source of enjoyment of the other, but it is also the root of abuse, oppression, war and exploitation. Thus his book is about how to relate to the other. The theme is continued and expanded in *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence,* tr. by A. Lingis (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981).

27 – *The Theory of Intuition...,* p. 151.

28 – Levinas cites *Ideas I* secs. 29, 45, 48, 49, 66; and "Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft," in *Logos,* I (1910), p. 313 – translated by Quentin Lauer, in *Edmund Husserl: Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy* (NY: Harper & Row, 1965), p. 108.

29 – In the light of this summary of Husserl's notion of intersubjectivity, Wild's remarks in his introduction to Levinas' *Totality and Infinity* are pertinent:

> The other person as he comes before me in a face to face encounter is not an *alter ego,* another self with different properties and accidents but in all essential respects like me. This may be the expression of an optimistic hope from a self-centered point of view which is often verified. The other may, indeed, turn out to be, on the surface at least, merely an analogue of myself. But not necessarily! I may find him to be inhabiting a world that is basically other than mine and to be essentially different from me....
>
> ...these traditional theories are one-sidedly egocentric and reductive. None of them does justice to the other as I meet him for the first time in his strangeness face to face. I see this countenance before me nude and bare. He is present in the flesh. But as Levinas points out in his revealing description, there is also a sense of distance and even absence in his questioning glance.... Of course, I may simply

treat him as a different version of myself, or, if I have the power, place him under my categories and use him for my purposes. But this means reducing him to what he is not. How can I coexist with him and still leave his otherness intact? (p. 13)

30 – Paul Ricouer, *Husserl: An Analysis of His Phenomenology, op. cit.,* Ch. 3.

31 – *Ibid.,* p. 46f.

32 – In Buddhist thought Vasubandhu's follower, Dignāga, honed this epistemology and its logic into a finely tuned instrument. In the West, Derrida challenged Husserl's moment of presence by deconstructing it into its *différance,* its alterity. As I will argue in Chapter Five, Yogācāra will ultimately also deconstruct the present into a flow of alterity.

33 – Yogācāra and the *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* correctly argue that color is not a property inhering in a thing, but a contribution of the mind to perception. Locke argued similarly in his distinction of primary and secondary qualities. Modern empirical studies have shown that there is no one-to-one correspondence between light frequencies and the perception of specific colors, and that colors *are* codings of visual data which happen in the brain, not in the things. The first chapter of Merleau-Ponty's *Phenomenology of Perception* argues the case well, and physical studies done since only further confirm the empirical research he cites.

34 – *Phenomenology of Perception,* tr. by Colin Smith (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), p. 135f. In this chapter my discussion of Merleau-Ponty will be confined to statements found in this text. However, recognizing that this early text was not his final word, that many of the notions introduced there, such as the tacit cogito and the body image, were later radically reshaped or abandoned, and that later notions, such as the chiasm and 'wild ontology,' redefine the scope and application of earlier concepts, the use of Merleau-Ponty in the following chapters will treat his work from this 'revised' reading.

35 – He cites Hochheimer, [*Analyse eines Seelenblinden von der Sprache,*] p. 69. No other publication data is given.

36 – He gives this note: "Cf. Fischer, *Raum-Zeitstruktur und Denkstörung in der Schizophrenie,* p. 250." His bibliography offers the following data: "Ztschr. f. d. ges. Neurologie und Psychiatrie, 1930."

37 – *Op. cit.*, p. 299.

38 – *Ibid.*, p. 322.

39 – *Ibid.*, p. 327.

40 – *Ibid.*, pp. 344f.

41 – He is alluding to the Hegelian notion of authentic self as coincidence of the self with the self, which Hegel deems possible, and yet defers to the end of history (implying it is not yet achievable).

42 – *Ibid.*, p. 398.

43 – *Ibid.*, p. 451.

44 – Hsüan-tsang wrote a text while in India on the non-difference of Madhyamaka and Yogācāra, which unfortunately is no longer extant. However, the ***Ch'eng wei-shih lun*** provides some clues to some of his probable lines of argument. I hope to devote a separate essay to that issue.

45 – The ***Ch'eng wei-shih lun*** explicitly states that all ***kleśa*** (fundamental mental disturbances) come under the rubric of ***upadāna*** (appropriation) in the ***pratītya-samutpāda*** model. Ch'üan 8, p. 11A (see Chapter Five for bibiiog. details); In Wei Tat's edition, p. 594.

NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO

1 – This is a recapitulation of what is traditionally called the Four Noble Truths, which constitute the cornerstone of Buddhism, viz.: 1– ***duḥkha*** , 2– its cause, 3– its extinction, and 4– the method.

2 – The two–Vasubandhu theory is ludicrous, and arises from historical and chronological discrepancies between secondary sources (such as Paramārtha's biography of Vasubandhu) rather than a serious reading of the primary texts themselves. Textually it seems clear to me that Vasubandhu undergoes precisely the type of evolution of thinking that one would expect from someone starting in Sarvāstivādin thought, moving through Sautrāntika and finally settling in Yogācāra. Two quick examples: (1) Vasubandhu's 'Mahāyānic' works are as concerned with Abhidharmic categories as is the ***Abhidarmakośa***. His works exibit a progressional unfolding. His ***Pañcaskandha prakāraṇa*** deals with a dharma list that is somewhere between the seventy–five list (the ***kośa*** list) and the hundred list (the doctrinal Yogācāric account); and the same could be said for the ***Triṃśikā*** (though the ***Ch'eng Wei–shih lun*** attempts to account for both lists). His ***One–hundred Dharma Treatise*** gives the mature account. (2) The ***Triṃśikā*** mentions ***arhats*** but not ***bodhisattvas***, indicating, at the least, that Vasubandhu was still thinking in 'pre–Mahāyānic' categories while writing it. Though A. K. Warder, Amar Singh and their followers have remained steadfast in their insistence that we should sharply distinguish between two Vasubandhus, Frauwallner, the most important voice originally arguing for two Vasubandhus has recanted, and now accepts that there was only one.

3 – As this chapter was written, I was only aware of one dissertation which attempted to treat a term discussed in this chapter. James M^cDermott's ***Developments in the Early Buddhist Concept of Kamma/Karma*** (Princeton, 1970), though it only covers up to the ***Abhidharmakośa***, has nonetheless proved helpful. Recently I have discovered Paul Griffith's dissertation, reworked and published as ***On Being Mindless: Buddhist Meditation and the Mind–body Problem*** (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1987), which addresses in the issue of the absence and reemergence of citta in nirodha–samāpatti. The range of texts he examines together with his philosophical approach make this an important contribution, though some of his assertions and conclusions are less than satisfactory (e.g., equating nirodha–samāpatti with 'catalepsy', or presuming and subsequently reading in a form of the mind–body problem which seems inappropriate for Buddhist thought, etc.). Griffith's book certainly moves the examination and discussion of these issues into a new and welcome arena.

4 – This does not mean that other models could not serve the same function. I have selected these four because (a) they are all basic Buddhist models, utilized by all Buddhist schools (though different schools may interpret

them differently), (b) these four models are distinctly Buddhist in that they are exclusively associated with Buddhism, whereas many of the other familiar Buddhist doctrines are shared by non–Buddhist schools (e.g., *dukkha* and *kleśa* are also main features in Sāṃkhya thought, etc.), (c) these four not only overlap with each other, but overlap with virtually every other model common to all the schools, and hence, by extension, may be taken to connote the vast range of other Buddhist models, (d) these four, either explicitly or implicitly, underpin the Abhidharmic project upon which Yogācāra is built, and (e) taken together they can be made to generate the full range of Buddhist philosophical, psychological, existential, linguistic, cognitive, ethical, cosmological, and disciplinary–pedagogic (i.e., practice) observations or theories through which Buddhism has constructed itself.

5 – Since the Sanskrit terms are generally more familiar to English readers than their Pāli equivalents (e.g. *karma* instead of *kamma*, or *nirvāṇa* instead of *nibbāna*) general discussion will use the Sanskrit terms *except* (1) when citing or quoting a Pāli text, (2) when the context demands a distinction be drawn between Pāli and Sanskrit usage (e.g., when comparing or contrasting how different texts define terms), and (3) during the first major occurance of a term in this text, if its Pāli form is pertinent that will be given in parenthesis, prefixed with 'P.' ; ex: *kleśa* (P. *kilesa*). If the Pāli term occurs first, the Sanskrit will be given in parenthesis; ex.: *dhamma* (S. *dharma*). Also it should be pointed out that several Sanskrit and/or Pāli terms will be used throughout the text in anglicized adjectival forms, such as 'karmic', 'svabhāvic', etc.

Two more points about the use of Sanskrit and/or Pāli terms and concepts should be noted: (1) for clarity, some terms which grammatically should be compounded will be given in non–compounded form to enable the English reader to quickly identify the respective terms (e.g., *kleśa–āvaraṇa* instead of *kleśāvaraṇa*), unless a specific text or context is being cited or invoked which requires the compound; (2) varying translations or equivalents will be used interchangeably to emphasize the semantic spread of some terms (e.g., see how *sparśa, saṃskāra* and *prajñapti* are treated in this section). Since Sanskrit notions and terms so stubbornly resist being reduced to English equivalents this becomes necessary. Insistence on strict one–to–one correspondences is not only unfeasible, but when attempted often leads to erroneous and nonsensical English expositions, as for instance A. K. Warder's use of "principle" for *dharma* throughout his *Indian Buddhism*.

6 – This chapter aims at demonstrating the validity of this claim for this, as well as the other three models to be treated here. While the presentation just given of the skandhas emphasized the psychological aspects, the description of *pratītya–samutpāda* which follows will begin to open the discussion into a more philosophic discourse. This should not be understood as implying that one model is more philosophical or more psychological than the other. Either model

could be presented in either a philosophic or psychological discourse exclusively (as well as within other discoursive realms, e.g., devotional, cosmological, etc.). As a result of the Renaissance and reinforced by Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Liberalism, Western thought has advocated and insisted upon a sharp distinction between 'philosophy' *qua Wissenschaften* (the hard and soft sciences) and its supposed nemesis 'religion' ("that irrational bundle of superstitions").

Similarly a line has been drawn, particularly by the modern Analytic tradition following Frege's rejection of *psychologism*, between 'psychology' and what they like to think of as 'philosophy proper' (see n. 22 below). Despite whatever political or ideological purposes such a distinction may serve today, blind adherence to it can distort our view of non-Western or pre-Renaissance thought, where no such demarcation between philosophy and psychology is countenanced. In modern philosophy this almost irrational fear of psychology has forced an otherwise usually clear-headed discipline into avoiding having to deal head-on with the most fundamental epistemological issues, seemingly out of fear that such investigations may border on psychology. Even exemplary rationalist efforts, such as the later books of Spinoza's *Ethics*, are today typically viewed as "weak" because they indulge in psychological categories.

Whatever their current status, for Indian thought, particularly Buddhist thought, philosophy and psychology are deemed inseparable. To mark this inseparability, highlighting both the logical rigor needed to do proper psychology while maintaining awareness of the psychological aspects at play in philosophizing, I have coined the term *Psychosophy*. This word has the advantage of eliminating the *logos* from psycho–*logy* and sedates the rapturous hyperbole of the *philo*– in philo–sophy. The de–theologizing aspect (exclusion of *logos*) of this term is completely appropriate within the Buddhist context. While Yogācāra is perhaps the psychosophic system *sine qua non*, no doubt many other traditions, Western as well as Eastern, could be more adequately interpreted through this term.

For a good overview of the skandhas in the early Pāli texts, one which takes issue with labeling them "psycho–physical", see Rupert Gethin's "The Five Khandhas: Their Treatment in the Nikāyas and Early Abhidhamma," *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, 14 (1986) pp. 35–53, and the sources cited there. This article will be cited near the end of this chapter.

7 – The most common traditional account of Buddha's Awakening claims that it occurred at night, and describes three sequential insights which respectively occupied the three 'watches' of the night (i.e., three hour periods, roughly corresponding to 9–12 p.m., 12–3 a.m., and 3–6 a.m.). In the first watch he saw his own karmic continuity, i.e., all his previous lives, actions, thoughts, etc., the interaction of one action with another, and how all these had led him to this particular moment. In the second watch his insight extended to the past and future actions and conditions of all sentient beings, how each and every situation arises due to previous actions and conditions and how this subsequently conditions the arising of further actions. In other words, he 'saw' the principle of

karma, not as a universalistic 'principle', but in or as its particular operations. In the third watch he observed ***pratītya–samutpāda***, which held the key to unraveling karmic bondage (i.e., ***duḥkha***). He achieved Awakening (***bodhi***) just as the dawn broke.

That the elements of this story are so mythologically perfect has led some scholars to question its authenticity. These doubts are buttressed by the occurance in the Pāli ***suttas*** of significantly different versions of Buddha's Awakening, which vary on such things as the relevance of its relation to conditioned co–arising, some concurring with the above version of the story and others contradicting it, though many of these accounts are supposed to represent Buddha's own words (there are also second–hand accounts by his contemporaries). See D. M. Williams, "The ***Paṭiccasamuppāda***: A Developed Formula", ***Religious Studies***, 14, March 1978, pp. 35–56, esp. pp. 38–40, for a discussion of some of these variants. Also see the excellent study by Étienne Lamotte, "Conditioned Co–production and Supreme Enlightenment", in ***Buddhist Studies in Honor of Walpola Rahula*** (London: Gordon Frazer) 1980, pp. 118–132. We need not here go further into the question of the authenticity of this story. For our purposes it should be sufficient to point out that this tripartite knowledge is also found repeated in other contexts, and hence probably represents an early tradition of what, for Buddhists, was both fundamental and ***unique*** to Buddhism in their own eyes. For instance, the ***Tevijja–vacchagotta sutta*** in ***Majjhima Nikāya*** I has Buddha deny the claim that he is omniscient, that rather he possesses three kinds of special knowledge (***tevijja***), viz. (1) When he wishes, he can look back into all his past lives and see who and what he was, the situations he had been in, etc., (2) when he wishes, he can see the past, present and future lives of all beings, their dispositions, if they are happy or sad, and the conditions which produce those dispositions, etc., and (3) he knows the means of cutting off the ***āsavas*** ('outflows', 'cankers', 'festering karmic predilections') and ***āvaraṇas*** (cognitive and conative obstructions), he has already done this, and 'knows how to enter therein' (i.e., into the condition devoid of ***āsavas*** and ***āvaraṇas***). Here cutting off the ***āsavas***, etc., may be taken as a synonym for understanding conditioned co–arising. However, see ***Majjhima Nikāya*** I, 21–22 for perhaps a different implication. We will return to this when discussing the ***tri–dhātu*** model.

8 – The Pāli texts contain formulations which omit certain ***nidānas***, and there are also instances in which terms not part of the standard list are included (e.g., ***āsavas, papañca,*** etc.) On this, see Conze, ***Buddhist Thought in India***, pp. 156–158; D. M. Williams, "The ***Paṭiccasamuppāda*** : A Developed Formula", ***op. cit.***, pp. 35–56; also see Takeuchi Yoshinori, ***The Heart of Buddhism,*** esp. pp. 63–126, for a recent attempt to philosophically investigate these discrepancies, utilizing not only a close reading of the texts but also ideas culled from Kant, Husserl, Heidegger and other European thinkers. It should also be noted that as schismatic disputes developed, almost any "typical" Buddhist position drew counterpositions, all of which had their adherents and schools. The

Kathā vatthu and ***Abhidharmakośa*** with their commentaries are just two of the better known compendiums of these disputes. This plurality of positions should be kept in mind while reading the following exposition of ***pratītya–samutpāda***. Many of the positions given here have their Buddhist opponents. I am interested in giving a sense of the issues with which Yogācāra was concerned, though the exposition is not confined to their position alone, nor does it present their position fully.

9 – We will shortly offer a description which accords with the ***Abhidharmakośa*** and general Yogācāra theory. Also cf. n. 33, below.

10 – For the other ***āvaraṇa***, i.e., ***kleśa–āvaraṇa,*** see the description of the eighth ***nidāna*** below. The theory of two ***āvaraṇas*** is a later innovation, thoroughly entrenched by the time the Yogācāra school emerges. In the earlier texts, such as the Pāli ***Suttas*** and ***Abhidhamma,*** more often a list of ***five āvaraṇas*** (***pañcanīvaraṇā***) is encountered, though, by most accounts, these are usually confronted and overcome early in one's practice, rather than signifying the culmination of practice. Gunaratana gives the following description of the ***pañcanīvaraṇā***:

> The five hindrances (***pañcanīvaraṇā***) are sensual desire, ill will, sloth and torpor, restlessness and worry, and doubt....They receive the name "hindrances" because they hinder and ***envelop*** the mind....
> (***The Path of Serenity and Insight,*** pp. 28f; emphasis added)

They 'enclose' or effect mental ***closure***. Cf. the notion of ***saṃvṛti*** (enclosure) to be discussed in the next chapter. This list of five later becomes part of the dispute between the 75 dharma scheme of the ***Abhidharmakośa*** and the 100 dharma scheme of Yogācāra, i.e., whether to classify them as ***kleśa dharma, aniyata dharma,*** etc. See appendices for those respective lists. We will broach this issue again later.

11 – As we will see, in the Pāli Abhidhamma the term ***cetanā*** (volition or motivation) is frequently substituted for ***saṃskāra***. In Mahāyāna, this collapsing of saṃskāric strata is perhaps most evident in the writings of Vasubandhu (who subsumes it under the rubric of 'appropriation', ***upādāna***) and Candrakīrti (who sees these strata as similar expressions of prapañcic anxieties, i.e., as psycho–linguistic projections attempting to mask duḥkhic dis–ease). For both Vasubandhu as a Yogācārin and Candrakīrti as a Mādhyamikan, ***saṃskāra*** is merely a nominalistic method of describing the basic psycho–cognitive disorders which characterize human existence. Vasubandhu calls these basic disorders ***vijñapti*** while Candrakīrti calls them ***prapañca*** (cf., e.g. Candrakīrti's ***Prasannapadā*** for ***kārikā*** 18.9 where he defines ***prapañca*** as ***vāk*** 'discourse' and ***vikalpa*** as ***citta–pracāra*** 'the play–ground of thought').

Probably precisely because ***saṃskāra*** is a nominalistic recounting of

subconscious operations of consciousness, Vasubandhu in his *Triṃśikā* -- the core text behind the *Ch'eng wei-shih lun*, translated and examined below in Chapter Four -- chose to bypass listing or describing the *saṃskāras* usually included in the Yogācāric list of 100 dharmas. This list is given below as Appendix B. After describing how consciousness operates (*vipāka, pariṇāma, pravṛtti*, etc.) a separate discussion of *saṃskāra* would have been redundant. Perhaps the text that most explicitly collapses these categories is the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*; cf., e.g., sagātakam section, vs. 683 and 718.

12 – *Kāya* (body) is, in Buddhism, a larger notion than *nāma-rūpa*, since there are bodies entirely independent of *rūpa*, such as the *mano-maya-kāya* (body produced by mind). Also see Rupert Gethin's "The Five Khandhas. . ." cited in n. 6.

13 – The notion of senses actively *intending* or constituting (or even 'constructing') objects became virtually axiomatic for many Indian schools, not only Sāṃkhya and Buddhism. It can even be found as late as Svapneśvara's commentary (18th century ?) to Śāṇḍilya's *Bhakti-sūtra* ; see Cowell's translation, ch. 1, p. 4 and n. 3 (*Bibliotheca Indica*, v 84, 1981, W. German rpt of the 1878 Calcutta ed.)

14 – *Prapañca* is often used in both Pāli and Mādhyamika texts to signify the root problematic, the erasure of which constitutes the elimination of duḥkhic ensnarement. Yogācāra also uses this term, though its use there is not as prominent as in these two other schools. See below Chapter Five, note 82, for a translation of a passage from the *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* which uses the term *prapañca*. Also see the excellent examination of *prapañca* by Bhikkhu Ñāṇananda, *Concept and Reality in Early Buddhist Thought: an Essay on 'Papañca' and 'Papañca-Saññā-Saṅkhā'*. On p. 130 Ñāṇananda correctly warns "to equate [*papañca*] to '*nāmarūpa*'...would be to obscure an important segment of the philosophy of early Buddhism." Though he says this in the context of extricating the distinctively Buddhistic use of the term from its later appropriation and redesignation by other systems, notably Vedānta, this may also caution us against treating these terms as synonyms. They cannot be fully reduced to each other, though their semantic spread does overlap. The same caution applies to the other terms being listed here as implicated by *nāma-rūpa*.

Moreover this observation -- that besides the overlap something extra remains, that the overlapping marks and invokes an *excess* which helps establish the conditions for the further generation of further terms, *more* clarification, etc. -- also applies to the overlapping of the four models being articulated here. For instance, many Buddhist schools would claim that only the first, second and fourth models are reducible to the second, i.e., *pratītya-samutpāda*. We will soon demonstrate that the third can also be reduced to the second -- in fact the Pāli texts have already substituted and interchanged them in the most critical and

significant contexts. Nonetheless, by virtue of the excess alluded to here, these models can never be entirely reduced to each other. To a certain extent, this notion of 'excess' and the notion of ***prapañca*** also 'overlap' in this same manner. ***Prapañca***, particularly in its aspect as 'proliferating', tellingly intersects what we, following contemporary deconstructive writings, have described as excess.

15 – The difficulty of accounting for this special function of ***mano–vijñāna*** both logically and epistemologically contributed to the Yogācārin attempt to supplement the six ***vijñānas*** with two additional ***vijñānas***, making eight in all. This will be examined later.

16 – This line of reasoning, though already present in the earliest texts, became most clearly articulated in Dharmottara's –***ṭīkā*** to Dharmakīrti's ***Nyāyabindu***. It is also echoed in the opening pages of Kamalaśila's commentary to the ***Tattvasaṃgraha***. The point in these texts, as in the early texts, is that this psycho–linguistic overlay (= imaginative conceptualization, ***savikalpa–jñāna***) obstructs direct cognition of the non–conceptualized sensorium (***nirvikalpa–jñāna*** –– though Dharmottara's position is a bit more complex; for him a valid cognition must be distinct and 'reach' its object, hence it must be definite, ***savikalpa***, and by definition cannot be indefinite or indistinct, ***nirvikalpa***. In the text however this is not as clear as I am stating it here and it may be fair to say that he equivocates on this issue).

This debate grew out of Dharmakīti's revision of Dignāga's definition of 'valid perception'. While Dignāga defined valid perception as ***kalpanāpoḍha*** (i.e., 'devoid of conceptual construction' or ***avikalpa*** 'without constructive imagination') Dharmakīrti added that it must also be ***abrānta*** 'free of error'. To be free of error, it was assumed and argued, implied being definite and non–ambiguous, and thus Dharmottara's position. For an insightful discussion of this issue, with special reference to the problem of cognitive errors (mirages, eye–sickness, etc.) see Eli Franco's "Once Again on Dharmakīrti's Deviation from Dignāga on ***Pratyakṣābhāsa***," *Journal of Indian Philosophy,* 14 (1986) pp. 79–97. For a related discussion on the criteria of veridical perception, this time between Yogācāra and Sautrāntika, see Bimal Matilal's "Error and Truth – Classical Indian Theories," *Philosophy East and West,* 31, 2 (1981) pp. 215–224.

Though this fact sometimes is obscured or lost amidst the intricacies and complexities of philosophic debate, it cannot be overemphasized: the 'ineffability' of reality derives not from reality being somewhere other than experience, but simply from the fact that sensation, *as sensation,* is always verbally 'silent'. ***Prapañca*** is the discourse (***vāk*** –– see n. 11) which *supplements* it; it is the linguistic web which accompanies sensation, infiltrating it, and finally substituting itself for the sensorial dynamics.

Literature is the attempt to fill the gap between sensation and discourse with *meaning,* an activity which is both a reduction of sensation to language and an evocation of sensation by language. It could be argued that

beginning with the *Prajñāpāramitā* literature, the Buddhist theory of verbal and textual authority (*śruti*) hinges on the ability of fictitious literature (i.e., the sūtras of a Buddha who does not speak:– cf. *Kathā vatthu* XVIII.2 and similar statements in the *Laṅkāvatāra sūtra, Lotus sūtra,* etc.) to evoke soterically expedient sensations.

17 – How this psycho–linguistic closure comes to reiterate itself will be outlined and examined in what is to follow. It is the formative question for Abhidharma Buddhism. In Chinese *saṃsāra* is translated *sheng–mieh* which means 'birth and destruction' or 'life and death', implying the transmigratory repetitions of lives and deaths.

18 – See Chapter One for a comparison between the three types of components in a *dhātu* , viz. organ, object and consciousness, and Merleau–Ponty's notion of the 'intentional arc'.

19 – Merleau–Ponty also refutes the notion of sensation as a passive process, and even rejects the term 'sensation', offering in its stead *le sentir*. *Sentir* is the infinitive meaning 'to sense' and *le* treats the verb as if it were a noun, hence this would be literally translated as 'the to sense', evoking the active, intentional character of sensing. On his refutation of the theories of passive perception, particularly as they presuppose the 'constancy hypothesis' (i.e., there is a one–to–one correspondence between actual objects and our perceptions of them) see ch. 1 of his *Phenomenology of Perception*. On *le sentir* see *ibid.* ch.2.

20 – Cf. Sthiramati's commentary to v.15 of the *Triṃśikā* ; and ch. 1 of the *Abhidharmakośa*.

21 – Thus, while on the one hand Abhidharma thought is concerned with the description and analysis of conscious experience (*citta* and *caitta,* i.e., apperception and its cognitive fields), this concern is always the context for as well as contextualized by the unconscious conditions (*saṃskāra; citta–viprayukta saṃskāra,* etc.). The desire to identify concrete latencies even went so far as the positing of *rūpic* intentional structures, such as *avijñapti–rūpa* and *vijñapti–rūpa* by the Sarvāstivādins. These notions, crucial for understanding how Vasubandhu's Yogācārin thinking derived from his rejection of Sarvāstivāda, will be examined more carefully later in the next chapter. The notion of latent conditioning that is 'deeper' or (logically) prior to empirical conditioning is discussed in Yogācāra as *bījas* (seeds), of which there are two types: (1) acquired seeds – corollaries to the 'empirical conditioning' discussed, and (2) 'beginningless' seeds – those seeds or conditioning factors and structures which have always already underpinned the process of conditioning.

'Beginningless' is a commonly misunderstood Buddhist term, which simply means, much as the term "transcendental" meant for Husserl, that which

constitutes experience *though not* itself *given* in experience. It was their admittedly sloppy way (since it confuses, among other things, logical and temporal priority) of circumventing the chicken–and–egg problem. If how I am conditioned now depends on my previous conditioning, what initially conditioned me to be susceptible to conditioning at all? Moreover, what originally differentiated my conditioning from someone else's, such that mine has been advantageous (***kuśala***) and his disadvantageous (***akuśala***), or *vice versa?*

The notion of an unconscious assumes that certain forces must always already be in operation, whether libidinal forces, or "seeds". Hence the interpretation of Freud's notion of 'drives' (*trauben*) by the American Freudians as "instincts" derived naturally, if mistakenly, from the original concept of the unconscious as operations always already in play. The problem of the 'origins' of the karmic consciousness stream became a kind of psycho–epistemological parallel to the problem of the first cause or prime mover. We will examine how Hsüan–tsang treated this controversy, which became quite heated in China, later when dealing with the *Ch'eng wei–shih lun.*

22 – This is to a large extent a consequence of Behaviorism's radical empiricism, i.e., its desire that everything it describes and asserts be 'objectively' observable. Since choosing what would give John pleasure or Mary pain involves to some extent John's and Mary's subjective dispositions, the Behaviorist strives to avoid basing his science on such 'non–publicly observables'. Hence he avoids difficult issues, such as the fact that the same object (e.g., a pornographic movie) might give John pleasure and at the same time give Mary pain (or *vice versa*). Thus pain and pleasure are not intrinsic properties of an object, but depend on the dispositions of the perceiver. For good introductions to Behaviorism, see e.g., John B. Watson's *Behaviorism* (NY : Norton Library) 1970 rpt of 1924 ed.; or B. F. Skinner's *About Behaviorism* (NY : Vintage) 1976. For a step–by–step manual of how operant conditioning is implemented, see Luke S. Watson, Jr.'s *Child Behavior Modification: A Manual for Teachers, Nurses, and Parents* (NY : Pergamon Press) 1973; For some of Skinner's responses to the critique I have suggested here, see his "Humanism and Behaviorism" in *Reflections,* VIII, no.3, 1973, pp. 1–8. This attitude for avoiding 'subjectivistic' or 'psychologistic' explanations is also echoed in most twentieth century Analytic Philosophy, particularly in the area of what is perhaps currently mislabeled 'philosophy of mind'. Did the logical and evidential difficulties of 'psychologism', the anxiety of ambiguity, prove too *painful,* leading to this 'aversion' (***pratigha***)?

In contemporary European philosophy one of the more interesting attempts to deal with this issue, particularly in light of the Buddhist notion of ***saṃskāra*** as latent and yet related to volition, is that of Paul Ricouer, especially the first volume of his 'philosophy of will' trilogy, *Le Volontaire et l'involontaire* (Paris: 1950), tr. into English by Erazim Kohak as *Freedom and Nature: The Voluntary and the Involuntary* (Evanston: Northwestern UP, 1966). However Buddhists would be extremely critical of several elements in Ricouer's attempt to

reconcile the decisive, effort-making, consenting will with the 'involuntary' resistances of personal character, the unconscious and "the brute fact of organic life". First, Ricouer's wish to salvage and preserve the "I" (like many others, he takes Descartes' salvaging of the Cogito as a decisive and positive historical moment for philosophy), particularly the I as ***appropriator*** of life and world, simultaneously confounds freedom with bondage (we shall see later that the issue of appropriation is central to Yogācāra's analysis of ***saṃsāra***) as well as confusing the notions of agent and action. 'Will', for Buddhism, is a ***prajñapti*** for the coalescence of saṃskāric latencies; the activity of deciding is not the expression of a self (***ātman***) or will, but the expression of compulsive and impulsive forces -- at least in the case of we nonenlightened ones; but a fully awakened Buddha must be devoid of will, since will implies a ***desire*** which arises from a perceived lack, and the Buddha must be beyond this; which is why Mahāyāna Buddhism insists on limiting one's progress to the highest Bodhisattva realm such that one always intentionally falls short of becoming a full Buddha precisely so that one can 'will' to help other sentient beings -- hence the agent is (a euphemism for) latent tendencies, not a quasi-docetic 'incarnating Cogito'. This is not the place to develop a point by point Buddhist critique of Ricouer's project (which would include his notions of body, Transcendence, fault, consent, preformed emotions, etc.). His later revisions when confronting Freud already indicate that he himself saw a need to modify his position in the face of saṃskāric complexities. Here we need only reiterate that when he offers arguments like "the act of deciding is the central and constitutive act of my mode of being" (***Freedom and Nature,*** p. xviii, translator's intro) because "a decision intends its object as something ***to be done by me*** . . .[and] ***is within my power*** " (***ibid.***), this indicates an attempt at self-affirmation, not because there is a self which is free in virtue of that affirmation, but because the sheer fact of this attempt signifies that the desire for self-affirmation already concedes the absence of any self, such that a self must be constructed in the place of this absence. Since this need, like all needs, "is not self-explanatory but is a lack and a desire which acquire[s] definitive direction only as appropriated by a will" (***ibid.,*** p. xix), Ricouer's resolution of the tension between self and object, appropriator and appropriated, will and unwilling, becomes a mere nominalistic victory of the will over the unwilling which, in spite of this nominalistic supplementarity (see n. 16 above) or perhaps even because of it, has already conceded itself to the saṃskāric forces it intends to subdue with its 'consent' treaty. This deserves further investigation, but that must await another occasion. All in all, Ricouer's work is one of the most sustained wrestlings with this problematic in the twentieth century.

23 - The assigning of ***samādhi*** to the category of knowledge rather than maintaining it as a distinct category may be a bit controversial. On these categories, see the discussion below on the ***śīla, samādhi, prajñā*** model.

The issues only broached here go to the heart of much of the development of Buddhist theory. The emphasis on 'knowledge-remedies' led

Buddhism to be a major spearhead in the development of logic in India as well as producing some of India's finest logicians. Dignāga goes so far as to declare in the dedicatory verse to his ***Pramāṇasamuccaya*** that Buddha is ***pramāṇa,*** i.e., Buddha and his Awakening are nothing but euphemisms for the correct means of knowledge. Buddha's axiom ***"ehipassiko"*** (lit. 'come and see'), meaning don't believe anything that your own experience doesn't confirm no matter who says it, established a critical stance which fluctuated between empiricism (on early Buddhism as a logical, empirical enterprise, see Jayatilleke's classic ***The Theory of Knowledge in Early Buddhism***) and onto-theological skepticism (e.g., Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika). This overemphasis on rationalism had its backlashes, and was often mediated by devotional movements, the East Asian schools of Pure Land being the best known.

The schematic complexities of Abhidharmic thought, while relished by such schools as the Sarvāstivādins and Theravādins (the latter particularly as their doctrines came to be codified in the fifth century by Buddhaghosa), invited attack from other schools, notably Mādhyamika and Sautrāntika, who in their respective manners attempted to simplify if not entirely jettison it. Yogācāra forms a kind of curious middle way between these extremes. While Asaṅga endeavored to develop a distinctly Mahāyānic Abhidharma, Vasubandhu's works display a gradual but definite simplification of this enterprise. In the ***Triṃśikā,*** while he still enumerates the dharmic categories like a good Abhidharmist, after verse 17 he reduces them to linguistic euphemisms for the operations of ***vijñapti*** (Sthiramati's commentary is particularly emphatic about this point). If, as many scholars believe, the ***Trisvabhāvanirdeśa*** was his last, most mature work, we can say that in the end he abandons the Abhidharmic architectonics for the dialectical interpretation of ***pratītya-samutpāda*** introduced in the ***Madhyānta-vibhāga.***

After Vasubandhu, Yogācāra splinters into (1) a streamlined Abhidharmic school, exemplified by Sthiramati, Dharmapāla and Hsüan-tsang, and (2) a school of critical realism, exemplified by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, which concerned itself less with Abhidharmic categories and more with epistemological issues. To say that this latter school rejected the Abhidharmic form of Yogācāra is not to say that they are Sautrāntikas, though there are definite Sautrāntic elements in their works, just as there are Sautrāntic elements in Vasubandhu's works.

As for the issue of continuity and discontinuity, this debate raged on many fronts throughout Buddhist history. While on the one hand, rubrics were offered which warned against seeing something permanent in the impermanent (one of the four ***viparyāsas***), it became difficult to account for moral responsibility or karmic continuity if all conditioned things, including the self, are to be understood as momentary and radically discontinuous. If the act performed by P at $time^1$ does not consequentially inhere in that same P at $time^2$, then it becomes difficult to hold P responsible for that act after he has committed it. Also, causality, especially efficient causality -- which is the only form which really interested the Buddhists -- also becomes problematic if one adheres to an ontology so radically

discontinuous that time and temporality are rejected as misconstrued notions. On the other hand, continuity implies permanent or at least stable *identities,* since to say that X is continuous means that there is an X such that at time[1] and at time[2] X is *identical.* But it is precisely this notion of identity which the Buddhist notions of ***anātman*** (no-self) and ***anitya*** (impermanence) wish to put into question. This controversy, especially as developed between the Sarvāstivādins (on the side of continuity) and the Sautrāntikas (on the side of discontinuity), served as a catalytic condition for Vasubandhu's eventual embracing of Yogācāra, as we shall see later. 'What is a person if neither a continuous nor discontinuous entity' became a basic problematic for Buddhism since many of its doctrines such as karma and transmigration presuppose some form of temporally continuous identity. The various attempts to answer this question led to many of the early schisms which resulted in a plethora of schools, such as the Puggalavādins, Paññattivādins, etc. On the schisms see discussion below on the ***Kathā–vatthu*** along with the secondary sources cited there. Also cf. n. 33, below.

24 – In Yogācāra this is most clearly exemplified by the characterization of Awakening as an exchanging of ***vi–jñāna*** (bifurcating cognition) for ***jñāna*** (non–dual, immediate knowing).

25 – The idea here is very close to the Freudian notion of Transference.

26 – It is the situation and consequence of this projective operation that Yogācāra wishes to highlight by the doctrine of ***Vijñapti–mātra,*** as will be demonstrated later. According to Yogācāra the texture of these projections becomes so thick that nothing else is experienced, hence ***vijñapti*** (that which causes cathexic objects to be cognized) 'only' (***mātra***) is experienced. This is the 'closure' which psycho–sophically encloses (***saṃvṛti***) the human horizon.

27 – Kierkegaard, *Philosophical Fragments,* ch. III. However, Buddhism would not agree that the appropriate response to this state of affairs is to reject reason for a 'leap of faith'. Rather the 'poison' of reason can be turned into 'medicine'.

28 – See, e.g., Anacker's discussion in *Seven Works of Vasubandhu,* pp. 146f n. 43.

29 – Cf. these lists, both translated as appendices to the present work.

30 – Spinoza, particularly in bk. IV of his *Ethics,* is very sensitive to this issue. The seeds of the dialectical method later developed by Hegel, who was profoundly influenced by Spinoza, are to be found in Spinoza's treatment of

pleasure (*Laetitia*) and pain (*Tristitia*), which like Buddhism he also examines in relation to desire (*Cupiditas*). Spinoza claims that moral values have a utilitarian basis, i.e., what we call 'good' and 'bad' are actually what gives us pleasure or pain, which he defines as that which increases the self (pleasure) or decreases the self (pain) in its conative efforts to persevere and perfect itself. An equivocation in his treatment of the notions 'good' and 'bad' is dialectically suggestive. At first Spinoza claims that pain is bad and pleasure is good. IVp41: *Laetitia directe mala non est, sed bona; Tristitia autem contra directe est mala*; "Pleasure is not in itself bad, but good. On the other hand, pain is in itself bad" (Shirley's translation). Though pain signals the bad, or what obstructs one's efforts at perfectability, it sometimes proves more ethically efficacious -- and hence 'good' -- because it can generate enough discomfort that one will make an effort to improve; whereas pleasure has a tendency to make one complacent and arrogant (cf. E-IVp58sch). Though this is not yet quite dialectical, the shifting value of pain as bad and good (and likewise for pleasure), especially given the pivotal role this plays in the *Ethics* on the turn from bondage to freedom, invites a dialectical interpretation.

This rejection of pain for being intrinsically bad, though sometimes morally expedient, opens an interesting avenue for comparing Spinoza, Nietzsche and Buddhism on their condemnation of self-abasement and asceticism, a position all three shared.

31 – Along with similar notions in Western philosophy, such as Hegel's observation that I define myself through the other, or Whitehead's 'negative prehensions', a most fruitful inquiry into the economy of 'negative appropriation' might begin with Freud's theory of defense mechanisms. Defense mechanisms are unconscious, reiterative operations which at once *repeat and distort* 'threatening' psychic episodes. In order to avoid certain unpleasant situations, these mechanisms psychologically displace themselves elsewhere only to reinvest a new center or locality with a distorted repetition of the situation from which they fled, so that they must attempt again to break away, and in so doing consistently (re-)define and (re-)determine the self and its actions as the locale of these 'neurotic' displacements. These 'defensive' maneuvers come very close to the Buddhist notion of the *saṃskāric* operations behind *upādāna* as well as offering an illustration of the tenacious reiterability of *saṃsāra*. The work by deSilva and others to compare Freud and Buddhism has barely begun to reveal the deeply penetrating lights they can shine on each other.

32 – Cf. the Freudian theory of projection, and Spinoza's discussion of pain alluded to in n. 30, above.

33 – This raises the possibility of an interesting interpretation of *avidya*. Since *pratītya-samutpāda* is usually treated as a circle, the twelfth link and the first link are contiguous. Hence (#1) nescience 'reduces' to (#12) Death

and (#2) embodied conditioning. What does that mean ? Conditioning only accrues and remains as a continuous underpinning if one *dies* after each moment or experience, i.e., in a profound and radical way he *forgets* the conditions constituting his experiences so that when subsequent conditions make these latencies (= [temporarily] forgotten experiences) emerge into actuality, one acts 'impulsively' with no idea where the feeling or disposition originated. This is something like the guy who comes home from a miserable day at work and yells at his wife. He may even think and feel that she is the cause of his anger, when actually the real causes are his previous experiences. The ***Abhidharmakośa*** does in fact suggest that ***avidya*** is a kind of breach or rupture in memory. If ***avidya*** is this kind of radical discontinuity, one in which conditioning continues precisely because we don't see the conditioning connections between temporally discrete actions, then the cure for ***avidya*** is memory, i.e., ***smṛti*** (lit. 'memory'), a steady and aware 'mindfulness' (another translation of ***smṛti***); a memory both in the here and now, such that I am fully aware of what I am doing (karma) and in what context (dharma), and one which recovers the seeds of my karmic conditioning. For most Buddhists this recovery would not involve a primordial ***arché***, but rather the etiological roots of my particular situation, i.e., the unraveling of my conditioning. However, particularly in East Asian Buddhism, there are elements of ***arché***-recovery, notably in the theories of Buddha-nature and Original Mind. In Yogācāra this controversy took the form of an argument about whether the seeds (***bīja***) in the ***ālaya-vijñāna*** are beginningless (i.e., have always been there) or whether they are all acquired through experience (see n. 21). According to the ***Ch'eng wei-shih lun*** different groups held different opinions, with Dharmapāla contending that ***ālaya*** contained both types of seed.

If this theory of ***avidya*** is examined closely however, a most striking paradox emerges. The ***continuity*** of karmic conditioning is grounded on the ***discontinuity*** of memory concerning that conditioning. Moreover, the solution to this misplaced sense of continuity consists precisely in rectifying the memory, such that it becomes continuous in order to reveal a discontinuous universe (the Sautrāntika doctrine of momentariness posits that reality is composed of absolutely discrete individual moments, ***kṣanika***, which do not carry any causal force between them). From a continuous universe (or rather, plura-verse) and discontinuous mindfulness/memory to a discontinuous plura-verse and continuous mindfulness/memory -- this reversal of continuity/discontinuity nonetheless maintains an unquestioned dichotomy between an ontology and the way that that ontology is viewed. As stated earlier, Mahāyāna aimed at erasing bifurcational thinking, particularly dichotomies of such fundamental metaphysical gravitude, and therefore it is not surprising that this paradigm was rejected by them as "Hīnayānic". For our purposes, it is important to note that this paradigm's 'solution' suggested that the overcoming of ***duḥkha*** was primarily the rectification of a mental problem, and that this rectification results in a continuous, all-embracing memory/mindfulness. Certain Sautrāntika elements of the Yogācāra school retained this paradigm, though altering its terminology (e.g., they

were called *sākāra-vijñānavadins*, 'the school [holding that enlightened] consciousness retains mental representations'). Further, this element also fueled the Buddhist controversy on the omniscience of the Buddha, leading to the doctrine that Buddha knows all things, i.e., has total mindfulness *and* total memory. This is too complex an issue to examine adequately in a footnote, though too important an issue to leave unremarked. I have been unable to find any secondary source which acknowledges, much less explicates this memory paradigm and its influence on the development of Indian Buddhism.

34 – Generally the claim is that though all twelve *nidānas* are simultaneous and all together condition each moment, in terms of experience usually one or the other predominates in our awareness. This is a corollary to the 'death of memory' suggested in the previous note. For instance, when I am desiring, I may 'forget' the other conditions, such as the sensations, previous *vedanic* experiences and their saṃskāric consequences, etc., though these are all operative in that moment of desire. As pointed out, the desire itself could be reduced to the confluence of those other conditions. Similarly, in a moment of sensation (*sparśa*) I may forget or overlook the cognitive and affective components which go into making that sensory moment (the field of 'philosophy of perception' in the West sometimes myopically exemplifies this). Based on this various schools have argued that certain *nidānas* are more efficacious for entry into the clarification and resolution of the karmic dilemma, due to such factors as the ability of those *nidānas* to more efficiently evoke awareness of the others, the degree of each's cognitive ubiquity, their amenability to conscious alteration, their ability to positively influence the remaining *nidānas*, etc.

The predominance of one *nidāna* also shows itself in the central concerns of the various Buddhist schools. While some focus more on 'desire' as a root problematic, others focus more on 'nescience', or the problems of cognitive dissonance due to improper or imperfect sensation (*sparśa*), etc. One may even systematically group or categorize the various schools and thinkers by determining which *nidāna* predominates or is central in their philosophy (though, of course, all the *nidānas* will be utilized in some form). As an example, I have compiled the following correlations, which are merely provisional illustrations, admittedly controversial and subject to revision or reevaluation. On the left are the names of the *nidānas* and on the right the school(s) or thinker(s) who most exemplifies a basic concern or central preoccupation with that *nidāna* (with their key doctrines in parentheses).

1. *avidya* ------ Nāgārjuna (*śūnya-dṛṣṭi*)
2. *saṃskāra* ------ Candrakīrti (*prapañca*)
3. *vijñāna* ------ Sākāravāda-Vijñānavāda; Paramārtha's *āmala-vijñāna*
4. *nāma-rūpa* ------ Tantra; Buddhaghosa
5. *āyatana* ------ Sautrāntika (*samyakpramāṇa*)
6. *sparśa* ------ Dignāga (*prakaśa*)

7. ***vedanā***	-------	Buddhaghosa (***Visuddhimagga***)
8. ***tṛṣṇa***	-------	Theravāda
9. ***upadāna***	-------	Vasubandhu (***vijñapti–mātra***)
10. ***bhāva***	-------	Sarvāstivāda; tathāgatagarba
11. ***jāti***	-------	Pure Land
12. ***māranam***	-------	Dōgen; Han–shan te–ching

In this list Buddhaghosa appears twice. He is associated with ***vedanā*** since the most often studied portion of his ***Visuddhimagga*** is the meditation section, which emphasizes a kind of alternating adhesion/aversion therapy. One practices and cultivates good virtues, while one overcomes, for instance, lust for women by visualizing them as putrifying corpses, etc. This is a kind of self–imposed operant conditioning designed to intercept and alter the manner in which one classifies various experiences ***vedanically***. He is also classified under ***nāma–rūpa*** because, as will be argued later, the fundamental question underlying the ***Visuddhimagga*** is 'what is ***nāma–rūpa***,' i.e., how does it transmigrate, how does it come to be born, what are the kammic factors, etc.? Dōgen and Han–shan are grouped under ***māranam*** because (1) their underlying existential issues concern impermanence (e.g., Dōgen's revaluation of satori as ***Uji***, 'Being–Time', affectively cultivated through ***Genjō–kōan***, 'Real–izing the kōan', etc.), and (2) both, as did many other Buddhists particularly in the Zen tradition, were driven to seek answers from Buddhism due to the deaths of their parents (particularly mothers) when they were very young. Hsüan–tsang also exhibits some of this when he gets the Emperor to foot the bill for his mother's reburial after his triumphant return to China from India. The other correlations should be self–explanatory.

35 – Yogācāra will go one step further and insist that subjects and objects are themselves nothing but instantiated conditioned desires. That which is untainted (***anuśrava***) by appropriation is no longer available to description, since description itself, as a mode of psycho–linguistic appropriation, automatically 'taints' whatever it *takes* to be a referent.

Discussing Freud's chagrin and resistance to the mounting evidence that the traumatic childhood experiences his patients reported were in fact fictions, not actual events, J. H. Van Den Berg writes:

> If every patient and every normal person relates events, and even serious, very serious, events from his past which actually never happened, then something is wrong with that past. The past has become talkative, but it is talking nonsense, it is playing the fool.

A comparison of this notion of "talkative" with the notion of ***prapañca*** may not be inappropriate. Van Den Berg continues:

> For each fact in the present, the past is giving history, but a history which never was, which evidently was made up quickly; the past is fabricating history, it is making up astounding events and indelible experiences. The past would not do this if it had not been forced to

> do it. . . .Is the past not obliged to talk and talk and talk, if the idea that everything has a past is allowed no exception? Apparently there was every reason to make this rule absolute; nineteenth-century man was afraid, he found safety if the "meaning" of things was located in the past. But the past was not ready for this task, it was just being built; nonetheless it had to produce a "meaning" for everything. Is it surprising that at the end of the nineteenth century the past started to make up stories?
>
> . . .In our day [the past] no longer produces hastily fabricated fantasies. The modern fantasies are much better constructed; so well constructed, in fact, that it is hardly possible to unmask them, if at all.

Of course, contemporary fantasies are always harder to identify, to become aware of, than those of the past. The conditioning most difficult to see is inevitably our own.

> . . .Everything is "past"; nothing is "present". Since the present was made uninhabitable by the signs pointing to the past, the past had to take over the task which had been entrusted to the present for as long as man could remember. The past did take over the task; now we are living in the past.
>
> . . .He who, on principle, resorts to the past is obliged to retreat ever deeper there. For the past has once been present, and for that reason was part of the dangers which exist in the present. Only when the past loses itself in primeval ages, in other words, only when the character of the present has been substantially erased from the past -- only when the past has been made entirely imaginary and so unreal -- only then is the regression halted. ("Neurosis or Sociosis", pp. 56-58, in Harold Bloom's [ed.] *Sigmund Freud: Modern Critical Views*)

Also cf. remarks on *arché* in n. 33 above. If we carry this analysis a few steps further, and note that not only is the 'neurotic trauma' a fictionalized past constructed in the present, but the present also, insofar as it is influenced and shaped by this construction, is also fictitious -- which means that the oppositions of past/present and fiction/actuality are not as neat as Van Den Berg suggests -- and that this "talkative" propensity (*prapañca*) displaces both present and past with its interpretive jabber, a jabber that assumes a mythic, deep-seated, symbolic 'reality', then we begin to approach the Yogācāra notion of *vijñapti*.

36 - Alex Wayman, on the basis of some Tibetan texts, has suggested *bhāva* be translated as 'gestation' (see his "Dependent Origination - The Indo-Tibetan Tradition", rpt. in his *Buddhist Insight*, pp. 163-192). Though perhaps adequate for when *pratītya-samutpāda* is strictly taken as referring to the human condition or the organic conditions of sentient beings, 'gestation' is too limited. *Bhāva* here signifies something like a state of Nature. It is analogous to

the notion of a 'Cosmic Verb', though either of these suggestions should be taken merely as heuristics; ***bhāva*** need not be interpreted in such a metaphysical way. It is probably most appropriately rendered as 'impetus'.

37 – In later Indian Philosophy, particularly Kashmir Śaivism, this notion of the cosmic pulse of the world, compounded with a rich philosophy of language, reached prominence as the ***unmeṣa*** and ***nimeṣa*** (uncovering and concealing) of ***spanda*** (the cosmic vibrating Pulse).

38 – Raised in a very sheltered life, he had never been allowed to see any suffering. When nearly thirty he sneaked out of the palace with his charioteer and saw, much to his horror and shock, a grossly ill man, a withered decrepit old man, and a several day old corpse, each on successive nights. This so disturbed him that when on the following night he saw a wandering mendicant, he vowed to also follow that path and overcome the outrage of ***duḥkha***.

39 – S.N. XII,7.65ff. See also the discussion of this formulation in R. Robinson's ***The Buddhist Religion*** (first ed.), pp. 21f and in Takeuchi, ***op. cit.***, pp. 84ff.

40 – In another text ascribed to Nāgārjuna, the ***Pratītya–samutpāda hṛdaya kārikā,*** he offers "an exegetical attempt to reconcile the traditional ***dvādaśāṅgaḥ pratītya–samutpāda*** [i.e., as the twelve links] with the ***śūnyatā***–doctrine" (Lindtner, ***Nagarjuniana,*** p. 171). A partial translation is given by L. Jamspal and Peter Della Santini, "The Heart of Interdependent Origination of Acarya Nāgārjuna with Commentary by the Author: Translated into English from the Tibetan", ***Buddhist Studies***, (Delhi) March 1974, pp.17–31 [includes introduction, English tr., an Eng/Tib/Skt glossary, and a reconstructed Sanskrit text in Devanagri].

The Jamspal–Della text consists of seven kārikās which divide the twelve links into 3 parts, viz. 1st, 8th, 9th = 'afflictions' (***kleśa*** or ***vikalpa*** –– cf. Lindtner, ***ibid.***), 2nd and 10th = deeds (karma), and the remaining seven = sufferings (***duḥkha*** or ***janman*** –– cf. Lindtner, ***ibid.***).

Though Lindtner argues that this should be accepted as an authentic Nagarjunic text, its reliance on Abhidharmic theory and such Yogācāra texts as the ***Daśabhūmi–sūtra*** leaves this conclusion suspect. But see his arguments, ***ibid.*** Cf. Dragonetti's response to the claim of Nāgārjuna's authorship in his "Some Notes on the ***Pratītyasamutpāda hṛdayakārikā*** and the ***Pratītyasamutpāda hṛdayakārikāvyākhyāna*** Attributed to Nāgārjuna", ***Buddhist Studies*** (Delhi) no. 6, 1979, pp. 70–73. In this response to Jamspal and Santini, Dragonetti claims that Sanskrit citations exist for more of the text than they thought, and that the probable author was Suddhamati.

In any case, here too the basic veracity and acceptability of the twelvefold formulation emerges unscathed. Why Nāgārjuna exempted

pratītya-samutpāda from his deconstructive negations should be a matter of serious consideration by modern scholars, though for the most part little attention has been given to this issue, as if it has gone unnoticed. Only the recent translation/commentary by Kalupahana (Nāgārjuna: ***The Philosophy of the Middle Way,*** Albany: SUNY Press, 1986), which reached me after this section was written, takes mention of this.

41 – An excellent exposition of ***pratītya-samutpāda*** from the perspective of Theravāda, and the ***Visuddhimagga*** in particular, is given in the ***pratītya-samutpāda*** essay in ***Nava-Nalanda*** I (Patna: n.d.) pp. 179–239.

42 – As will be demonstrated in more detail later, whereas the Abhidhamma texts repeatedly state that ***rūpa*** is entirely karmically neutral, that thought and matter exert no causal influence on each other, Buddhaghosa nonetheless posits a karmic relationship between ***rūpa*** and thought, perhaps directly due to the use of ***rūpa*** in the tridhātu model. His famous ***citta-vīthi*** (cognition series) model is only one example of his efforts to posit intercausal relations between mental and rūpic phenomena. As I will also suggest later, Buddhaghosa very probably was directly and profoundly influenced by Yogācāra thought, which not only was thriving in north India when he left it, but in southern India and Śri Lanka when he studied and wrote there. Hsüan-tsang's travelogue discusses the Yogācāra studies there in some detail, and this will be discussed in a later chapter.

43 – Some of these sources include: Winston King's ***Theravāda Meditation: The Buddhist Transformation of Yoga*** (University Park: Penn State UP). See especially his diagram on pp. 85f. Randy Kloetzli's ***Buddhist Cosmology*** includes seven charts of the tridhātu (pp. 33–39); ch. II discusses its structure and ch. IV discusses its function as a path. Also cf. the references he cites on p. 24 n. 1 and p. 33 n. 1. Alphonso Verdu's ***Early Buddhist Philosophy*** (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America) includes some insightful materials (cf. pp. 53–65 and 130–175, and the chart on pp. 171–175). Rahula's essay "A Comparative Study of Dhyānas, according to Theravāda, Sarvāstivāda and Mahāyāna" on pp. 101–109 of his ***Zen and the Taming of the Bull*** is concise and critical. Wayman's essay "Aspects of Meditation in the Theravāda and Mahīśāsaka" reprinted in his ***Buddhist Insight*** (Delhi: Motilal) pp. 69–98 is rich in detail and suggestive associations. Herbert Guenther's ***Philosophy and Psychology in the Abhidharma*** attempts a synthetic interpretation based on Pāli abhidhammic sources along with the ***Abhidharmakośa, Abhidharmasamuccaya*** and Sthiramati's ***-vṛtti, Triṃśika-ṭīkā,*** etc.; cf. esp. pp. 116–143. ***Meditative States in Tibetan Buddhism*** by Lati Rinbochay, Denma Lochö Rinbochay, Leah Zahler and Jeffrey Hopkins; this book is in two parts. The first is Zahler's translation of Lati's 'Oral Presentation', and gives a moralistic cosmology as well as rudimentary meditational advice. The second part translates part of a nineteenth

century Tibetan monk's (Paṇ-chen Sö-nam-drak-ba) commentary on Asaṅga's ***Abhisamayālaṃkāra***. Why they chose this particular commentary to translate and present of all the possible texts available and in need of translation (e.g., Asaṅga's original text) is a mystery. For the most part, it records a sectarian dispute over whether certain features of meditative experience are already present in the stages prior to ***rūpa-dhātu*** and/or ***ārūpa-dhātu***, or not. As a sectarian text it can only foster hermeneutic confidence for those who uncritically accept the positional bias advanced there as textual dogma.

Another translation from a Tibetan source is Constance Hoog's *Prince Jin-Gim's Textbook of Tibetan Buddhism* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1983), her rendering of 'Phags-pa's ***Śes-bya rab-gsal*** (***Jñeya-prakāśa***). A Chinese translation of this text, which seems to differ occasionally from the Tibetan version can be found at T.1645.32, pp. 226-236. This thirteenth century primer, composed for Kublai Khan's second son, begins with a detailed reiteration of the tri-dhātu cosmology as found in the ***Abhidharmakośa***. Curiously, it follows this with the evolutional theory of the ***Brahmajāla sutta*** (how 'sublime beings' originated and gradually grew coarser, until they became human), a not entirely clear description of ***pratītya-samutpāda***, and then a brief overview of the ***kośa***'s seventy-five dharmas. It acknowledges that Asaṅga and Vasubandhu offer a different account, but nonetheless seems to prefer and remain attached to the seventy-five dharma theory (cf. p. 57). This makes it difficult to assign this text to a particular school, since elsewhere (p. 49) it is critical of both the Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika schools. Its concluding sections cover the Path and the Fruit in typical Mahāyāna fashion (***sambhāra-mārga***, ***prayoga-mārga***, the six pāramitās, etc.), and the last chapter recounts the seventy-five dharma version of ***asaṃskṛta-dharma***, though it indirectly implicates the Yogācāra version by mentioning ***Tathatā***. Perhaps because it was intended as an 'exoteric' exposition (of the bśad-mdzod genre), its presentation remained Hīnayānic. Interestingly, 'Phags-pa also seems to have considered the four models of skandhas, pratītya--samutpāda, tri-dhātu, and (an expanded) śīla-samādhi-prajñā as the basic models for his handbook. This is interesting because I only discovered this work after having already written most of my analysis.

By far the best English language survey and critical appraisal of the tridhātu as used in Pāli Buddhist meditation is Henepola Gunaratana's *The Path of Serenity and Insight* which utilizes and coherently presents the doctrines propounded in Buddhaghosa's ***Visuddhimagga*** and the eleventh-century commentary on the ***Dhammasaṅgaṇi*** by Anuruddha, ***Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha***. This latter has been translated along with the translator's own compendium of Abhidhamma thought by Jagdish Kashyap as *Abhidhamma Philosophy* (Delhi: Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan) rpt. 1982. The ***Visuddhimagga*** is the *classicus locus* for Theravādin speculations on tridhātu. Historically and doctrinally, between the early Pāli sources and the later revised Theravāda school as codified by Buddhaghosa there is the Sarvāstivādin school. For a good account of their understanding of the tridhātu doctrine see Nalinaksha Dutt's "Doctrines of the

Sarvāstivāda School of Buddhism", *Indian Historical Quarterly*, 14, 1937, pp. 114–120, 799–812. Yogācāra texts which deal with tridhātu include the Asaṅga text mentioned above, the *Yogācārabhūmi*, the *Daśabhūmika Sūtra* as well as several others. The Yogācāra attitude, however, is summed up in the famous line in the *Avataṃsaka Sūtra* –– "the three realms are only consciousness".

44 – For an example, see the vivid descriptions in Mark Tatz and Jody Kent, *Rebirth: The Tibetan Game of Liberation* (NY: Anchor, 1977) pp. 66–75. This game is a kind of Buddhist 'chutes and ladders' which presents an accurate and informative overview of both Buddhist cosmology and the manner in which one transmigrates the various paths (Sūtra, Tantra, etc.) through it.

45 – *Buddhism: Its Essence and Development* (NY: Harper Torchbooks, 1959) p. 51.

46 – Cf. *Wu–men kuan* (Gateless Gate), case #2.

47 – *Zen and the Taming of the Bull*, p. 49, paraphrasing M.N. III, p. 169 (PTS ed.).

48 – The four kings rule the four directions from Mt. Meru, which in Buddhist cosmology signifies the center of the world. Kloetzli (*op. cit.*, p. 29) writes:

> Two classes of gods dwell on Mt. Meru; the Caturmahārājakāyika and the Trāyastriṃśa. Four classes of Caturmahārājakāyika gods inhabit the four terraces (*pariṣaṇḍa*) extending halfway up Meru. The Caturmahārājakāyikas are the most numerous among the gods and also inhabit the palaces (*vimāna*) of the sun, moon and stars. The ruler of the Trāyastriṃśa is Indra or Śakra whose abode rests atop Mt. Meru.

Three of the four kingdoms are characterized in the *Abhidharmakośa* as i. "always drunk" (inhabited by *sadāmattas*), ii. "bearing garlands" (inhabited by *mālādharas*) and iii. "bowl in hand" (inhabited by *karoṭapāṇis*).

49 – Early Yogācāra, on its devotional side, developed an important Maitreya cult. This cult was still strong in Hsüan–tsang's day, and he makes reference to it and his participation in it, particularly in moments of crisis. That Amida worship superceded Maitreya worship in China, and subsequently all of East Asia – crystallizing as Pure Land Buddhism – seems perhaps due more to political than religious reasons. This area deserves much more serious attention and study than it has so far received by modern scholars. In English virtually the only one even addressing the issue of the Maitreya cults is Alan Sponberg. Cf. e.g., his "Wonhyo on Visualization: Maitreya Cult Practice in Early China and Korea", a revised draft of a paper presented at the Princeton Conference on

Maitreya Studies (May 1983), to be included in the forthcoming *Maitreya, the Future Buddha*, Princeton UP, ed. by Sponberg and Helen Hardacre.

50 – Rahula, in *Zen. . .*, *op. cit.*, pp. 101–110, gives a marvelous, concise overview of this disparity, using the Pāli *Nikāyas*, *Abhidhamma* and commentaries, *Abhidharmakośa*, and Asaṅga's *Abhidharmasamuccaya*. He concludes that the Yogācāra model is closer to the original *Nikāyas* than either the Pāli *Abhidhamma* or Buddhaghosa. Wayman's article "Aspects of Meditation ...", *op. cit.*, also treats this issue, using more sources. Gunaratana, *op. cit.*, pp. 101–104, reiterates the standard Theravādin gloss, namely that the discrepancy between four *dhyānas* and five *dhyānas* represents slightly different 'paths' which nonetheless begin and end identically. Guenther's synthetic approach in *Psychology and Philosophy...* incorporates the positions of the various major schools (Theravāda, Vaibhāṣikas, Sautrāntikas, Yogācāra, etc.) but tends to favor, implicitly, Buddhaghosa's *Aṭṭhasālinī* (i.e., his comm. on the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*), since he considers it "based on the actual experience...so vividly described in words" (p.121) whereas the other texts use abstract, textual, and etymological arguments. His interpretation differs from Rahula's, for instance, on the issue of whether 'one-pointed mind' should be included in all four (or five) rūpa-dhyānas or not. Rahula contends that this is only found in the Pāli Abhidhamma texts, not in the Suttas or Sanskrit texts, and its inclusion is misleading. Guenther, on the other hand, taking one-pointedness as a synonym for *samādhi*, accepts the importance of its presence in each of the dhyānas. Cf. n. 59.

51 – Treated as transmigrational realms, they are collectively called the Brahma-lokas or 'Brahma-worlds', though technically speaking Brahma only resides and rules in the lowest of the rūpa-dhātu heavens. There are several schema for classifying these life-worlds, but these will not be discussed in the present section. For details, see Kloetzli, *op. cit.*, and Verdu, *op. cit.* In terms of the *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* the only transmigratory realm we need be concerned with here is the one in which the *asaṃjñika-devas* dwell, since Hsüan-tsang translates the term *asaṃjñika* in the *Triṃśikā* (v. 16) as referring to the 'heavenly realm' of the *asaṃjñikas* rather than in the sense more likely intended by Vasubandhu, viz. as a meditative state. This meditation and another closely associated with it, *nirodha-samāpatti*, become very important in the Yogācāra system, and we will deal more fully with those later. They are both considered very high level meditational attainments, penultimate to Awakening.

52 – This of course presupposes the common assumption that the *Sutta-piṭaka* is in fact older and more representative of the earlier tradition than the *Abhidhamma-piṭaka*, parts of which were known to have been composed at a much later date.

53 – See note 50. Those works, including Gunaratana's, give references

to the various texts in which these models are discussed.

54 – See previous note.

55 – *Vivicc'eva kāmehi vivicca akusalehi dhammehi savitakkaṃ savicāraṃ vivekajaṃ pītisukhaṃ paṭhamajjhānaṃ*. Rahula, *ibid.* p. 142 n. 8, notes the following locations in the *Nikāyas* where the "stereotyped formulas" for these four are given: *Dīgha N.* I, pp. 73–75, 183–183; II, p. 186; III, p. 78, 131, 222; *Majjhima N.* I, pp. 159, 181, 435–436; *Anguttara N.* I, pp. 53, 168, 182; *Saṃyutta N.* II, pp. 210–211, IV, pp. 263ff, V, pp. 2134ff.

For alternate renderings of the key terms in English, cf. Guenther, *op. cit.*: on *prīti* and *sukha*, see pp. 121f; on these and the rest cf. pp. 49–61. While his discussions contain many helpful insights, his conflation of the various sources glosses some of the real differences the various systems espoused. His seeming thoroughness is also occasionally marked by omissions; e.g., he renders *samprajanya* as 'full awareness' (p. 124) and *prajñā* as 'intellectual acumen and appreciative analytical understanding' (p. 125) without noting that the *Vibhanga* and *Abhidharmakośa* both treat these terms as synonyms (cf. Rahula, p. 107).

56 – *Vitakkavicārānaṃ vūpasamā ajjhattaṃ sampasādanaṃ cetaso ekodibhāvaṃ avitakkhaṃ avicāraṃ samādhijaṃ pītisukhaṃ dutiyajjhānaṃ*.

57 – *Pītiyā ca virāgā upekkhako ca viharati, sato ca sampajāno, sukhaṃ ca kāyena paṭisaṃvedeti, yaṃ taṃ ariyā ācikkhanti 'upekkhako satimā sukhavihārī'ti tatiyajjhānaṃ*. Note that the qualification of *sukha* as 'bodily' (*kāyena*) occurs only in the suttas; neither the abhidhamma nor the later texts of other schools seem to have retained this explicitly, though insofar as the lived–body (*kāya*) is always the locus of experience, this qualification may have been implicitly understood, though unemphasized.

58 – *Sukhassa ca pahānā dukkhassa ca pahānā pubbe'va somanassa domanassānaṃ atthangamā adukkhaṃ asukhaṃ upekkhā sati parisuddhiṃ catutthajjhānaṃ*.

59 – Following Rahula's chart on *op. cit.*, p. 102. See his essay for the abhidhammic justifications for including *ekaggatā* (one–pointedness of mind) in each of the five levels.

60 – Gunaratana, p. 99, writes:

> [The fourth] *jhāna* has two kinds of equanimity – [1] equanimous feeling, the affective tone which inclines neither towards pleasure nor pain, and [2] specific neutrality, the mental attitude of sublime impartiality free from attachment and aversion. Though the two are different factors, the one belonging to the aggregate of feelings

(*vedanākkhandha*) and the other to the aggregate of mental formations (*sankhārakkhandha*), their concomitance is not fortuitous; for as specific neutrality becomes more and more refined it naturally tends to come into association with equanimous feeling, its hedonic counterpart.

He is drawing on the *Vibhaṅga* and Buddhaghosa for these distinctions.

61 – On Hegel's notion of 'concept' as a synonym for the dialectical *aufhebung* process, cf. his "Preface" to *The Phenomenology of Mind/Spirit*.

62 – See Gunaratana, pp. 108–109, 119–122.

63 – *Iddhis* (S. *ṛddhi*) are the supernormal powers which accompany advanced spiritual attainments. Pāli texts usually list four: *chandiddhipādo, cittidhipādo, viriyiddhipādo, vimansiddhipādo,* i.e., 'the urge to do, active thought, energy, and the will to investigate.' For a good overview of the basic Pāli and Sanskrit literature and interpretations, see Har Dayal's *The Bodhisattva Doctrine in Buddhist Sanskrit Literature* (NY: Samuel Weiser, 1978 rpt of 1932 ed.), pp. 104–106, 112–134. Cf. Warder, *Indian Buddhism,* p. 89. The so–called Āndhra schools which Warder identifies as the sources of Mahāyāna claimed that the *ṛddhis* of the Buddha and his disciples "enables them to effect whatever they wish, regardless of the laws of nature" (*ibid.* p. 327), prefiguring some of the more transcendentalistic interpretations of *upāya* in Mahāyāna. Cf. also Sten Konow, *The Two First Chapters of the Daśasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā: Restoration of the Sanskrit Text, Analysis, and Index* (Oslo: 1941) for an early Mahāyānic reworking of this and other abhidhammic categories.

64 – *abhiññā* (S. *Abhijñā*). On them, cf. Gunaratana, pp. 128ff; Dayal, *ibid.,* pp. 106–134. Conze's *Buddhist Scriptures,* pp. 121–133; *The Large Sutra on Perfect Wisdom,* tr. Conze, pp. 79–82. Jayatilleke, in his *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge,* argues that these five (or sometimes six) super–knowledges and powers should not be considered supernatural, but rather as the empirically accessible spheres which are the domain of meditational 'experts', much as the mathematical and conceptual cryptology of modern physicists is accessible only to those experts, but nonetheless empirical. In other words, these supernormal abilities are accessible to anyone with the discipline and abilities to acquire them; they are matters of training.

65 – *Psychology and Philosophy...,* p. 127.

66 – The notion of *avyākta* 'non–defined', or better 'non–recording' karma, already important in the abhidhamma schema, becomes a crucial Yogācāra distinction, which helps differentiate the seventh and eighth consciousnesses (which were Yogācāric innovations) from the first six consciousnesses. We will return to this later when treating the *Triṃśikā*.

67 – Cf. Merleau-Ponty's notion of *l'être sauvage et brut* (lit. 'savage and brutal Being', usually translated 'wild ontology') in *The Visible and The Invisible.*

68 – P. 277. *Path of Purity,* p.362. Cited and commented upon in Gunaratana, p. 115.

69 – As stated above, Buddhaghosa lived after Vasubandhu, in a time when Yogācāra had already developed into a major Buddhist force. His writings thoroughly reflect a Yogācāric influence, though for obvious reasons his Theravādin commentators ignore or suppress this fact. Modern scholarship, whether emerging directly from the Theravādin tradition or whether incorporating Buddhaghosa's writings into more intersectarian approaches, unfortunately also fails to take adequate note of this influence. I've only seen two works which even mention the possibility of Yogācāric influence on Buddhaghosa. One is Guenther in his *Philosophy and Psychology of the Abhidharma,* where on p. 133, while discussing the ārūpya-dhyānas primarily from the point of view of Buddhaghosa's *Aṭṭhasālinī* (his comm. on the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*), Guenther writes:

> The author of the Aṭṭhasālinī, who is, as many passages in his work reveal, much indebted to the intellectual and spiritual acumen of the Vijñānavādins...

However, Guenther does not develop this observation, nor does he pick it up again later. The other is Kalupahana's new book, *The Principles of Buddhist Psychology* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1987), where on pp. 114–115 he argues that Buddhaghosa was misguidedly influenced by the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* -- though not the Yogācāra of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu (Kalupahana's distinction is more a polemic than an adequately evidenced argument) -- and that this introduced a host of improper metaphysical theories into subsequent Theravādin thinking. His point that Buddhaghosa (i) was influenced by Yogācāric thinking, whether from the *Laṅkāvatāra* or mainstream Yogācāra, and (ii) that this influence has profoundly altered the subsequent ways in which Theravādins have interpreted their own tradition is well taken. One only wishes that Kalupahana would have explicated this issue more fully and systematically.

70 – It may be interesting to compare how a cognate term, *kaścid,* meaning 'no-thing', is treated in Mahāyānic literature. For instance, in these two kārikās from Nlglrjuna's *Mūlamādhyamaka kārikā:*

> [18:6] The Buddhas have heuristically taught (*prajñaptitam...deśitam*) atman-theory (*ātmeti*) and anatman-theory (*anātmeti*). Also, they have not taught of some thing (*kaścid*) as atman or anatman.

> [19:6] If it is assumed that time exists depending upon an existent

(*bhāva*), how can there be time without an existent? No existent whatsoever (*kaścana bhāva*) is found to exist. Where can time be?

Kaścid seems to signify an 'empty term', i.e., a concept formulated in language, in these cases pedagogically, which because it has no extra-linguistic reality, does not in fact exist and thus is 'nothing'. This is the 'nothing' of a chimera (e.g., 'round square'). It would take us too far afield to explore the various types of 'nothings' and 'emptinesses' developed and expounded by Buddhism throughout its history, as important and fascinating as that topic is. We can only hope that someone will undertake such a project soon, not only to put to rest all the misconceptions about Oriental 'nothingness' and nihilism, but more importantly to enrich our appreciation of a still too narrowly understood aspect of Buddhism.

71 – P. 254: *Sabbaso ākiñcaññāyatanaṃ samatikkamma nevasaññā nāsaññāyatanaṃ upasampajja viharati ti.*

72 – The trace is one of Derrida's most complex and difficult concepts, drawing on the Hegelian and Nietzschian notions of *aufhebung*. It is treated with ever more intricacy throughout his writings, and thus no single source could be cited for an adequate account of it. On the one hand it evokes the question of what, in French, may be the implication of the phrase *il se reste...* which means "it remains", but more literally would be translated "it itself remains" or "it [is the agent of] its own remaining" or "it remains itself", etc. The question then is what notion or form of identity survives through the difference from one moment to the next, or from one level to the next (the 'it' which oversees the 'it' that changes between pre-remaining and post-remaining), or the identity which both loses and gains itself through reflective reflexivity (the *se* makes the verb reflexive). The trace is that which survives radical negation, what survives the deconstruction of identity, but only insofar as it marks an erasure such that it may be re-traced, 're-traited', 'remaining' as *différance* (another important Derridean term, neither identical nor different from *difference*; i.e., it sounds the same but is written differently). I have already written on the trace in "Re-tracing the Human-Nature vs. World-Nature Dichotomy: Rereading Lao Tzu" (forthcoming, Dec. 1988, in *Journal of Chinese Philosophy*). An important, sustained discussion of the trace by Derrida can be found in "OUSIA et GRAMME: note sur une note de *Sein und Zeit*." in *Marges de la philosophie* (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1972) [translated by Alan Bass as "*Ousia* and *Grammē*: Note on a Note from *Being and Time*" in *Margins of Philosophy* (University of Chicago P, 1982)].

Helpful for the reader intimidated by the demands made on the reader by Derrida's style, though difficult texts in their own right, are Rodolphe Gasché's "Joining the Text: From Heidegger to Derrida" in *The Yale Critics: Deconstruction in America*, ed. J. Arac, et al. (Minneapolis: U of Michigan Press, 1983), pp. 156-174 [an interesting reading of the trace in the light of Heidegger's 'withdrawal of the withdrawal'], and chapter one of Robert Magliola's *Derrida on the Mend* (Indiana: Purdue UP, 1984) [see my review of this book in

The Journal of Ecumenical Studies, Fall 1986]. Suffice it here to say that rather than offering another theory of identity-in-difference, which for Derrida would only reinstate all of the original logocentric problematics, Derrida is rather concerned with the erasure of the logocentric tension between presence and absence (the re-tracing of trace; the presence of a track which marks the absence of whatever left it behind, i.e., the presence which remains – *il se reste* – that marks an absence; the activity of absenting through which a trace arises; the French word *trait* can mean both 'trait' and 'trace', thus trace as the deferred signification of psychological and other traits and tendencies; etc.). It is also a corollary to his notion of 'permeable margins':– cf. "Tympan" in *Margins* and *Positions* (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1972) [translated by Alan Bass as *Positions* (University of Chicago P, 1981)]; and the notion of 'reserve' (what remains in reserve, untapped excess):– cf. *Positions;* "The Supplement of Copula: Philosophy before Linguistics" in *Margins;* "From Restricted to General Economy: A Hegelianism without Reserve" in *Writing and Difference,* tr. Alan Bass (University of Chicago P, 1978). Again, like the trace, these topics are re-discussed throughout Derrida's writings.

73 – P. 118, citing *Visuddhimagga* p. 280 (*Path of Purity* p. 366f).

74 – The example of oil 'residue', i.e., that which remains (*il se reste*) even after being emptied, has its corollaries in Yogācāra texts, and is part of the distinctively Yogācāric interpretation of *śūnyatā*. Cf. e.g., *On Knowing Reality* (Janice Willis' translation of the *Tattvārtha* chapter of Asaṅga's *Bodhisattvabhūmi* – which, contrary to what Willis claims, is rather Asaṅga's theory of language!) pp. 100–102, 117, 122–123; and Vasubandhu's *bhāṣya* to v. 2 of *Madhyānta-vibhāga*.

75 – *Phassa* means the contact between a sense-organ and its object; if there is no object, with what is an awareness in 'contact'?

76 – The trisvabhāva model, often considered one the primary Yogācāra models, will be investigated later. I will there show why this model needs to be considered in four steps, rather than simply three.

77 – A translation with an introductory essay can be found in T.W. Rhys Davids, *Buddhist Suttas* (NY: Dover) 1969 rpt. of 1881 *Sacred Books of the East* edition, pp. xxix–136.

78 – As mentioned previously, there are differing enumerations of the number and types of dhyānas and/or bhūmis in the three-world system, and this sutta contains one of those variations. On p. 115, *ibid.,* Rhys Davids translates the five post-rūpic meditations as

[1] the infinity of space alone is present. And passing out of the mere

> consciousness of the infinity of space he entered into the state of mind to which [2] the infinity of thought is alone present. And passing out of the mere consciousness of the infinity of thought he entered into a state of mind to which [3] nothing at all was specially present. And passing out of the consciousness of no special object he fell into a state [4] between consciousness and unconsciousness. And passing out of the state between consciousness and unconsciousness he fell into a state in which [5] the consciousness both of sensations and of ideas had wholly passed away.

At which point Ānanda mistakes him for dead, though he is not dead yet. Cf. the description of meditative sequences on pp. 52ff, where the four rūpic jhānas are severly glossed allowing this list to equal eight stages (three *rūpic* + five *arūpic*). In this version, our top level which was the impasse between *saṃjñā* and *asaṃjñā* is crowned with a higher stage, in which neither *saṃjñā* nor *vedanā* has survived. This is uncharacteristically nihilistic, but finds its corollaries in the *nirodha-samāpatti* as well as *nirvikalpa jñāna*, both of which we shall have occasion to discuss later.

79 – This aporia of precedence and consequence is reflected in the historical development of the theory of Awakening. While Buddha repeatedly claims in the Pāli texts that Awakening is consequent upon uncovering the deep, underlying psycho-cognitive roots of *avidyā* (i.e., the *āsavas*, etc.), the Theravāda tradition, by arguing that the complete uncovering of presuppositions through the meditative examination of the ārūpa-dhātu was unnecessary, allowed the possibility of an Awakening which did not plumb the radical depths of the human condition. Later, this controversy took several forms. While the Theravadins believed that Awakening was sudden, other non-Mahāyānic schools insisted that it was gradual. This debate is recorded in the *Katthā-vatthu*. Another form of the debate argued that if disentangling one's karmic condition involved the gradual activity of discovering and overcoming, piece by piece, one's karmic legacy, the task would be interminable, since each counter-karmic action is itself an action, and thus productive of further karma. Instead, certain schools proposed a sudden, disruptive experience which plucked out the problematic roots without having to examine them centimeter by centimeter. Both the sudden/gradual and the modificatory/disruptive controversies reemerged in Ch'an (Zen). The polemical assault of the Southern school against the Northern school is well known, as are such later ramifications as Chinul's Sudden Awakening *followed by* Gradual Practice. Lin-ch'i, the founding patriarch of what in Japan is called the Rinzai school, himself came to Awakening in part by abandoning the modificatory model in favor of the disruptive model (cf. Irmgard Schloegl, *The Zen Teaching of Rinzai*, Berkeley: Shambhala, 1976, p. 35). The chiasm between previous and subsequent, i.e., the temporal implications of the *archē* being a trace, became one of the most striking features of Dōgen's philosophy: against the claim that Awakening involved a once-and-for-all realization, or that Actualized Awakening

merely involved the realization of an identity with Original Awakening, Dōgen reiterated the aporetic chiasm by insisting that Awakening itself has to be dropped each and every moment in order that one may Awaken each and every moment. It goes beyond the scope of the present work to examine these and other theories of Awakening further.

80 – From *Zen: Poems, Prayers, Sermons, Anecdotes, Interviews*, ed. and tr. by Lucien Stryk and Takashi Ikemoto (NY: Doubleday Anchor Original, 1965), p. 113.

81 – Schloegl, *op. cit.*, pp. 45–46.

82 – On the term ***pratimokṣa*** (P. ***pātimokkha***) and the various attempts by modern scholars to translate it, see John Holt, *Discipline*, p. 35f n. 1. Holt's book is among only a handful of modern works which deal with the Vinaya corpus. While this may lead one to conclude that *today* Buddhist philosophy does not attract ethically-minded thinkers, unfortunately one repeatedly encounters the misguided assertion that Buddhism itself lacks sufficient ethical depth. As a more careful appraisal of both Buddhist literature and history would show, however, this lack exists in the interests of modern scholars, not Buddhism itself. While Buddhism has perhaps lost some of its original zeal in the fields of ethics and social reform, a zeal observable in such things as Buddha's critique of the caste system and his proposal of a Saṅgha as a social alternative, or the fact that Buddhists created the first animal shelters and preserves in human history, places where the hunting or killing of animals was forbidden (a tradition still observable in Southeast Asian monastic communities today), etc., the ethical crisis of contemporary Buddhism derives not so much from a lack of ethical and social concern within early Buddhist communities, as much as it reflects later social and political conditions which displaced the concrete ethicality of Buddhism's original intentionality. That it is the concrete applications and not the ethical impulse which have suffered can be seen by the virtually unanimous call for ethical reconsolidation by nearly all Asian Buddhist communities, from India and Southeast Asia to Japan.

Rahula's *The Heritage of the Bhikkhu* (NY: Grove Press, 1974) is an English translation (by K.P.G. Wijayasurendra) of his Sinhalese ***Bhikṣuvage Urumaya***, a history of the ethical and socio-political orientation and activities of the Saṅgha. Rahula was one of the leading forces behind the move for Ceylonese independence from the British, and this work chronicles not only past socio-political events in Buddhist history, but also documents the "imperialist conspiracy" which almost succeeded in stripping Buddhism of its activist abilities, by political machinations as well as proferring revisionistic misrepresentations of the bhikkhu (monk) in scholarly literature.

The shrewd and manipulative distortions of history and socio-realities by 'scholarship', particularly as it has influenced and continues to influence not

only Western perceptions of Asian traditions and cultures, but more importantly how it continues to influence Asian self-perceptions, has not yet been fully delineated or appreciated, though some efforts in this area have been made. Two works which revealingly deal with these issues, though not in reference to the Asian context, are Ortega y Gasset's *An Interpretation of Universal History*, tr. by Mildred Adams (NY: W.W. Norton, 1975), a series of lectures critiquing Toynbee's historicism; and Malek Alloula's *The Colonial Harem*, tr. from French by Myrna and Wlad Godzich (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), a presentation of 19th and early 20th Century French postcards of Algerians, particularly women, accompanied by an essay whose language and rhetoric evokes sartrean, barthesian and foucaultian themes which indict the colonial fantasizer through his own fantasies.

For an example of the force of Buddhist ethicality even during the Yüan Dynasty in China, see Sechin Jagchid's "The Mongol Khans and Chinese Buddhism and Taoism", *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies*, 2, no. 1, 1979, pp. 7-28. When competing with the Taoists for support and patronage of the Khan, the Buddhists win out by responding to the question 'What is the secret of ruling?' with: Study politico-ethics, know what causes people suffering and joy and act accordingly.

83 - But see Sangharakshita's *A Survey of Buddhism* (Boulder: Shambhala, 1980) p. 127, in which he echoes the Pali Text Society's *Pali-English Dictionary* which rejects the term 'commandment'. Instead he proposes 'ten items of good character' or 'good behavior and training'. However he offers no specific reason for rejecting the term commandment. Of course, if taken in its literal, technical sense as a 'decree' or 'edict' from God or some other divine source, the term would have to be rejected by Buddhism. But if simply taken in a loose, popularistic sense as 'fundamental ethico-moral rubric', then there should be no objections to the term.

84 - *Brahmacarya*, which originally probably meant something like 'religious life' (cf. e.g. M I:522; and Jan Ergardt, *Man and His Destiny*, p. 57), came to mean complete sexual abstinence. While total abstention was insisted upon for the monastic community, the notion of brahmacarya was softened for lay followers to mean refraining from sexual misconduct such as adultery, incest or sexual activity with a member of the monastic community. A similar institutionalization of this term occurred in Jainism, at roughly the same time; in fact, this entire list of ten advantageous activities may reflect a revisionistic appropriation of the Jaina Five Vows. Cf. Chandradhar Sharma's *A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy* (Delhi: Motilal, 1976) p. 66.

85 - Rahula, in *What the Buddha Taught*, writes: "abstention...from harsh, rude, impolite, malicious and abusive language" (p. 47).

86 – Rahula, *ibid.*, writes: "backbiting and slander and talk that may bring about hatred, enmity, disunity and disharmony among individuals or groups of people."

87 – Rahula, *ibid.*, writes: "idle, useless and foolish babble and gossip."

88 – (*op. cit.*, p. 69)

89 – We will look at the notion of *avijñapti–rūpa* later.

90 – The Theravādin Vinaya texts have been translated into English and published by the Pali Text Society and the Sacred Books of the Buddhists series. These rules are found explicated there. The Vinaya presents these rules anecdotally, recounting the situations and persons which occasioned their original formulations. Typically an argument or issue arises between members of the Saṅgha or others, which is resolved by the establishment of some rule or set of rules. For Buddhaghosa's version of how those rules came to be codified and canonized in the First Council, see his *Vinayassa Bāhiranidānaṃ*. This has also been translated into English as *Inception of Discipline and Vinaya–Nidāna* by N.A. Jayawickrama (London: Sacred Books of the Buddhists XXI, 1962) which also contains the Pāli text romanized in the back. For a fascinating, if more legendary account of the process of canonization and its subsequent historical development, cf. Dhammakitti's *Saddhamma–saṅgaha*. Written centuries later, it differs frequently with Buddhaghosa's account. Dhammakitti's text has been translated by B.C. Law as *A Manual of Buddhist Historical Traditions* (Delhi: Bharatiya, 1980). Law's introduction is excellent.

91 – Cf. the discussion of this in Rahula's *The Heritage of the Bhikkhu*, pp. 8–12.

92 – Ch. 6:3. P. 112 in *Buddhist Suttas, op. cit.*

93 – For a quick summary of this and the other Buddhist councils, and the major issues in dispute, see *Buddhism: A Modern Perspective* Charles Prebish, ed. (Penn State UP, 1978) pp. 21–26. The Second Council is treated on pp. 23–25. The works by Buddhaghosa and Dhammakitti cited in n. 90 above also discuss the Councils.

94 – Aside from the Theravādin Vinaya, only the Sarvāstivādin and Mahāsāṅghika Vinayas have received any sustained attention. See Charles Prebish's *Buddhist Monastic Discipline: The Sanskrit Prātimokṣa Sūtras of the Mahāsāṃghikas and Mūlasarvāstivādins* (Penn State UP, 1975). Such studies are only a beginning. The East Asian traditions considered the Vinaya as a separate school, though to date acknowledgement and study of this 'school' in Western

99 – This prefigures the notion of an ālaya–vijñāna or warehouse–consciousness, which is the locus of the cognitive and affective economies. Like a warehouse, it takes things in, stores them for awhile, and when the proper conditions arise, it sends those things back out. The ālayic economy will be described more fully in a later chapter.

100 – Cf. Ergardt, *op. cit.* pp. 42ff for a discussion of the function in the ***Majjhima Nikāya*** of such cognate terms as ***bhavati*** (to become, to develop), ***bhāveti*** (to cause to become or develop), ***bhāvanā*** ([mental] development), ***cittabhāvana*** (mind–development), ***bhāvitattā cittassa*** (developing the mind [to see things] as they are), etc. Cf. also p. 82, re: ***bhāvehi*** (the imperative 'Develop!'), and *passim.*

101 – There are several ways that the various Buddhist schools are conventionally differentiated, such as by their opposing arguments on key epistemological or ontological concepts, by the structure and contents of their canon (which texts, and which reading of those texts they deem most important), etc. One rarely finds an attempt to differentiate and explicate the various schools using their respective mārgas as the criterion of comparison, though such a comparison would be quite valuable and instructive. Not only would this be illuminating for stark contrasts, such as between Mādhyamika and various forms of Pure Land, but perhaps even more revealing where the initial differences appear a bit more obscured, such as ***between*** various Pure Land schools, or the mārga of the ***Abhidharmakośa*** in light of the ***Yogācārabhūmi*** or ***Cheng wei–shih lun,*** etc. This approach might also prove useful in the difficult task of classifying those important thinkers who seem to straddle several schools, depending on who is describing them, such as Dignāga (Sautrāntika or Yogācārin), Śāntarakṣita (Mādhyamikan, Sautrāntika or Yogācārin), Bhartṛhari (Hindu, Buddhist, both, neither), etc. This might lead to such fascinating questions as 'Do Candrakīrti and Sthiramati actually share the same basic assumptions while expressing them through different methods?' A comparison of their respective mārgas (e.g., ***Mādhyamakāvatara*** vs. ***Triṃśika–ṭīkā***) might address that more directly than contrasting their rhetorical or logical stances.

102 – The 75 dharma system of the ***kośa*** and the 100 dharma system of the ***Ch'eng wei–shih lun*** enumerate and explicate the ***asaṃskṛta*** (non–conditioned; non–conditioning) nirodhas differently from each other. This will be examined later.

103 – This issue forms one of the important themes of Vasubandhu's ***Karma–siddhi–prakaraṇa***.

104 – Cf. Ergardt, pp. 50, 57, 68 and ***passim*** for the locations and

scholarship can barely be called rudimentary.

95 – The Mādhyamikan critique of śīla seems, ironically, never to have been institutionalized. For instance, whereas Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā* exhibits some of these tendencies, his *Mādhyamikāvatāra*, on the contrary, firmly grounds itself within the practice of the pāramitās. In subsequent Indian and then Tibetan forms of Mādhyamika, the anti-śīla rhetoric is entirely displaced by the syncretic blending of Prāsangika Mādhyamika with other schools, such as Yogācāric, Sautrāntika and Svātantrika thought. The writings of such thinkers as Śāntideva, Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla, and Tsoṅ-ka-pa amply illustrate this syncretism. It has led scholars to frequently dispute to which school(s) these thinkers owed their allegiance.

As to Zen schools, the anti-śīla tendencies never really became mainstream. The first Korean Ch'an master, Wu-hsiang (kor.: Musang; 684–762) was well known for his rejection of the precepts, including the requirement of 'sitting-meditation'. According to Tsung-mi, Musang influenced other masters, such as Wu-chu (714–774). The tension between following the 'rules' versus 'freedom from all conventions' reasserted itself periodically, but usually in the more restricted and subdued form of 'follow the scriptures' versus 'burn the scriptures'. On the early conflicts, cf. Yanagida Seizan's "The *Li-Tai Fa-Pao Chi* and the Ch'an Doctrine of Sudden Awakening" in *Early Ch'an in China and Tibet*, ed. by Whalen Lai and Lewis Lancaster (Berkeley: Berkeley Buddhist Studies, 1983) pp. 13–49. On the more normative Ch'an traditions concerning śīla and vinaya, cf. Martin Collcutt's "The Early Ch'an Monastic Rule: *Ch'ing kuei* and the Shaping of Ch'an Community Life" in *ibid.*. pp. 165–184.

96 – For Theravādin examples of such meditations, see e.g. Nyanaponika Thera's *The Heart of Buddhist Meditation* (NY: Samuel Weiser, 1973) which contains a translation and discussion of the *Mahā-satipaṭṭhāna sutta* of the Dīgha Nikāya; and Matara Sri Ñāṇārāma Mahāthera's *The Seven Stages of Purification and the Insight Knowledges* (Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1983) which offers an overview of Buddhaghosa's *Visuddhimagga* from a practical orientation.

97 – For an engrossing, if slightly theosophical discussion of these practices, based primarily on the Tibetan tradition, cf. Lama Anagarika Govinda's *Creative Meditation and Multi-Dimensional Consciousness* (Wheaton, Ill.: Theosophical Publishing House, 1976). For beautifully presented examples of Tantric art as preserved in the Japanese tradition, cf. Pierre Rambach's *The Secret Message of Tantric Buddhism*, tr. from French by Barbara Bray (NY: Rizzoli International Publications, 1979).

98 – An excellent treatment can be found in Agehananda Bharati's *The Tantric Tradition* (NY: Samuel Weiser, 1975) chs. 5 and 6 and *passim*.

functions in the Pāli texts of the terms used in this paragraph.

105 – *Principles of Human Understanding* I, sec. 3; in *George Berkeley: Principles, Dialogues, and Philosophical Correspondence*, ed. by Colin Turbayne (Indianapolis: Bobbs–Merrill, 1965), p. 23.

106 – *Ibid.*, sec. 6, p. 25.

107 – Notice that Berkeley considers 'conceivability' to be the only significant criterion of existence. In this he intentionally diverges from the more typical Scholastic (he calls them the "Schoolmen") position which would evaluate the reality or existence of a thing based on whether it could (i) 'be' or (ii) 'be conceived'. Their position opens the door for the possibility of things which might 'be' (i.e., be real and/or exist) and yet remain inconceivable, or beyond our ability to adequately cognize them. Berkeley's immaterialism is precisely the claim that the first category ("to be"), isolated from the second category ("to be conceived"), is a chimeric, misleading 'abstraction' not supportable by actual experience. His explicit target is the doctrines of the Occasionalists, though his elimination of the independent status of the first category also challenges Medieval thought, as well as Descartes, Spinoza and most of Berkeley's other predecessors. Since the distinction between 'to be' and 'to be conceived' was used, among other purposes, to argue that certain attributes or qualities of God existed though they were incapable of being adequately conceived by us, Bishop Berkeley explicitly sets out to argue that his doctrine does not threaten the theological viability of God, but on the contrary, since it makes God the agent of the ideas which populate the world, and makes our minds the immaterial spiritual agents most like God in that they too perceive these ideas, therefore his doctrine provides the valuable theological insight which will overcome materialists, skeptics and atheists.

108 – *Op. cit.*, sec. 2, 7, 27, 36, 38, 48, 57, 89, etc.

109 – This argument is extrapolated from his *Principles of Human Understanding* I, sec. 3–6, 48 and 90.

110 – This argument should raise some question about whether the real objects–qua–ideas need necessarily be humanly empirical or not, i.e., whether by *percipi* Berkeley means strictly that given a perceptible object X, a human perceiver Y must necessarily be able to perceive X, or whether X need only be perceivable by God; and if only God must necessarily be capable of perceiving X, what is the relation between objects humans perceive and those that God perceives? Are God's 'ideas' analogous or identical to our own, or are they different? If different, to what degree? And if different in critical ways, what is the status of human knowledge? Berkeley himself opens the door to these and other questions -- which if pushed sufficiently, lead right back to the 'skepticism

and atheism' his doctrine of immateriality was designed to circumvent -- when he writes (sec. 6):

> Some truths are so near and obvious to the mind that a man need only open his eyes to see them. Such I take this important one to be, to wit, ***that all the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth*** [my emphasis], in a word, all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not any subsistence without a mind – that their ***being*** [emphasis Berkeley's] is to be perceived or known, that, consequently, so long as they are not actually perceived by me or do not exist in my mind or that of any other created spirit, they must either have no existence at all or else subsist in the mind of some eternal spirit – it being perfectly unintelligible, and involving all the absurdity of abstraction, to attribute to any single part of them an existence independent of a spirit.

His inclusion of the Heavenly choir amongst the 'bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world' would suggest that there do indeed exist ideas or things which only God, but never humans, can perceive (cf. sec. 48); as does his claim that if no created mind or spirit perceives something, it can still be said to exist if it "subsist[s] in the mind of some eternal spirit". This passage raises all sorts of other, related sticky issues as well: Is there any ontological distinction between something 'actually perceived by me' and something which 'exist[s only] in my mind'? If, as he argues elsewhere, 'matter' cannot be posited as a substratum to perceptions (sec. 7, 16–17, 71–73, etc.) because it is a mere linguistic 'abstraction', what justifies his assertion of a substrative 'mind' belonging to 'some eternal spirit'? Mustn't that substrative mind also be a mere linguistic abstraction?

Buddhism agrees with Berkeley that it is improper to postulate a substance/matter independent of perception to serve as its substratum. They would oppose, however, his own substrative postulation of 'spirit' or 'Eternal Invisible Mind' (I, sec. 94), since it is subject to the identical objections which he raises against materialism, viz. it is a non-verifiable postulate external to and irrelevant to a consciousness engaged in immediate perception. To use his own language, it is an 'abstraction'. Hume's famous contention that he could find no substrative, permanent self within the momentary, changing 'bundle of perceptions', of course, is directed precisely at this point. This highlights the force of Husserl's observation that consciousness is always ***consciousness of***. The existence of consciousness is as dependent on an object as the object is on consciousness; as Husserl claims, this even applies to so-called "imaginary" objects. The 'mind', as the vector of apperception, arises through conditions; there are no grounds for making it (mind or spirit) the agent (sec. 27, 57, etc.) of perception, though the wake of Cartesianism predisposed many to believe and assert that there were. Tellingly, the weakness of the argument(s) Berkeley advanced for privileging mind (especially sec. 57, 62, 151) offered precisely the point at which Hume focused his

attack, in Hume's successful venture of destroying the religious edifice of Berkeley's thought.

111 – Sautrāntikas insist that direct perception (***pratyakṣa***) cognizes particulars (***svalakṣaṇa***), whereas inference (***anumāna***) cognizes general categories (***sāmānya***), and that only particulars are real, though general categories can help us think about them if we are careful. By 'careful', they mean don't mistake the generalities for universals, remember that the generalities are prajñapti and not actual realities, and remain cautiously aware of the seductive economy of language which reduces all that falls within it to the status of universals, at least implicitly. Thus their theory of language, apohavāda, which denotes things by indicating what they exclude (instead of saying 'this is a table', one says 'this is not not-a-table'), is designed to compensate for language's universalistic tendencies, as well as providing a method for indicating particulars that does not reify universal categories. Each of the words in the sentence "Here is the table", when analyzed, shows itself to signify a universal class. For instance, to say "table" is to reduce this particular perception to the universal class 'table'. Apoha (not not-a-table) indicates we may heuristically associate this particular with other similar particulars, but only because its characteristics exclude possible associations with other particulars (e.g., 'antelope'); the point being that this association is based on cognitive heuristics, not some ontologically real universal class. It offers a method, if properly used, for converting universal categories into informative indexicals.

For more on apoha, see Mokṣākaragupta's ***Tarkabhāṣā,*** eng. tr. by Kajiyama, Yuichi as ***An Introduction to Buddhist Philosophy: An Annotated Translation of the Tirkabhāṣā of*** Mokṣākaragupta, Memoirs of the Faculty of Letters, Kyoto University, no. 10, 1966; Th. Stcherbatsky's ***Buddhist Logic,*** 2 vols. (NY: Dover) 1962; and the essays by Richard Hayes, Radhika Herzberger, Shoryu Katsura, K. Kunjunni Raja, and Tom Tillemans in ***Buddhist Logic and Epistemology,*** ed. B.M. Matilal and Robert Evans (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1986) on pp. 31–58, 143–170, 171–184, 185–192 and 207–228, respectively. The Gelukba School in Tibet apparently has a very different view of these matters, and their interpretation is expounded in Anne Klein's ***Knowledge and Liberation*** (Ithaca: Snow Lions, 1986).

112 – By this, I mean not simply that ***yathābhūtaṃ*** and ***tathatā*** are synonyms, but rather that tathatā implies the convergence of 'knowing and seeing' (***jānāti passati***) with 'things just as they are' (***yathābhūtaṃ***). In Husserlian terms, whether this signifies a noetic-noemic unification or whether it signifies the erasure of any and all noetic-noemic closures such that transcendental conditions (for Husserl these would be the transcendental object and the transcendental subject, but other transcendentals could be proposed) are dis-closed, has been disputed between differing Buddhist schools.

The problem of the noema, i.e., a cognized meaning noetically

constituted from a *hylé* (fundamental sensorial 'stuff') or transcendental object (i.e., an object which participates in the constitution of a sensed-object, though not itself given within the actual cognition of that sensed-object) has parallels in Buddhist thought, such as arise with the terms *viṣaya* and *ālambana*. Though Indian literature is far from consistent in its use of these and related epistemic terms, later texts, particularly of the Sautrāntika and later Yogācāric schools, take these terms as sensorial objects, or more precisely as the *objective-pole* of an act of cognition. The frequent denial of the existence of external objects which occurs in these texts is aimed primarily at rebuking the tendency to assign ontological status to sensed-objects outside, behind or beyond the actual cognitive act. Hence, these schools would vigorously deny Husserl's notion of a transcendental object. What exactly a sensed-object *is* remains a point of contention, however; Is it merely a mental projection (*pratibimba*), or does it contain some non-mental material elements (*rūpa*)? Are correct cognitions composed of definitive perceptions (*savikalpa jñāna*) or are they entirely devoid of conceptualizable content (*nirvikalpa jñāna*)? Do Awakened persons still experience representational mental images (*sākāra*) or do they experience in a radically different manner, thoroughly devoid of any mental images (*nirākāra*)? Each of these positions has been accepted and argued by different Buddhist schools.

To some extent the distinction between *nirākāra* and *sākāra* may simply boil down to a distinction between immediate direct perception as opposed to an indirect perception mediated by a conceptual background (Ganzfeld). The controversy then would hinge on the semantic ambiguity of the term *ākāra*. Both Sākāravadins and Nirākāravadins would agree that Awakened perception is direct and immediate. However the former would take *ākāra* as the 'configuration' of an act of immediate perception (shapes, sizes, textures, etc.) rather than as simply the percept, whereas the latter would take *ākāra* as signifying a conceptually derived ordering of perception that is representational rather than presentational, and therefore indirect perception. We will deal with some of these issues later, but for now we may say that those who assert that a correct, Awakened cognition involves definitive, representational mental content are, in effect, asserting that Awakened cognition is still noematic, whereas those who claim Awakened cognition is neither conceptual nor inclusive of any formalized mental images (i.e., it involves no *ākāra*), are denying both ontological status to noema as well as declaring that there are no noemae in Awakened cognition . For the latter groups, the noema is displaced by Tathatā, though exactly what that term signifies for each of them is arguable. We will return to this later.

Obviously the problem of a transcendental subject lying behind noesis or the noetic act, has been rigorously scrutinized by Buddhists, who, in the main, argue against it. However, one does find Buddhist literature which speaks about a true or pure self, particularly in the Tantra (cf., e.g., *Guhyasamājatantra* ch. 12 v. 4, etc.), and East Asian Buddhism, especially in Japan, has developed an entire rhetoric about the 'True' or 'authentic self'.

For instance, late in the *sagāthakam* portion of the *Laṅkāvatāra* (vs. 746–850) we find an entire section devoted to an oddly unbuddhistic glorification of ātman (self). Some examples (Suzuki's translation):

> 746. The ego (*ātma*) characterized with purity is the state of self-realization; this is the Tathagata's womb (*garbha*) which does not belong to the realm of the theorisers....
> 753. The Mind, primarily pure, is with the secondary passions, with the Manas, etc. and in union with the ego-soul [*ātman*] -- this is what is taught by the best of speakers.....
> 755. The ego [primarily] pure has been defiled on account of the external passions since the beginningless past, and what has been added from outside is like a [soiled] garment to be washed off.
> 756. And when a garment is cleansed of its dirt, or when gold is removed from its impurities, they are not destroyed but remain as they are; so is the ego freed from its defilements....
> 760. As the womb is not visible to the woman herself who has it, so the ego-soul is not visible within the Skandhas to those who have no wisdom....
> 763. When there is no true ego-soul, there are no stages, no self-mastery, no psychic faculties, no highest anointing, no excellent Samādhis.
> 764. If a destroyer should come around and say, "If there is an ego, show it to me;" a sage would declare, "Show me your own discrimination."

If there is any doubt as to the intent of these verses, the next four are unequivocal.

> 765. Those who hold the theory of non-ego [*anātman*] are injurers of the Buddhist doctrines, they are given up to the dualistic views of being and non-being; they are to be ejected by the convocation of the Bhikshus and are never to be spoken to.
> 766. The doctrine of an ego-soul shines brilliantly like the rising of the world-end fire, wiping away the faults of the philosophers, burning up the forest of egolessness.
> 767. Molasses, sugar-cane, sugar, and honey; sour milk, sesame oil, and ghee -- each has its own taste; but one who has not tasted it will not know what it is.
> 768. Trying to seek in five ways for an ego-soul in the accumulation of the Skandhas, the unintelligent fail to see it, but the wise seeing it are liberated.

Followers of anātmavāda are to be ostracized as heretics, while visions of ātman are liberating! For v.766, cf. *Bhagavad Gītā* ch. 11, vs. 12, 19–32; the Laṅkāvatāra gives this theme a decidedly apocalyptic tone. Cf. vs. 786–789, etc., for more on the Laṅkāvatāra's apocalyptic vision. Also, cf. the notion of one-taste

(*eka-rasa*) espoused in the *Saṁdhinirmocana Sūtra* (ch. 1) with the notion of many tastes implied in v.767.

To be fair to the Laṅkāvatāra, it also offers many verses denouncing ātman and proclaiming anātman, e.g., vs. 60, 281, 728, etc. This only adds to the ambivalence. Not unexpectedly, when ambivalence and ambiguity pervade a text, a wide hermeneutic space allowing vastly disparate interpretations arises. A simple case in point is the following verse also from the *sagāthakam* section of the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* (v. 419):

> Purity is not obtained by body, speech, and thought [i.e., karmic activity]; The Tathagata-lineage (*gotraṃ tāthāgatam*) being pure, is devoid of Karma.

Gotra, which means 'family' or line of descent, has since the earliest Buddhist texts been used to counter Caste-consciousness by means of substituting a functional meaning for the term rather than an essential or ontological meaning. Simply, one is what one does (*karmaka*), rather than what one claims to be (*ātmana*). The *Sonadanda sutta* of the *Dīgha Nikāya* is a good example of this genre of redefining caste and class terms into functional, ethical terms, in that case through the word brahmin (priestly caste). Hence the *Laṅkāvatāra* verse poses the paradox that those who functionally follow the Tathagata are acting without acting, i.e., their action does not produce karma. More specifically, it is claiming that 'purity' cannot be achieved through karmic means, since purity signifies, by definition, the absence of karma. The point is methodological, procedural. D.T. Suzuki, accurately reflecting the East Asian tradition which would be disposed to interpreting these ideas essentialistically, not only so interprets it, but actually *translates* it thus:

> The pure [essence of Tathagatahood] is not obtained by body, speech, and thought; the essence of Tathagatahood (*gotraṃ tāthāgatam*) being pure is devoid of doings. (insertions Suzuki's; *The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* tr. by D.T. Suzuki, Boulder: Prajñā Press, 1978, p. 258))

He has not only essentialized the verse, he has also obscured its basic point, viz. the overcoming of karmic-activity. 'Purity' becomes the property of an essentialistic ontological being, perhaps even an essential property, rather than the characterization of a methodological and behavioral condition. That this type of hermeneutic stance produces a rhetoric of 'True Self' goes to the heart of the conflict between Hsüan-tsang and those Yogācāric schools and trends in China which he attempted to overcome. Since any 'ontology' professed in Mahāyāna Buddhism must ultimately view itself as provisional and (un-)grounded in śūnyatā, 'ontology' can never really be ontology, but at best 'upāyic rhetoric. This will be discussed more fully in the next chapter.

113 - Cf. Sangharakshita's *A Survey of Buddhism* (op. cit.) pp. 156-157:

> In those texts wherein the steps of the Eightfold Path are distributed

> into three stages the order of stages is not, as one might expect, Morality, Meditation, Wisdom, but Wisdom, Morality, Meditation. Here by wisdom is meant "learning"; for intellectual comprehension of the Doctrine, though in itself powerless to effect Liberation, must precede any attempt to put into actual practice even its most elementary tenets.

For another description of the interplay between the threefold praxis and the Eightfold Path, cf. Lama Govinda's *The Psychological Attitude of Early Buddhist Philosophy* (NY: Samuel Weiser, 1969) ch. 4.

114 – See my article "Ch'an and Taoist Mirrors" in *The Journal of Chinese Philosophy* 12 (1985) pp. 169–178, where I introduced the distinction between 'proscriptive epistemology' and 'prescriptive epistemology'. A proscriptive epistemology proscribes valid from invalid knowledge, valuable from nonvaluable meaning, good from bad, right from wrong, etc., by establishing criteria which demarcate the 'inner' and acceptable from the 'outer' and unacceptable/dangerous. It tends to be reductionistic and restrictive. Prescriptive epistemology, on the other hand, aims at uncovering the fundamental conditions of human knowing rather than insisting on or even recommending any particular criteriology of knowledge. It offers guidelines to facilitate the radical investigation, but refrains from proscribing any acts of knowing.

115 – See *ibid.* Jayatilleke's *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge* may be seen as an attempt to reduce prajñā to this third type, by arguing that the Early Buddhist criterion was a thoroughgoing empiricism. While he makes countless useful and insightful observations, he may finally have confused the requirement that a cognition be intersubjective with the claim that such knowledge is thereby empirical. Phenomenology, while also arguing for intersubjectivity, nonetheless is critical of empiricism. Husserl's critiques in *Ideas* and *The Crisis...* are well known. See also J. Douglas Rabb, "Empiricism from a Phenomenological Standpoint", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,* XLVI, 2, Dec. 1985, pp. 243–63. This is not the place to seek to determine exactly where the various strands of Buddhist thought would side in this debate, but we should remain aware that their options are larger than empiricism.

116 – This is not to say that Buddhism never became ensnared in the tension between means and ends. Actually, an interesting topology of the relations between the various schools could be drawn according to which schools emphasized Buddhism as a means (e.g., Theravāda), which as an end (e.g., Pure Land), which took the means themselves as the end (e.g., Tendai and Dōgen), which denied the efficacy of means toward an end (e.g., Mādhyamika), etc. The Sudden vs. Gradual controversy in Ch'an plays on the same theme.

117 – Cf. *Questions of King Milinda* III.5, where the king teases

Nāgasena by applying a well-known argument used by Buddha against Brahmins to argue that Buddha himself does not exist. In the *Tevijja Sutta* Buddha discredits the Brahmins who blindly follow authorities they and their teachers have never met. The king now argues that since neither Nāgasena nor his teachers have met Buddha, (i) they cannot know whether Buddha existed and therefore (ii) "there is no Buddha!" Nāgasena replies that even though the king and his father have never seen the Ūhā river in the Himalayas, they definitely know it is there. The king agrees. As to the problem of 'how to know Nirvāṇa', that occurs and is discussed throughout the *Milindapañha*. Cf. e.g. IV.8, 61–38. The following section (book V) deals entirely with 'the problem of inference'.

118 – "The Five Khandhas: Their Treatment in the Nikāyas and Early Abhidhamma", *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 14 (1986) pp. 35–53. The references offered in the next few notes are taken directly from Gethin's endnotes.

119 – SN III.47.

120 – MN I.299, SN III.100–1; cf. SN III 166–7.

NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE

1 – That this rendering poses immediate interesting connections with the term ***paramārtha***, usually mistranslated as 'ultimate truth' or 'absolute truth' but more literally meaning 'excelling referent' or 'ultra-referent', should be obvious. This will be discussed below.

2 – The notions of (i) an ***arché*** or (ii) an originary scene or (iii) a metaphysical First Cause, though overlapping, are distinguishable. While some forms of Buddhism, such as Mādhyamika, will reject all three outright, only the last notion, the notion of a first or primal cause is universally rejected by all Buddhists. From Pāli Buddhism to Pure Land, all would agree, for instance, that ***avidyā*** (nescience) is "beginningless". In East Asian Buddhism, the notion of primal or 'original' causes did, however, assume a prominence quite out of keeping with the Indian Buddhist resistance to metaphysical theories of primal events. For certain Buddhists the ***arché*** or originary scene would be one's 'original' Buddha nature, or the 'One Mind' theory of ***the Awakening of Faith***. Recovering or 'awakening' to one's true identification with this nature becomes the goal. Since Buddhism, at least since the inception of Mādhyamika, denied any ontological, metaphysical or substantial reality to 'identity' or 'nature' (***svabhāva***), these developments incurred serious controversies. It is a form of the 'originary' controversy which Hsüan-tsang takes up against Paramārtha and his doctrines. That will be discussed in a later chapter.

3 – The notion of a sudden, subitaneous Enlightenment or Awakening often presupposes a ready-made realm of Truth onto or into which one almost accidentally stumbles. Such a ready-made domain, whether called 'original mind', 'no-mind', 'pure mind', 'original nature', 'original face', or whatever, frequently has "the power to Awaken" attributed to it. This idea, derived from the tathāgatagarbha doctrine which guarantees that each sentient being is endowed with the embryonic seed (i.e., potential) for becoming a Buddha (realizing one's full potential). The tathāgata-garbha doctrine was transmitted to China through various texts, not the least important being the ***Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*** which tradition claims was the text that Bodhidharma used to establish the Ch'an sect, though modern scholarship has found the traditional version of Ch'an history to be suspect if not blatantly fictitious. Nonetheless, the idea that "we all are (potentially) Buddhas", originally ascribed to Bodhidharma and his introductory Ch'an message, became a major cornerstone for all East Asian Buddhism.

4 – While a 'causal root' in a beginningless chain may seem to be a non sequitor, the Yogācāra school does propose such a formulation, perhaps as a possible middle way between the virtually eternal dharmas of the Sarvāstivādins and the radically momentary, discontinuous dharmas of the Sautrāntikas. If the formulation is understood in strictly temporal terms, i.e., a causal chain which at

one and the same time has no beginning and yet has a temporally causal origin, then, of course, it would be nonsensical. If 'beginningless' is taken to mean either 'transcendental' (i.e., constitutive of experience without itself being given in experience) or 'remote' (i.e., removed from the domain of current cognitions), then the formulation may carry some significance. For an example of this type of reading, see the following note.

5 – If we take "beginningless" as an alternate formulation for "remote", then in virtue of some 'remote' or 'beginningless' event or chain of events the present comes to pass. Yogācāra, as well as some other Buddhist schools, subscribed to this type of modified 'primal cause'. The Yogācāra theory deals with this in terms of the seeds (*bīja*) and habituating influences (*vāsanā*) in the ālaya-vijñāna. In a later chapter we will touch on the issue of originary (i.e., beginningless) seeds vs. acquired seeds as reflected in the *Ch'eng wei-shih lun*.

6 – But see Bhikkhu Bodhi's "Introduction" to his translation of the *Mahānidāna Sutta* (with portions of Buddhaghosa's and Dhammapāla's commentaries). He argues that *paṭiccasamuppāda*

> teaches something more rigorous than a simple assertion of general conditionality. What it teaches is *specific conditionality* (*idappaccayatā*), the arising of phenomena in dependence on specific conditions. This is an important point often overlooked in standard accounts of the doctrine. Specific conditionality correlates phenomena in so far as they belong to *types*. (p. 2)

Bhikkhu Bodhi, *The Great Discourse on Causation: The Mahānidāna Sutta and its Commentaries* (Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1984). See also pp. 10–13 and *passim*. His point is well taken and significant, and strongly reflects the Buddhaghosan exegetical tradition. In contrast, the Mādhyamika school rejects any such thing as a 'sufficient cause'.

7 – The issue here is not the scientific coherence or justification for the theory of electro-magnetic energy, or even whether that energy should be conceptualized as a 'spectrum' of gradated continuity. The point is simply that we are conditioned to think of it that way, not just in the trite sense that we have all been exposed repeatedly to this theory, but that the theory is itself constructed out of our conditioning. We are conditioned to perceive certain things -- and science strives to technologically increase our range of perception by inventing and using instruments that render imperceptibles perceptible: telescopes and microscopes make invisibles visible, sub-atomic cloud chambers convert otherwise imperceptible events into observable and conceptually malleable data, etc. -- and we are conditioned to consider the things we perceive in certain ways. Whether we reduce our conditioned consideration to Kant's a priori categories, Locke's

primary and secondary qualities, Cartesian dualism, Aristotelian substances or any other proposed and influential theory of what our cognitive preset constants might be, we are always determining our experience in terms of our conditioned cognitive parameters. Buddhism suggests that those parameters are not immutably fixed as Kant believed; they can and ought to be altered, corrected, 'purified'. In short, the issue is not whether any particular theory is viable, but rather the importance of recognizing that the procedure through which all theories arise is already a conditioned process.

8 – If one objects that this criterion does not apply to the Vaibhāṣikas, then consider this. For the Vaibhāṣikas a real dharma must have functioned/acted in the past, be functioning/acting now, or will function/act in the future; though considered 'real' even when not in the moment of acting, the status of reality only comes to it because it is capable of acting and in fact does actually act at some point. Hence though it can be said to 'exist' (***asti***) throughout the three times (past, present, future), it can only be considered a real entity (***bhāva***) because it definitely acts at some actual moment. While they defer the immediacy of causal efficacy when considering whether some thing is real or not, it is only the immediacy, not the causal efficacy itself which is deferred.

9 – I hope to justify this odd reading of the term presently.

10 – Monier-Williams, *A Sanskrit–English Dictionary* (Delhi: Motilal, 1986 rpt) pp. 586a–589a.

11 – The more technical term for 'other' in Sanskrit is ***anta,*** but I will try to show through a phenomenological reading of ***pāra***– that it, too, signifies a profound meditation on the significance of otherness.

12 – One may be reminded not only of the Hegelian 'other' and the dialectical discourse on otherness which it has bred, but of Freud's important observations on his grandson's impromptu childish game. This is the episode:

> The child had a wooden reel with a piece of string tied round it. It never occurred to him to pull it along the floor behind him, for instance, and play at it being a carriage. What he did was to hold the reel by the string and very skilfully throw it over the edge of his little curtained [or "veiled"] bed, so that it disappeared into it, at the same time uttering the meaningful "o–o–o–o." He then pulled the reel out of the bed again by the string and hailed its reappearance with a joyful "***da***" ["there"]. This, then, was the complete game – disappearance and return.

Freud interprets the sounds as "fort/da" ("away/right there"). Freud reasoned that

this game was a way that the child was working through the separation anxieties that were beginning to arise as his mother, as it were, exited beyond his horizon, beyond his control. See Freud's *Beyond the Pleasure Principle,* ch. 2, and Derrida's close and suggestive reading of this chapter, "Coming into One's Own", in *Sigmund Freud: Modern Critical Views,* ed. Harold Bloom (NY: Chelsea House Press, 1985) pp. 129–142. Since the context is the power of pleasure and pain, and what "beyond the pleasure principle" might motivate and condition behavior, this very squarely falls within proximity of the Buddhist vedanic concerns discussed in the previous chapter.

13 – The term 'ken' is being used in the broadest sense. Admittedly, the issue of memory is being ignored for the present. But Buddhists have suppressed serious reflection on memory, frequently either ignoring it or reducing *smṛti* to mindfulness of the present moment, or a kind of Husserlian retention which retains the just passed moment for an instant or two. They would defend this negligence by arguing that the status of an object outside of my immediate cognition, even when 'remembered', is epistemologically suspect, certainly more so than the object being currently cognized. This makes their claims about meditation objects all the more interesting. For instance, in Theravāda (and probably Yogācāra) meditation after observing an object with fixed attention for a length of time, the object is reconstituted mentally just as it is, i.e., visualized with all its details and flaws. Subsequently, the object becomes seen as it truly is, devoid of *ākāra* (shape, size, texture, etc., but implying, in Buddhist usage, mental representations, *Vorstellung*). The two meditative objects, the one with flaws and the one as it truly is, are not considered memory objects, but current, vital mental constructions as real as the initial sensory object. Its presence is of the present. As Plato's *anamnesis* and Kashmir Śaivism's *pratyabhijñā* show, even re-collective theories must demand that memories become fully present as actual cognitions in order to be called 'knowledge'. Further, for Buddhists, memory qua saṃskāra means that memory is contextual, always present in a sense as a constituent of the Ganzfeld; neither memory nor the so-called objects it retains can ever be truly absent. That this position, though philosophically intriguing, was nonetheless at times difficult to maintain led to the development of the notion of the ālaya-vijñāna as an attempt to account for how memory functioned without having to posit the absolute absence of anything in memory.

14 – Cf. Derrida's *Spurs* in which he mounts a Nietzchian critique of Heidegger's *Being and Time* through just this point of the appropriational nature of the given, the gift, the *Es gibt,* which even in Heidegger's text precedes Being, though Heidegger overlooks or "forgets" its place. Derrida's text is a stunning rumination on the issue of appropriation over and against any ontologically prior being.

15 – Lao Tzu's first chapter offers a delicious, profound meditation on

this theme:

> ...These two [oppositions] arise together, though differently named,...
> [the region of their linkage] is called *hsüan* (deep, profound, dark, mysterious),
> [fixing the locus of each] *hsüan* is [futile, since] that again is *hsüan*-ed.
> This [region/non-region] is the gateway to all marvels (*miao*).

Despite Lao Tzu's explicit balancing of all oppositional tensions in this passage, virtually every commentator on this chapter has read the first two lines as if they favored one side of an opposition ("constant tao" or "nameless") over the other ("tao-able" tao or "Having-name"). On this, and the violence such a reading does to the whole chapter see my "Retracing the Human- vs. World-Construction Dichotomy in Lao Tzu", forthcoming *Journal of Chinese Philosophy,* Dec. 1988.

16 – Epistemologically, the obstruction is of paramount importance, since, it is only on account of obstruction (*āvaraṇa*) that one is less than omniscient (*sarvajña*) and thus not Awakened (*bodhi*). Offering a coherent theory for how noesis and noema are linked and related remains problematic, since, as Mādhyamika would remind us, in order to be related they must either be the same or different. If the same, the distinction between noema and noesis is fallacious or unnecessary. If different, they lack the common ground by which a relation, particularly a cognitive relation, could be predicated of them. As Aristotle noted, like can only know like. The Mādhyamikan critique of epistemology is of course more precise and more far-reaching. Cf. e.g. *Prasannapadā,* Ch. 1.

17 – Psychoanalysts would call this type of extreme psychological projection through which I defend and affirm my self by radical self-effacement, "pathological". The Buddhist non-self doctrine (*anātman*) should not be confused with some form of self-annihilation. The self which is erased never existed; it was sheerly a cognitive construct, a prajñapti gone wild. The anthrocentricity of a "person" is erased, not the actual person. No longer hemmed in and grounded on a false logocentric root, a living body opens and enjoys (*sukha*) the world.

18 – Cf. Chuang Tzu's notion of the 'fit', i.e., when the belt fits, the waist is forgotten. When everything runs smoothly, one can forget about it, let it follow its own course. It is only when things stop running smoothly, when things start rubbing the wrong way, that the resultant friction compels us to become aware of the situation. If the shoe fits, we forget it. If our feet hurt, we think about our shoes. See K.M. Wu's *Chuang Tzu: World Philosopher at Play* (Scholar's Press, 1985) and my review of it in *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* 11 (1984) pp. 421–427.

19 – *Chuang Tzu* ch. 6. Watson's translation, *Basic Writings*, pp. 76–77

20 – One may object that this entire line of argument, beginning with a logocentric reading of *pāra–* as 'other', i.e., taking the notion of other s the essential core from which other, more marginal readings are centrifugally produced, involves and presupposes precisely the type of metaphysical privileging of center over margin which is here being challenged. However, I will not claim that the word *actually* evolved out of the meaning 'other', nor that every use and derivation need be traced back or even related to some notion of other. The reading of *pāra–* should be seen as a heuristic construction, one consciously constructed from a list of seemingly disparate dictionary definitions. It is a hermeneutic exercise, not a claim about the historical or linguistic status of any particular, central meaning. As will be evident shortly, what unfortunately emerges as the most influential interpretation of the term *paramārtha* is an extremely marginal one, namely the Vedāntic reading. We will propose a different marginal reading as a substitute, one which more genuinely reflects its Buddhist usage.

21 – This claim will be modified later in this chapter. Since to claim either that there is one or many ultimate achievements would entail promoting an extremist view, Buddha cleverly steers a middle course. See discussion of 'summits' below.

22 – *op. cit.*, pp. 588–89. Cf. *parame* ("standing at the top, supreme, superior"), *parās* ("beyond, further, off, away; in future, afterwards... on the other side of..."), *paras–para* ("mutual, each other"), *paro(–kṣa)* ("beyond the range of sight, invisible, absent, unknown, unintelligible"), etc.

23 – Cf. Monier–Williams, *op. cit.*, pp. 90b–91c.

24 – Conze writes that *svāhā* is "in the Tantric system... reserved for mantras addressed to feminine deities." E. Conze, *Buddhist Wisdom Books: The Diamond Sutra, The Heart Sutra* (NY: Harper Torchbooks, 1972) p. 106.

25 – H. Giles, *A Chinese–English Dictionary* (Taipei: 1972 rpt) character #9876. Cf. *Mathew's Chinese–English Dictionary* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, revised 1979), character #5754. *Jina,* of course, is an important term for Buddhism, since Buddha is considered the 'conqueror' of the *āsavas,* and it is an even more important term for Jainism, which derives its name from the Jinas who conquered dukkha and karmic ensnarement, such as Mahāvīra. While the Chinese character *sheng* implies both 'to be superior to, to excel' and 'to overcome, vanquish', the Sanskrit *paramā* only corresponds with the former meaning. Genjun Sasaki, *Linguistic Approach to Buddhism* (Delhi: Motilal, 1986), p. 77 states:

Parama in Pāli means, according to the commentators, *uttama* (ultimate). The *Abhidhānappadīpikā-sūci* defines *uttama* as that which has achieved its highest situation (*ubhūto atyattham uttamo*). Further, Dhammapāla defines *parama* in his *Kathāvatthu-anuṭīkā,* as *paṭṭhāna,* meaning 'pre-eminent' or *aviparītabhāva* meaning 'irreversibility'.

Candrakīrti, in his *Prasannapadā,* pp. 494, (English tr. in M. Sprung, *Lucid Exposition of the Middle Way,* Boulder: Prajñā Press, 1979, p. 231) reads *parama* similarly.

26 – A side note: *Sheng* (first tone) which is written identically to the fourth tone 'victorious' *sheng,* means (according to Giles) "to be adequate to; to bear; to sustain; to be worthy of," and Giles cites fourteen phrases using this term, including *pu k'e sheng wen* 不可勝言 "words are inadequate to express it"; and *k'u pu sheng wen* 苦不勝言 "miserable beyond all description" (Giles' trs.). The phrase *pu sheng wen* could be literally translated 'no adequate words', i.e., there are no adequate words to express... etc.

Yi, has several other important meanings, including the virtue which for Confucians is second only to *jen* (humankind-ness), and is usually translated 'righteousness'. Composed of two parts -- the upper part meaning a herd of sheep and the lower part meaning "I" or "me" -- which together denote the relation between the self and society, how does the "I" fit into the herd, how does the herd relate to the "I", etc., it thus may be more appropriately translated as "Justice", which constitutes the principles and codes for how societies treat individuals based on how individuals act in society, etc.

27 – Though scholars are gradually becoming aware of these schisms, much more needs to be done. An important contribution which addresses the 'contamination' of T'ien-t'ai non-dualism by Hua-yenish ontologizations and hypostatizations, is the recent PhD dissertation by Lang E. Ra, *The T'ien-t'ai Philosophy of Non-Duality: A Study in Chan-jan and Chih-li,* Temple University, 1988, unpub.

28 – For informative studies of how the two satyas developed subsequently in India (primarily in the Mādhyamika school), and then Tibet (wedding Mādhyamika with Tantra), see Malcolm David Eckel, *Jñānagarbha's Commentary on the Distinction Between the Two Truths: An Eighth Century Handbook of Madhyamaka Philosophy* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1987) and Michael M. Broido, "Veridical and Delusive Cognition: Tsong-Kha-Pa on the Two Satyas", *Journal of Indian Philosophy,* 16 (1988) pp. 29-63. Also see the interesting discussion, particularly of *lokasaṃvṛtti* and *lokavyavahāra,* in A.M. Pandhye, *The Framework of Nagarjuna's Philosophy* (Delhi: Sri Satguru, 1988) pp. 103-106.

29 – Monier-Williams, p. 1007.

30 – But cf. Sasaki, *op. cit.*, p. 80, where he charges that the Sanskritization of the Pāli *sammuti* (statement or convention) in effect created a new etymology for saṃvṛti.

> The Pāli root *saṃ-man* is disregarded and replaced by the Sanskrit root *saṃ-vṛ*, meaning 'to cover' or 'to hide'. It may be noted in passing that *saṃvṛtti* (spelled with two *ts*) is a misreading for *saṃvṛti*... Hence it would be unfair for some scholars to follow this misreading in an attempt to distinguish *saṃvṛti* from *saṃvṛtti* in its connotation.

31 – Monier-Williams, *op. cit.* A vṛti–*druma* is "a boundary tree,... –*dvāra*, n. a gate in a hedge,... –*bhaṅga*, m. a breach or fissure in a hedge,... –*ṃ–kara*, m. 'hedge-forming'."

32 – *Ibid.* The abbreviations refer to verbal cases: acc[usative], dat[ive], loc[ative], instr[umental], abl[ative]. E.g. "acc. of pers." is "accusative of person".

33 – *Ibid.*, p. 1009.

34 – On Asat, see Antonio deNicolas, ***Meditations through the Ṛg Veda: Four-Dimensional Man*** (Stony Brook: Nicolas Hays, Ltd., 1976), ch. 4, in which he offers an insightful reading of Asat as one of the "four languages of intentionality" embodied in the Ṛg Veda.

35 – *Ibid.*, p. 1116.

36 – *Ibid.*

37 – *Ibid.*

38 – *Ibid.* The abbreviations used are: f. = feminine; Suṣr(uta); Śārṅg(adhara) P(addhati); Śiś(upāla–vadha); Sarvad(arśana–saṃgraha); Amar(u–śataka); H(emacandra's) Yog(a–śāstra); mfn. = masculine, feminine, neuter; Subh(āshitāvali). Also Cf. *saṃvara, saṃvṛtj, saṃvartate, saṃvartā*, etc. cited on the same page.

39 – Cf. Derrida's *Spurs, op. cit.*, for a discussion of Nietzsche's characterization of 'woman' as a "dissimilatrice."

40 – My references to Freud here should not be understood as a claim that saṃvṛti need exclusively or even necessarily be interpreted in a freudian sense. I wish merely to suggest one of many possible 'Western' analogies which, to me, seem particularly fruitful and suggestive. What is said in this chapter about saṃvṛti neither rises nor falls on the justification of this analogy. It is merely a heuristic indication.

41 – Franklin Edgerton, *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary* (Delhi: Motilal, 1985 rpt.) vol. 2, p. 541. Edgerton's point is similar to Sasaki's, cited above in n. 30.

42 – Cf. Monier-Williams, p. 1034.

43 – David Kalupahana, ***Nāgārjuna***, *op. cit.*, p. 332. He discusses the two truths on pp. 331–335, and 340–341, offering a simplistic history of how Nāgārjuna corrected the distortions imposed by Sarvāstivādins, etc. on the original Buddha's teaching. The way he employs the Pāli texts to support his Mahāyānic readings is quite interesting. Kalupahana also argues that in Pāli the paramattha/sammuti distinction was basically "moral", the ideal over the conventional (p. 333–335). He also argues that saṃvṛti should not be reduced exclusively to the linguistic domain. Cf. Sasaki, *op. cit.*, (pp. 79–83) for a slightly different account of whether saṃvṛti and (Pāli) vohāra or (Skt.) vyavahāra (sometimes mis-sanskritized vyāhāra, 'speech') should or shouldn't be taken as applying strictly to a linguistic field, and if not, how much wider is its field. Both agree these terms should not be restricted to linguistic reference.

44 – The following line from Sasaki (p. 85) is typical: "When a Pāli ***sammuti*** is sanskritized as ***saṃvṛti,*** it has lost its etymological meaning, for the former is derived from the root ***sam–man*** ('to think together'), while the latter is derived from the different root *saṃ–vṛ* ('to cover up')."

45 – Cited in Sasaki, *ibid.*, p. 85. These quotes come from the ***Prasannapadā,*** XXIX, p. 492; cf. English tr. in Sprung, *op. cit.*, p. 230. Candrakīrti's discussion is typical for Mahāyāna, though he defers a full exposition to his ***Madhyamakāvatāra.***

46 – ***Prasannapadā,*** p. 495; Sprung's tr., p. 232.

47 – ***Madhyānta vibhāga śāstra,*** ed. R.C. Pandeya (Delhi: Motilal, 1971), p. 94. The passage I am about to examine is also cited in Sasaki (pp. 87f), but his translation and discussion, uncharacteristically, seem far off the mark.

48 – ***Vidya,*** which literally means 'knowledge' or 'found' (e.g., 'found out'), can also refer to whether a thing is actual, i.e., whether it exists. If X

cannot be rationally determined to exist, then X does 'not exist' (avidya). Whereas in the West, the Scholastics and Cartesians would feel compelled to consider both whether a thing 'could be' (*esse*) and whether it 'could be conceived' (*concipi*), the term (a-)vidya shows that such considerations were sometimes not in the foreground in Indian disputations. We have already commented on how Berkeley also conflated this distinction for European philosophy.

49 – This term is too complex and important to be explained in a cursory way; and what the term meant for different schools and different thinkers is not always clear. Suffice it for now to say that of the eighteen dhātus (see ch. 2), for Yogācāra and subsequently all Mahāyāna Buddhists, the Dharma-dhātu became the most important, in part, because it helped facilitate a reductionistic reevaluation of the other seventeen dhātus as 'ideas' or 'mental objects' (dharmā) of themselves. Since the cognitive object of manas, via mano-vijñāna is a dharma, the dharma-dhātu becomes a shorthand way of saying that all cognitive objects for all the senses are intentional, and hence mental objects. Texts such as *The Awakening of Faith* exhibit this reductionism when, for instance, they claim that the Dharma-kāya (Dharma-body, here signifying enlightened noesis) and the Dharma-dhātu (lit. 'realm or domain of dharma', here signifying the enlightened noema) are one. The notion developed beyond this scheme, and in some texts (such as Sthiramati's) it is used as a synonym or appellation for 'ultimate reality', the ontological ground of everything, etc.

Cf. Warder's *Indian Buddhism,* (Delhi: Motilal, 1980), pp. 403ff, where he discusses the commentaries to the ***Ratnagotra vibhāga (Mahāyāna Uttaratantra Śāstra)*** and ***Abhisamayālaṅkāra*** written by a Sthiramati which Warder believes is a different Sthiramati from the Yogācāric one we are currently discussing. However, Warder may be wrong. 'Both' Sthiramatis share very similar theoretical orientations, though Warder tries to make the non-Yogācāric one a Mādhyamikan. Cf. esp. p. 405 which describes that Sthiramti's notion of dharma-dhātu. In the future I hope to translate and publish a study on the Chinese translation of Sthiramati's commentary on Nāgārjuna's ***Mūlamadhyamaka kārikā*** (T. 1567), apparently only extant in Chinese. This text might answer some questions such as: Where there two Sthiramatis, a Yogācārin and a Mādhyamikan? Are Yogācāra and Mādhyamika compatible or mutually exclusive? How does Yogācāra read Mādhyamika? etc. If this commentary is, however, written by a Mādhyamikan, not a Yogācārin, the questions will of course be different.

50 – His commentary on the ***Triṃśikā*** also provides details of his language theory which give food for thought (e.g., ***bhāṣya*** to v. 1, etc.; and cf. ***bh.*** to vs. 24 and 25, which discuss paramārtha in terms of language, for example, the role of ***namin tiṣṭati,*** 'abiding in the nominal', for achieving liberation). A thorough study of his linguistic theories, as well as their relation to and influence on other Indian theories, is much needed. Sthiramati was a first class original

thinker, and the unrecognized precursor to much of Candrakīrti. However so far modern scholarship has not paid sufficient attention: he is usually either portrayed as the villain in a pseudo-controversy between himself and Dharmapāla revolving around whose Yogācāric interpretation is more 'correct' (with the East Asian community generally assuming that Hsüan-tsang sided with Dharmapāla, therefore conferring higher status on him; and CWSL contributes to this myth); or else he is taken as a minute commentator and expositor of Vasubandhu's texts. While one can argue that the implications he finds and explicates may not violate Vasubandhu's thought, and may even amplify it, one would be hard pressed to seriously claim that even a fraction of the implicatory nuances and surprising directions he takes in his commentaries to, e.g., ***Triṃśikā*** and ***Madhyānta vibhāga,*** are in any sense clearly 'there' in Vasubandhu's text. We have yet to fully appreciate the scope of original and innovative thinking which the 'commentary' genre produced, not only in the Buddhist tradition, but throughout world literature.

51 – E.g., cf. MMK 18.7 with Sthiramati's above discussion, and his commentary to vs. 1, 24 and 25 of the ***Triṃśikā.*** Nāgārjuna, too, discusses how what is referred to, the signified (***abhidhātvayaṃ,*** i.e., what an ***abhidhāna*** signifies) stops operating or ceases (***ni-vṛttam***) when the citta's perceptual-field (***citta-gocara***) stops moving or ceases (***nivṛtte***). When the citta stops projecting a world, then referentiality -- which implicates and presupposes an ontological layer of signifieds -- also ceases. The chapter (MMK 18) goes on to argue that this realization brings one to the jñāna which is valid and always already the case, with or without Buddhas or Buddhists (18.12). As we shall see later, the ***Triṃśikā*** also treats this topic. It may not be going too far to argue that verses such as this one demonstrate that Nāgārjuna's method presupposes and thus advocates samādhi as a necessary ingredient in the practice of that method.

52 – Eckel, *op, cit.,* p. 17. Cf. pp. 4–8, 51–65 and ***passim*** for a cursory discussion of the appropriation of Yogācāra by Madhyamaka. Much more study is needed.

53 – ***Prasannapadā,*** pp. 264–265; Sprung, pp. 155–156. Sprung translates this passage thus:

> Whatever is the quintessential nature (***dharmatā***) of the elements of existence, that and only that has a self nature (***svarūpa***). And what is the quintessential nature of the elements? Their self-existent nature (***svabhāva***). And what is self-existent nature? Original, invariable nature (***prakṛti***). What is original, invariable nature? Devoidness of being (***śūnyatā***). And what is devoidness of being? Not being of the nature of substantial thing [sic] (***naiḥsvabhāvya***). What is not being of the nature of substantial thing? The way things really are (***tathatā***). What is the way things really are? Being as they are (***tathābhāva***):

invariableness, steadfastness throughout all time.

While even Yogācāra would be uneasy with this reification of ontological constancy, the general thrust of this passage is a reiteration of the Yogācāric tri-a-svabhāvic doctrine, in which three 'self-existent natures' are emptied (***śūnyatā***) as three 'non-self-existent natures,' such that tathatā (just-as-it-is-ness) becomes evident. Nāgārjuna's own problematic statements on dharmatā and tattva (e.g., 18.7: ...***anutpannāniruddhā hi nirvāṇam iva dharmatā,*** and 18.9: ***Apara-pratyayam śāntam prapañcair aprapañcitam, nirvikalpam anānārtham etat tattvasya lakṣaṇam.*** See Kalupahana, pp. 271ff for an interesting, if apologetic discussion of the latter verse) do not by themselves lead to or justify Candrakīrti's 'system'.

54 – Candrakīrti, for one, denied that paramārtha-satya had anything to do with speech. He called it 'silence' (***tuṣṇīṃbhāva***). ***Prasannapadā,*** p. 57; Sprung p. 50. This passage will be discussed below.

55 – The idea of 'one taste' already occurs in the Nikāyas and is further developed in the Prajñāpāramitā literature and in texts such as the ***Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra*** and Lotus Sutra. Chinese T'ien-t'ai used the Lotus Sutra's ***ekarāsa*** as one of its pivotal doctrines.

56 – ***Nāgārjuna,*** p. 273.

57 – There have been many attempts to reduce the fourfold alternatives to a basic model, and the secondary literature is replete with attempts to translate it into formal logic. Generally it appears in some permutation of the following two schemata:

(1) x, (2) -x, (3) x and -x, (4) neither x nor -x; or

(1) x is [y], (2) x is not [y], (3) x both is [y] and is not [y], (4) x neither is [y] nor is not [y].

58 – A great deal of experimental psychology has amply studied and documented this point. Our eyes, for instance, are in constant movement, oscillating over a thousand times a second, since, if a light were to shine directly on the same part of the retina uninterruptedly for over forty-five seconds, the light would disappear from view (though still shining on the retina). By implication if the visual field were in a constant fixed position vis-à-vis the eye, neither the eye nor the field altering or moving in any way, then the world would literally disappear from sight! If we are subjected to a constant sound (either tonally or rhythmically constant), such as the hum of a machine or the ticking of a clock, after forty-five seconds to a minute we 'habituate' to the sound and not only don't consciously acknowledge or hear it, but EEGs show that our brains are no longer registering the sensation. Only a change in sound, a disruption of its

constancy will make us aware of it. We've all had the experience of being in a room where a loud machine went unnoticed until it turned off. The contrast between the resulting quiet and the previous unnoticed noise is so stark that we suddenly realize how loud it had been. Similar experiments have been done with other senses, all indicating that perception requires variability and change, contrast; perception disappears with constancy. Epistemology has recognized this for a long time, and it is reflected in such riddles as: If the universe is doubling in size every second, and we, as part of the universe, are doubling in size at the same rate, how would we know? Since this 'change' would be constant, it would necessarily be imperceptible.

59 – It cannot be overstressed that positions (***dṛṣṭi***), from a Buddhist point of view, are not simple, neutral abstract collections of propositions, but charged passionate interpretations of experience which thoroughly color and flavor – literally – our every thought, sensation and action. They are produced by and produce embodied-conditioning (saṃskāra), and are thus symptoms of our conditioning rather than neutral alternatives from which one can innocently and naively choose. This all follows from the Buddhist analysis of ***avidyā*** and ***jñeya-āvaraṇa***.

60 – This, to some extent, is precisely the position taken by Husserl in *Logical Investigations* and *Ideas*. Husserlian Phenomenology, let's not forget, began as a search for essences (*Wesen*).

61 – Kalupahana's tr., p. 361. Square brackets mine.

62 – ***Prasannapadā,*** p. 57; Sprung, p. 50.

63 – *Ibid.,* p. 445; Sprung, p. 202.

64 – *Ibid.,* p. 358; Sprung, p. 176. Cf. his commentary to MMK 18.8; *ibid.,* pp. 369ff; Sprung's tr. (p. 181f) is somewhat misleading in parts.

65 – See Whalen Lai, "The Sinitic Understanding of the Two Truths Theory in the Liang Dynasty ((502-557): Ontological Gnosticism in the Thought of Prince Chao-Ming," *Philosophy East and West,* 28, no.3, July 1978, pp. 339-351.

66 – *op. cit.,* pp. 30-32.

67 – Broido offered the last Sanskrit phrase as a single compound, but I have broken it up for easier readability. I will discuss its components shortly.

68 – Broido is the first to publish certain English correspondences for technical Sanskrit terms which for several years I thought I alone was proposing

(though I do not agree with all of his suggestions). For instance, he takes ***artha*** as "referent", and even offers an endnote to a passage in his translation of Tsong-kha-pa's text which says

> This use of ***artha*** (don) is very common in both Sanskrit and Tibetan and seems to have the dictionary sense of "that towards which something is directed", that is, the object of an intentional state. The latter phrase probably best taken in the sense of Husserl...

a reading of artha not unlike the one I offered above. I take his article as a sign that Buddhist scholarship in the West is healthy, astute and on the right track, despite whatever critical remarks are made in the course of this chapter.

69 – ***Madhyamika-kārikā*** 28.10.

70 – ***Prasannapadā***, p. 494; Sprung, p. 232.

71 – See note 71. He addresses the issue of how to translate while attempting to remain faithful to the demands of textual and philosophic accuracy on pp. 30ff, and in his notes.

72 -- *Ibid., passim.*

73 – I owe this example to Holmes Welch, *Taoism: The Parting of the Way* (Boston: Beacon, 1966).

74 – *op. cit.*, p. 47; from Tsong-kha-pa's *dgongs-pa rab-sal* (lHa-sa ed., Delhi rpt.) 108b2. I've deleted Broido's transcribed Tibetan, or substituted Sanskrit equivalents.

75 – See ***Sandhinirmocana Sūtra***, ch. 1.

76 – Broido, *op. cit.*, pp. 47–48.

77 – The distinctions he draws are (p. 40):
paramārtha = samyagartha, the real or proper intentional object;
saṃvṛti* = obscured (cf. āvaraṇa, sgib-pa; āvṛti, bsgribs-pa);
saṃvṛti# = vyavahāra, conventional
satya* = veridical (non-delusive, mi-slu-ba) in primary sense
satya# = neither veridical nor delusive in primary sense.
Accordingly Tsong-kha-pa's view is:
Buddha-cognition is paramārtha-satya*
āryas' cognition is typically saṃvṛti*-satya#
pṛtagjana's cognition is typically mere saṃvṛti#, and he rejects the Svātantrika

view that it is samvṛti#–satya*.

Broido characterizes Tsong–kha–pa's opponent, Padma dKar–po, as:
Buddha and ārya both have paramārtha–satya* and saṃvṛti*–satya*, they differ in the intensity and stability of these cognitions.
pṛtagjana's cognition is mere saṃvṛti* (not saṃvṛti#).

Candrakārti is schematized:
Buddha–cognition is paramārtha–satya
ārya cognition is typically saṃvṛti–satya
pṛtagjana's cognition is typically mere saṃvṛti.

78 – See, e.g., ***Madhyānta–vibhāga,*** ch. 1; a translation of this basic text, with rudimentary comments is offered as an appendix.

79 – Tsong–kha–pa's metaphysical substratum can be reduced to this notion of vastu. Both saṃvṛti–satya and paramārtha–satya see something: the former sees a 'snake' (delusion) as its artha; the latter's artha is the rope. He may have actually had just this analogy in mind when formulating his argument. Buddhists have found it hard, understandably, to discuss the problem of appearance and reality without sounding ontological or metaphysical.

80 – ***Viṃśatikā*** 4 and bhāṣya.

81 – This Yogācāric notion was later adopted and modified by Śaṅkara to explain how māyā displaces Brahman, and he called his revised version of the theory adhyāsa. We shouldn't confuse the Vedāntic version of cognitive displacement and its absolutistic metaphysical agenda with the epistemo psychological theory of the Yogācārins.

82 – Here we see an important difference between the Buddhist notion of recurrent, karmic experience and Nietzsche's notion of eternal recurrence. While for Nietzsche eternal recurrence was a solution, a way of synchronizing all that remains beyond one's present ability to affect or change with one's will that it be so (that is, accepting or acquiescing to history, but on one's own terms), for Buddhism eternal recurrence is a symptom of the problem, viz. karma's habituality. Eternal recurrence, for Buddhists, would signify what needs to be overcome, not reified.

83 – Jacques Lacan, "The agency of the letter in the unconscious or reason since Freud," in ***Écrit,*** tr. by Alan Sheridan (NY: Norton, 1977), pp. 146–178, esp. p. 154: "(The anagram of '*arbré*' and '*barré*' should be noted.)" Cf. also Anthony Wilden's discussion of Lacan's reworking of Structuralism in his essay "Lacan and the Discourse of the Other", in Lacan's ***The Language of the Self,*** tr. and comm. by Anthony Wilden (NY: Delta, 1968), pp. 159–311, esp. pp. 204–249.

84 – Ferdinand de Saussure, ***Cours de linguistique générale*** (Paris: 1916); English tr. by Wade Baskin, ***Course in General Linguistics,*** ed. by Charles Bally, et al. (NY: Philosophical Library, 1956). The section relevant to our present discussion is also reproduced in ***The Structuralists: From Marx to Lévi–Strauss,*** ed. by Richard and Fernande De George (NY: Doubleday Anchor, 1972), pp. 69–79.

85 – Even in Twentieth Century American jurisprudence, the system of law by, of and for the people, though explicitly considered a conventional product authored by all too human disputants, and hewn from their cantankerous disputes, grounds itself in the Constitution, which even as its name indicates was 'constituted' by political hands. But the Constitution frequently is venerated as if it were a sacred, timeless absolute document that stated eternal inalienable rights beyond reproach or revocation (though the phrase "inalienable rights" is found in the Declaration of Independence, not the Constitution). The Constitution may be amended, i.e., supplemented, but to actually erase part of the Bill of Rights or an existing amendment is still today utterly unthinkable (in practice one gets around this by adding amendments that alter or negate previous amendments; one does not simply erase a ratified amendment). When it becomes thinkable, the Constitution will no longer function as the binding document it appears to be today.

86 – This will be discussed later in this chapter.

87 – The Theravādins have a 'twenty–four conditions' list; the Vaibhāṣikas reduced those to seven or eight; Yogācāra tended to reduce that further to only two or three basic types of conditions; the ***Ch'eng Wei–shih lun*** defines four types of conditions; cf. Chapter Five, below. Mādhyamika eschewed the entire project of classifying conditions into typologies and, as Candrakīrti remarks in the first chapter of the ***Prasannapadā, pratītya–samutpāda*** means ***pratyayatā mātreṇa,*** i.e., utter conditionality. This is not the place to examine or compare these various typologies.

88 – Inasmuch as texts remain associated with their authors, such that, in the case of a strong text, the author is sometimes considered as if he were a property of the text (e.g., the author of the Fourth Gospel), and in cases of strong writers, particularly if they produced a large literary output, the text is considered a property of the author (e.g., Shakespeare and his works), the text and author share a proximity, a location, although one invariably encompasses and subsumes or possesses the other. Thus the 'author' –– as that which belongs to the text, or that of which the text is an expression –– remains beyond the actual moment of writing. It is much easier to see, though, that a long–dead, biographically ambiguous author (e.g., Pythagoras) is more prajñapti than flesh and

bones. Such an 'author' is constructed out of the intersection of the histories embodied in the text (including readings of the text) and the histories embodied in the reader. In other words, the notion of 'author' is a hermeneutic construction.

Moreover, in a sense the text never ceases to be written, since each reader, through the unavoidable violence of reading and interpreting, perforce re-writes the text. Old texts are often revised or entirely revamped by editors, redactors, copyists, etc. It would be as impossible to state unequivocally how the first *Tao-te-ching* read, as to reconstruct what Aristotle's dialogues were like. Readers and subsequent writers have re-written, altered, and irrevocably lost much that has been written. But even texts whose syntagmatic and verbal integrity are unquestionable depend upon current readers for their 'sense', their 'meaning', their place in our history. What does the word 'Word' (*logos*) mean in *John* 1:1 anyway?

89 – This power of opposition is what Structuralism exploits and explains. For Structuralism all meaning arises through oppositonal tensions, which in turn are enactions of structures which already embody binary or tertiary oppositions.

90 – The *Viṃśatikā* (Twenty Verses) is commonly construed as an argument for ontological idealism, and much contemporary literature insists on reading it that way -- despite (or maybe because of) the fact that such a reading makes the text incoherent.

91 – While the Buddhist theory of karma draws to a large extent on contemporaneous Jaina theories, for the Jainas karma is a *material* category, i.e., the economy of the inflow (*āsava*) of karmic 'matter' which adheres to the *jīva,* (living-soul). For the Buddhists karma is a mental category. This emphasis on the basic human problematic being mental rather than physical or metaphysical paved the way for Yogācāra's psycho-philosophic reinterpretation of the Buddhist mārga.

92 – Interestingly, this is one word whose root or basic form remains recognizable in virtually all Indo-European languages: Skt: *jñāna,* Greek: *gnosis* or *gignōskeinō* Latin: *gnoscere, noscere, cognitio,* French: *connaitre,* Eng: know, etc. The Sanskrit *jñ-* becomes *kn-* in English, as in German it became *kennen, Kenntnis* (Old High German: *bi-chāan,* Old English: *cnāwen,* Middle English: *knowen*). In other language groups such as Semitic (Hebrew: *da'a*) or Chinese (*chih*), no similarities with the Indo-European root are found.

93 – R. Gethin, "The Five Khandhas...", p. 37.

94 – He cites *Saṃyutta Nikāya* III 59–60, 86–87.

95 – He offers the following note: "This is most simply expressed at Dhātuk 9 where the truth of arising and the truth of the path are said to be *saṃkhārakkhandha;* it is elaborated at Dhs 185–225, and at Vibh 63–9 where the various categories of unskilful *dhammas* are treated in terms of the *khandhas*."

96 – *Saṃyutta Nikāya* IV.230–231. Cited in James McDermott, *Developments in the Early Buddhist Concept of Kamma/Karma,* Princeton University, 1970, PhD dissertation, p. 53 (recently published in India by Motilal, but page numbers given here will be from the original ms.).

97 – This, and other common formulae used to describe the arhat are discussed and classified in Jan Ergart, *Faith and Knowledge in Early Buddhism* (Leiden, 1977).

98 – See an interesting discussion of the issue of *amata* in relation to nibbāṇa in Rune Johansson, *The Psychology of Nirvana* (Garden City, NY: Anchor, Doubleday, 1970) pp. 32–33, 103ff. To avoid substantialistic interpretations, Johansson translates *amata* as "freedom from death".

99 – I can think of no more apt example of this genre than A. J. Bahm's *Philosophy of the Buddha* (NY: Collier Books, 1962). Focusing on Early Buddhism (entirely in translation), his argument is succinctly announced in the first paragraph of his first chapter:

> Gotama's Philosophy may be summed up in a simple, clear and obvious principle, which immediately compels belief once it is understood. The principle: Desire for what will not be attained ends in frustration; therefore, to avoid frustration, avoid desiring what will not be attained.

While this is certainly part of Buddha's message, Buddhism per se cannot be reduced to this or any other single simplistic formula. How, for instance, is one to know or determine what exactly *is* attainable? Bahm, incidentally, never once mentions the Stoics. It is nonetheless a frequently intriguing book.

100 – Cf. ch. 2 of J. N. Mohanty's *Husserl and Frege* (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1982).

101 – Merleau-Ponty, *The Phenomenology of Perception* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962), Part Two, Section 2, "Space". His argument, in part, is that when we perceive X *as* a geometric shape, that perception presupposes the history of the discovery/invention of that shape. We, unfortunately, confuse the 'as' for 'is'. For instance:

> If what I perceive is a circle, says the logician, all its diameters *are*

> equal. But, on this basis, we should equally have to put into the perceived circle all the properties which the geometer has been able and will be able to discover in it. Now it is the circle as a thing in the world which possesses in advance and in itself all the properties which analysis is destined to discover in it. The circular trunks of trees had already, before Euclid, the properties that Euclid discovered in them. But in the circle as phenomenon, as it appeared to the Greeks before Euclid, the square of the tangent was not equal to the product of the whole chord and its exterior position: the square and the product did not appear in the phenomenon, nor necessarily did the equal radii. (p. 273)

This argument takes perception as integral to geometric formulations in a way perhaps objectionable to those opposed to phenomenology. His full argument, which responds to this criticism, is too detailed to reproduce here and we needn't deal with it further. This snippet from an argument which continues for many pages is only brought in here for its suggestive evocation of the problem of prapañca as vikalpa in terms of historic embodiment (saṃskāra).

The ambivalence of Husserl's notion of geometric origins has been admirably explored by Derrida in his *Edmund Husserl's Origin of Geometry: An Introduction,* tr. by John P. Leavy, ed. by David Allison (Stony Brook: Nicolas Hays, 1978).

102 – Interestingly, some Indian systems explicitly envision the flow of time by this alternate model. While we tend to assume that the 'natural' way to think about temporal direction is as a flow from the past toward the future, *from* birth *to* death, from Creation to Apocalypse -- and even Heidegger has us being thrown by Being toward death, this movement, according to him, inscribing the parameters for all possibilities of our being authentic -- this exclusivistic, unidirectional model meets not only such alternatives as circular (Eternal Return) and reiterative (Eternal Recurrence) time models; it meets its direct opposite, a model which in all seriousness has the meaningful flow of time flowing in the opposite direction. The Sarvāstivādin school, for instance, repeatedly envisions dharmas 'existing' in the future (i.e., harboring the potential for efficient causal activity), coming from the future into the present (i.e., discharging the efficient causal function), and then depositing itself in the past (i.e., a 'spent' dharma). It is the future which holds the possibilities for current action, not the past, according to this model. It would be interesting to work out how this reverse teleology, if applied rigorously and systematically, alters the meaning and relation of such things as purpose, goal-oriented action, progress, desire (as a moving toward, a reaching for), conditionality, and so forth. Unfortunately it is hard to say whether the so-called Sarv2ātivadins themselves applied any systematic rigor to these questions since the state of their literature has so far discouraged most scholars from attempting any in depth studies of their thought. Few Sanskrit

texts are extant; most of what we have in Sanskrit consists of problematized citations from Sarvāstivadin texts by texts from other schools, usually in the course of a critique of their tenets. Chinese translations probably constitute the largest extant collection of Sarvāstivadin texts, but due to terminological and other difficulties these have remained virtually unstudied by modern scholars.

103 – Nyanatiloka Mahathera's *Guide Through the Abhidhamma–Piṭaka* (Colombo: Bauddha Sāhita Sabhā, 1957) p. 5.

104 – Cf. *A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics*, tr. of *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* by C.A.F. Rhys–Davids (London: Pali Text Society) pp. 155–157 and *The Book of Analysis (Vibhaṅga)*, tr. P.A. Thiṭṭila (London: Pali Text Society) pp. 16f. I have drawn on both, but follow neither translation. Cf. also Nyanatiloka Mahathera's *Guide Through the Abhidhamma–Piṭaka, ibid.*, pp. 20–21, where he briefly discusses and clarifies this mātikā.

105 – Sec. 1096–1112 classifies the āsavas into four types: *kāmāsava* (desire–āsava), *bhavāsava* (rebirth–āsava), *diṭṭhāsava* (perspectivally closed–āsava), *aññāṇāsava* (ignorance–āsava). It then discusses which dhammas are āsavas, which can have āsavas, which aren't but can have, etc.

106 – Cf. sec. 1113–1134. These fetter or tie one to the wheel of rebirth. A list of ten 'fetters' is given and then discussed. The ten are: kāma, repulsion, conceit, diṭṭhi, perplexity, ritualism, desire for rebirth, envy, meanness and ignorance.

107 – Cf. sec. 1135–1150. These are bodily–ties (*kāyagantho*) to the wheel of rebirth, and the text lists four: bodily–tie of craving (*abhijjhā–kāyagantho*), bodily–tie of ill–will, bodily–tie of ritualism and bodily–tie of dogmatism and proselytizing.

108 – Four are listed, identical to the four āsavas.

109 – Four are listed, identical to the four āsavas.

110 – These were discussed in the last chapter.

111 – Cf. 1117–1184. Reiterates diṭṭhi–āsava and nīvaraṇas.

112 – This odd classification seems to mean: rūpa is one of the five skandhas, and, according to sec. 994 of the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī*, all five skandhas are not in themselves *kleśa*, but can produce or suffer kleśic consequences. Rhys–Davids translates 994 like this:

> Which are the states that are not corrupt but baneful?
> Good and indeterminate co-Intoxicant states [*sāsava*] taking effect in the worlds of sense, form and the formless; in other words, the *five* skandhas. (square brackets mine; italics hers)

I take this to mean that the skandhas per se are neutral in reference to the āsavas or kleśas, but that they may be swayed, or 'corrupted'. The later notion of *vāsanā* as a 'perfuming' – i.e., a cloth can absorb the odor of a perfume due to proximity, and will then smell like that perfume, although the cloth itself is not the perfume, and will not smell like that permanently – seems to evoke the same idea.

113 – In his translation of this passage from the *Vibhaṅga,* Thiṭṭila offers: "Is not to be abandoned either by the first path or by subsequent paths," while Mrs. Rhys-Davids renders the terms more literally. *Dassana* and *bhāvanā,* i.e., 'perspectival orientation' and 'cultivation', are the opening phases of the self-correcting practice prescribed and described by the abhidhamma. They signify becoming oriented and then sustaining practice on/as the beginning rungs of the 'path' (*magga*). Having an orientation, an attitude toward disciplined cultivation, while cultivating and disciplining that attitude constitutes the initial methodological training. Cf. *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* 1002-1008, 1254-1267.

114 – Cf. 1019. Rhys-Davids offers this note to 1019:

> Parittaṃ, understood as involving intellectual and ethical, as well as physical insignificance – the connotation of the French term *borné*. The illustration chosen is that of a lump of cowdung! The essential quality is appānubhāvatā, i.e. of little importance of efficacy generally. Parittaṃ itself is ranked as an equivalent of the whole sphere of sense-experience.

By 'sense-experience' she means the kāma-dhātu.

115 – A textual, as well as contextual issue is raised here. Rhys-Davids writes (p. liii):

> ...I have not followed the reading of the PTS. edition when it states that all form is kāmāvacaram eva, rūpāvacaram eva, that is, is both related to the universe of sense and also to that of form. The Siamese edition reads kāmāvacaram eva, na rūpāvacaram eva. It may seem at first sight illogical to say that form is not related to the universe of form. But the better logic is really on the side of the Siamese.

This 'logic' turns on her understanding 1281-1284 to be claiming "that the avacaras were mutually exclusive as to their contents" (p. liv). But no such claim is to be

found there. The passages in question are attempting to define what is proper to each sphere, but it nowhere precludes overlap. Explicitly 'contents' such as the skandhas extend throughout the three realms. And rūpa, amongst other things, is one of the skandhas. Thiṭṭila's translation of this passage in the *Vibhaṅga* follows Rhys-David's reading. It is unnecessary for our present purposes to come to a decision about this textual aporia.

116 – *Pariyāpannā* and *apariyāpannā* are shorthand terms for locations on the path. In a section of the text which discusses What is appropriational? What is appropriated and favorable to appropriation? What is not appropriated but favorable to appropriation?, when the question becomes What is neither appropriated nor favorable to appropriation?, the answer is: "The paths that are Unincluded, and the Fruits of the Paths, and unconditioned element." The Unincluded here means that which is located at the transition point between the mundane realm (*lokiya*) and the fruits of the transmundane realm (*lokuttara*), and hence 'not-included' in either. The ultimate 'unconditioned element' means nirvāṇa. 'Included' means included in the mundane realm, 'unincluded' means located at the switch point between mundane and transmundane realms.

117 – Rūpa is sometimes taken to mean a *visible* object, or a color, etc. The Chinese term which translates rūpa is *se* 色, meaning not only 'form', but also 'color', 'aesthetically pleasing visual'. In other formulations rūpa becomes the object of 'body', i.e., what body 'touches', or 'body' itself (e.g., *rūpāṇi,* 'bodies').

118 – But cf. *Atthasālinī,* p. 328; *The Expositor,* pp. 427f, where Buddhaghosa does define rūpic decay as 'aging', offering 'hoariness' and 'wrinkling' as examples.

119 – In Theravādin and Sarvāstivādin abhidharma, maleness and femaleness are defined as rūpic properties, and are included as such in their lists of dharmas.

120 – C.A.F. Rhys-Davids' translation, p. 203, modified.

121 – Viññati (Skt. *vijñapti*) is obviously an important term for Yogācāra. Here it means a gesture, whether bodily or linguistic, which has the capacity for communicating intention. My body language and what I say and how I say it offer clues, indications to what I internally intend. What becomes of interest to the Theravādins and Sarvāstivadins is its opposite, avijñapti-rūpa, i.e., the failure to produce a gesture capable of being understood by an external observer. The vijñapti and avijñapti-rūpas are considered karmic conduits, even though they are rūpic, not strictly mental or cognitive! Yogācāra rejected the avijñapti-rūpa altogether, separated vijñapti from rūpa (in the process, conjoining vijñapti and prajñapti) and declared that the sensorium, including and especially

the so-called neutral rūpic components, are nothing but vijñapti (*vijñapti-mātra*).

122 - *Atthasālinī*, p. 304; *Expositor*, p. 400.

123 - *Atthasālinī*, p. 337; *Expositor* p. 437.

124 - *Ibid.* (*Expositor*, pp. 437f).

125 - *Points of Controversy*, p. 309.

126 - *Ibid.*, pp. 205-207.

127 - *Ibid.*, pp. 207-208.

128 - *Ibid.*, p. 288.

129 - *Ibid.*, p. 255. The question here is whether, if one is not immediately experiencing *ñāna*, even though *avijjā* (avidyā, nescience) is banished, is it correct to say that he is having thoughts not conjoined with ñāna? The Theravādins say 'no', since if nescience is banished, ñāna must be present, or have been present, by definition. It is, they argue, *present even if not active*. Even if he is having thoughts which are not conjoined with ñāna, you should still say he has ñāna! To this pious outrage, the opponent sanely replies this would be granting him status based, at best, on a past insight (ñāna), not one presently active. Clearly what is at stake in this argument is the Theravādin's metaphysics of presence, here displaying its connection and inseparability from issues of authority, reverence and teleological identity.

130 - For a discussion of the difference between prajñā and jñāna, see Genjun H. Sasaki's *Linguistic Approach to Buddhist Thought* (Delhi: Motilal, 1986) pp. 90-105. Also, see below.

131 - Sangharakshita translates apraṇihita as 'Aimlessness', while Conze uses 'Wishless', and writes in *Buddhist Thought in India* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1967) p. 67:

> The word *a-pra-ni-hita* means literally that one 'places nothing in front', and it designates someone who makes no plans for the future, has no hopes for it, who is aimless, not bent on anything, without predilection or desire for the objects of perception rejected by the concentration on the Signless [*ānimitta*]. This raises the problem whether Nirvana can be desired.

Predictably he answers this by saying that the Nirvana one desires is one's own mistaken conception of Nirvana, not Nirvana itself, which is defined as the

absence of craving or desire. See his very helpful discussion of the 'Three Doors to Deliverance', viz. *śūnyatā* (emptiness), *ānimitta* (signless), and *apraṇihita,* in *ibid.* pp. 59–69. Doctrinally, if not in terms of praxis, Conze is correct in noting that "the Wishless [is] very much less important for Buddhist thought than Emptiness and the Signless..." (p. 67). Nonetheless, whether always explicitly doctrinalized (e.g., as non-attachment) or not, 'wishlessness' invariably looms large within Buddhist practice. However, the picture Conze draws of one who is wishless sounds more like someone lethargic and depressed than a joyful, energetic treader of the supermundane path; he has possibly confused disengagement for detachment. On 'disengagement' (*nibbida*), see below. The *Triṃśikā* alludes to the notion of *apraṇihita* in verse 27. Cf. ch. 4.

132 – This problematic of means and ends became one of the most important issues addressed by the various schools of East Asian Buddhism. Some of the hottest and thorniest controversies grew out of it, though garbed in a new phraseology. Questions such as "If I already have Buddha-nature, and Buddha-nature means (Original) Awakening, then why do I have to practice?", or "What is the difference between 'Original Awakening', 'Non-Awakening', 'Initial Awakening', 'Final Awakening', and 'the inception of Faith'?", recur incessantly in the T'ien-t'ai, Hua-yen, and Ch'an schools. Some Ch'an traditions, picking up on a suggestion by Nāgārjuna, simply sidestep the issue by declaring "nothing is attained." The patriarch of Japanese Sōtō Zen, Dōgen, puzzled for many years by this dilemma, drew on both Ch'an and Tendai formulations of the problem, and offered one of the famous 'solutions', namely that practice itself *is* Awakening. Predictably, these ongoing controversies led to entirely novel positions and formulations, as, for instance, some T'ien-t'ai sects arguing that to differentiate any potentially actual Awakenings from the 'actually potential' Original Awakening violated Awakening's non-dual nature. See Chan-jan's *Shih Pu-erh men* ("The Ten Gates of Non-duality"), T46.1927, pp. 702–4, and Chih-li's commentary on it, *Shih Pu-erh men Chih-yao-ch'ao* ("On the Main Points in 'The Ten Gates of Non-duality'"), T46.1928, pp. 704–20.

133 – 'Reduced' is perhaps too strong a word, since it is the centrality of the Eightfold Path which becomes displaced, not the list itself. The Eightfold Path re-emerges as part of the list of Thirty-Seven Factors of Awakening, which is adopted by Mahāyāna through the *Prajñāpāramitā* literature which in turn compiled it from the Abhidharmic literature. The seven factors of Awakening (*sattabojjhaṅga*) which constitute the cause and condition of the arising of knowledge and insight, mentioned in the *Saṃyutta Nikāya* (see Jayatilleke, *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge,* p. 422 and n. 2) are expanded in the Mahāsaḷāyatanika Sutta of the *Majjhima Nikāya* (III, 287 ff) into Thirty Seven Factors (for a discussion of these, see Har Dayal, *The Bodhisattva Doctrine in Buddhist Sanskrit Literature,* Delhi: Motilal, rpt. 1978, pp. 80–164; for a list, cf. Conze, *The Large Sutra on Perfect Wisdom,* p. 671; also cf. note 137 below).

This chain of influence -- viz. early Buddhism to Abhidhamma to Abhidharma to Prajñāpāramitā to Yogācāra -- needs to be studied more fully than it has been to date. The present work is intended as a small contribution in that direction, though the complexity and sheer bulk of this literature, not to mention the lack of extant texts, makes any sufficient overview virtually impossible at this point. Since more and more scholars are coming to realize the importance of this chain, which also concerns the question of the origins of Mahāyāna, we should be hopeful that this significant area will soon receive the attention it deserves. I believe that studies in this area will eventually compel us to re-write much of what has passed up to now as official, authoritative Buddhist history, in both traditional and academic circles. At the least, it will provide a much more accurate understanding of the development and interplay of the various Buddhist schools, the dominant schools such as Sarvāstivāda and Mādhyamika as well as the lesser known schools.

134 - Occasionally ten pāramitās are listed, which adds [7] skillful and advantageous implementation of upāya (*upāya-kauśalya*); [8] commitment (*praṇidhāna*); [9] power (*bala*); and [10] knowing (*jñāna*) to the list of six. The *Ch'eng Wei-shi lun* uses the list of ten.

135 - For a helpful and critical appraisal of the meanings of the Sanskrit term *kṣanti* in terms of how it sometimes deviates from the original Pāli Buddhist term *khanti* (a 'willingness' to calmly engage all things/theories along with their implications, in a way which incurs no detriments) as well as the further implications raised by the Chinese terms used to translate *khanti* and *kṣānti*, cf. Genjun H. Sasaki's *Linguistic Approach to Buddhist Thought* (Delhi: Motilal, 1986) pp. 64 n. 1, 101f, 133-140.

136 - Sangharakshita, *op. cit.,* makes such an effort on pp. 123-169, 419-452. Lama Govinda, in *The Psychological Attitude...* ch. 4, offers a different configuration. In CWSL, Hsüan-tsang records that the cultivation of the pāramitās involves the two categories of *puṇya* (merit) and *prajñā* (wisdom), which were applied in different ways by different thinkers to the six. See n. 75 of the translation of the *Triṃśikā* below for a translation of this passage. It is also possible to correlate the three trialectic factors with the three major sections of the Buddhist canon, i.e., śīla with Vinaya, samādhi with Sutra, and prajñā with Abhidharma. However such correlations should be taken as reflecting relative tendencies rather than absolute or hard and fast distinctions between them, since the entire canon can be seen as dealing with all three factors.

137 - Cf. Ergardt, *op. cit.,* pp. 88f.

138 - *Milindapañha*, PTS ed., edited by V. Trenckner, p. 105.

139 – The issue of Buddha's alleged omniscience gradually assumes a more central place in Buddhist thought. Dharmakīrti, who probably lived shortly after Hsüan-tsang's trip to India, attempted to divert the issue by arguing that Buddha only knew Dharma (*Dharmajñā*), not each and every thing, either collectively or individually. Śāntarakṣita, however, in his *Tattvasaṃgrāha*, a compendium of Buddhist philosophy aimed primarily at rebuking the attack on Dharmakīrti by Kumārila's Mīmāṃsā school, revitalizes the position that Buddha is omniscient (*sarvajñā*), and his concluding chapter, which underlines and highlights the entire book, is precisely his argument for this omniscience. Once Mahāyāna emerges, the Sūtra as well as Śāstra literature continually refer to Buddha's omniscience; this has been mentioned above.

140 – Cf. Sasaki, *op. cit.*, pp. 90–105, on the distinction between *prajñā* and *jñāna*. According to Sasaki prajñā primarily means 'knowledge to be practiced', while jñāna means 'knowledge achieved', i.e., the 'product' of prajñā.. He reviews several salient moments in the history of these terms. He also notes that they become unified as or in the *ākāra* (cognitional image):

> [The *ākāra*] represents the mental disposition in which *prajñā* and *jñāna* come into unity. In other words, *prajñā* denotes the essential nature of *ākāra* and the basis of *jñāna*. The [*Abhidharmakośa*] states that "the essence of *ākāra* is *prajñā*." (p. 103)

Note his essentialistic language.

141 – Cf. Dayal, *op. cit.*, p. 109.

142 – English translation: *Points of Controversy*, tr. by Shwe Zan Aung and Mrs. Rhys Davids (London: Pali Text Society, 1960 rpt), p. 173. S.N. Dube's *Cross Currents in Early Buddhism* (Delhi: Manohar, 1980) offers a useful overview of the *Kathā-vatthu*.

143 – A.K. Warder, in his *Indian Buddhism* (Delhi: Motilal, 1980 revised ed.), argues that the Andhakas constitute the prototype for the later-to-emerge Mahāyāna. They do indeed seem to hold positions which Yogācāra will later develop. However, significant differences also must be noted, on issues major and minor, e.g., on the duration of a moment of consciousness (the Andhakas argued it lasted for a full day; Yogācāra accepted the orthodox notion of momentariness), or the existence of guards in the hells (the Andhakas deny it, while Vasubandhu's *Viṃśatikā* utilizes it to argue for the intersubjectivity of karma). The most significant corrolary between Andhaka and Yogācāra theories is the insistence on the centrality of karma as necessitating the reduction of *rūpa* and other supposedly non-mental categories to their mental implications.

144 – *Points of Controversy*, p. 173

145 – An excellent overview of the Theravādin Path (magga) as formulated by Buddhaghosa can be found in Ñāṇārāma Mahāthera's ***The Seven Stages of Purification*** (Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1983) from which the following summary will be extracted. It shouid be noted that the exact author of the commentary to the ***Katha–vatthu*** is uncertain, and that Buddhaghosa or one of his contemporaries is often credited with it. If so, these four ñāṇas could be his own simplified list.

146 – See previous note.

147 – The first four stages are:
(1) Behavioral purification (***sīla visuddhi***);
(2) Mental purification (***citta visuddhi***), involving overcoming the ten impediments (***palibodhā***), six obstacles (***vodāna***) and five hindrances (***pañcanīvaraṇa***) (see *ibid.* ch. 2), as well as developing samādhic proficiency through (a) Upacāra–samādhi (holding a clear mental image while the hindrances are suppressed), (b) Āppanā–samādhi (entering the rūpa–dhātu jhānas) and (c) khaṇika–samādhi (clearly seeing 'momentariness') –– (a) and (b) involve ***samatha***, 'calm', and (c) involves ***vipassanā***, 'clear insight';
(3) Purification of Theories (***diṭṭhi visuddhi***), which includes sixteen types of knowledge (***ñāṇa***) to be obtained in sequence (see *ibid.* ch. 3).
(4) Purification by overcoming doubt (***kaṅkhāvitaraṇa visuddhi***) (see *ibid.* ch. 4).

148 – The saṅkhāric manœuver in which the saṅkhāra 'defend' themselves by 'displacing and transferring' the insightful gaze of the meditator on to other things, of course, is very evocative of the Freudian notions of displacement and transference. In both the Buddhist and Freudian formulations, the Unconscious attempts to avoid being scrutinized and exposed by marshalling defense mechanisms which divert scrutiny away from the 'truth', truth being the hidden, repressed etiological source of whatever problem underlies the apparent symptoms that prompted the scrutiny in the first place. A further irony should be noted in the Buddhist formulation: the saṅkhāras are in fact fighting for their very existence, i.e., for the preservation of their 'self'. If exposed, they would disappear and lose their power to generate and perpetuate the saṃsāric cycle of existence. This is also a metaphor for the persistent clinging to a 'notion of self' (***ātma–dṛṣṭi***) that Buddhism identifies as the root problematic of the duḥkhic dilemma. Just as one generates all sorts of cognitive fantasies (***prapañca, vikalpa, kalpanā,*** etc.) to avoid admitting that no permanent self exists, saṅkhāras generate this displacing smoke–screen in order to prevent the insight which dissolves them, an insight which evaporates their darkness with its glaring light. This process is what lies behind the mythical descriptions of Clear Seeing, Awakening or Enlightenment dissipating the distractive 'temptations' of Mara in the story of Buddha's Awakening.

149 – Interestingly, at this stage Ñāṇārāma offers a Theravādin retort to the Mahāyanic notion of a Bodhisattva vow, though his point is made indirectly. Mahāyāna practice involves four vows that all aspirants must make at the inception of their entry into Buddhist practice. One vow is directly aimed against 'Hinayāna'. Since Mahāyāna sees the pursuit of the individual attainment of Nirvāṇa as a 'selfish' Hinayāna practice, all Mahāyānist practitioners must vow not to enter Nirvāṇa until all sentient beings are ready to likewise enter. As a consequence of this vow, the highest stage to which a Mahāyānic Bodhisattva can aspire is the tenth Bodhisattva stage (*bhūmi*), which is just short of Buddhahood, in order to await the ripening to Buddhahood of all sentient beings. Ñāṇārāma writes:

> Some meditators are unable to go beyond the Knowledge of Equanimity about Formations due to some powerful aspirations they have made in the past, such as for Buddhahood or Pacceka Buddhahood, Chief Discipleship, etc. In fact, it is at this stage that one can ascertain whether one has made any such aspiration in the past....

In a conciliatory tone, Ñāṇārāma finally says:

> However, even for an aspirant to Buddhahood [i.e., a Mahāyānic Bodhisattva!] or Pacceka Buddhahood, Knowledge of Equanimity about Formations will be an asset towards his fulfilment of the Perfection of Wisdom [i.e., prajñā pāramitā]. This Equanimity of Formations is of no small significance when one takes into account the high degree of development in knowledge at this stage. (p. 57)

150 – See note 120 above. The Thirty Seven Factors of Awakening (*bodhi pakṣika dharma*) are:

- The Four Abodes of Mindfulness (*smṛti upasthāna*)
  Focusing mindfulness/recollection on (i) body, (ii) sensations, (iii) mind, and (iv) things (dharmas).
- The Four Correct 'Efforts' [or literally 'Abandonments'] (*samyak prahāṇa*)
  (i) effort not to initiate dis-advantageous (akuṣala) actions which have not yet occurred,
  (ii) effort to eliminate (repetition of, or consequential continuation of) dis-advantageous actions which have already occurred,
  (iii) effort to initiate advantageous (kuśala) actions which have not yet occurred, (iv) effort to further strengthen and expand advantageous actions which have occurred.
  [I follow Thurman in accepting Dayal's argument that *prahāṇa* (lit. 'abandonment') is a mis-Sanskritisation of the Pāli *padhāna* (struggle, effort); cf. Dayal, *op. cit.*, pp. 102–3)]
- The Four Bases of Magical Powers (*ṛddhipāda*)

(i) Harnessing a strong desire/will (*chanda*) to the saṃskāric energy engendered by meditative concentration (samādhi) and 'effort' (prahāṇa) (*chanda samādhi prahāṇa saṃskāra samavāgaḥ*).
(ii) Harnessing mind (citta) to the saṃskāric energy engendered by meditative concentration and 'effort'.
(iii) Harnessing vigorous energy (vīrya) to the saṃskāric energy engendered by meditative concentration and 'effort'.
(iv) Harnessing analytic-method (mīmāṃsā) to the saṃskāric energy engendered by meditative concentration and 'effort'.

- The Five [metaphorical] Cognitive-Organs (*indriya*)
  (i) faith (*śraddhā*), (ii) vigorous energy (*vīrya*), (iii) mindfulness/recollection (*smṛti*), (iv) meditative concentration (*samādhi*), and (v) cognitive acuity (*prajñā*).
  [Cf. Dayal, pp. 141–147 for a fascinating discussion of the textual history of how 'faith' (śraddhā) eventually displaced 'desire/will' (chanda) from this list.]
- The Five Powers (*bala*)
  The dynamic functioning of the Five Cognitive-Organs.
- The Seven Factors of Awakening (*saṃbhodhyaṅga*)
  (i) Mindfulness/recollection, (ii) investigating the teachings (*dharma pravicaya*), (iii) vigorous energy, (iv) joy (*prīti*), (v) tranquility (*praśrabdhi*), (vi) meditative concentration, (vii) equanimity/'neutralization' (*upekṣā*).
- The Eightfold Noble Path (*aṣṭāṅga-* or *aṣṭāṅgika mārga*)
  [Listed above]

151 – Initially the notion of 'changing lineage' carried political connotations, in particular, one's liberation from the confines and determinations of the caste system and other societal conditionings. Entering the saṅgha (Buddhist community) provided basic behavioral and peer conditions for disengaging from caste society. It marked part of the Buddhist rejection of Caste distinctions by announcing a novel social and religious status, while providing a practical alternative. To change 'lineage' meant that liberation from societal conditions had been fully actualized, i.e., that one's politics had made one a new type of person. Eventually the notion of change-of-lineage acquired intricate Buddhological significances. So far the only comprehensive study of the notion of gotra is the brilliant study in French, drawing on Indian and Tibetan sources by David Seyford Ruegg, *La Théorie du Tathāgatagarbha et du Gotra* (Paris: 1969).

152 – See my "Ch'an and Taoist Mirrors", *op. cit.*, where I discuss the mirror metaphor and argue that to say that an object is *in, of, in front of, before, outside, inside,* etc., the mirror, is to speak from a prior metaphysical commitment, a locative ontology, and constitutes a reductionistic interpretation of the mirror's reflective functioning.

153 – As an example, see Nāgārjuna's *Śūnyatāsaptati* (eng. tr. and

romanized Tib. text in C. Lindtner, *Nagarjuniana,* Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag, 1982, pp. 31–69), especially verses 36, 40–42, 51, 59–60, 64, 66, and 73. This is a curious text. Though the style of its argumentation is Mādhyamikan, much of its vocabulary and basic concerns evoke Yogācāric issues (e.g., *parikip–* in verse 61, etc.). Closer study of such texts would do much to help modern scholars close the presumed gap between these schools. On the issue of 'cessation' and 'delusion', Nāgārjuna's *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā* verse 7 is instructive:

> While [the ignorant] imagine that annihilation (*nirodha*) pertains to a created thing (*bhāva*) which is dissolved (*naṣṭa*), the wise (*sat*), however, are convinced that annihilation (*nirodha*) of [something] created (*kṛtaka*) is an illusion (*māyā*).
> (Lindtner's translation, p. 105, all insertions his)

Verses 15 and 16 also address this:

> 15. ...The world, devoid of a previous and final limit (*pūrvaśaścimāntarahita*), appears like an illusion (*māyāvat*).
> 16. When one thinks that an illusion (*māyā*) arises or that it is destructed, one who recognizes the illusion is not bewildered by it but one who does not recognize it longs for it (*paritṛṣ–*).
> (*ibid.,* p. 107)

These themes recur throughout Mahāyānic literature.

154 – On this, cf., e.g., Husserl's *Ideas,* ch. 4, secs. 37–38, (pp. 109–113 in Gibson's English translation). For a fascinating study and critique of this problem from within the framework of Neo-Kantian discourse, see Nishida Kitaro's *Intuition and Reflection in Self–Consciousness,* trs. V. Vigielmo, Takeuchi T., and J. O'Leary (Albany: SUNY Press, 1987).

155 – Even in extreme cases, like the traditional story of Hui–Neng's Awakening, this rubric remains in place, if tacitly. The story goes that while still a young and unlearned firewood seller, Hui–Neng was carrying some wood through the street when he overheard someone chanting a line from the Diamond Sūtra. Immediately upon hearing it, he was Awakened. Wouldn't that be a case of Awakening without recourse to the Bodhisattva Path? Perhaps, but it should be noted that the most common traditional 'explanation' of how that occurred is that Hui–Neng was ripe for Awakening at that moment due to the merit and practice he accumulated in previous lives, i.e., he did have recourse to the Bodhisattva Path, if in the 'past'. Whether this explanation merely reflects a conservative spirit concerned with preserving Buddhist institutions, or says something else about what Buddhists, Ch'anists in particular consider Awakening to be is an open question. After all, the notion of acquiring experience and merit in previous lives which come to fruition in the present life has had a continuous history since

Buddha himself, as evidenced in the Jātaka tales, etc.

156 – Nāgārjuna's *Vigrahavyāvartanī* eloquently argues that rather than negating the possibility that there be a world, śūnyatā (emptiness) constitutes that very possibility. Without śūnyatā the world is inconceivable.

157 – T.W. Rhys Davids' translation, my interpolations; from *Dialogues of the Buddha* (London: Luzac & Co., 1956 rpt) I, pp. 250–1.

158 – *Ibid.*, p. 251. Square brackets mine.

159 – As will be clear in a moment, 'the summit of consciousness' means the horizonal margins, i.e., an awareness which knowingly extends up to its fullest limits.

160 – ***Abhisaṅkhareyyaṃ***. Rhys Davids has 'fancying', which is clearly wrong, but offers a footnote suggesting "perhaps 'perfecting' or 'planning out'. ***Saṃkhara*** (S. ***saṃskāra***), which we defined above as 'embodied conditioning', implies the 'bringing together of conditions', or 'compounding conditions'. ***Abhi***– is an emphatic prefix. The sense in this passage seems to be something like dredging up the deepest or most remote latent saṃskāras. Since at this stage in training the impact of new conditioning would be virtually arrested, only the vestiges of previous, deeply embedded conditioning would still be functioning and exerting any influence. Despite the impression one might get from Rhys Davids' translation, which I have modified slightly, the Bhikkhu here is not lamenting 'thinking' per se. He is now aware that ***saññā*** is 'associative thinking', and therefore is dependent on conditions, including his unresolved saṃskāras. Since in early Buddhism Awakening explicitly involves breaking saṃskāric (i.e., karmic) conditioning, the Bhikkhu is merely noting that as long as 'associative thinking' keeps arising through 'embodied conditions' (i.e., ***saṃjñā*** arises from ***saṃskāra***), the karmic dilemma has not yet been resolved.

161 – Remarkably, this text seems to be saying that at this stage, progress is made through sheer decision.

162 – Woodward's translation, in *The Book of the Kindred Sayings* (London: Luzac & Co., 1956 rpt) IV, pp. 145–146; slightly modified. Parentheses and emphasis mine.

163 – Note that in Pāli the clear distinction between the Sanskrit terms ***saṃskāra*** (embodied–conditioning) and ***saṃskṛta*** (a conditioned thing, or 'the conditioned' in general) is not always rigorously maintained, though Pāli equivalents for the terms, ***saṅkhāra*** and ***saṅkhāta*** respectively, do occur. Frequently ***saṅkhāra*** is used to designate both or either.

164 – See previous note.

165 – Cf. *Points of Controversy*, pp. 145f.

166 – *Ibid.*, p. 243.

167 – *Ibid.*, pp. 190f.

168 – They concede to their opponent that it cannot be categorized as conditioned either. They say here that in entering cessation speech, action and then consciousness cease. Emerging from cessation follows the opposite order, i.e., consciousness recommences, then activity, then speech. They ask, could one come out of the unconditioned? Under what conditions? Thus, nirodha samāpatti is still karmic, while nibbāṇa is not.

169 – *Ibid.*, pp. 124–127.

170 – *Ibid.*, pp. 260f.

171 – *Ibid.*, pp. 285f.

172 – This may be the most famous case of misreading or erroneous citation in Buddhism. In the Nirvāṇa chapter of *MMK* Nāgārjuna writes:

> [19] ***Na saṃsārasya nirvāṇāt kiṃcid asti viśeṣaṇam/***
> ***na nirvāṇasya saṃsārāt kiṃcid asti viśeṣaṇam //***
> [20] ***Nirvaṇasya ca yā koṭiḥ koṭiḥ saṃsaraṇasya ca/***
> ***na tayor antaraṃ kiṃcit susūkṣmam api vidyate//***
> There is no thing by which saṃsāra is distinguished from nirvāṇa,
> there is no thing by which nirvāṇa is distinguished from saṃsāra. [19]
> Nirvāṇa's horizonal-limit (***koṭi***) and the horizonal-limit of saṃsāra,
> there is not even the subtlest thing between them. [20]

Note that in his ***Prasannapadā*** Candrakīrti seems to fall into the essentialist camp, writing: "And so there is no specifiable difference between the everyday world (***saṃsāra***) and ***nirvāṇa*** with respect to one another, because, on being thoroughly investigated, they are basically of the same nature." (Sprung's translation, pp. 259–260)

173 – Sprung, *ibid.*, p. 229; ***Prasannapadā***, p. 491.

NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR

1 – The term *lakṣaṇa* does not occur in the Sanskrit text. *Hsiang chuan* seems to be Hsüan-tsang's rendering of *pravartate*. This Sanskrit term, a form of the key term *pravṛtti*, is usually rendered as 'evolving,' 'evolution,' 'transformation,' etc. The Chinese term *chuan* quite literally renders it 'turning around,' 'revolving,' etc. Since 'evolving,' etc. carries teleological overtones, and 'trans-*form*-ation' invokes morphological presuppositions not warranted by Yogācāra theory, I have opted to translate *chuan* with the neutral term 'operating.' Following context, in other verses (e.g., v.5) I have also translated it 'turns around'. The term *pravṛtti* will be discussed more thoroughly in the next chapter.

This verse might also be rendered

> 'Because of or relying upon the provisional expressions *ātman* and *dharma*, there *mutually* operate/develop multitudes of types [of "self"-natures, i.e., substantialistic experience]'...

in which *hsiang* denotes the mutual influence between the various 'operations' (*chuan*). In this reading, the verse would be saying that based on the svabhāvic dyad of subjective self-substance (*ātman*) and objective self-substance (*dharma*), all manner of conscious experience intricately and interweavingly comes into operation; in other words, from the simple mistaking of svabhāvic 'metaphors' for a 'reality,' the mistake 'compounds' (*saṃskṛta*) and permutates into the vast complex of human experience. However, the case for misreading *hsiang* as *lakṣaṇa* can be made on doctrinal grounds -- despite the absence of the term in Sanskrit -- since many texts describe Awakening or the nirvāṇic perspective as a 'knowing' (*jñāna*) devoid of *lakṣaṇa*-s; the term *lakṣaṇa* signifying the "categorizing" which implicitly and explicitly organizes experience through (false) discrimination (*vikalpa*). Cf. e.g., *Ch'i Hsin Lun*, chs. 2 and 3; Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamika-kārikā*, ch. 1; etc. Since this sense of vikalpa corresponds with Vasubandhu's use of *upacāra* ("metaphor" or "provisional expression") -- both signify taking 'metaphoric' distinctions as *referring to* real entitative referents -- both of the readings suggested here (i.e., the one based on the Sanskrit and the one based on the Chinese) are entirely compatible, if not actually identical.

2 – Since Hsüan-tsang uses *shih* for both *vijñāna* and *vijñapti* (as well as other terms for the latter, which will be noted through emphases in A, B and C, as they occur), I will mark that critical term in my translation by putting it in **boldface**. A Chinese reader without access to the original Sanskrit would of course be unable to distinguish the two terms.

3 – Hsüan-tsang is overliteral in his translation of vipāka, rendering the 'vi-' as *yi* ("different"). This has already been noted by Sponberg. See his dissertation on K'uei-chi, (see bibliography). "Differently maturing" implies the seeds (*bījas*) maturing or coming to fruition at various/different times; in other

words, present *effects* arise through latent causes. As will be stated presently, this describes the functioning of the ālaya-vijñāna.

4 – The compound *ssu liang* can mean 'thinking and deliberating' or simply 'thinking'. However, when taken as separate characters, *ssu* is used to translate cetanā, which can be rendered "volition" or "willing." This compound is used -- rather ingeniously -- by Hsüan-tsang to render *mananākhyaśca*, over which the various translators cited here seem to be in some disagreement ("thinking," "always reflecting," "mentation"). It describes the functioning of Manas.

5 – *Liao-pieh* and *shih* are both used by Hsüan-tsang as equivalents for Vijñapti. The Sanskrit text uses the term *vijñaptir* only once in this line, which makes Hsüan-tsang's use of *shih* either redundant or problematic. Either it denotes, for a second time, vijñaptir or it is meant to qualify all three 'names' by implying the three types of 'consciousnesses' [and hence to be understood as *vijñāna* and not as *vijñapti* here] announced at the end of the previous verse, i.e., "differently maturing [-consciousness]," "willing and deliberating [-consciousness]," and "discriminating or discerning objects consciousness." Tat, in fact, reads it in precisely this way (cf. G). However we choose to understand it here, it becomes clear that in both the Sanskrit and Chinese texts, *vijñapti* is used to denote the function of the sixth consciousness (mano-vijñāna), and does not, at least in this verse, stand for the entire consciousness process, much less all of 'reality'. This association of *vijñapti* exclusively with the sixth-consciousness gives us a clue as to the way Vasubandhu and his brand of Yogācāra used and understood the term. This will be discussed elsewhere.

6 – Anacker, following Robinson, has correctly rendered *asaṃviditak-* as 'not discerned consciously'. Hsüan tsang's *pu k'e chih*, while capable of being read in the same way, unfortunately more strongly implies an utter "unknowability." While Vasubandhu's phrase seems only to be claiming that the Ālaya operates subconsciously, Hsüan tsang's phrase suggests that it *cannot* (*pu k'e*) be known at all. This reading seems unwarranted because the Ālaya, despite its subconscious operations, nonetheless can and must be *known* for what it is. The issue of how something *sub*-conscious can be brought *into* consciousness goes to the heart of the Yogācāra problematic. Buddhism in fact is compelled to develop a vocabulary which describes modalities of 'knowing' (*jñāna*) which are not within the closure of consciousness (e.g., *nirvikalpa-jñāna*, *prajñā*, etc.). This theme will be developed more fully later.

7 – *Chih shou* 執受 literally means "attachment/grasping + feeling/receiving," hence appropriation of or through one's feelings. *Shou* when used in a technical sense is the equivalent for *vedanā*, the pain/pleasure principle. Hsüan-tsang is using *chih shou* to translate *upadhi*, 'what is appropriated'. *Upadhi* is suggestive of the ninth *nidāna* of the *pratītya-samutpāda* model, viz.

upadāna which means 'appropriation'.

8 – 'Discerns' translates *liao* 了, which is used here by Hsüan-tsang to translate *vijñapti*.

9 – *She shou* literally means 'cut off or abandon feelings,' and here translates *upekṣā vedanā*. *Shou*, again, translates *vedanā* (see n. 7 above). *Upekṣā* means neutral or neutralized or equalized (in the sense of equalizing/neutralizing opposites). It is #28 on the hundred Dharma list.

Traditionally Buddhists distinguish three basic types of *vedanā*: (1) pleasurable, (2) painful, and (3) neutral. As in modern Behavioral Psychology, the claim is that all experience is conditioned (*saṃskṛta*, *saṃskāra*) by positive and negative reinforcement, i.e., painful and pleasurable feelings. This conditioning in fact is to a large extent what constitutes karma. While good and bad karma are derivative of painful and pleasurable conditioning, generally 'neutral vedanā' was considered to be karmically neutral, i.e., it did not engender further conditioning. While occasionally a text can be found to claim that *upekṣā vedanā* (neutral or indifferent vedanā) resolves the problematic of the pain/pleasure bifurcation of experience, most Buddhists held that 'indifference' did not overcome the bifurcation and that the middle way involved seeing through all three senses of *vedanā*. This topic is too complex to be resolved in a footnote, since, e.g. the rūpa-dhātu jhānas in Theravādin *praxis* to a large extent consist of ascending through and to a series of *upekṣās*, and the status of *upekṣā* in the higher level arūpa-dhātus became an issue of controversy amongst some schools (though the *praxis* of 'cessation of *saṃjñā* and *vedanā*' seems to clearly signify the cessation of *upekṣā-vedanā* as well). I have translated vedanā (and *shou*) as "pain/pleasure" because the conventional renderings such as "feelings" or "perceptions" are too vague; the term has a precise and distinct denotation, viz. the inevitable categorization and coloring of all experience as painful, pleasurable or neutral. Unfortunately even after Freud's 'pain/pleasure principle' and the Behaviorist's 'operant conditioning,' we still lack a precise term for this dynamic in English.

The numbers in brackets following sensation, etc. are the traditional numbers assigned these dharmas on the list of 100 dharmas. Note that their appearance here is not in the same order as the list.

This verse, in its Chinese rendition, contains fundamental clues for determining what the upper three *vijñāna*-s, viz. [1] *ālaya*- ,[2] *manas*, and [3] *mano-vijñāna*, mean. In verse 2 they are described as [1] varyingly maturing, [2] thinking and deliberating, and [3] discerning and distinguishing sense-objects, respectively. In this verse, they are described as [1] grasping and 'feeling' things, [2] locus, and [3] discerning, respectively -- with the point being that all three operate within *ālaya*, but subconsciously. To gloss, [1] 'holds' experience, [2] localizes experience through thinking, and [3] is the discriminating discernment of sense objects (*viṣaya*). This will be examined in more detail elsewhere.

10 – Robinson's translation, of which I have a xerox of the original handwritten copy, inadvertently omits *manaskāra*.

11 – *Wu chi*, lit. 'non-recording,' i.e., morally neutral. 'Non-covered' (*wu–fu*) means not obstructed or impeded by the two *āvaraṇas*, viz. cognitive obstruction and affective obstruction (cf. n. 15, 75, 85). 'Non-recording' means that even though it is *produced by* karma, it does *not produce further* karma. This is derived from the Pāli Abhidhammic notion that the *acts* of an arhat, though karmic in the sense that 'karma' means 'action,' does not produce or engender any karmic fruits, i.e., it does not 'record' the act in such a way as to establish the conditions for any future act. Hence, while *wu–chi* implies that the current conditions are resultant (*vipāka*) from actions which were previously 'recorded,' as they actualize in the present they are not 'recording' this moment for any future maturation. The analogy of a tape–deck can illustrate this. A tape which had been previously recorded can now play back what was recorded then without at the same time re–recording any new material. Hence, though playing, it is now 'non–recording'. That the Ālaya was defined as (1) the conveyor of karmic seeds such that its constitution is nothing but karmic continuity and process, and (2) nonetheless it was considered in itself karmically 'neutral,' led in part to the Chinese controversies over the 'nature' of the Ālaya; was it pure and unending or tainted and hence to be superseded by a ninth *vijñāna* which would be pure, etc.? The Ālaya, as subconscious and insofar as it is synonymous with citta, comes under the heading of arūpa–dhātu, and hence is karmically neutral is the sense of *upekṣā* (see n. 9 above). This will be treated elsewhere.

12 – Cf. #85 on the 100 dharma list, *pravṛtti*. *Pao–liu* may in part be a pun for *liu–chuan*.

13 – See above, note 9 for *she* as 'abandoned' or 'neutral[–ize]'.

14 – For *avyakṛtam* Robinson's manuscript has "undefiled" and "without covering," both acceptable translations, crossed out with "pure" left in their place.

15 – Kochumutton offers the following paraphrase:
"...*ālaya–vijñāna* (store–consciousness) is the individual unconscious, which carries within it the seeds of all past experiences. It has within itself the representations of consciousness of unknown objects (*upādi*, literally meaning 'what one grasps,' or 'clings to') and places (*sthāna*). It is invariably associated with the experiential categories such as touch (*sparśa*), attentiveness (*manaskāra*), knowledge (*vid* = awareness), conception (*saṃjñā* = idea), volition (*cetanā*) and feeling (*vedanā* = sensation). None of these experiences at this stage is particularly pleasant (*sukha*) or *unpleasant* (*duḥkha*). Therefore, they are all equally indifferent (*asukha–aduḥkha* = *upekṣā*). The *ālaya–vijñāna* is not yet obscured by

āvaraṇas, whether *kleśa–āvaraṇas* or *jñeya–āvaraṇas*, and therefore, is described as unobscured (*anivṛtam*). Nor can it be defined as either good (*kuśala*) or as bad (*akuśala*), and, therefore, it is described as undefined (*avyākṛtam*). The *ālaya–vijñāna*, which is like a torrent of water (*srotasaugha–vat*), ceases to exist [!] only at the attainment of *arhattva*. (p.135f)

16 – While *neng* literally means 'is able to' or 'can,' it implies 'ability' from the subjective side. The typical way of rendering 'subject and object' in Chinese is *neng–so*. Literally *so* means 'place' or signifies the passive case.

17 – This might also be read (in concert with both Chinese grammar and Yogācāra doctrine) 'it depends upon that (the Ālaya) or turns around [and depends upon] objective conditions'. However, cf. the Sanskrit and D–F.

While the Sanskrit might be understood to claim that objective conditions (*ālambana*) 'develop' or 'evolve' (*pravartate*; cf. n. 1, above [in verse 5 Hsüan tsang translates it with *chuan* and not *hsiang chuan*]) out of the *ālaya*, Hsüan–tsang's version can be understood (and I have so translated it) to be claiming that the objective conditions are in fact objectifications of the *ālaya* itself, objectifications produced through a process of 'turning around' (*chuan*), i.e., "reversing" the interpretations of *ālaya* so that they come to stand for or displace direct knowing of the *ālaya* itself. In this reading *pravartate* would then refer to mistaking interpretations of *ālaya* for 'reality' (cf. n. 1); hence the *āśraya–parāvṛtti* ('turning around of the basis'), which in Yogācāra thought signifies the radical psycho–cognitive change characteristic of Awakening, would actually be an un–reversal, a removal of the interpretive projections mistakenly taken as naive or metaphysical grounds. *Chuan* (*pravṛtti*, *pravartate*, *liu chuan* 流轉) is *chuan*-ed (*parāvṛtti*, *chuan–yi* 轉依).

18 – *Ssu–liang* can also be read as a compound meaning 'deliberation' (see n. 4).

However the words *hsing hsiang*, which could also be rendered literally as 'natural forms,' are problematic here. *Hsing* (lit. 'nature') implies *svabhāva*; and *hsiang*, as noted above in n. 1, implies *lakṣaṇa*. This whole line is an attempt to render the word *mananātmakam*, which simply means 'mentalizing is its self'. Perhaps Hsüan tsang has again become too literal, rendering the *–ātma–* of *mananā*tma*kam* as *hsing*. This still leaves the *hsiang* problematic. Hence I have translated Hsüan tsang's phrase, bringing it in line with the sense of the Sanskrit, "its nature is characterized as 'willing and deliberating'." Notice how G renders it.

19 – Tat has overglossed. There are already two "consciousnesses" too many in his translation (though the last one could be excused contextually), and *ālambam* (= *yuan–pi*) he has rendered twice: first as "basis and support" and then as "its object." However see n. 18 for a justification of his use of "nature and character" in the next line.

20 - Since the list of 100 dharmas gives five ***kleśas***, and not four, the number 'four' here is unclear. A tentative correlation of the four ***kleśas*** given here and the five ***kleśas*** on the list yields:

self-delusion = #32 stupidity;
self-belief/view = #35 ***dṛṣṭi*** ;
self-arrogance = #33 arrogance/conceit;
and self-love = #30 (and 31 ?) ***rāga*** (and ***pratigha*** ?).

Also note that Hsüan-tsang has reversed the order of ***ātma-dṛṣṭi*** and ***ātma-moha*** from their order in the Sanskrit. He has also put part of this Sanskrit verse into his next verse.

21 - This line is unclear in both A and B. Note that D, E, and F all diverge significantly here. D is quite literal -- and quite inscrutable. E glosses a bit, but probably gives the correct sense. F comes closest to reading A the way Hsüan tsang did. In Chinese this line literally reads: 'follows (or accords with) where born where bound' or 'follows (or accords with) what is born what is bound'. ***So*** (cf. n. 16 above) can be understood as 'place' (which is what the Sanskrit intends) or as signaling the passive case.

Kochumutton offers:

> "...touch (***sparśa***), attentiveness (***manaskāra***), knowledge (***vit***), conceptions (***saṃjñā***) and volition (***cetanā***). These associates are of the same nature as the region (***dhātu-bhūmi***) in which one is born (***yatrajas-tan-maya***)." (p.137)

Cf. G. Since the terms ***dhātu-bhūmi*** do not occur in either A or B, relying on them to interpret this line is problematic. F and G are relying on Sthiramati's commentary, which says: ***Tan-mayair-iti yatra dhātau bhūmau vā jātas-tad-dhātukaiḥ tad-bhūmikair-eva ca samprayujyate, na-anya-dhātukair-anya-bhūmikair-vā.***

22 - I.e., #76, ***nirodha-samāpatti***. Vasubandhu is giving the three cases in which there is no ***manas***. The first is the extinction of ***kleśa-āvaraṇa***, which defines (according to Mahāyānic theory) the achievement of Awakening for the 'Hināyānic' practitioner, viz. the ***arhat***.

The second is a meditative state, the highest of the ***arūpa-dhyānas***, in which all sensory and mental perceptions stop. In his ***Karma-siddhi-prakaraṇa***, Vasubandhu grapples with the problem of how it is possible that personality continues in spite of this state. Since the state is defined as one in which ***citta*** does not exist, how does the ***citta*** stream re-emerge after the state ceases? Where was ***citta*** when it didn't exist, and how can karmic continuity reassert itself after it has been interrupted? Concern with these and corelative questions are what led Vasubandhu to embrace Yogācāra and its ***ālaya-vijñāna*** theory (This will be examined more fully elsewhere).

The third, which is beyond the ***arūpa-dhātu*** and hence ***lokuttara***, i.e., "beyond the 'three worlds'" (viz. the worlds of desire, form, and formless), can be

understood to signal a breaking out from the karmic closure.

23 – Cf. n. 16, re: *neng*.

24 – *Liao* in this verse *does not* translate *vijñapti*. It translates *upalabdhi*, showing that for Hsüan-tsang, *vijñapti* was not only interchangeable with *vijñāna*, but with *upalabdhi* as well. *Vijñapti* thus denotes cognitive, discriminative discernments.

This verse begins a discussion of the 6th consciousness, the *mano-vijñāna*. The *kuśala* group (#19–29) and its inverses are associated with this *vijñāna*. To summarize the basic classification so far:

(1) *ālaya* is non-covered and karmically neutral;
(2) *manas* is covered but karmically neutral ('non-recording');
(3) *mano-vijñāna* can be either karmically advantageous, disadvantageous, or neutral.

What this seems to imply is that though all three are karmically derived, (1) is a neutral embodiment of karmic seeds, from which, within its own perspective, it remains detached (and hence offers the conditions by which one can become detached from one's karmic stream). Although (2) is a product of negative karma, it produces no negative karma by itself -- or put another way, though its operations establish the conditions for the production of negative karma, in themselves the operations are neutral. (3) has the capacity to produce either positive, negative, or neutral karmic effects.

The term *hsing hsiang*, which was used in verse 5 of B (see n. 18) to render *mananātmakam*, in this verse has no clear correlate in Sanskrit.

The number 'six' refers to the six categories listed in the next verse.

25 – *Hsiang ying* ('mutually interact') has no counterpart in Sanskrit, and is Hsüan-tsang's gloss for the fact that in mano-vijñāna all three vedanā are operating. Note that the ālaya was characterized as only of neutral vedanā. In the description of Manas, no mention of vedanā was made at all. Polarized vedanā, i.e., the bifurcating tension of conditioning/conditioned experience *qua* pain and pleasure, only operates in the mano-vijñāna, and by implication, in the five sensory consciousnesses which are part of its domain.

What is interesting and problematic so far is that Manas, though separate from the karmic problems of conditioning, and thus logically and psychologically prior to karmic experience (*kuśala, akuśala,* etc.), nonetheless is karmically 'covered' (*nivṛta, fu*) and associated with *kleśa*, or, as Sthiramati writes, it is *kliṣṭamanas* ('defiled-manas'). Hence *kleśa* is given primacy over karmic conditioning understood as pain/pleasure conditioning. In fact, it may be considered as a necessary condition for such conditioning. This means that the definition of karmic conditioning as understood in previous schools of Buddhism, and as formalized in the pratītya-samutpāda model, must undergo a serious re-evaluation. This leads to an investigation of the sources and origins of karmic

conditioning beyond vedanic (pain/pleasure) conditioning. Hence the status of the *bīja* ('seeds') in the ālaya -- do they precede the consciousness-stream (are they beginningless?) or are they produced through the stream's experiences -- all these become crucial issues, deferred from empirical experience into the ālaya, which becomes simultaneously a singular, personal consciousness stream (*santāna*) and a transmigratory, intersubjective stream. These issues will be dealt with more fully in my discussions of the *Viṃśikā* and when examining the *Ch'eng wei-shih lun*'s discussion of the various theories on the ālaya.

26 – Anacker gives the following note:

"The 'sarvatragas' are those motivating dispositions that occur in every citta, and thus equivalent to Ghoṣaka's 'mahābhūmikas'....The 'sarvatragas' admitted by Vasubandhu are those motivating dispositions enumerated in verse 3: contacts, mental attentions, feelings, cognitions, and volitions. These exist even for states of the store-consciousness or latent impressions themselves." (p.189)

27 – *So-yüan shih* (所緣事) , lit. 'objective-conditions affairs'. There seems to be nothing in the Sanskrit which corresponds to this line of Hsüan-tsang's. Its meaning seems to supplement the gloss at the end of the previous verse (cf. n. 25). While all six categories associated with mano-vijñāna interact with the three vedanā-s, the actual province of each sense, as experienced through mano-vijñāna, is distinct. Hence 'memory' of a sound is different from 'memory' of a smell, etc. This means that although the senses all share a common structure, viz. the classification of 'sensation, etc.' into pain, pleasure, or neutral, the cognitive objects of each sense remain distinct. In other words, Hsüan-tsang's glosses seem to imply a kind of 'form/content' distinction *vis-a-vis* the six senses ('mind' [*mano-*] being the sixth sense), such that their 'form' is the vedanā structure while their content are the discrete domains of each sense.

28 – I.e., #22, 23, 24. The Sanskrit does not call these three "roots"; this is a gloss by Hsüan-tsang which reflects Vasubandhu's categorization. 'Lack of greed,' 'lack of hatred' and 'lack of delusion or misconception' are called 'the three roots' because (a) greed, hatred and delusion/misconception are the three root *āsravas*, or root mental problems according to all Buddhist schools, and (b) #22-24 are their 'antidotes' or 'reversing oppositions' (*pratipakṣa*), i.e., the means by which the root problems are corrected. The notion of 'antidote' is crucial for the Yogācāra project, and forms a fundamental theme of the seminal text *Madhyānta-vibhāga*. However, cf. Vasubandhu's *Pañcaskandhaka-prakaraṇa*, where he says that 'carefulness' (#27) alone is the root antidote (English translation in Anacker's *Seven Works of Vasubandhu*, p.67).

Notice also that the traditional terms for these three root *āsravas*, viz. *rāga, dveṣa, moha*, are somewhat altered in the 100 dharma list of kleśas as *rāga*

(#30), *pratigha* (#31) and *mūḍhi* (#32), while the terms *dveṣa* and *moha* are preserved in their negated forms (i.e., *a-dveṣa, a-moha*) as #23–24. Also, the negative form for *rāga* is given as *alobha* (#22).

29 – Hsüan-tsang translates *vīrya* (vigor) with *ch'in* (diligence, industriousness). This is not the term used for *vīrya* in the 100 dharma list though Hsüan tsang used *ch'in* for *vīrya* in his translation of the *Abhidharmakośa*. Cf. the 75 dharma list, #24.

30 – It may be noted that Tat does not provide the diacritical marks for the transliterated Sanskrit. I have added them throughout my transcription of his translation.

31 – Hsüan-tsang has reversed the order of 'perspectives' and 'doubts' from the Sanskrit. The 100 dharma list follows Hsüan-tsang's order. Also, the adjective 'wrong' preceding 'perspectives' is Hsüan-tsang's gloss; however, it is implicit in Vasubandhu's text. Whether Yogācāra, like Mādhyamika, considers all *dṛṣṭi* ('perspectives,' 'theories,' 'ways of seeing') to be 'wrong,' or whether it allows for a 'correct' *dṛṣṭi* will be explored elsewhere.

Note also that Hsüan-tsang has included the end of A's v.11 in his v.12, while the last term of A's v.12 (*māyā*) begins Hsüan-tsang's v.13. This allows v.11 to be entirely devoted to *Kuśala dharma* and v.12 to begin the *Kleśa dharma*.

32 – Hsüan-tsang has reversed the order of 'injury' and 'conceit' from the Sanskrit. The 100 dharma list follows his order.

33 – May also be rendered 'negligence, indulgence'. Hsüan-tsang begins v.14 with the end of A's v.13.

34 – The Chinese words for 'forgetfulness' literally mean 'losing memory'. *Nien*, here denoting 'memory,' also carries the connotations of the other Sanskrit term it translates here, i.e., *smṛti*, which in a Buddhist context can mean 'mindfulness' or 'concentration/recollection,' as well as 'memory'. It also came to denote (1) visualizing or worshipping a Buddha or Bodhisattva, and (2) chanting Buddha's name (*nien-fo* 念佛) in Pure Land practice (ex., the Japanese Jodo chant *Nam Amida Butsu*). Hence to a Chinese reader *shih-nien* might imply not just loss of memory, but losing concentration, or the inability to retain sufficient mental presence (= memory and/or meditative recollection) to perform Buddhist practice.

35 – Lit. 'dispersal and confusion,' i.e., the destruction of concentration.

36 – I have translated the Chinese literally. *Pu-cheng-chih* can also

be read as 'non-discernment' or 'no correct knowledge'. In his *Pañcaskandhaka-prakaraṇa* Vasubandhu defines *asamprajanya* thus: "It is a judgement connected with afflictions [*kleśa*], by which there is entry into not knowing what has been done by body, voice, or manas." (Anacker's translation, p.70, my interpolation)

Since karma is action by/through 'body, voice and mind,' this means that, through cognitional errors (in Yogācāra and Sautrāntic Buddhism 'cognition' always includes 'judgement'), one comes to lack self-awareness about one's own actions and their karmic repercussions. Hence, in the 100 dharma list I have translated this term as 'lack of [self-] awareness'.

37 – Indeterminate means karmically neutral, i.e., neither advantageous (*kuśala*) nor disadvantageous (*akuśala* or *kleśa*) in and of themselves; rather their karmic value must be judged contextually, or in other words, by things or situations other than themselves. *Middha* (ch: *mien*), which is best translated 'torpor,' is karmically neutral since drowsiness or tiredness may be either beneficial (e.g., when rest is needed in order to recover from an illness) or non-beneficial (e.g. when alertness is required, such as while driving). Simply put, torpor is not in itself good or bad. Its value in any situation must be judged by context. Likewise for the other three Indeterminates.

It should be noted that 'sloth' and 'torpor' were not always considered indeterminate in Buddhism. In the Pāli Abhidhamma, 'sloth and torpor' (*thīnamiddha*) were initially considered as a single term but were later distinguished from each other. More importantly this term was part of the list of the Five Basic Obstructions (*pañcanīvaraṇā*), and thus negative. The five are: (1) *kāmacchanda* (eros), (2) *byāpāda* (resentment), (3) *thīnamiddha* (sloth and torpor), (4) *uddaccakukkucca* (restlessness and worry), and (5) *vicikicchā* (doubt). For a lucid discussion of these five *āvaraṇas* see Henepola Gunaratana's *The Path of Serenity and Insight* (Delhi: Motilal, 1985) pp. 28–48, and my ch. 2, above.

38 – *Vitarka* and *vicāra* are already important terms in the earliest Buddhist texts, and receive special attention in the first of the Pāli Abhidhamma texts, the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*. They are the means by which one begins to understand the constitution of experience within the temporal flow, or put in Western terms, they are the opening moments of reflective thinking. They literally mean 'reflection' and 'inquiry,' respectively.

39 – The two pairs are 'remorse and torpor' and '*vitarka* and *vicāra*'. This line probably means that these two pairs can be either *kleśic* or *kuśala*, hence two pairs in two ways.

40 – Robinson's ms. indicates he was considering changing his translation of *anapatrāpya* in v.13, since in v.14 he wanted to use 'torpor' for *middha*. Since he did not indicate, at least on the copy I have, what his alternate

translation of the latter would be, I have left it as it appears in his text.

41 – Mūla-vijñāna; ch.: *ken-pen-shih*, a synonym for the *ālaya-vijñāna*. It is in this model of a root or fundamental consciousness which underlies and projects the conventional sensorium that Yogācāra theory most nearly parallels the Sāṃkhya theory of the higher Puruṣa and Prakṛti projecting the conventional realm of the *indriyas, tanmātras*, etc. in their model of twenty-five *tattvas*. Judging by Hsüan-tsang's account of his stay in India, the most significant and heated debates between Buddhists and Hindus at that time were between Yogācāra and Sāṃkhya. He recounts some of his own debate victories, and the issues which he raises are directly related to the Yogācārin attempts to distance themselves from the Sāṃkhyan doctrine. Dharmapāla is known to have written several disparaging tracts against Sāṃkhya, only a portion of which still survive.

Cf. Honda, Megumu, "Dharmapāla's Report on *Sāṃkhya*", *Indogaku Bukkyogaku Kenkyu*, 17, no.1, 1968-69, pp.445-440 (1-6). Though his translations are often questionable, the original Chinese passages are included for easy comparison. He lists the four extant works of Dharmapāla, all which survive only in Chinese: (1) T.1571.30 a gloss on the second half of Āryadeva's *Catuḥśataka*, translated by Hsüan-tsang ; (2) T.1585.31 his comm. on the *Triṃśikā*, i.e., the *Ch'eng Wei-shih lun* 'translated' by Hsüan-tsang ; (3) T.1591.31 a gloss on the *Viṃśikā*, translated by I-tsing; (4) T.1625.31 gloss on Dignāga's *Ālambanaparīkṣā*, translated by I-tsing.

The sections of his article are: I. Everything exists [he translates a passage which should read: 'although the already existing is *t'i*, the not-yet existing is *yung*' as "Own-nature (*svarūpa*) is everlasting, while its function (*vṛtti*) is transient", i.e., he confuses causality theories with metaphysical categories]; II. *satkārya* [on change (*pariṇāma*) and the inseparability of cause from effect]; III. Three constituents [i.e., the *guṇas*]; IV. Epistemology; V. The Soul [i.e., *puruṣa* and its relation (causal) to *buddhi*]; VI. Evolution of the principles [deals primarily with the *tanmātra* level and below; their order in this treatise is – *śabda, sparśa, rūpa, rasa, gandha*]; Final emancipation [buddhi disappears but a *puruṣa bīja* remains]; VIII. Intervention of Buddhic thought.

The relation of Sāṃkyha to Yogācāra, especially as to the light thrown on these debates by Hsüan-tsang's account, will be dealt with elsewhere.

42 – I.e., the five sensory consciousnesses, viz. seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching. Generally Buddhists divide 'sensation' into three parts, consisting of the sense organ, the sense object and the consciousness which links them. All three are necessary conditions for a sensation to arise. Adding mind (*manas*) as the sixth sense organ, along with *dharmas* (mental objects, thoughts, cogitations, 'experiential factors') and *mano-vijñāna* [thinking, cogitation] as the consciousness which links *manas* to *dharmas*, the six senses are described as the 'eighteen [experiential] elements' [*dhātu*].

Yogācāra disrupts this model by separating the sixth level from the five senses level, setting *mano-vijñāna* up as something akin to a cross between an empirical ego and an Aristotelian 'common sense' (i.e., that which organizes the disparate sense fields into a 'sense' of commonality, or in other words, what makes an 'object' of seeing, hearing and touching, for instance, though sensed independently by each of those senses, seem to be one and the same object) -- and thus substituting *mano-vijñāna* for what traditionally had been the function of *manas* -- and completely reformulating the role and function of *manas* (cf. n. 25), opening entirely new dimensions for Buddhist deep-level psychology and philosophy. The addition of the *ālaya* to this scheme is, of course, their most famous innovation.

43 – *Yathā-pratyayam-udbhavaḥ*, lit. 'as the conditions [through which] things arise;' ch: *sui-yüan-hsien*. *Hsien* is often translated as 'manifesting' or 'showing,' but I would argue that in many Buddhist texts it is most properly translated as '[mental] projection.'

44 – How senses include or exclude the other senses was, for various reasons which will be discussed elsewhere, an important issue in Abhidharmic, and subsequently Yogācāric thought. Cf. e.g., the section on *apratisaṃkhyānirodha* in Skandhila's *Abhidharmāvatāraśāstra* [ch. VIII; translated into French by Marcel Van Velthem as *Le Traité de la Descente dans la Profonde Loi de l'Arhat Skandhila* (Louvain: Institut Orientaliste de Louvain) 1977, p. 78. He also includes the Tibetan and Chinese texts in the back]. Also, cf. *Abhidharmakośa* I.45 and ff. See also the following note.

45 – This line is conceptually unclear in both A and B, and thus must be approached contextually. I have added a gloss in brackets which, I think, comes closest to the most apparent sense offered by the Chinese text.

The analogy of mind : thoughts :: water : waves occurs already in the Pāli *Nikāyas*. Cf. *Saṃyutta Nikāya* 5:121–24 (eng. tr. *Kindred Sayings* p.106). The wave metaphor in the *Ch'i hsin lun* is probably the most famous example in East Asian Buddhist literature. However, Sthiramati is probably right when he writes that Vasubandhu had in mind the wave analogy from the *Sandhinirmocana-sūtra*. The *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* in fact says of this line only the following:

> The so-called five consciousnesses, [in reference to the] body, internally they depend on the root consciousness; externally they accord with 'attention' [lit. 'what is intended'; *manaskāra*], 'the five sense organs,' 'sense-objects' [*viṣaya*], etc.; all these various conditions intermix and coalesce in the space one projects before oneself [*chung yüan ho-ho fang te hsien ch'ien* 眾緣和合方得現前].
>
> Relying on these, sometimes they arise together, sometimes not together, because the coalescing with external conditions may be sudden or

gradual. Like water and waves, 'according with conditions' [*sui–yüan*] (may be) many or few. This and similar analogies are explained in the [Sandhinirmocana–] sūtra.

[cf. Tat's translation, p.479]

K.N. Chatterjee translates Sthiramati's commentary thus:

The word, 'yathāpratyamudbhava' [sic] ...means the appearance in contiguity of each (of the cognitions) in accordance with the presence of their respective causes (pratyayas). (The words), 'saha na vā' mean collectively or severally. (The clause) 'taraṅgānāṁ yathā jale' serves as an illustration of the appearance of the five pravṛttivijñānas collectively or severally from the Ālaya–vijñāna.

So it is said (in the Sandhinirmocana sūtra 5.5) "So oh! of supreme intelligence, if there is the cause for the appearance of a single wave in a massive flow of water, then a single wave appears. If of two or of three or of many, then all appear at once. (But even then) the water flowing in a stream does not get extinct (does not cease to exist as apart from the waves) (but that) it (simply) has no utility (is not so perceived).

"Like this, on ! one of supreme intelligence, based on the waterlike 'Ālaya–vijñāna,' if there is the single cause of a single condition, a single cognition arises. Thus a single ocular cognition arises. If of two or three or of all the five (on the other hand) then all the five cognitions arise. There is a gāthā (in this context):

'"Like a mass of water, the ādāna–vijñāna, deep and subtle –– the seed–house of all that proceeds. The ignorant till it is not clear to them, due to ignorance, consider it the soul."'

The Samanantara–pratyaya or the substrate–cause, however, is not as existing counter to a cognition as the ālambana–pratyaya in–as–much–as in relation to the rise of a cognition, the cognition itself admittedly functions as the substrate–cause. There being, therefore, the (necessary) ālambana–pratyaya or the object–causes, there is no bar to the two or more sensations proceeding from one and the same samanantara–pratyaya (manas or intellect). What is the reason here that there being no samanantara–pratyaya, counter–existing to a cognition there should arise only one cognition or all the five (even) if the ālambana–pratyayas of (all) the five cognitions are simultaneously present? (i.e., there is no reason whatsoever). Thus it must be admitted that all the five cognitions arise in case the ālambana–pratyayas are there....[K.N. Chatterjee, ***Vijñapti Mātratā Siddhi*** (Varnasi : Kishor Vidya Niketan) 1980, pp.96–98]

Kochumutton interprets this passage as follows:

If sense–consciousness is the result of the co–operation of sense, object and consciousness, how can it still be called a transformation of consciousness (***vijñāna–pariṇāma***)? ...Waves arise on water *only* under certain atmospheric conditions. In other words, the arising of waves depends not only on water but also on the atmospheric conditions. But, that the waves

arise depending on the atmospheric conditions, does not make it impossible to say that those waves are just modifications (*pariṇāma*) of water on which they arise. Similarly, consciousness depending on certain factors such as sense-organ and object, transforms itself into sense-consciousness. However, that the sense-organ and object co-operate with the consciousness in producing the sense-consciousness, does not in any way contradict the fact that the latter is a transformation of consciousness.

Sthiramati, too, finds it necessary to refer to objects (*ālambana*) for adequately explaining the emergence of sense-consciousness. According to him the point of comparison between 'five sense-consciousnesses on *mūla-vijñāna*' and 'waves on water' is that just as waves can *together or separately* arise on the *same* water, so the five sense-consciousnesses can arise *together or separately* on/from the *same* *mūla-vijñāna*. There are two kinds of causes at work in both cases: antecedent causes (*samanantara-pratyaya*) and objective causes (*ālambana-pratyaya*). The former of these, for example, *water* or *mūla-vijñāna*, remaining always the same, the latter keeps changing. It is according to the number and nature of the [objective] causes available (*yathā-pratyayam*) [*Yathā-pratyayam-udbhavaḥ iti yasya yasya yaḥ pratyayaḥ sannihitas-tasya tasya niyamena-udbhavaḥ ātma-lābhaḥ*], that waves or sense-consciousness arise together or separately. By the objective cause (*ālambana-pratyaya*) of any consciousness is meant the object of that consciousness. But in the case of sense-consciousness it has got to be *external* objects, not the so-called *internal* objects such as seeds (*bīja*) left behind in the *ālaya-vijñāna* by past experiences, *saṃskāras* and *vāsanās*. For, while those internal objects remain always the same, the external objects can keep changing from time to time, and from place to place, and thus can provide for different and multiple-sense-consciousnesses... (pp. 142-144)

I'm not sure that either Chatterjee or Kochumutton has sufficiently understood Sthiramati's point. Chatterjee's translation is quite misleading at points, and Kochumutton's attempt to explain embodied-conditioning as constant while external objects are variable is highly problematic from a Yogācāric viewpoint.

Anacker offers the following note on this line:

The multiplicity of waves in water depends on the force of the prior agitation of water: in the same way the extent to which the evolving consciousnesses occur depends on the force of prior agitation in the citta-series. (pp.189f n. 7)

Vasubandhu's original point may simply be the same as what, in general, the *Ch'i hsin lun* states. Waves (sensory experience) arise on water (deep mind) due to the interplay of conditions (*Ch'i hsin lun* identifies 'wind' with *avidyā*); they are the perceptible surgings of what lies beneath them.

46 – Hsüan-tsang frequently uses *ting*, which otherwise would translate *samādhi*, as his translation of *samāpatti*. See Sponberg's "Meditation in Fa-hsiang Buddhism", revised draft of material presented at the Kuroda Institute Conference on Meditation Traditions in East Asia, May 1983 (unpublished draft for a forthcoming book on Meditation) for an explanation of these and other Buddhist meditational terms, and a discussion of the problem of trying to render these terms into Western languages.

It is unclear from the Chinese whether *wu-hsin* (= *acitta*) should be read as modifying the two samāpattis (which is how I have translated it) or whether *wu-hsin* should be taken as a separate term in this list, in which case it would signify unconsciousness or absence of perception. Cf. n. 84.

Unlike the previous verse, the *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* deals with this verse at great length. While verse 7 gave the conditions in which manas doesn't arise, this verse gives the conditions in which mano-vijñāna doesn't arise [cf. n. 9 and n. 22]. Since this crucial, but deceptively complex verse will be analyzed in more detail elsewhere, let me confine remarks here to a summary of some of the points raised so far:

The operations of the ālaya (*vijñāna-pariṇāma*) are described in a tripartite manner:

ĀLAYA	MANAS	MANO-VIJÑĀNA
'variously maturing' *vipāka*	'willing and deliberating' *mananākyaśca*	'distinguishing objects' *vijñaptir-viṣayaya*
appropriating *upadhi*	localizing *sthana*	discerning *vijñapti*
non-covered *anivṛta*	covered *nivṛta*	cognizing objects *viṣayasya-upalabdhiḥ*

non-recording *avyakṛtam*	non-recording *avyakṛtam*	[pain/pleasure/neutral] [*tri-vedanā*]
neutral[ized] pain/pleasure *upekṣa-vedanā*	------- -------	pain/pleasure/neutral *tri-vedanā*
ceases in: arhat stage	ceases in: arhat, cessation through meditation, supramundane- way	ceases in: non-conceptual heavens, two meditations of no citta, sleep, total unconsciousness
arhattve	*arhato,* *nirodha-samāpatti,* *mārge lokottare*	*asañjñika.* *samāpatti-dvayān,* *acittikā mūrchā*
caittas #9-13 but only neutral *vedanā*	*caittas* #30-35, 9-etc.	*caittas* #9-13, 14-18 30-35, 36-55, 56-59

This simplified schematic gives the basic relations between these three operations of consciousness as described in verses 1-16. Verses 17-20 clarify these distinctions and introduce the term *Vijñapti-mātra*. Verses 20-24 will redescribe these operations in terms of the tri-svabhāva theory. Verses 25-30 will then give an account of the soteric resolution of the psycho-sophical closure.

47 - 'Psychosophic closure' is my translation of *Vijñapti-mātra*.

My translation follows B quite closely. D, E, and F seem to follow Sthiramati's reading of this verse, but Hsüan tsang appears to have followed Dharmapāla. See Sponberg's *K'uei-chi...*, p.98 and p.185 n. 75. See also *Vallée*-Poussin's *Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi*, p.46. However, it should be pointed out that Hsüan-tsang's translation remains extremely literal. A word-by-word correlation could be demonstrated thus:
vijñāna [= *shih*]; *pariṇāmo* [= *chuan-pien*]; *'yam* [= *shih chu*]; *vikalpo* [= *fen-pieh*]; *yad-vikalpyate* [= *so-fen-pieh*]; *tena* [= *yu*]; *tan* [= *pi*]; *nāsti* [= *wu*]; *tena* [= *ku*]; *idam* [= *ts'u*]; *sarvam* [= *chieh...yi-chieh*]; *vijñapti-mātra* [= *wei-shih*].

48 - For *'vijñapti-mātra'* D originally had "nothing but perception", but has crossed this out and overwritten "representation-only". The notion of

'representation' being appealed to here is the Kantian notion of *Vorstellung*, i.e., the mental constructs which produce the phenomenal interpretations of intuitions of noumena. This Kantian reading of Sautrāntika and Yogācāric theories was initiated much earlier in this century, championed by Stcherbatsky, Frauwallner, and others. Despite many important affinities which this stream of Buddhist thought has with Kant, there still remain profound and ineluctable differences between them, such as Kant's categories, his notion of time and its role in the transcendental aesthetic, the role of judgement in cognition, etc. For these reasons I prefer the vocabulary of Husserlian phenomenology for re-interpreting Yogācāric thought; it preserves the most pertinent elements of Kantian thought, while more closely approximating other aspects of Yogācāric notions. However, even Husserl cannot be used uncritically, since he too diverges in significant ways from Yogācāra, e.g., on the issue of psychologism.

Anacker gives a clever, quasi-mādhyamikan reading of this verse:

> ...any instance of the mental consciousness involves discrimination, and speaking of a "mental consciousness" rests on discrimination. From the point of view (or non-point of view) of "revolution at the basis" [i.e, *āśraya-parāvṛtti*], all discriminations are voided. Hence this transformation of consciousness ceases on two grounds: (1) since there are no more discriminations, "mental consciousness" isn't discriminated, (2) since there are no more discriminations, discriminating mental consciousness doesn't occur. Since this transformation really doesn't exist, then, from the point of view or non-point of view of "revolution at the basis", everything that exists is pure undiscriminated perception-only. (p.190 n. 9) [square brackets mine]

49 – Both F and G follow Sthiramati's interpretation closely, understanding the discrimination between 'this and that' to refer to ātma (self, subject) and dharmas (objects, mental associates). While this interpretation can be supported by referring back to the first verse as the context for the whole piece, Kochumutton is at least prudent enough to put this interpretation in brackets.

As for Tat's reading of *vikalpo yad-vikalpyate* as *darśana-bhāga* and *nimitta-bhāga*, this can be indirectly justified by reference to what the *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* has to say on this verse. Hsüan-tsang explicates Dharmapāla's theory of four *bhāgas* over and against other theories of less than four *bhāgas*, primarily Sthiramati who accepts only one. This will be explained in greater detail elsewhere.

50 – *Chung*, which I translated as 'seed' following the Sanskrit *bīja*, could also be read as 'types,' i.e., 'because of all the various *types* of consciousnesses...'

'Unfolding' (*chan*): lit. 'to unroll, expand, open out' + 'operating' (*chuan*): see n. 1, 12, and 17 + 'force' (*li*): lit. 'force, power, strength.'

Hsüan-tsang has translated this verse quite literally, and has even

managed to retain some of its suggestiveness. For *tathā tathā*, 'such and such' (which is suggestive of *tathatā*, 'suchness' or 'as-it-is-ness') Hsüan-tsang gives *ju-shih ju-shih*, which is also suggestive of *chen-ju*, the Chinese equivalent for *tathatā*. For *sa sa*, 'that and that,' he gives *pi-pi*. 'This' also implies the subjective, while 'that' implies the objective. However he has not rendered the '**mutual** influence' stated in A (*yāti-anyonya-vaśād yena*...)

If read in the tripartite manner used in n. 46, this might be read as (1) ālaya is the all-seed consciousness (2a) which, as viewed by manas, is subject to perpetual subjective changes, (2b) while, if manas 'turns around' to look at the mano-vijñāna and the sensorium, it unfolds its operating force, until (3) mano-vijñāna discriminates that from that.

If this reading is correct, then vikalpa (discrimination) *is synonymous with vijñapti* as the latter term functioned in earlier verses. If so, *vijñapti-mātra*, far from meaning 'true cognition' or 'consciousness is real' or some such glorifying affirmation, simply means consciousness-experience is nothing but [false] discriminations, imaginings.

Kochumutton gives the following account of Sthiramati's interpretation:

> According to Sthiramati this stanza says how the various kinds of subject-object distinctions in the absence of any extra-mental means comes to actuality from *ālaya-vijñāna*, which is itself without a basis...by referring to the context in which the subject-object distinctions arise, namely the interaction between *ālaya-vijñāna* and *pravṛtti-vijñāna*. "The consciousness that contains all seeds" is obviously *ālaya-vijñāna;* and "its such and such transformations" refer to *pravṛtti-vijñāna*. The latter keep arising by the mutual influence of itself and ālaya-vijñāna. This statement might sound [like] a vicious cycle. But the point is that the actual origination of *pravṛtti-vijñāna* is occasioned by the coming-together (*sannipāta = sparśa*) of *indriya, viṣaya* and *vijñāna*.... (p.148)

51 – Anacker gives the following note:

> It is only the presence of seeds, or the absence of seeds, that makes for states of discrimination, or states of non-discrimination....[As Vasubandhu already stated in his *Karma-siddhi-prakaraṇa*] consciousness is really only aggregations of latent impressions or "seeds". (p.190 n. 10)

52 – *Vāsanā* and its Chinese correlate *hsi-ch'i* (or *hsün-ch'i*) literally mean 'to perfume,' as when a cloth with no particular odor of its own is left for a time in close proximity to perfume or incense. It soaks up and carries that smell as if it were an integral part of itself. This figurative impression is used to describe the 'latent habitual forces' which one acquires through conditioning experience. As one is conditioned through pain and pleasure, one's subsequent reactions to future similar situations are already being 'perfumed' into one's consciousness stream. Hence our past actions (karma) and experiences determine our future actions. Since these actions/reactions tend to repeat with each new

similar situation, we are said to act 'habitually.' 'Karma' and '[uncontrolled] habit' are virtually synonymous for Buddhist thought.

53 – The 'two attachments' or 'two graspings' are (1) grasper (*grāhaka*) and (2) grasped (*grāhya*), i.e., Vasubandhu's favorite terms for subject–object.

54 – Kochumutton's commentary on this verse goes right to the point:

> *Vipāka*...[i.e., the *ālaya*]...gets exhausted (*kṣīṇa*) in the course of time. But it continues to exist, so to say, through the *vāsanās* (habit–energies) left behind by the deeds (*karma*) it promoted, and by the *grāha–dvaya* (the twofold grasping) it exercised. *Vāsanās* are the impressions or habits, or characters, or traces, or habit–energies, left behind by past experiences. They are also capable (*samartha*) of producing future experiences. They are like seeds (*bījas*) which are produced by trees, and are also capable of producing future trees. For Sthiramati *vāsanā* means ability (*sāmarthyam*).
>
> There are two factors that produce *vāsanās*, namely *karma* (deed) and *grāha–dvaya* (the twofold grasping). Of them *grāha–dvaya* means the idiosyncrasy for subjectivity and objectivity. "The two graspings are (i) the grasping of the graspable, and (ii) the grasping of the grasper. Among them the grasping of the graspable is the belief that there are graspables independent of consciousness, although in fact they are what the stream of consciousness projects itself. The belief that such graspables are apprehended or known or grasped by the consciousness is the grasping of the grasper. And the habit–energies of the twofold grasping are the seeds, which being produced by the earlier graspings of graspable and grasper, are now capable [of] engendering fresh graspings of graspable and grasper of the same kind.' [Sthiramati: *Grāha–dvayam. Grāhyo–graho grāhaka–grāhaś–ca. Tatra vijñānāt–pṛthag–eva sva–santāna–adhyāsitam grāhyam–asti–iti–adhyavasāyo grāhya–grāhaḥ. Tac–ca vijñānena pratīyate vijñāyate gṛhyate iti yo'yam niścayaḥ sa grāhaka–grāhaḥ. Purvotpanna grāhya–grāhaka–grāha–ākṣiptam–anāgata–taj–jātīya–grāhaka–grāha utpatti bījam grāha–dvaya–vāsanā*]...What particularly interests me at this point is Vasubandhu's suggestion that the habit–energies of *karma* can produce the next *ālaya–vijñāna* only in collaboration (*saha*) with the habit–energies of the twofold grasping...This implies that the continuity of *ālaya–vijñāna* and of the consequent saṃsāric existence depends decisively on the subject–object idiosyncrasy. Therefore no wonder that Vasubandhu is advocating its eradication as the means of attaining *nirvāṇa*. (p.150f)

Cf. n. 25 –– this verse addresses the problematic raised there. See also n. 42.

55 – *Pien–chi* is Hsüan–tsang's translation for both *vikalpena* and *vikalpyate*. Related to *kalpanā* ('imagination,' 'mental construction'), *saṁkalpa* ('together imagined,' 'imagined conglomerate'), *vikalpa* ('discrimination,' 'making false

distinctions'), and *parikalpita*, they mean 'what is discriminated' and 'what discriminates,' respectively. The Chinese does not preserve this nuance. Moreover, the term *parikalpita* is often rendered in 'short-form' by *pien-chi* as well, thus thoroughly confusing the Chinese text (See n. 57).

This verse concerns the *parikalpita-svabhāva* and thus Hsüan-tsang is probably trying to indicate the etymological affinities between *pari-kalpi-ta*, *vi-kalpe-na* and *vi-kalp-yate*. The 'long-form' in Chinese for *parikalpita* is *pien-chi-so-chih*, which occurs in B v.20,3. On account of this ambiguity in Chinese between the short and long forms of *parikalpita*, and because elsewhere Hsüan-tsang has rendered *vikalpa* with *fen-pieh* (e.g., see n. 60), I have chosen to 'ignore' the Sanskrit text here, and render the Chinese with its own implications.

In the three-svabhāva scheme *parikalpita* signifies the deluded svabhāva. This scheme, whose earliest textual appearance seems to be the *Sandhinirmocana-sūtra*, came to be considered a fundamental Yogācāra doctrine. It receives significant treatment in the works of Asaṅga (e.g., the *She-lun*), Vasubandhu (who also devoted an entire text to it, viz. *Trisvabhāva-nirdeśa*), as well as basic Yogācāra texts such as the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*, etc.

Hsüan-tsang's translation literally reads *pien* 'everywhere,' 'generally,' 'universally' + *chi* 'calculate,' 'plan,' 'scheme.' Other translators had sometimes rendered it *wang-chi* ('false calculation'). Hsüan-tsang's term implies that this 'false discrimination' applies itself *everywhere* as a mental *elaboration or via a cognitive grid*. In other words it constitutes a cognitive closure which imposes itself into the very process of knowing/perceiving one's self and the world. In fact, since its basic assumption is that whatever it discriminates has substantialistic existence (*svabhāva*), it basically functions as that which 'discriminates' the world into 'self' and 'things,' i.e., *ātma* and *dharmas*.

My term 'schema-tize' is an attempt to preserve the calculative, plotting aspects of the Chinese *chi*. However this should not be misunderstood to imply that *parikalpita* is always a deliberate, consciously exercised activity. The 'schemata' may indeed be entirely presuppositional, unconscious, but nonetheless a 'rationalized,' (previously-) elaborated grid which comes to be applied piecemeal by an agent who is unaware of its 'karmic' (i.e., conditioned) origins. It might also be rendered as 'rationalizations projected everywhere,' but this might also be misconstrued to imply that the process is more consciously constructed than the Buddhists intend. While 'rationalizing' -- both in the psychological sense and as the activity of utilizing *ratio* to construct intricate logical 'rationalizings' (*dṛṣṭi*) -- is included in the notion of *parikalpita*, the term carries a much wider scope, virtually 'covering' (*saṃvṛti*) the entire range of non-Awakened human cognitions.

The *tri-(a)-svabhāva* doctrine will be examined more carefully elsewhere.

56 - 'Things' in Chinese is *wu* 物 . This is Hsüan-tsang's translation for *vastu*. There are many terms in Sanskrit for components and factors in perception and cognition, most of which have no direct correlate in

Western theories, and hence are both hard to translate and to pin down denotatively. Determining their precise meaning becomes more difficult as one scans the various usages these terms receive in different texts, and it is not at all certain that any one definitive meaning can be asserted as adequate or representative for all the texts. In the ***Triṃśikā*** so far we have encountered at least three terms which can be rendered in a general sense as 'cognitive object,' viz. ***viṣaya, ālambana,*** and now ***vastu***.

Some texts, such as the ***Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra***, seem to treat ***vastu*** as a quasi-mysterious term, as those 'objects' which remain outside the closure of cognitive misperception, and hence are the 'objective' ground of object-experience, though directly cognizable only by one who is Awakened. Hence in Chinese translations of the ***Laṅkāvatāra***, ***vastu*** was rendered by ***pen-yu*** 本有 'original existents,' ***miao-wu*** 妙物 'wondrous-mysterious thing,' etc.

It is unclear from Vasubandhu's verse whether he means that ***vastu*** is nothing but the consequence of 'imaginative-rationalizing construction' (***parikalpita***) or whether imaginative construction is 'superimposed' upon actual ***vastu***-s . The Vedantic school of Hinduism opted, in part, for the latter interpretation, generating a theory of ***māya*** and 'superimposition' from it; however, they displaced ***vastu*** as the actual existent upon which superimposition imposes itself, instead asserting that the 'real existent' is Brahman.

57 – This is the 'long-form' of ***parikalpita***, (cf. n. 55). Literally it reads: ***pien*** – 'everywhere,' 'universally' + ***chi*** – 'calculating,' 'scheming,' 'planning' + ***so*** – 'what is..' (or passive case, see n. 16) + ***chih*** – 'attachment,' 'seizing,' 'grasping.' Hence 'everywhere schema-tizing that to which one is attached,' or 'what is attached to through everywhere schema-tizing,' or 'everywhere schema-tizing what is grasped.'

58 – Kochumuttom's commentary is again helpful:

> ...The ***vastu*** that are distinguished into subject and object, are the subjective forms of living and non-living beings, self and representations of consciousness, all of which are referred to in [***Madhyānta-vibhāga*** I.4]....These forms may refer to anything external or internal, falling within the sphere of experience, including even ***buddha-dharma***, as Sthiramati observes [***yad yad vastu vikalpyate -- adhyātmikam bāhyam vā antaśo buddha-dharma api***]. But the point is that they are not the things themselves, but the forms (***ākāra*** or ***prakāra***) that one mentally constructs and projects on to those things. Again, while those things in themselves are neither subjects nor objects, the subjective forms of them can be, and are, categorized into various kinds of subjects and objects, such as graspable and grasper, enjoyable and enjoyer, etc. These forms are just mentally constructed nature, having no extra-mental existence. 'The ***vastu*** that is liable to subject-object distinction, as it has no existence [***sattā***] is imagined nature, and not a nature that is subject to external causes and conditions,'

> says Sthiramati. He then illustrates his point as follows: One and the same thing is often subjected to different kinds of subject–object distinctions by different people. For example, a man with bad eyes and another with normal eyesight will see the same thing differently. Or, something may be seen by some people as an object of knowledge, while by others as an object of enjoyment, etc. This difference of form under which something can be seen or perceived or experienced cannot come from the extra–mental thing, which remains always the same. It must, therefore, come from the mind, which differs from individual to individual. Thus it is the forms of existence that are described as imagined nature, and having no extra–mental existence. (p. 152f)

Sthiramati's interpretation bears a striking resemblance to Frege's distinction ***between*** 'sense' (***Sinn***) and 'meaning or referent' (***Bedeutung***). However the parallel ends when comparing the notion of reference to which they subscribe. For Frege the 'sense' (which is partly subjective and capable of being shared inter–subjectively) always consists of a partial reference to the True or the False ('meaning'). For Sthiramati, as for most Mahāyānic schools of Buddhism, the question of what, if anything, ***ākāra*** refer to is by no means so univocal. For Mādhyamika as well as Vijñapti–mātra, language ultimately ***does not refer to anything but itself.*** Cf. Frege's ***"Sinn und Bedeutung"***.

For further elaboration on ***ākāra***, see Dharmakīrti's ***Nyāyabindu*** ch.1; also Dharmottara's ***Nyāyabinduṭīkā***, ch.1 (translated into English in ***Buddhist Logic***, v.II, pp.1–46); cf. Vinītadeva's commentary on the same ***Dharmakīrti*** text. His ***Nyāyabinduṭīkā*** has been expertly translated into English; Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyaya's ***Vinītadeva's Nyāyabinduṭīkā: Sanskrit original reconstructed from the extant Tibetan version with English translation and annotations***, Calcutta, 1971 (part of the ***Indian Studies: Past and Present*** series).

59 – The 'long–form' for ***paratantra–svabhāva***.

60 – Here Hsüan–tsang has reverted to ***fen–pieh*** to translate ***vikalpa*** (see n. 55).

This passage, in order to read it in a manner consistent with A, might also be translated:

> The 'Depending on others to arise' self–nature [is a] discrimination (***vikalpaḥ***) arising from conditions.

61 – I.e., ***Pariniṣpanna***. The Chinese literally reads: ***yuan*** – 'round,' 'complete,' 'entire,' 'perfect' (***yuan*** is a euphemism for synthetic totality, and hence connotes 'what has been perfected, unified') + ***ch'eng*** – 'to complete,' 'accomplish,' 'to perfect' (this is the same ***ch'eng*** used in the title Ch'eng ***wei–shih lun***) + ***shih*** – 'real,' 'solid,' 'full.' Hence, 'perfectly accomplished realness' or 'what is really there for those who are perfectly accomplished.'

Notice this 'real' nature is not a separate, independent 'higher' nature,

but rather the 'accomplished' or perfectly cognized *aspect* of the *paratantra*, or as Vasubandhu puts it, the *absence* (*rahitatā*) of parikalpita in paratantra.

Tat entirely distorts these lines, preserving an interpretation of parinispanna as an independent absolute which has had many adherents throughout Chinese Buddhist history. He "translates":

> ...the difference [?] between the nature of Ultimate Reality [?] (*parinispanna*) and the nature of dependence on others (*paratantra*)
> Is that the former is eternally free from the parikalpita-nature (conception by the imagination) of the latter [?], that is, the Paratantra (dependence on others for manifestations).
> (interpolations in square brackets, mine)

This is entirely unjustifiable by either the text or context. See the following note for Sthiramati's interpretation of this passage.

62 – Kochumutton translates Sthiramati's commentary to this verse as follows:

> This nature is called the absolutely accomplished, because it is unchangeably accomplished...Where there is the [graspable-grasper] discrimination, there the graspability and grasperhood are imagined. It is said to be imagined because the graspability and the grasperhood, which in fact are non-existent, are simply imagined to exist where there is the [graspable-grasper] discrimination. ***The absolutely accomplished nature is the other-dependent nature's eternal and absolute devoidness of graspability and grasperhood.*** (p.154; italics mine)

63 – The import of this line is quite obscure in both A and B. It may mean that just as 'impermanence' is an abstraction, or general category, which like all 'universals' must be unreal (according to most Buddhist schools), the *categories* of paratantra and parinispanna are also ultimately unreal. Or it may imply that one must be careful about applying general categories (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*) to unique individuals (*svalakṣaṇa*). For instance, the general category 'impermanence' is, as such, unreal -- only each and every entity uniquely not being permanent can be called 'real' (at least by Sautrāntikas). Hence, when one says *x* and *y* are impermanent, this cannot be taken as a statement of *identity* between *x* and *y*.

Anacker (p.190 n. 11) takes a different tact:

> Impermanence is neither exactly the interdependent (which looked at "as a whole" may not be impermanent), nor does it exist anywhere except in the interdependent. Actually, neither the constructed nor the fulfilled are exactly different or non-different from the independent, since the constructed is basically the interdependent constructed and constricted, and the fulfilled is basically the interdependent unconstructed and unconstricted.

64 – "See" (*chien*) is *dṛṣṭi*, which though it literally means 'to see,' also implies 'point-of-view,' 'perspective,' 'way of seeing,' '*theoria*'. Remember that in

v.6 *kleśa* and *dṛṣṭi* become synonymized as *ātma-dṛṣṭi* . Cf. n. 20 and 31.

The crucial point here is that rather than paratantra being a mediant position on the way to pariniṣpanna, on the contrary, pariniṣpanna is described here as the *sine qua non* condition for seeing and understanding paratantra.

65 – This last phrase should read "the other *isn't*." Anacker offers the following note (p.190 n. 12) explaining his interpretation:

> The interdependent is "discrimination which arises from conditions" in the sense that though, for instance, the concept of the aggregate of consciousness is a construction, inasmuch as this discrimination rests on real interdependent conditions, it is of the interdependent nature.... Now as long as even these interdependent discriminations persist, the fulfilled, revolution at the basis, has not yet occurred. When the fulfilled occurs, even those discriminations vanish. Of course, in a fulfilled state, there will not be any discrimination of "fulfilled" either.

66 – 'Always-already' is my translation of *chi*. *Chi* is a most important term, being the strongest copula available in Chinese. Usually translated as 'precisely,' '(x) exactly is...,' etc., it seems that the term 'always-already,' particularly with the metaphysical and demetaphysicalizing connotations it has received from Husserl, Heidegger (*immer schon*) and Derrida (*toujours déjà*), may be the most appropriate modern translation. *Chi* is often used to signal 'identities' which become only apparent to the Awakened, such as the famous passage from the Heart Sūtra, "Form always-already is śūnya, Śūnyatā always-already is form." Even in ordinary experience, when we 'wake up,' we sense that the world is always already awake. See Takeuchi's *The Heart of Buddhism*, pp. 77, 158, and *passim*, where he discusses *chi* (*soku* in Japanese), and amongst other things, compares it with Heidegger's *Ereignis* in the context of pratītya-samutpāda.

67 – That non-svabhāvic nature is 'grounded' in svabhāvic nature is a typical claim from the Prajñāpāramitā literature. Cf. e.g., the Diamond Sūtra's famous 'formal logic:' *x* is not-*x*, therefore it is *x*.

68 – The phrase 'Buddha's secret meaning' is Hsüan-tsang's gloss, and has no correlary in A.

69 – F comes closest to B in meaning. D and E could be construed to be saying that *niḥsvabhāva* is merely an aspect of *svabhāva*, with the latter term getting ontological and not merely empirical primacy. Hsüan-tsang's reading quite clearly embraces Mādhyamikan thought, and appears to agree with Sthiramati's reading of this verse.

70 – Hsüan-tsang has curiously translated *svayam-bhāva* (roughly

'self existent,' or 'existent by/through itself') with *tzu-jan*, a term loaded with Taoist connotations. Literally meaning 'self-so' or 'self-ly,' it has been generally interpreted to signify the spontaneous unique naturalness of each and every thing, especially as used by Lao tzu and Chuang tzu .

Kuo hsiang's commentary on the *Chuang tzu* introduced a new conception of *tzu-jan*. For Kuo hsiang, *tzu-jan* meant each and every thing always and everywhere self-creating themselves, again and again, with recourse to or dependence on nothing outside themselves. It functioned as a symbol for self-mastery (*tzu-tsai* 自在).

Tzu-jan had already appeared in Chinese Buddhist texts, e.g. the *Ch'i-hsin lun* ch.3. Judging by his use of the term here, in Hsüan-tsang's day Kuo hsiang's interpretation must have been both general knowledge and the 'orthodox' meaning of *tzu-jan*, since only that notion of 'independently self-creating' would yield the appropriate connotation.

71 - The second half of this verse is a gloss by Hsüan-tsang. Cf. D, E and F.

This verse explains how the three self-natures are also simultaneously three non-self-natures. The 'Everywhere schema-tizing' is by definition without self-nature, since it is pure fictitious construction. As Sthiramati points out, this is of the 'nature' of a purely psycholinguistic chimera, and hence is no more real than a round square or the son of a barren woman (he uses the stock example of 'sky-flower'). Hence it lacks an 'essence.'

Paratantra also lacks essence in that paratantric entities can't define themselves, generate themselves, or make themselves exist independently of other 'entities.' They all depend on conditions other than themselves. Whatever is not self-originating cannot have its 'own' nature, since its 'nature' is shaped and conditioned by things external to itself.

Pariniṣpanna is without nature, because all Indian schools define nature as a 'self' (*ātman*) or a 'thingness' (*dharma*), but pariniṣpanna is utterly separate and detached from self or thingness.

The point of all this sophistry is to show that the three natures and their negations are provisional steps progressively leading to Awakening; neither *svabhāva* nor *niḥsvabhāva* have any ontological ramifications. They are used as epistemological maps for de-ontologization.

72 - 'Excelling Referent' is a literal translation of both the Sanskrit *paramārtha* and the Chinese *sheng-yi*. These terms have suffered an unfortunate history of mistranslation and misinterpretation in much modern scholarship, East and West. *Paramārtha* does not mean 'Ultimate Truth' or 'Supreme Reality' or 'Absolute Truth,' etc., though it is usually rendered with terms such as these. *Para-* or *param-* means the superlative case. *Artha* can mean 'referent,' 'meaning,' 'object,' 'an objective,' or even 'attained material objectives (i.e., wealth).' In other words, it always signifies that towards which intentionality intends.

In opposition to ***saṃvṛti***, which literally means 'enclosed,' 'surrounded by,' 'closure,' ***paramārtha*** announces the non-closure. But this is an ironic and even paradoxical term, for it implies that its referent is beyond referentiality. Hence it is always an ***indirect*** referral. The 'ultimate referent' is thus no referent at all, since it can never be directly referred to. In part it defies reference because it is not a thing, or even a ***no-thing***. More to the point, it exploits language's own self-referentiality to break out of language, to ***refer*** or ***defer*** language beyond itself. This function, discussed in detail in ch. 3 above, parallels the ironic intent behind the Yogācāric term Vijñapti-mātra. Like ***paramārtha***, it is used not to reify or self-affirm itself, but in order to expose the anxieties, needs, and resultant complexes through which a need for such a term becomes engendered.

73 – ***Tathatā***, usually translated as 'Suchness' or 'Thusness,' may also be rendered 'as-it-is-ness.' It signifies the Awakened (non-)perspective of directly perceiving ***yathābhūtam***, 'things exactly as they are,' without the cognitive misperceptions characteristic of unAwakened beings. The Chinese translation is ***chen-ju***. ***Chen*** means 'true,' 'truly' ; ***ju*** signals a simile and means 'like,' 'as.' Hence 'true-like' or 'truly-like.' Notice it takes the form of a simile and not a copula. In the next line Hsüan-tsang uses ***ju*** to translate ***tathā***.

74 – There are too many 'natures' in the Chinese translation. The Sanskrit reads ***sarva-kālam*** (at all times) ***tathā-bhāvāt sa*** (it exists just so) ***eva vijñapti-mātratā*** (this is vijñapti-only-ness). Hsüan-tsang's ***ch'ang*** (constantly, always) translates ***sarva-kālam***; ***ju ch'i hsing*** (like its nature) more or less translates ***tathā-bhāvāt sa***; ***chi*** translates ***eva***; ***wei-shih*** translates ***vijñapti-mātra***; that leaves only the suffix ***-tā*** in the Sanskrit to be the correspondent for ***shih hsing*** (real nature).

-tā, as a suffix, indicates that the word to which it is affixed should be read as an abstract noun, functioning similar to the English suffix ***-ness*** (ex. loneli-***ness***). If indeed ***shih hsing*** is meant to render ***-tā***, then Hsüan-tsang has performed overkill.

The problem of rendering ***-tā*** with ***hsing*** is discussed in "Phenomena and Reality in Vijñaptimātra Thought (I): On the usages of the suffix 'tā' in Maitreya's Treatises" by Shoko Takeuchi, in *Buddhist Thought and Asian Civilization*, ed. Kawamura and Scott (CA: Dharma Publishing) 1977, pp. 254-267; however, I do not agree with many of Takeuchi's conclusions. This issue will be addressed in the next few notes below.

75 – According to the ***Ch'eng wei-shih lun*** this is the stage of 'accumulating merit,' sometimes translated 'moral provisioning' (***saṁbhāra***). ***Saṁbhāra*** may also be translated as 'preparation.' Cf. Kamalaśila's ***Bhāvanākrama*** ch.1, where, e.g. he quotes the ***Akṣayamati-nirdeśa*** as saying "...even as ***duḥkha*** is the antecedent cause of the lived-body (jīvitendriya), just

so the bodhisattva's great compassion is the antecedent cause of 'acquiring the equipment' (*sambhāra*) of Mahāyāna..."

Although even in Theravādin texts śīla (behavioral self-discipline, 'morality'), samādhi (meditation), and prajñā (Awakened discernment) are given parity such that each reinforces and depends on the others for its development (i.e., developing śīla will benefit samādhi which will benefit prajñā which will benefit śīla and samādhi which will benefit prajñā and śīla, and so on), nonetheless the Abhidhamma, with some justification from the Pāli suttas, developed a progressional scheme which hierarchized the 'three jewels.' According to this hierarchy, the three jewels constitute stages: one goes from śīla to samādhi to, ultimately, prajñā. See, e.g., Lama Govinda's *The Psychological Attitude of Early Buddhist Philosophy*, pp. 67–70; and Gunaratana's *The Path of Serenity and Insight*, pp. 11–14.

The 'stage of accumulating merit or moral provisioning' is a hold-over in Mahāyāna of considering śīla to be the initial stage of serious practice. However, this becomes qualified through the inclusion of samādhi and prajñā in the six pāramitās, which are the core of Mahāyānic śīla practice. The *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* says:

> At this stage [i.e., *sambhāra*], one has not yet realized vijñapti-mātra tathatā (the psychosophy of closure as-it-is). Depending on the power of 'confident resolve' [dharma #15] to cultivate the various perfecting practices...[one solidifies his faith into] the stage of understanding practice.
>
> What are the defining characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) of the perfecting practices cultivated?
>
> In general there are two types, which are called 'merit' and 'discernment' (*puṇya* and *prajñā*; ch: *fu* [lit. 'happiness, felicity'] and *chih*). Of the perfecting practices, whichever are of the nature of wisdom (*hui*) are called 'discernment' (*chih*), and the rest are called 'merit.' The six pāramitās, at bottom, are all characterized by these two. The breakdown is: the first five are called 'meritorious virtue' (*fu te* 福德) and the sixth is called Prajñā (*hui-chih*). Or again, sometimes they are broken down as only the first three are 'meritorious virtue,' the last one alone is Prajñā, and the remaining [two, viz. (4) vigor and (5) samādhi] are a mixture [of the other] two.

According to the *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* this stage is still prior to overcoming the two *āvaraṇas*, viz. *kleśa-āvaraṇa* (the deep-seated psychological obstructions) and *jñeya-āvaraṇa* (the root-level cognitive obstructions). Since Mahāyāna generally grants the so-called 'Hinayānic' Arhat the status of having overcome the *kleśa-āvaraṇa* (but not *jñeya-āvaraṇa*), this would indicate that this stage is even prior to the "Lesser Vehicle's" Awakening, or in other words, this is an entirely unAwakened stage.

This line literally reads: 'however reaching not-yet arising consciousness.' I have translated this line in accord with what the Sanskrit suggests. However, if that were to be set aside, this line could also be read

'reaching the stage where consciousness has not yet arisen...,' which could be taken to refer to the *dhyānas* in the arūpa-dhātu in which *citta* does not arise, viz. *nirodha-samāpatti* and *asamjñi-samāpatti*. Cf. n. 22.

In the passage quoted above Hsüan-tsang wrote that the practitioner has not yet realized *vijñapti-mātra tathatā*, (ch: *wei-shih chen-ju*); He does *not* write *wei-shih*-hsing nor *wei-shih*-shih-hsing, which were his ways of rendering vijñapti-mātra-tā (cf. n. ml and mn). If a distinction can be validly drawn here between *vijñapti-mātra* (*wei-shih*) and *vijñapti-mātra*-tā (*wei-shih-hsing*), such that the latter is an imperfect approximation of the former -- and a careful reading of Hsüan-tsang's translation of the thirty verses does bear this out -- then this verse must be understood as a warning against svabhāvically understanding Psychosophical closure. In this reading, the entire verse would read differently:

Reaching the stage where consciousness has not yet arisen,
seeking and abiding in the 'psychosophic closure' nature,
[nonetheless there remains] the torpor [= inertia] of the two attachments
which can not yet be extinguished.

If one were to judge which reading was more appropriate based on the following verse, I would argue that the translation as given here in this note is more accurate. See n. 77.

76 - Here again Hsüan-tsang seems to have translated the *-tā* of 'mātra-*tā*' with *hsing* ('nature'). Cf. n. 74.

77 - This verse begins the description of *how* to attain Nirvāṇa. This verse gives the first stage, the next gives the second stage, and so forth through five stages.

Notice that if read in the alternate manner suggested in n. 75, this verse would be claiming that abiding in Vijñapti-mātra-'nature' is not yet getting beyond the double attachment to self and others which Vasubandhu had declared to be the root of the 'consciousness problem' back in the first verse. This reading, in fact, would easily concord with the next verse. The issue of which reading to choose hinges on whether this verse should be taken as an affirmation of Vijñapti-mātra-ness or whether it should be understood in some other sense.

Also notice that D and F are becoming more and more divergent. E has been strongly influenced by D (Robinson was on Anacker's dissertation committee), and has merely modified D through much of his translation. F has interpreted the trisvabhāva theory in an entirely different manner from all the others. D will read this verse as an affirmation of Vijñapti-mātra (as he has done on some previous verses), rather than a statement on its limitations. Hsüan-tsang's text, as indicated above, can be read either way.

78 - This may also be read: 'In front of me, there stands a small thing.' *Shao wu*, lit. 'small thing,' implies a small part of a larger matter to be

understood. It is Hsüan-tsang's rather ingenious translation of ***tanmātra***. ***Tanmātra***, originally a Sāṃkhyan term denoting the basic, simple elements of the experiential realm, is composed of two parts: ***tan*** (= ***tat***) 'that' + ***mātra*** 'only;' hence 'that-only,' or 'that which cannot be reduced further.'

Hsien chien, 'before me' or 'in front of me,' can also be read 'projecting in front of oneself' (cf. n. 43).

79 – Anacker offers this note (p.190 n. 13):

> As long as consciousness isn't flowing with perception-only, there will be residues of dualistic and constructive apprehension. But the consciousness "All this is perception-only" is also not to be indulged in, since it involves a dualistic apprehension. Any grasping at the flow is itself not immersement in the flow. Really being in perception-only means being in "this-only", whatever the present perception presents, without the tunications of past impressions, expectations, or the desire to make something stop still.

Both D and E are barely coherent for this verse. Anacker's note, interesting as it is, seems entirely besides the point. Vasubandhu has already stated (v.4 and 5) that the 'flow,' which is nothing but ***ālaya***, *ceases* already at the Arhat stage. Hence how can consciousness be "flowing with perception-only" ? Moreover, what would a 'perception' be that was entirely devoid of past impressions (or their 'tunications,' if such a distiction can be drawn)? This would mean the utter absence of memory, and hence complete lack of re-cognition. Vasubandhu rejected Sautrāntika in favor of Yogācāra precisely for the kinds of problematics this position engenders. Perhaps what should be in question here is Anacker's atavistic use of 'perception' for ***vijñapti***.

Notice that while D and E, again very close, seem to be translating an entirely different passage from the one in B, F manages to come quite close to B.

80 – *So-yüan* translates ***ālambanam***. Sometimes translated 'object-support,' it generally signifies the objective pole of a perceptual moment. Whether this objective pole derives from an actual object, is generated by consciousness, or arises through a combination and cooperation of object and consciousness, became a point of controversy between various Buddhist schools. Hsüan tsang's text is open to any of these interpretations (see the following note).

81 – I have purposefully translated these two lines without supplying a pronoun or agent of the 'awakenly-knowing' because none exists in the Chinese text. Despite the fact that translators tend to supply missing pronouns when translating from Chinese, out of syntactical habit, in this instance it would be inappropriate since this 'knowing' is to be defined in the fourth line as devoid of subject or object. The third line begins, uncharacteristically for a Chinese text of this sort, with the pronoun 'you' (*erh*). If not just a device used by Hsüan tsang to maintain his symmetry of five characters per quarter-verse, this 'you' might be taken to function as a highlighting of the contrast between the 'you' who is

mentally considering an experience you have not had, and the experience which is defined as devoid of 'you.'

The verse is saying there is a moment of insight in which the psychosophic closure makes itself transparent (and hence no longer acts as a closure) which utterly and instantaneously neutralizes the root problematic of karmic continuity through detachment from the dual appropriations, viz. 'grasper and grasped.' In other words the appropriational duo, by being exposed for what they are, viz. karmically potent mental fabrications, become impotent, and thus see-able as the fictitious malignancies (*āsrava*) they really are.

The structure of this sentence suggests some interesting readings. Word-for-word it reads:

chih 'wisdom,' '[correct] knowledge,' etc. (while often used in Buddhist texts as an equivalent for *prajñā*, Hsüan tsang sometimes differentiates *prajñā* [Awakenly-discerning] from *jñāna* [awakenly-knowing] by using *hui* for the former and *chih* for the latter) +

tou – 'all,' 'the whole,' 'in its entirety' +

wu – 'nothing,' 'there is not,' 'without,' 'absence of' +

so – location, 'objective' case, or passive case +

te – 'attain,' 'acquire.'

Hence the first two lines of this verse might also be translated 'if, at the very moment one is within objective conditions one knows that all of this, in its entirety, is nothing which is attainable or acquirable...'

What does this mean? If, during the experiential continuum, there comes a moment where the sensorium –– which is inclusive of all sensations, whether pleasurable, painful or neutral, whether subjective or objective, etc. –– is directly, intuitively, and without any doubt or ambivalence whatsoever, known (*jñāna*) in such a way that it is void of any appropriational characteristics, this constitutes the experience of 'consciousness-only.' The objective pole, which includes subjective 'sense-supports' that have been objectified as 'objects' of perception, is "entirely without anything to be acquired".

Does this necessitate that the *ālambana* themselves are non-existent, or that everything is *created* by mind? Not at all. It only means that the appropriational characteristics, i.e., those aspects of experience which perpetually, from the horizon, condition experience to present itself appropriationally –– as 'I-mine,' as 'my truth,' '*my* experience,' as things, ideas, theories and objects which can be taken to hand, which can be *taken* –– only these appropriational characteristics are emptied from experience.

One no longer grasps at anything, since everything is non-graspable, non-acquirable, in a profound way non-attainable. It is a kind of meta-objectivity which sees things as they actually are, a kind of meta-perspectivality which Sthiramati calls *sarvajñāna*, 'omniscience.' 'Things' are not presented, or represented, or given to/in experience. They are directly known devoid of appropriational tendencies, and hence devoid of karmic capacity. Since nothing is acquired, no seeds can accumulate, and the *ālaya* is broken. The

destruction of the *ālaya* becomes a metaphoric means of describing in experiential terms the disruption and final elimination of karma. Since language itself, in this view, is no more than an instrument and instantiation of the appropriational tendencies (*prajñapti*), whatever might be the experiential case in or subsequent to this insight must necessarily be 'beyond' language.

82 – If any justification can be made for Hsüan tsang's use of the same Chinese character (*shih* 識) for both *vijñāna* and *vijñapti*, this line is it. Vasubandhu writes here that you are abiding in VIJÑĀNA–mātra, not vijñapti–mātra, though the entire context established by the previous verses would lead one to expect the latter term. Obviously, the Chinese reader, unaware that the original text is distinguishing *vijñapti* from *vijñāna*, would have no clue at this point that *wei–shih* has switched referents.

Note, though, that one abides in consciousness–*mātra* and not consciousness–*mātra–tā*.

However, in the *Ch'eng wei–shih lun*, Hsüan tsang writes of this verse:

> 'You, at that moment' refers to what is called really abiding in the truly paramārthic *nature* of psychosophical closure which always–already realizes as–it–is–ness. *Jñāna* and as–it–is–ness are thoroughly equalized because they are both detached from the characteristics of 'noesis' (grasper) and 'noema' (grasped). The noetic–noemic characteristics (*grāhaka–grāhya–lakṣaṇa*) together constitute the discriminations (*vikalpa*) of attainable existents (i.e., the appropriational attitude), [which are actually nothing but] *prapañcic* mental projections.

(cf. Tat's translation of this passage on his p.687)

Vijñāna–mātra can be understood in two ways: (1) that the entire experiential realm as constituted in the closure of non–Awakened experience is 'nothing but a fabrication of the operations of consciousness,' or (2) that this verse signals a stage towards Awakening, but not Awakening itself, and that this stage consists of the emptying of the so–called objective realm of its svabhāvic 'essences,' leaving 'nothing but consciousness remaining.' If the latter interpretation is to be followed, then the next stage would be the emptying of any svabhāvic 'essence' from consciousness itself. Finally, by neutralizing the objective and subjective poles, *tathatā* alone remains, that is, things are known for what they are without the slightest interpretive interpolation. The subsequent discussion in the *Ch'eng wei–shi lun* gives credence to both of these readings.

83 – The term *lakṣaṇa* does not occur in A. Also the last part of Hsüan tsang's verse is a slight gloss of A.

84 – *Wu–te* can also be translated 'non–attainable' or 'nothing acquirable/attainable.'

Hsüan tsang's translation of the first few words of this verse might

seem problematic from the point of view of the later developments of Chinese Buddhism. *Wu-te* must be translated 'non-acquirable' because the issue here is the elimination of the appropriational attitude, not a hyperbolic genuflection to some mystical Other. It translates *anupalambho*, which means 'cannot be known through the senses or ordinary means of knowledge.' As mentioned in n. 24, *upalabdhi*, at least to Hsüan tsang, was considered in some ways synonymous with *vijñapti*. If *upalabdhi* and *upalambho* can be taken as virtually synonymous terms, then this may be tantamount to claiming that realization of *vijñapti-mātra* is devoid of *vijñapti*, i.e., 'discriminating/understanding-only' means no longer 'discriminating-understanding' !

The next phrase, *pu-ssu-yi*, meaning 'non-conceptual,' 'inscrutable' (lit. 'not critically reflectively thinking') in Chinese, translates the Sanskrit *acitta* which means absence of citta, 'non-citta.' *Acitta* can be understood in at least two ways: (1) insentience in the ordinary sense, meaning the absence of a subjective vector within or behind any non-perceptual moment, such as, for instance, in deep sleep or utter unconsciousness; (2) the absence of a subjective vector *within* an experiential field of awareness, such that subjective and objective poles, i.e., noesis (*grāhaka*) and noema (*grāhya*), are neither constituting experiencing nor being constituted by it. The 'experience' of Nirvāṇa and the not-yet-fully-Awakened experience penultimate to Nirvāṇa (i.e., *nirodha-samāpatti* as the experiencing of *saṃjñā-vedayita-nirodha* [#76 and #99 on the Hundred Dharma list]) are said to be this type of *acitta*. This latter signifies the release from the closure of what texts like the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* call *citta-mātra-dṛśya*, 'seeing only what is projected by mind (citta).'

Besides reversing the order of the terms from the Sanskrit, Hsüan tsang has left unremarked an important aspect of Yogācāra thought which eventually came to be overlooked by many East Asian Buddhists as well as most modern scholars. This line is describing the *jñāna* which goes beyond the 'three worlds' (*jñānam lokottaram*; cf. n. 11). Since, as the famous line from the *Hua-yen sūtra* says (and similar lines can be found throughout this type of literature), "The three worlds are nothing but citta", this line indicates that (1) *vi*-jñāna becomes transformed into just *jñāna*, i.e., 'consciousness' becomes 'Awakenly-knowing' -- and thus the assertion that Yogācāra holds a position of 'only consciousness is real' becomes clearly absurd -- (2) this jñāna not only is no longer a *vijñāna*, it is also explicitly declared to be no longer a citta.

While Hsüan tsang often becomes overly literal (e.g. his translation of *vipāka*), in this case his 'non-conceptual' for *acitta* displaces the crucial term *citta*. But cf. v.16 where Hsüan tsang does literally translate *acitta* with *wu-hsin*. 'Non-conceptual' is a justifiable reading of *acitta* if 'citta' is taken in the sense of 'generic thought;' hence *a-citta* would mean 'unthinkable.' Nonetheless, by *interpreting* rather than literally translating this term, Hsüan tsang has not allowed this verse to enter into a debate, which came to the fore shortly after his death, between his disciple K'uei-chi and the Hua-yen patriarch Fa-tsang on the supposed distinction between *wei-shih* (consciousness-only;

meaning Hsüan tsang's 'school') and *wei–hsin* (mind–only; meaning Fa–tsang's position). Since most of the important Chinese Buddhist schools such as T'ien–t'ai, Hua–yen, and some forms of Ch'an, came to be known as *wei–hsin* (*citta–mātra*) due to their affirmation of citta as a metaphysical ground beyond any ultimate negation or cancellation, this crucial line of the *Triṃśikā* might have radically altered the course of Chinese Buddhism by arguing unambiguously that Awakening involves the superceding of citta, i.e., that Awakening consists of breaking the *ālaya–vijñāna* (by turning it into *jñāna*) and eliminating citta. Citta, in its most precise abhidharmic and Yogācāric formulation means the momentary, subjective point at the bottom of any cognitive moment. Some meditational practices, such as the *nirodha–samāpatti* mentioned earlier, are aimed precisely at the elimination of citta from the experiential stream. For Vasubandhu, this pre–mahāyānic practice did not go deep enough, because the 'stream' itself, namely the *ālaya* which becomes the Yogācāric metaphor for 'karmic continuity,' remains unaltered and fully functioning even after this *samāpatti*. For Vasubandhu, only the full transformation from 'consciousness' (which includes the *ālaya* and the 'subjective' citta) to 'Awakenly–knowing' effectively unroots the karmic dilemma.

But cf. n. 81 on Hsüan tsang's use of *chih*. While we may rely on the Sanskrit in this verse to indicate *chih* here translates *jñāna*, a Chinese reader would be ambivalent as to whether *chih* is translating *jñāna* or *prajñā*. For all intents and purposes these two terms are treated as synonyms by Chinese Buddhists.

Note that what was translated as 'nothing whatsoever is attained/acquired' in verse 28 was *tou wu so–te*, while what is here translated as 'non–aquirable' is *wu te*.

85 – The 'two crude barriers' are the basic obstacles or obstructions which prevent one from clearly seeing the closure for what it is, namely *kleśa–āvaraṇa* (obstruction through conative, affective mental problems) and *jñeya–āvaraṇa* (obstruction through cognitive, metaphysical and ontological assumptions and presuppositions). Cf. n. 75.

86 – 'Reversal of dependence' translates the Chinese term, not the Sanskrit. *Āśraya–parāvṛtti* is usually rendered something like 'revolution of the basis.' D.T. Suzuki understood this term to refer to shifting one's metaphysical dependence from *pravṛtti–vijñāna* (i.e., the six consciousnesses from *mano–vijñāna* down through the five senses) upward towards the *ālaya–vijñāna*. Whatever the merits of this interpretation might be for the *Laṅkāvatāra–sūtra*, in the case of the *Triṃśikā* the *parāvṛtti* or 'turning around' seems to mean the transformation from *vijñāna* to *prajñā*. Also, see n. 75.

87 – *Anāśravo–dhātur*, i.e., the *dhātu* (experiential realm or province) of *anāśrava* (uncontaminated, non–defiled).

88 – Hsüan tsang has used *pu–ssu–yi*, which in the previous verse translated *acitta*, to here translate *acintyaḥ*.

89 – Hsüan tsang has translated the single term *sukho*, meaning 'sweetness,' 'blissful' (i.e., the opposite of *dukkha*) with two terms in Chinese: *an* – 'peaceful,' 'quiet;' and *le* – 'joyful,' 'happy,' 'felicitous.' As a compound, *an–le* often corresponds to the Sanskrit *ānanda* 'blissful.'

90 – Notice that even at this, the highest stage, one is described as a body. The notion of 'body' in Buddhism, particularly its phenomenological implications, has barely been noticed as yet, most discussion of 'body' centering around the history of the tri–kāya doctrine. However from the Pāli *Brahmajāla sutta* onwards, Buddhism has consistently argued that the limits of the body are the limits of reality. The *vimukti*–body or 'Liberation–body' is that body which is liberated from the saṃsāric, psychosophical closure.

NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE

1 – Many of the early monk translators were not Indian, but hailed from a variety of locations in Central Asia, such as Parthia, Sogdiana, Bactria, Khotan, etc. As a field, Central Asian Buddhism is only very recently receiving any attention by Western scholars outside the Soviet Union (the Soviets have been studying the archeological, etc., remains of Buddhism in Central Asia, e.g., Afghanistan, for some time). Jan Nattier, at the University of Hawaii, Honolulu is currently preparing a detailed bibliography of sources, with plans to publish it as a monograph. She delivered a very informative prospectus on the state of the field at the Annual AAR meeting in Chicago, 1988.

The degree to which this field has been neglected can be gauged to some extent by a cursory glance at the bibliography to B.N. Puri's recent *Buddhism in Central Asia* (Delhi: Motilal, 1987): the vast majority of sources predate 1940, including several from the nineteenth century; the post–40s works are primarily from the '50s and mid–sixties, with only four books dating past the '60s – one a reprint, one in French (a general history of Asia), one on art, and the other on the silk route, i.e., only the reprint specifically addresses the subject of Buddhism. On a short, English–source bibliography circulated by Nattier at the AAR, Puri's book is one of two she explicitly warns us to avoid ("...the text is so riddled with errors that it cannot be used without the greatest caution."). However, her list offers titles only slightly more recent (the majority being journal articles, not books).

2 – Especially the Sarvāstivāda, Mahāsaṅghika, Mahīśāsika, etc. schools. Nattier discussed this in her paper, and Hsüan–tsang's travelogue confirms it. On his journey to India through Central Asia, he was surprised by the dearth of Mahāyānic monasteries along the way. They became more numerous as he approached India proper.

3 – Cf. Zenryū Tsukamoto, *A History of Early Chinese Buddhism: From its Introduction to the Death of Hui–Yüan,* tr. from Japanese by Leon Hurvitz (Tokyo: Kodansha) 1985, 2 vols. See n. 27 below.

4 – Basically the Chinese settled on two types of 'answers' to this question. The first was the synthetic, syncretistic conflation of doctrine, most notably as proferred in the text *Ta–ch'eng ch'i hsin lun* (*Awakening Mahayanic Faith*). This provided the groundwork for subsuming the multiplicity of schools into one–vehicle (*eka–yāna*; Ch.: *yi–ch'eng*). The second, which is related to the first, is the hierarchical classification of doctrines, usually correlated with the presumed chronological order in which Buddha taught them. Known as *p'an–chiao,* this became a way for all schools to concede some upāyic validity to the other schools while positioning themselves in the highest –– which in China came to mean the most totalistic, most subsuming, the "Roundest" –– slot. This

involved privileging whatever particular text the school held as most important. The Sinitic Mahāyāna schools -- T'ien-t'ai, Hua-yen, Ch'an and Ching-tu -- all rest on foundational (or at least cornerstone) p'an-chiaos. T'ien-t'ai grounded itself in the *Lotus Sutra*, declaring its eka-yāna as the subsumer to which all other schools are vestibules. According to their p'an-chiao, it was Buddha's penultimate sermon, given just prior to his final sermon and entrance into nirvāṇa. Hua-yen privileged the *Avataṃsaka Sutra* (a fusion of distinct Sanskrit texts into one text), which they believed expressed the immediate content of his Awakening, as it was delivered, according to their p'an-chiao, in the first two weeks following his Awakening under the Bodhi tree. The T'ien-t'ai also accept this account of the *Avataṃsaka*; however, for them, Buddha gushed it out, it was too immediate, too removed from ordinary experience to be of any pedagogic value; therefore, Buddha generated a succession of teachings which culminated, in full maturity and with a honed pedagogical precision, in the Lotus Sutra. Ch'an, while eventually replacing 'textual grounding' with a 'scriptureless transmission' from master to disciple (though Ch'an never really abandons texts, either its own or standard Buddhist texts), originally grounded itself in the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*, and with Hui-neng, the Sixth Patriarch, switched to the *Diamond Sutra*. Ching-tu (Pure Land), since in China it developed out of the T'ien-t'ai school, also accepted the Lotus Sutra (along with two supplementary texts) as foundational, but their p'an-chiao emphasized the 'degeneration of Dharma' theory of history, which posits that the further one gets from the time of the Buddha, the more degenerate the age and the more distorted the understanding of the Dharma. For them, the age had already become so degenerate that no one would be able to achieve Awakening through his/her own efforts, and only the grace of a Bodhisattva's transfer of merit would prove to any avail.

5 - For instance, the Ājīvikas (cf. A.L. Basham, *History and Doctrines of the Ājīvikas*, Delhi: Motilal, 1981 rpt); or the pseudo-logic of the *Kathā-vatthu* as discussed in ch. 2 above; or Jaina logic, though technically speaking their logic arose in response to Buddhist logic. Early Jain thinkers, such as Umāsvāti (44-85 C.E.), Samantabhadra (2nd-3rd century C.E.) or Kundakunda (127-179 C.E.) were debaters, commentators, and doctrinal formulators, but hardly proficient logicians. Although Āryarakṣita's *Anuyogadvāra Sūtra* (1st century) already broached epistemological themes such as the *pramāṇas* (means of valid cognition), it is not until the fourth or fifth century (e.g., Siddhasena Divākara) that Jaina epistemology achieves a rigorous logic. Many of the early Jaina logicians arose in response to Buddhism, and are known and respected in Jaina history for their refutations of Buddhist arguments; e.g., Mallavādi - 4th-5th Century, defeated Buddhists at the court of King Śilāditya; Pātrakesarī - (5th-6th Century) his *trilakṣaṇa-kadarthana* refuted Buddhist causation theories [not extant]; Mallavādi [II] - 700-750 C.E., wrote a commentary on Dharmottara's commentary on Dharmakīrti's *Nyāyabindu*; etc.). But generally

> Akalaṅka [8th Century] is said to be the pioneer in the field of Jaina logic. It is believed that the science of logic was given a definite shape in his time. (Yuvacarya Mahaprajna. *Jaina Nyaya Ka Vikasa,* tr. into Eng. by Nathman Tatia as *New Dimensions in Jaina Logic,* Rajasthan: Jaina Vishva Bharati, 1984, p. 163)

His biography bears a marked resemblance to the Mīmāṃsika Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, down to the family name.

> 'Bhaṭṭa' was [Akalaṅka's] family title. His brother's name was Niṣkalaṅka. Once the two brothers lived in a Buddhist monastery to study Buddhist logic. It was leaked there that they were Jaina. Niṣkalaṅka was killed; but Akalaṅka somehow escaped. After getting the status of an *ācārya* for himself he had a debate with the Bauddhas in the court of Himaśītala, the king of Kaliṅga. The opponents installed goddess Tārā in an earthen pot and by virtue of her power became invincible. Akalaṅka knew this secret. He invoked the deity of his order and after breaking the pot defeated the Bauddhas in the debate. (*ibid.,* p. 163).

This violent and fanciful story shows both where Jainas had to go in order to learn logic, and how serious a matter it was for them.

6 – Cf. translation and discussion in Anacker, *Seven Works of Vasubandhu,* pp. 29–48.

7 – Cf. Richard Chi's *Buddhist Formal Logic* (Delhi: Motilal, 1984 rpt of 1969 Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain ed.) which discusses, in great analytic detail, one of these texts, the *Nyāyapraveśa* along with K'uei-chi's (Hsüan-tsang's leading disciple) commentary on it. I will be presenting papers on the reception of the Indian syllogism by the Chinese which will discuss this and other texts at the Annual Conference of the International Society for Chinese Philosophy, Hilo, Hawaii, July 24–29 1989 and at the Fall 1989 Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Religion, which will discuss this and other texts.

8 – As part of his delineation and rejection of the sixty-two extreme views.

9 – We will deal with this more fully later when discussing how Hsüan-tsang interprets the claim that consciousness is not empty.

10 – Cf. *The Crisis of the European Sciences,* tr. by David Carr, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970, pp. 203–208.

11 – *Ibid.,* pp. 258f.

12 – *Ibid.*, p. 260.

13 – *Ibid.*, p. 127f.

14 – This 'crossover' idea is derived from the ***Madhyānta–Vibhāga***. While Yogācāra proper only takes this crossover procedure one step, it may be argued that Hua–yen, and in some ways T'ien–t'ai, extended the crossover indefinitely or infinitely, so that Hua–yen's infinite mutual interpenetration of all events or T'ien–t'ai's 'provisional and empty' culminating in the 'middle', etc., can be seen as the working out of Yogācāric implications.

15 – The term 'differend' was coined by Jean–François Lyotard. His fascinating book, *The Differend: Phrases in Dispute*, tr. from French by Georges Van Den Abbeele (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), drawing expertly on the philosophic tradition from Plato and Aristotle to Kant to Wittgenstein to Heidegger and Russell, etc., proposes a deconstructive ethic to deal with how, in an age without metaphysical certainty, where opposing, contradictory moral and ethical claims lead to logical impasses and aporia (his explicit theme is Auschwitz, i.e., in an age where the referent cannot be reached for testimony – how can one answer, in an ethically compelling manner, the contemporary defender of Nazidom who simply denies the reality of, i.e., the referent 'Auschwitz', and who claims that the imposition of Nuremburg justice is only doing to the loser what the loser himself is accused of doing, viz. imposing his own will and sense of right and wrong on a weaker party?), how, in the milieu of undecidability, does one make decisions with integrity? He begins to define 'differend' on p. xi:

> As distinguished from a litigation, a differend [*différend*] would be a case of conflict, between (at least) two parties, that cannot be equitably resolved for lack of a rule of judgement applicable to both arguments. One side's legitimacy does not imply the other's lack of legitimacy. However, applying a single rule of judgement to both in order to settle their differend as though it were a mere litigation would wrong (at least) one of them (and both of them if neither side admits this rule)...

16 – Not only do the obvious Hindu appropriations of Buddhist thought come to mind, such as Gaudapāda's utilisation of Madhyamaka andYogācāra thought to reinterpret the Upaniṣads, or Śaṅkara's appropriation of the Yogācāric notion of cognitive displacement as the basis for his theory of adhyāsa *qua* māyā; but perhaps even more importantly the persistence by both Buddhist and Western scholars to read notions like ***śūnyatā*** in Vedāntic or

onto-theological registers needs to be recognized and addressed. *Śūnyatā* is not a *via negativa* for revealing or uncovering the 'True Ground of Being' or any other such fantasy; nor is *śūnyatā* itself that ground. The term signifies the activity of 'emptying out' such notions, not merely as concepts, but in terms of the festering inner compulsions which lead one to posit such things in the first place. Emptiness is not an ontological ground, but a methodological tool to be discarded, i.e., 'emptied', when its task is completed. Such, at least, I would argue, is the authentic Yogācāra or Madhyamaka sense of the term. That is not to say that all Buddhists at all times and in all places have unequivocally explained it in precisely this way. In terms of the *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* no other understanding of emptiness than the one given here is to be found, though implications of this understanding are developed and explored. Some illustrative passages will be cited later.

17 – Louis de la Vallée-Poussin consulted the Tibetan version of Sthiramati's commentary, not the Sanskrit, for his French translation of the *Ch'eng wei-shih lun*. Though he reads it well, i.e., he has good instincts as to what Sanskrit terminology lies behind the Tibetan, some discrepancies have apparently crept in. Despite his vast erudition and unblinking command of a dizzying array of sources, he doesn't show a sense of Sthiramati as an integral thinker with a cohesive position spread among a range of texts. Despite his conferring with Sthiramati's commentary in Tibetan, he seems in several places to defer too readily to K'uei-chi's appraisal. One example will be discussed later.

18 – This 'psychology' revolves around notions of *prapañca, vikalpa, abhūta-parikalpita*, etc., as root problematics, and some sort of knowledge, most frequently *nirvikalpa-jñāna*, as their corrective. Many details of this psychology stay in contention between the various schools, but the basic gist underwrites their thinking.

19 – Dating Indian thinkers is a notoriously uncertain enterprise. According to Tāranātha's *History of Buddhism in India* (tr. from Tibetan by Lama Chimpa and Alaka Chattopadhyaya, Simla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 1970) Candrakīrti, Candragomī and Dharmapāla are contemporaries (cf. pp. 198–207, 209, 213, etc.). However while Tāranātha says that Dharmapāla succeeds Candrakīrti, he also claims that Dharmapāla's commentary on *Mādhyamika-kārikās* is *older* than Candrakīrti's (p. 213). Dharmakīrti is supposedly initiated by Dharmapāla (p. 229). Since Candragomī is also said to have received one-time instruction in Sūtras and Abhidharma-piṭaka from Sthiramati (p. 210), all these thinkers would have to be contemporaries. Yet elsewhere he claims that Sthiramati lived in an earlier period, contemporaneous with Dignāga, Buddhadāsa, Buddhapālita, Bhāvaviveka, and others (p. 177). Putting Tāranātha further into doubt are Hsüan-tsang's own writings, especially the (*Ta T'ang*) *Hsi-yu-chi* (大唐)西域記 (Journey to the West during the Great T'ang Dynasty). Having

visited India centuries earlier than Tāranātha's writing, and thus closer to the time of the original events, his writings are more definitive, particularly in terms of what or who is ***absent*** from his account. Since he aims to be somewhat comprehensive, the failure to mention someone is a good indication that that person has either not yet made his mark, or that that person is not yet living. According to Hsüan-tsang, Dharmapāla was challenged by Bhāvaviveka to debate, but declined. Dharmakīrti and Candrakīrti are not mentioned at all (Beal, ***Buddhist Records of the Western World***, NY: Paragon Book, 1968 rpt, p. i.189-90 n. 76, notes that some have associated a 'Deva Bodhisattva' mentioned in the text with Candrakīrti, but he rejects that identification). Though Sthiramati is mentioned, there is no indication that he and Dharmapāla were contemporaries (cf. Beal, p. ii.171, which in fact suggests that they were not). Since we are unable to even date these figures relative to each other, dating them on an objective chronology becomes even more difficult.

20 – The fate of Tantra in China is, I suspect, more complex than this. Not only is there the Mongol and Tibetan influence, which for perhaps nationalistic reasons rarely receives serious attention from Chinese scholars; closer examination of some late Chinese Buddhist writings, such as Han-shan Te-ching's autobiography written during the Ming Dynasty, indicates the presence of Tantric elements and themes (e.g., his 'dreams') which go unannounced as such. Further, Vairocana, central to the Hua-Yen Sutra and thus to the Hua-Yen school, is also a key Tantric deity. Much more work needs to be done to clarify these and other indications which have so far remained 'between the lines' in Chinese Buddhism.

As for Shingon in Japan, Kūkai (a.k.a. Kobodaishi) is venerated as one of Japan's most influential thinkers, credited not only with bringing Tantra from China, but with developing the katakana alphabet and instituting many new cultural directions, which Japan has nurtured ever since. On Kūkai, see Yoshito Hakeda's ***Kūkai: Major Works*** NY: Columbia UP, 1972; on Shingon, see Minoru Kiyota's ***Shingon Buddhism: Theory and Practice*** (Los Angeles-Tokyo: Buddhist Books International, 1978), and Pierre Rambach, ***The Secret Message of Tantric Buddhism, op. cit.***

21 – To date, the two best sources on the state of Buddhism in sixth and seventh century China – particularly in terms of the ubiquity of Yogācāra schools and their subsumation by Hua-yen – are unpublished dissertations. Robert Gimello's ***Chih-yen (602-668) and the Foundations of Hua-Yen Buddhism***, Columbia University, 1972, gives a thorough account of the Buddhism of Hsüan-tsang's day (Hsüan-tsang's dates are 600-669, making him and Chih-yen precise contemporaries). Ming-wood Liu's ***The Teaching of Fa-tsang – An Examination of Buddhist Metaphysics***, UCLA, 1979, covers, among other things, the polemic disputes between Fa-tsang and Hsüan-tsang's brand of Yogācāra in great detail. It is lamentable that neither of these works, both first

class, has been published and made more readily available. What they examine bears directly on the *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* and the matters under discussion here, but I must refer the reader to them, as space does not permit me to reproduce their works here.

22 – Chang-yueh, in his preface to Hsüan-tsang's *Hsi-yu-chi*, paraphrasing chapters 38 and 20 of Lao tzu, expresses it thus:

> At this time the schools were mutually contentious; they hastened to grasp the end without regarding the beginning; they seized the flower and rejected the reality; so there followed the contradictory teaching of the North and South [Ti-lun schools], and the confused sounds of "Yes" and "No," perpetual words! (Beal's translation, *op. cit.*, p. i.5, square brackets mine)

23 – E.g., Sthiramati's commentary to Asaṅga's *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, T.1616.31. The existence of such texts suggest that Hsüan-tsang's opinion of Sthiramati may not have been as negative as is usually asserted.

24 – Although Kūkai chose to write a commentary to Kumārajīva's version, translated in Hakeda, *op. cit.*

25 – To even begin to catalogue all the forms and varieties of psychologistic reductions found in Chinese, Korean and Japanese Buddhism is beyond the scope of this present work. T'ien-t'ai's 'contemplating mind' (*kuan-hsin* 觀心) or chilicosms of thought-instants (*nien* 念); Ch'an's direct pointing at mind, no-mind, etc.; the *Hua-yen Sutra's* "the three worlds are only mind," etc.; are all only the obvious, visible tip of the iceberg.

26 – The only other text which Hsüan-tsang translated into Sanskrit while in India was the Lao Tzu.

27 – On these schools, cf. Zenryū Tsukamoto, *A History of Early Chinese Buddhism: From its Introduction to the Death of Hui-Yüan, op. cit.* This is Hurvitz' translation of *Chūgoku Bukkyō Tsūshi* v. 1 (Shunjūsha: 1979). Unfortunately Zenryū died before completing a full history, so these volumes end with Hui-yüan. Hence it stops short of the Yogācāric expansion in China and the subsequent explosion of Sinitic Mahāyāna. Hsüan-tsang's predecessor and foil, the translator Paramlrtha, e.g., is only mentioned once. However, it is an excellent and fairly thorough survey of the material it covers. It is long on history and sometimes short on philosophy and doctrine; historically critical, but rarely philosophically critical. Hurvitz's notes provide an indispensable

supplement.

Hurvitz' translation, as always, is very professional. An index, primarily of Chinese names with the characters, is at the end of the second volume. The original audience of the book was to be the Japanese layman (with an understanding that Hurvitz would make it available to English readers), so the material is accessible with a minimum of technical vocabulary. Many important texts are cited. No other work available in English even approaches its scope and detail.

For a different (perhaps more accurate) interpretation of these schools, cf. Whalen W. Lai, "The early Prajñā schools, especially 'Hsin-wu', reconsidered", ***Philosophy East and West,*** 33, no. 1, January 1983, pp. 61–77.

28 – ***Ibid.***

29 – For instance, see ***Alchemy, Medicine & Religion in the China of A.D. 320: The Nei P'ien of Ko Hung,*** tr. and ed. by James Ware (NY: Dover, 1981). The theme of the text is precisely the uncertainty of what to do, what will work, which 'elixirs' and practices are lethal or dangerous, etc., coupled with an intense desire to experiment. It was from these often mortally fateful uncertainties that 'neo-Taoists' turned to Buddhism as a method, a way, a Tao.

30 – Cf., e.g., ***Chuang Tzu*** ch. 16 (p. 41, line 9 in the Harvard-Yenching Concordance edition). Although I have not found the actual compound ***hsin–hsing*** in the Chuang Tzu, both terms are crucial. E.g., on the relation of Mind and Form (another ***hsing*** 形) cf. ch. 4 (p. 9, ln. 28), ch. 23 (p. 62, ln. 19), ch. 5 (p. 12, ln. 2), etc. On Mind and Nature (***hsing*** 性) cf. ch. 16 (p. 41, ln. 9). For Mencius mind and nature are also crucial: cf. 2:1.2 and passim on 'the imperturbed mind' (lit. 'not-moved mind', ***pu–tung hsin*** 不動心), and the famous dispute with Kao-tzu on the meaning of Nature, 6:1.3: ***Sheng*** (生 the inborn, innate, lit. "born, arising, producing") is ***hsing*** (性 nature), playing on the etymology of the character for ***hsing,*** which is a compound of ***hsin*** 心 'mind, heart' (also written 忄) and ***sheng*** 生. While the appearance of Chuang Tzu's language and thought in Chinese Buddhist writings is generally recognized (though an exhaustive detailed study has yet to be written in a Western language), Mencius' influence is rarely discussed, if noticed. In a study of the ***Lin–ch'i–lü*** which I am preparing, Mencius' contribution to Ch'an will be explicitly acknowledged and examined.

31 – Cf. ***Tao te ching,*** chs. 11, 12, 14, etc.

32 – This was usually posed in reference to the famous line in the Heart Sutra: "Form is emptiness, emptiness is form; form is not different from emptiness, emptiness is not different from form."

33 – For instance, Hui–yüan uses a pun drawn from the *I–ching* concerning *shen's* (spirit) being quick to show anger. This pun is reminiscent of a later Zen story (and may be its source). Cf. Lai's article for Hui–yüan's pun. The Zen story is:

> One day Tesshu, the famous swordsman and Zen devotee, went to Dokuon and told him triumphantly he believed all that exists is empty, there is no you or me, etc. The master who had listened in silence suddenly snatched up his long tobacco pipe and struck Tesshu's head.
>
> The infuriated swordsman would have killed the master there and then, but Dokuon said calmly, "Emptiness is quick to show anger, isn't it?"
>
> Forcing a smile, Tesshu left the room.

from *Zen: Poems, Prayers, Sermons, Anecdotes, Interviews*, ed. and tr. by Lucien Stryk and Takashi Ikemoto (NY: Doubleday Anchor, 1965), p. 121.

34 – Cf. also Whalen Lai, "*Hu–Jan Nien–Ch'i* (Suddenly a Thought Arose): Chinese Understanding of Mind and Consciousness", *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies*, 3, no. 2, 1980, pp. 42–59, which deals with, amongst other topics, the notion of *shih* (consciousness) in the *Feng–fa–yao,* the treatment of *hsin* (mind) and *shih* (consciousness) in the *Prajñā* schools and the *Ch'eng–Shih* (*Satyasiddhi*) masters' speculation of *Citta–santāna* (consciousness–stream); cf. also Whalen Lai, "Before the Prajña Schools: The Earliest Chinese Commentary on the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā*," *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies*, 6, no. 1, 1983, pp. 91–108, which deals with the Neo–Taoist/early–Chinese Buddhist (ca. 312–385 CE, the time of Tao–an) interpretations of *Śūnyatā* by way of the *Prajñāpāramitā–Sūtra* of 8000 lines and the *Ming–tu* commentary. Section headings:
(Intro, historical perspective);
I. A Preliminary Analysis of the *Ming tu* Commentary,
1.The concept of *Mahāyāna*,
2.The meaning of *Pen–wu* (Original Nothingness),
3.The understanding of *Hsin–wu* (Mind–as–empty),
4.The *Ming–tu* Commentary and other *Prajñā* schools.
Includes Chinese glossary.
The last section contains this quote (Lai's translation) with his comment:

> (My teacher says) '...The *Mahāsattva* courses (in the perfection of wisdom) and sees that as being identical with life and death. Saṃsāra and the (Nirvanic) Way are the same. All dharmas being empty, all things are equal. This path of equality is one that would not abandon the ill of any sentient existence in an aspiration only for the originally pure. Rather, it is to bear the pain of life and death in order to guide others on to the Great

Way so that the path of the Buddha can continue with no end.' (p. 482a14-15 [in T])

That is neither Hinayāna Psychology nor Taoist philosophy, and can never be reduced to them.

35 – For a good example of the critique of Paramārtha's translations, cf. K'uei-chi's commentary to Hsüan-tsang's translation of the ***Madhyānta Vibhāga,*** in which he exploits every opportunity to ridicule and attack Paramārtha's earlier translation. His criticisms, it should be pointed out, are invariably justified and pertinent. Texts such as these should be consulted by those Japanese scholars who blindly repeat each other when they attempt to assert that Paramārtha's translations are 'better' than Hsüan-tsang's. Paramārtha's may at times be more readable or literary (since Hsüan-tsang often chose to emulate Sanskrit syntax, and the Chinese of his day was syntax-dependent for meaning rather than grammar-dependent, hence making his texts difficult to read, especially in the absence of a Sanskrit original or at least some knowledge of Sanskrit and its syntax), but they are almost never more ***accurate.***

36 – Fa-tsang especially worked hard at establishing this relation, as well as offering numerable ways of approaching this. ***Shih-shih wu-ai*** 事事無礙 (the non-obstruction of event and event) alludes to a totality constituted not out of the elimination or overlooking of actual distinctions, but out of the total accumulation of all possible perspectives, contexts, realms of discourse, etc., such that all possible distinctions are made possible and actualizable, but only insofar as they all mutually depend on each other and are mutually constitutive, i.e., 'empty.' Fa-tsang poses this as a going beyond identity and difference. For examples of this in translation, see Garma Chang's ***The Buddhist Doctrine of Totality*** (University Park: Pennsylvania State UP, 1971), pp. 187-230.

This rigorous affirmation of the total and the individual carries interesting political implications, though Hua-yen does not draw them out. It offers a theory by which the State and the Individual both achieve integrity and freedom without 'obstructing' or impeding the other. In fact, this may indicate the influence of Chinese political thinking, albeit unconscious and in all likelihood completely unnoticed, in the development of Hua-yen as Sinitic Mahāyāna. The harmonization of self and society, citizen and ruler, family-member and family-whole – graphically inscribed in the character for the Chinese virtue ***yi*** 義 ('righteousness', 'justice', ethic of social interaction) whose parts consist of a 'herd, flock of sheep' 羊 and below that 'I, me' 我 , thus signifying the interrelation of the self with the herd, i.e., how do I and society interact – looms high on the agenda of Chinese thought at least since the time of Lao Tzu and Confucius. Hua-yen has ontologized and existentialized this ethico-political problematic. In Ch'an the ontology is dropped while the existential dimension is developed in

terms of pedagogy, i.e., what constitutes the relation between teacher and student. A full fleshing out of this sketch must await another occasion.

37 – Some recent noteworthy works dealing with this issue are *Sudden and Gradual: Approaches to Enlightenment in Chinese Thought*, ed. by Peter Gregory (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987) and Peter McRae, *The Northern School and the Formation of Early Ch'an Buddhism* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1986).

38 – Cf. Wing-tsit Chan's translation and note in *Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 384.

39 – *Hsing-hsiang* usually translates *ākāra;* cf. Index [see n. 76, below], pp. 89–90; in Sanskrit, *ākāra* means the form, shape, representational texture of a cognized object.

40 – Since, as pointed out in the last chapter, there are some minor discrepancies between the Chinese and Sanskrit verses as to which phrases are placed in which verse, this schematic will follow the Chinese. For instance, verse 5 in the Chinese begins with the discussion of manas, whereas in the Sanskrit it first completes discussing the ālaya-vijñāna and then begins manas.

41 – Following Vasubandhu's classifications in the *One Hundred Dharmas Śāstra* (*Śatadharmaśāstra, Pai-fa lun* 百法論), Hsüan-tsang lists remorse, torpor, initial mental application and discursive thought as the four Indeterminates, whereas the *Triṃśikā* seems to include these four as part of the secondary Mental Disturbances (*upakleśa*). Sthiramati's commentary also treats them as upakleśa. Cf. previous chapter, v. 14 (e.g., compare A and B, and C and D); see appendix, for all 100 dharmas, classified according to the standard, not *Triṃśikā*, groupings. Note also that the 75 dharma list includes several kleśic dharmas in its list of Indeterminates. Perhaps the *Triṃśikā* marks some intermediate stage between Vasubandhu's formulation of the 75 dharmas as they appear in the *Abhidharmakośa* and the 100 dharmas of the *Śatadharmaśāstra*.

42 – They will be described more fully shortly.

43 – As an aside, I offer some French cognates of *alter* to help set up a semantic resonance: *altérant* – adj., thirst-producing; *altération* – adulteration, deterioration, debasement, faltering (voice), heavy thirst [*soif*]; *altercation* – f., altercation, dispute; *altérer* – to alter, to change, to adulterate, to spoil, to fade, to make thirsty; *s'altérer* – to undergo a change, to alter, to degenerate, to deteriorate; *alternance* – f., alteration, rotation (agriculture); *alternatif* – alternate, alternative; *alternative* – alternative, option; *alterner* – v., to alternate,

to rotate. Notice the connotations of 'rotating,' turning over the soil; this parallels well with the Sanskrit and Chinese terms. Note also the implication of 'thirst', *tṛṣṇa*. Rather than suggesting an evolutionary betterment, however, these words suggest spoilage, deterioration. Note as well that this semantic field constitutes the grounds for any ethic which requires choice, the ability to choose *alternatives*.

44 – For the Chinese text to *Ch'eng wei–shih lun* I have relied primarily on the Nanking blockprint edition recently made available again by the People's Republic of China: *Ch'eng wei–shih lun* (金陵刻經處識 *Chin–ling k'o–ching ch'ü shih*, 2 vol., 1897). It is a boon to have this and other prints of many important Buddhist texts again being produced in the PRC, since they are extremely reliable editions, often superior to the Taisho. I have also used the reprint editions of other texts likewise made available from PRC, such as K'uei–chi's commentary to the Twenty Verses, *Wei–shih erh–shih lun shu–chi* 唯識二十論述記 (光緒刻經處校刊 *Kiangsi k'o–ching ch'ü hsiao–k'an*, 2 vol., 1438); the *Yogācārabhūmiśastra*, Hsüan–tsang's translations of *Madhyānta Vibhāga, Saṅdhinirmocana Sūtra, Mahāyānasamgrāha*, etc., as well as his travelogue, *Hsi–yu–chi*. *For Ch'eng wei–shih lun* I also consulted Wei Tat's bilingual edition, but found a number of places where the blockprint had a superior reading. I was unable to procure a copy of Saeki's edition, and have thus relied on Vallée–Poussin's presentation of Saeki's correlations, etc. in Vallée–Poussin's *Vijñaptimatratāsiddhi: La Siddhi de Hsuan–Tsang*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1928).

References to *Ch'eng wei–shih lun* will be to the blockprint and/or Tat. The blockprint is traditional style, meaning that the left hand page and its obverse side share the same page number. Hence I have called the left side of a page "A" and the page when turned over "B". *Ch'eng wei–shih lun* has 10 ch'üan, and begins numbering pages anew with each fresh ch'üan, so reference will be to ch'üan, page, side, and occasionally column. E.g., the first verse occurs at ch.1:1B,5–6, i.e., first ch'üan, page 1. side B, columns 5 and 6. References to Tat will be only to page number.

45 – Giles, character #9210, my emphasis.

46 – Monier–Williams, p. 594. It also means development, evolution; digestion; aging; result, consequence; a figure of speech by which the properties of an object are transferred to that with which it is compared, etc. It is clear, though, that the primary meaning(s) of *pariṇāma* and *pien* coincide.

47 – After all, Sanskrit still has six other declensions to choose from (ablative, genitive, etc.), whereas the neng–so dyad does not imply even a third case, much less a number of others. More significantly, the locative/nominative distinction not only lacks any clear oppositional tension, but suggests an entirely

different notion of identity and difference, as will be demonstrated momentarily.

48 – Especially Sāṃkhya, but their thought influenced other schools; cf., e.g., Patañjali's *Yoga Sutras*. In *Yoga Philosophy of Patañjali: Containing his Yoga Aphorisms with Vyāsa's* Commentary in Sanskrit and a Translation..., by Sāṃkhya-yogāchārya Swāmi Hariharānanda Āraṇya, rendered into English by P.N. Mukerji (Albany: SUNY Press, 1983). A glossary is offered at the back:

pariṇāma – Result; effect; fluctuation; transformation
pravṛtti – clear mode of mind; inclination to worldliness (*e.g.* in Pravṛtti-mārga); conation; supersensuous perception.
(pp. 465f)

49 – *Ta-tsu-en-ssu san-tsang fa-shih chuan,* by Hui-li (completed by Yen-tsung), Nanjio #1494. I used the edition published in Nanking (*Chin-ling k'o-ching ch'ü tsang-pan,* 1954) ch.4:19A-20B, ch.5:7A-8B. English tr.: *The Life of Hsuan-Tsang,* Compiled by Monk Hui-li, translated under the auspices of the San Shih Buddhist Institute (Peking: Chinese Buddhist Association, 1959), pp. 154-160, 174-176. The English is generally reliable, but incomplete.

50 – This may be viewed in terms of Kierkegaard's description of reason as a 'passion' which, once it spends itself, nonetheless inevitably begins again; or Freud's notion of life as irresolvable tension, a tension which only ceases in death; or as the constant round of rebirths, ever engendering another life, another birth which is produced by the blending of one's desire for life (*bhava-āśrava*) with one's parents' desire for pleasure (*kāma-āśrava*); or in countless other ways.

51 – This sort of hermeneutic straddling has functioned in some contemporary literary criticism as an emblem of freedom, i.e., the undecidability or aporia of a text becomes glorified as the essence of the freedom of the reader, the hermeneutic freedom of textual openness. While the ambiguous, the aporetic does mark the (resistance to) encoding of a revolutionary spirit which challenges any text's claim to univocality or fixed determinateness, these pockets of resistance are still thoroughly parasitic on textual determinations, and thus are merely emblematic of freedom, not actual freedom. A 'free' reading must be able to thrive not only in a text's ambiguities, but within determinateness itself. As Yogācāra would say, this involves being able to see through closures, looking through any (textual) limit, 'seeing' the limit as a transparency.

52 – Cf. Monier-Williams, pp. 693-694.

53 – *Ibid.,* p. 594.

54 – *Ibid.,* p. 528.

55 – 'Moistening' the seeds, i.e., activating the seeds by providing productive conditions, is part of the *Ch'eng wei-shih lun's* vocabulary for causality.

56 – In the Yogācāric context the most striking example would be the rules of *saṅdhi*, i.e., the system of substitutions whereby two adjoining letters are replaced by a single letter. There are internal saṅdhi, or substitutions within a single word, and external saṅdhi, or substitutions based on the contraction of the last and first letters of contiguous words. Its grammatical sense was applied to other spheres. Already in Pāli Buddhism, the term denoted the linking of a previous to a subsequent consciousness-stream (*paṭisandhi-viññāṇa*), i.e., what links a previous life to a subsequent life. The earliest text to appear with distinctively Yogācāric themes is the Saṅdhi-*nirmocana Sūtra*, whose title alludes to, amongst other implications, the alterations of consciousness, particularly insofar as they are implicit, i.e., unconscious. *Saṅdhi* here signifies the explicit traces of implicit substitutions, the series of rules, of alterations of words and mental/cognitive situations. A grammatical example: A word ending with -a followed by a word beginning with a- ; the two words are linked and ā is substituted for the two a-s. Hence the long a (ā) is the explicit trace of two short a-s (-a + a-). Another example: -a + u- = o; citta + utpāda => citt-o-tpāda (cittotpāda). The mind similarly works by systematic substitutions, displacements, concealing and revealing, highlighting foreground from background, etc. To understand the movement means to recognize in what is present (i.e., what is presented in consciousness) that which is absent, that which has been displaced by substitution (i.e., the background, the unconscious). Psychoanalysis thus maps the language of the unconscious, the grammar of displacive substitutions with which conscious life articulates and expresses itself.

57 – On how the *Triṃśikā* treats these terms, see the previous chapter and its notes.

58 – This is already implied, or at least is one possible reading of *Triṃśikā* v. 15-16. An explicit discussion of how the various consciousnesses become perceptual object-supports (*ālambana*) for each other is discussed at Ch 8:5B-6A. Cf. Tat, p. 570. This will be translated below.

59 – Ch.7:12A-13A; Tat, pp. 502-504. In the perennial dilemma that faces all translators, readability vs. literal accuracy, I have opted for the latter. Taking the text seriously as a philosophical treatise involves, I believe, treating its vocabulary as technical terms, as well as regarding its general usage of language to be a mirror of its form of thinking. Tat's translation is very free, and he generally follows Vallée-Poussin; his text is almost an English rendering of the latter's French version, minus the immensely helpful notes that Vallée-Poussin

provided. While their translations will certainly be more 'readable' than mine, that readability often comes at the expense of faithfulness to the text. To be fair, the text is often overly concise, elliptical, and the wholesale filling in of the blanks by Vallée-Poussin, his interpretive expansions of the text, etc., are frequently insightful and justifiable. But no matter how insightful an interpretation or amendation might be, it remains precisely that. While no translation can avoid being an interpretation, it can try to convey to the reader a sense of the flow of the original text, with as accurate a representation of the original's terminology as is possible. ***Ch'eng wei-shih lun*** is not a 'pretty' text, even in Chinese, and to make it such in English would thus be to perform a certain kind of violence. I apologize if this makes the reader's task more difficult, but my aim was accuracy not elegance. I hope in this I was successful.

60 – Nimitta, Monier-Williams, p. 551: a butt, mark, target... cause, ground, reason, motive,... ***caused or occasioned by,...*** etc. In Buddhist texts, nimitta means the sensorial marks by which a sense-object is cognized and characterized as what it is, i.e., color, shape, texture, etc. For Yogācāra it means the cognitive sensorial marks by which a projection of consciousness assumes an objective quality.

61 – While the word ***chia*** generally means 'provisional' in Chinese Buddhist texts, Hsüan-tsang clearly establishes an opposition between 'real' and 'nominal', and thus uses the term ***chia*** as his equivalent for ***prajñapti***. On ***prajñapti,*** see chs. Two and Three above.

62 – This may seem less problematic if we keep in mind that Dharmapāla is said to have accepted altogether four bhāgas, not just these two, so that the 'seer' and the 'nimitta' are subtended by two other cognitive constituents, though it is not clear whether either of these are actually 'neng-pien' (that which alters) either.

63 – K'uei-chi assigns this position to Nanda.

64 – Note that both Dharmapāla and Nanda consider ātman as well as the dharmas to be 'external objects'. Why should the 'self' be classified as external? External to what?

65 – ***Hsü-wang fen-pieh yu chi ch'eng ku*** 虛妄分別有極成故 which seems to mean 'consciousness' is inclusive of everything, including whatever is falsely discriminated. This point seems trite.

66 – ***Shih k'ung*** 實空 could also mean tathatā (***chen-ju***) and śūnyatā.

67 – This last line offers a clue to Hsüan-tsang's attempted harmonization of Yogācāra and Mādhyamika. He reportedly wrote a treatise while in India, in Sanskrit, arguing the non-difference of these two schools. Tathatā and śūnyatā become affirmational and negational means of establishing the same proposition. Significantly, as we shall see shortly, both as-it-is-ness and emptiness are declared to be prajñapti by the *Ch'eng wei-shih lun*.

68 – I will be translating *ching* 境 (*viṣaya*) as 'perceptual-field' unless the context shows that a singular object is indicated, in which case I will translate it 'perceptual-object'. A related term, *ālambana* (*so-yüan* 所緣), which in Chinese literally means 'objective condition', in Sanskrit signifies the objective 'support' of a cognition, i.e., what lies at the objective pole of a perception or cognition that supports or upholds that particular perception. In realist systems it signifies the object as perceivable; in systems with more critical epistemologies it signifies what is being perceived *as* an object. I will translate *so-yüan* either back into Sanskrit as ālambana or into English as 'objective-[cognitive]-support', depending on context.

69 – E.g.: *Daśabhūmika:* "The three dhātus are *wei-shih.*" *Sandhinirmocana Sūtra:* "the ālambana is projected by *wei-shih.*" *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra:* "There are no dharmas apart from citta."

70 – Vallée-Poussin [hereafter VP], p. 421–22 Sanskritizes them as follows: (1) *viruddha vijñāna nimitta jñāna;* (2) *anālambana vijñāna pratyakṣopalabdhi jñāna;* (3) *anabhisaṃskārāviparīta[tva] jñāna;* (4) *trividha jñānānuvartaka jñāna:* (4a) *vaśitājñānānuvartika jñāna;* (4b) *pravicaya jñānānuvartaka jñāna;* (4c) *nirvikalpaka jñānānuvartaka jñāna.*

71 – This contains an implicit critique of the notion of *rūpa* as *pratigha* (resistance). If it truly occupied and obstructed space in such a way that all other *rūpa* is repelled from that locus, then such mutually exclusive cognitions should be impossible.

72 – *Tien* means to overturn; *tao* means hindrance, impediment. As a compound *tien-tao* means to confound, to confuse (e.g., right with wrong).

73 – VP, p. 422 n. 3, points out that this knowledge is associated with the tenth *vaśitā* according to *Daśabhūmika-sūtra* and the *She-lun*. For K'uei-chi, this knowledge marks the accomplishment of the Eighth Bhūmi.

74 – Literally: As his desires alter (turn and change), lands, etc., all are established (*ch'eng*).

75 – *Shih yu* 實有 here implies 'stable entities'.

76 – Akira Hirakawa's *Index to the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (Tokyo, 1977) 3 vols., especially v. 2, Chinese–Sanskrit, has been indispensable. The Index correlates both Hsüan–tsang's and Paramārtha's terminology in their respective translations of the *Kośa* with the Sanskrit original. Though neither maintained constant correspondences, a sense of their usage, of the semantic spread they imputed into terms is discernible. Many passages in the *Ch'eng wei–shih lun* which might otherwise have remained entirely unclear or which I might have thoroughly misunderstood, became more readily comprehensible when I discovered the likely Sanskrit terms. VP, who worked without the advantage of such an index, becomes all the more amazing when one sees how often his Sanskrit reconstructions are on the mark. He identifies *kuan–ch'a* as *pravicaya* (investigation, examination). Cf. Index p. 72, where a number of correspondences are noted, including pravicaya's cognate term *vyavacāraṇāvasthā* (stage of pondering over or considering). Cf. Monier–Williams, pp. 691 and 1033. (All references to the Index will be to volume 2, unless otherwise noted).

77 – In Taoist texts, such as *Tao te ching, hsü* is a very positive term, connoting the 'openness' of a cup or room or mind, etc., that allows those things to function. Like the hollow of a bellows that increases and decreases as the bellows is used, hsü signifies inexhaustible functioning. On the other hand, in texts such as the *Ch'eng wei–shih lun* its sense of 'hollow' as opposed to 'full', solid, substantial (*shih*) is highlighted.

78 – Index, p. 128.

79 – On how the *Triṃśikā* treats this and the other two svabhāvas (self–natures), see vs. 20–25.

80 – Index, p. 127. Cf. Monier–Williams, p. 831.

81 – Index, p. 468. Cf. Monier–Williams, p. 817. In the *Kośa* Hsüan–tsang used *wang* in other ways as well; e.g., the compound *wang–wei* for *dṛṣṭi*. (妄謂)

82 – According to the Index, p. 193, *shih* carries a number of implications: *dravya* (substance), *asti, as–* (is, exists), etc.

83 – This existentialization derives, to a large extent from Mencius, who centuries before had existentialized Confucius' teachings; e.g., redefining the Five Constants in terms of the Four Beginnings, the latter being existential lived–world examples of what lies at the basis of the former, which, because they are experiential (*hsin*) are to be taken as indicative of human nature (*hsing*). I hope to write more on this on another occasion.

84 – Ch.7:13B–16B; Tat, p. 508–524.

85 – 13B–14A; 508–510. VP: I.423–424. The Chinese text is extremely terse. VP's translation is, as a consequence, very free, and he incorporates so much of K'uei-chi's commentary that it would not be inaccurate to say that he has translated the latter rather than the *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* itself. Tat virtually repeats VP, though he rearranges the order of presentation. Since the terseness will not yield a useful translation, I have decided to paraphrase peppered with translated phrases.

86 – VP, I.423 interprets the next line, which only says rather cryptically, "since two accord with one," as referring to a later discussion (VP, II:445) concerning two types of ālambana, viz. the immediate object (*sākṣāt-ālambana*) which is always integral to a consciousness, never apart from it; and the remote object, which may seem to be separable from the cognizer, as a sort of *hylē* that produces the nimitta-bhāga which the darśana-bhāga perceives. He 'translates' the phrase "since two accord with one" thus:

> ...parce qu'il est un des deux Bhāgas (à savoir le *nimittabhāga*) de ces Vijñānas; tout comme la partie du Vijñāna qui connait (à savoir le *darśanabhāga*) n'est pas distincte du Vijñāna puisqu'elle est Vijñāna de sa nature.

Not bad for four Chinese characters! The 'two' of the above phrase, then, would refer to the two bhāgas, and the 'one' would be consciousness itself.

87 – Ch.7:14A; Tat, p. 510.

88 – I have translated the Chinese literally. The Sanskrit reads:

> *Abhūta-parikalpo 'sti dvayam tatra na vidyate, śūnyatā vidyate tu-atra tasyām-api sa vidyate. //2*
> *Na śūnyam na-api ca aśūnyam tasmāt sarvam vidhīyate, sattvād-asattvāt sattvac-ca madhyamā pratipac-ca sā. //3*

I would translate this as:

> [Though] abhūta-parikalpa (m.) (mental construction of the non-real) exists, no duality is found. But śūnyatā (f) is found there, even in this (m), there is that(f). [2]
> Neither śūnya nor aśūnya, thus is everything described; due to its existence (*sat*), its non-existence (*asat*) and again its existence (*sat*), This is called the Middle Way. [3]

The most significant difference between the Chinese and Sanskrit is the clue that gender gives to the meaning of v. 2. Cf. Appendix, in which I've appended an annotated translation from the Sanskrit of the first chapter of the ***Madhyānta-vibhāga.***

89 – Ch.7:14b; Tat, p. 516.

90 – Or: 'One falsely attaches to substantialistic dharmas', i.e., one attaches falsely to 'consciousness altered', taking those alterations to be substantial things independent of the cognition in which they arise. ***Shih*** = ***dravya,*** and will be translated either as "real" or as "substantial."

91 – The correct knowledges probably refers to (1) ***nirvikalpa-jñāna*** (non-discriminative knowledge) and (2) ***pṛṣṭhalabdha-jñāna*** (post-Awakening knowledge).

92 – In Chinese, ***su-ti*** 俗諦. ***Su*** means 'vulgar, common, mundane' and ***ti*** means 'to judge, examine.' Hence it 'translates' as "mundane-determinations" or "common [= conventional] modes of exploring the world".

93 – Though generally Hsüan-tsang renders ***paramārtha-satya*** as ***sheng-yi-ti,*** here he repeats the more common rendition used by Kumarajīva and Paramārtha, viz. ***chen-ti*** 眞諦. ***Chen*** means 'true, genuine'.

94 – Index, p. 145: Hsüan-tsang uses ***chien-li*** for (1) ***prajñapti,*** (2) prati-pad, (3) labh-, (4) vyavasthā, (5) gam, (6) vyavasthāpana-, (7) vyavasthāpita, (8) ***vyavahāra,*** and (9) sthāpita. Cf. n. 76 above.

95 – Here Hsüan-tsang clearly still has MMK chapter 24 in mind. The verse immediately following v. 10 (translated in Chapter Three, above, cf. n. 69 and corresponding text) states:

> A wrongly perceived emptiness ruins a person of meager intelligence. It is like a snake that is wrongly grasped or knowledge that is wrongly cultivated. (Kalupahana's tr., *ibid.,* p. 335)

Cf. MMK 13.8:

> The Victorious Ones have announced that emptiness is the relinquishing of views. Those who are possessed of the view of emptiness (***śūnyatā-dṛṣṭi***) are said to be incorrigible (***asādhyān***). (*ibid.,* p. 223, my insertions)

96 – This could also be translated: 'Of the various dharmas, some are

empty and some are not empty.' Either reading would arguably accord with the present context.

97 – Chapter Three, above, n. 63 and corresponding text.

98 – Ch.7:15A; Tat, p. 518.

99 – *Ibid.*

100 – Ch.8:7B–8A, Tat, p. 582–584. In this passage vāsanā is rendered *hsi–ch'i*, while in the passage just cited it was rendered *hsün–hsi*. These terms are interchangeable. The first connotes 'perfumed or smoked habit', the second 'habitual force'. *Hsi* means 'what is acquired through repetition', hence 'habit' or 'practice', etc.

101 – Index, p. 195: *ch'a–pieh* = *viśeṣa, prakāra, prabheda, bhid–*.

102 – These two mārgas, and the other three presented in the *Ch'eng wei–shih lun* will be outlined below. For now it is sufficient to note that the darśana–mārga precedes the bhāvana–mārga, and that the former involves gaining conscious control over *how* one cognizes, while the later involves practice and cultivation. Hence, 'discrimination' (i.e., how current experience reflects and produces conditioning) is dealt with in the former, and the long term conditioning, those conditionings which one is born with, i.e., are carried over from previous existences, require the cultivational uprooting of the latter mārga.

103 – VP, p. ii.479:

> Vāsanā of the *bhavāṅga* (*bhava* = the triple existence, *aṅga* = *hetu*) : The Bījas which proceed from the act, *karmabījas,* which creates the retribution of the three Dhātus (*traidhātukavipāka*). – The Bhavāṅga is of two sorts: impure but good, *sāsravakuśala,* the acts which create the agreeable fruits; bad, *akuśala,* the acts which create a disagreeable fruit. [my translation, as will be all subsequent translations from his French version]

104 – *Chao* 招 means 'to hail, beckon, call', but is used (Index, p. 248) for *abhi–nir–vṛt–* ('to result from', 'proceed from').

105 – VP, p. 478; he links the linguistic vāsanā to a discussion in the section on the Ten and the Two Hetus and Fifteen Adhiṣṭhānas, his p. 454 (re: ch.8:1A; Tat, p. 552). The relevant passage reads:

> Anuvyavahārahetu (*sui–shuo–yin* 隨說因) and *vacana*– or

> *vāgadhiṣṭhāna* (*yü-yi-ch'u* 語依處).
> The *vāgadhiṣṭhāna* has for its nature *vāc*, speech, which is produced by *dharma*, *nāman* and *saṃjñā* [the word *vāgadhiṣṭhāna* is thus a karmadhāraya and signifies: the Adhiṣṭhāna which consists of *vāc* : this is the explanation of the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*]. *Vāc* or speech is produced by the thing (*dharma*) that it names [VP adds this note: The thing that one names is a *nimitta*, a mental image which proceeds from previous speech], the name and the notion.
> One establishes the Anuvyavahārahetu relative to this Adhiṣṭhāna. – In effect, it is because of speech and in conformity with it that is in line with experience (*vyavahāra*) of all things (*artha*) that are seen, heard, thought, known (*dṛṣṭaśutamatavijñāta*...). – The denomination (*abhilāpa*, *neng-shuo* 能說, i.e., the speech which denominates) is the cause of the denominable (*abhilāpya*, *so-shuo* 所說, i.e., all the dharmas). [my translation from VP's French rendition]

The text mentions another theory as well, in which the *sui-shuo-yin* (lit: 'Cause *qua* following from language') is taken as a tatpuruṣa signifying 'Adhiṣṭhāna of Vāc', i.e.,

> it is the support of speech, known as *nāman*, *saṃjñā* and *dṛṣṭi*: since it is by reason of, and in conformity [with *nāman*], which names [an object, with *saṃjñā*] which seizes [the object's] characteristics, [with *dṛṣṭi*] which becomes attached to it. [my translation from the Chinese]

According to K'uei-chi, this latter position entails that the three dharmas – name, associative-thinking, and viewpoint – are the cause, such that vāc is their fruit. That interpretation seems rather incoherent. How can 'name', etc., be the *cause* of language?

106 – Ch.7:15A; Tat, p. 518.

107 – *Tien-tao* 顛倒, lit. 'to turn around, reverse, flip over, make contrary.' Index, p. 342: *viparīta*, *viparyaya*, which also mean 'turned around, reversed, opposite, contrary, reversal.' Traditionally Buddhism lists four viparyāsas or 'perversions', i.e., reversals of what is correct. The four are: Taking what is impermanent as permanent; taking what is selfless as having self; taking what is impure as pure; taking what is miserable as happy. These 'perversions' are reversals, which, correct seeing must again reverse, or turn back. The āśraya-paravṛtti ('foundational reversal' or 'turning around of the basis') in part derives from this notion. It exemplifies the privileging of the cognitive in terms of analysis of the problematic as well as prescriptions for its cure.

108 – VP, p. 428: interprets *luan*, which means 'confusion, chaos,

anarchy' (i.e., psychological, political, cosmological, etc. confusion) as corresponding to *bhrānti*, 'a cognitive error, an erroneous cognition.' But cf. Index, p. 487: *bhrānti* does not occur there, but amongst the correspondences listed is *viparyāsa*. Other terms are *ākula–*, *mūrchā–*, *vikṣipta–*, etc.

109 – VP, *ibid.*, offers the following gloss:

> That is to say: The illusion (or thought) which is *arūpavijñāna*, immaterial Vijñāna (the *darśanabhāga*), has for a cause the *rūpavijñāna*, the material Vijñāna, the Vijñāna appearing as Rūpa (*the nimittabhāga*). There is no *viṣayin*, subject, if there is no *viśaya*, object.

VP is taking *hsiang*, *lakṣaṇa*, 'mark or characteristic', in this context as 'cause'.

110 – To be more precise, at ch.2:14B (Tat, p. 128) the *Ch'eng wei–shih lun* states that "the (bījas) lead to their own fruit, i.e., rūpa (bījas) lead to rūpic fruit, and citta (mind) (bījas) lead to citta fruits, each leading to the production of its own particular kind... This refutes the theory which the Sarvāstivādins are attached to, viz. that rūpa and citta reciprocally act as causes and conditions for each other." Does this mean that no reciprocal relation is posited? No. What is being denied is an ontological status for rūpa, i.e., if one accepts that it is on a causal parity with citta, then one is implicitly conceding that there is an external thing, independent of consciousness, which shapes cognition. K'uei–chi, in his commentary to this line is quick to point out that rūpa and citta *do act as adhipatipratyaya*. The *Ch'eng wei–shih lun* accepts four categories of conditions; the *adhipatipratyaya* is the fourth type, a sort of miscellaneous grab–bag of whatever is to be considered a 'condition' (*pratyaya*) but was not included in the first three categories. The four pratyayas will be outlined later, particularly the third, the *ālambana–pratyaya*.

111 – *Ethics* I.def4, Shirley's translation.

112 – The Reason vs. Will debate predates Protestantism, e.g., with the Dominican vs. Franciscan debates of the Middle Ages, but Luther establishes Protestant theology firmly on a foundation of Will *qua* faith, and it is this feature, especially as it relates to the problem of free–will and determinism, that marks the movement away from Catholicism and towards the notion of a morally autonomous individual, the Protestant hallmark. On this, cf. the Luther–Erasmus debates, which were a decisive moment in the formation of the Reformation: *Erasmus–Luther: Discourse on Free Will*, tr. and ed. by Ernst Winter (NY: Continuum, 1988).

113 – Tr. by William Alston and George Nakhnikian (Hague: Martinus

Nijhoff, 1964), p. xiv.

114 – Cf. above, Chapter Three, n. 80.

115 – Cf. ch.2:7A; Tat, p. 94:

> The 'true' (*chen*) is the *svalakṣaṇa* (*tzu–hsiang*). Prajñaptic knowledge and language (*vāc*) do not [cognize such] an object. Prajñaptic knowledge and language don't attain the svalakṣaṇa, but only the operation of samānya–lakṣaṇa (general or universal characteristic) of dharmas.

116 – Cf. *Madhyānta Vibhāga*, ch. 3, and *passim*. Cf. above, Chapter Four, n. 17 and 28.

117 – Chapter Three.

118 – Ch.2:4B; Tat, p. 86.

119 – Ch.7:15A; Tat, 520.

120 – *Fen ming hsien–ch'eng* 分明現證. The compound *hsien–ch'eng* translates *sākṣāt–kārta* (Index, p. 122). Sākṣāt–kāra implies being put in front of one's eyes, making evident to the senses; "evident or intuitive perception, realisation" (Monier–Williams, p. 1198), and signifies the same thing as the English phrase "seeing it with my own eyes." It is tempting to think of Husserl's notion of *Evidenz*, but as this form of 'believing' is about to be criticized as bespeaking a naive viewpoint, I have translated *hsien–ch'eng* more literally. In Chinese *hsien* means 'to make evident, become manifest, to (be) see(n)' and in Yogācāra literature frequently signifies 'projection.' Index, p. 121, gives a number of Sanskrit correspondences: *ābhāsa–prāpta, ut–PAD, upa–LABH, DṚŚ, pratyutpanna, pratyupasthita, madhyama, vartamān*, etc. *Ch'eng* means 'realization.'

121 – *Hsien liang so–te* 現量所得. *Liang* translates *parimāṇa*, 'measure, measuring out', "measure of any kind, e.g. circumference, length, size, weight, number, value, duration... having measure, measurable" (Monier–Williams, p. 599). It is cognate to *pramāṇa*, means of cognition; I have translated it here as 'cognition.' *So–te* usually translates *upalabdhi*, 'perceptually grasp.'

122 – The text says *yi* (manas) and not *yi–shih* (mano–vijñāna), but VP, p. 428–429, notes that this section "follows very closely the Saṃgrāha", i.e., the *She–lun*. For this line VP has: [During immediate knowing] "color isn't

conceived as external (because the Pratyakṣa attains the svabhāva). It is later that the Manovijñāna (the reflexion of Manas: *manovikalpa*) falsely creates the notion of externality (*bāhyasamjñām* or *bāhyabuddhim janayati*)." His use of the word svabhāva is questionable; his justification comes from a section of the text (his p. 87; Tat, pp. 92–94; Ch.2:6B–7A) that discusses svalakṣaṇa, but not svabhāva. VP equates them (p. 87, "svalakṣaṇa = svabhāva"). But the discussion there concerns unique particulars revealed in perception as opposed to the generalities indulged in by language and reasoning.

123 – *Ideas, op. cit.,* e.g., introduction, part I, and *passim.*

124 – *Ideas, ibid.,* ch. 4, pp. 101ff. As to his intent, he writes on p. 101, in reference to the *epoché:*

> The disconnecting of the world does not as a matter of fact mean the disconnecting of the number series, for instance, and the arithmetic relative to it.
>
> However, we do not take this path, nor does our goal lie in its direction. That goal we could also refer to as *the winning of a new region of Being, the distinctive character of which has not yet been defined,* a region of *individual* Being, like every genuine region. We must leave the sequel to teach us what that more precisely means.

It is, no doubt, to this passage that Merleau-Ponty, in the introduction to his *Phenomenology of Perception,* elliptically refers when he writes, "...the whole of *Sein und Zeit* springs from an indication given by Husserl." (*Phenomenlogy of Perception,* tr. by Colin Smith, NJ: Humanities Press, 1962, p. vii) Merleau-Ponty begins his own definition of phenomenology by saying, "Phenomenology is the study of essences: the essence of perception or the essence of consciousness, for example." (*ibid.*)

125 – Ch.1:2A; Tat, p. 10

126 – Cf. Ch.1:14A; Tat, pp. 54–56.

127 – *Liao* carries another meaning which is interesting in our context. It marks bringing something to a conclusion. As 'comprehending', then, it involves an understanding which comes at the conclusion of a process. As conclusion it implies bringing things to a close, bringing a pursuit or endeavor to *closure,* e.g., closing a legal case ("this case is closed").

128 – Some of the *Ch'eng wei-shih lun's* statements on the existence of other minds will be translated below, immediately after the argument currently under discussion.

129 – Ch.7:16A; Tat, pp. 522–524.

130 – Traditionally, *sparśa* (lit. 'touch') is defined as the meeting, contact, encounter, 'touch' between a sense organ and a sense-object, implying the organ is internal and the object is external; consciousness is that which arises due to this contact. The opponent has doubts about the location of the object of contact, i.e., what is within and what is outside consciousness. Since the point is not to locate things and perceivers on an ontological map, but to analyse the manner in which we cognize, the question is wrongheaded, since for Yogācāra to say that all experience is of consciousness – or even in consciousness; vijñāna straddles the genitive ["of"] and locative ["in"], and the conflation of vijñāna with vijñapti invokes the instrumental ["by, with"], dative ["for, in pursuit of"], ablative ["from, because"], etc. – is only to therapeutically rephrase the tautological proposition that all experience is experiential.

Tat translated this sentence as "And how sceptical you are regarding all things that you come into contact with!" i.e., the 'contact' being contact with the wei-shih teachings! It could be read that way, but only as a reinforcing irony which plays on the 'contact' issue just outlined.

131 – 'Examine' = *ti* 諦 , elsewhere used for the *satyas,* i.e., saṃvṛtti-*satya* and paramārtha-*satya*. Cf. Chapter Three.

132 – General, Specific, Advantageous, Mental Disturbances, Secondary Mental Disturbances and Indeterminate. See appendix.

133 – The reference is unclear. Tat, following VP (p. i.431), takes it to refer to the viprayukta-dharmas.

134 – Reference is to whatever was the referent of the previous note. VP interprets the three to indicate caittas, rūpa and the viprayukta-dharmas.

135 – Again unclear. I am following VP, as does Tat.

136 – I've transcribed this account from McCrae's *The Northern School and the Formation of Early Ch'an Buddhism, op. cit.,* pp. 15–16.

137 – The coincidence of the Indian Buddhist notion of *prapañcopaśama* or the 'making peaceful' (*upaśama*) of prapañca and Mencius' notion of pacifying the 'perturbed' (lit. 'moving') mind marked a point of consolidation between Chinese Buddhism and Confucianism.

138 – Cf. Dharmakirti's *Santānāntara-siddhi, with Vinītadeva's Commentary,* translated [freely] from T. Stcherbatsky's Russian version into

English by Harish C. Gupta, in *Papers of Th. Stcherbatsky, Indian Studies Past & Present* (Calcutta, 1969), pp. 71–121.

139 – Ch.7:15B–16A; Tat, pp. 520–522.

140 – The *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* differentiates two types of ālambana: Immediate or direct ālambana (*ch'in so-yüan* 親所緣) and remote ālambana (*shu so-yüan* 疏所緣). Cf. Tat, pp. 542–544; VP pp. 445f, and below.

141 – *Hsien,* as I've argued above, might be read either way.

142 – VP p. i.430. Countless examples could be collected from other works as well. For instance, Tat, on p. 547, 'translates': "The five material Indriyas or organs. They have as their essential nature the subtle Rupa (eyes, etc.) which is the manifestation of Mulavijnana, etc." Has the *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* finally said that ālaya-vijñāna 'manifests' rūpa? In Chinese not only is there no word for 'manifest', but the passage reads quite differently from Tat's causative-idealist 'interpretation':

> The five rūpa organs, which alterations (*so-pien*) in the mūla-vijñāna, etc., take in through the eyes, etc. Pure rūpa (*ching-se*) is regarded as their nature.

The passage actually says that their nature is 'pure rūpa'. How pure rūpa produces "alterations in the mūla-vijñāna, etc." such that they are taken in (*yi* 以) through the eye, etc., is not explained there.

143 – VP pp. ii.446f; cf. ch.7:19B–20A; Tat, p. 544.

144 – Ch.7:17A–21B; Tat, p. 534–550; VP ii.436–452.

145 – Index, p. 121.

146 – Cf. Monier-Williams, p. 1167.

147 – *Ibid.,* p. 1180.

148 – Ch.7:18A; Tat, p. 536.

149 – VP and Tat (who has translated VP in this section, not the Chinese text) claim that the citta is the antecedent of the subsequent caitta, but properly speaking, they should be producing each other. Here again, the assumption they make that the mind, a.k.a. the citta is 'creating' the world has colored their interpretation.

150 – Ch.7:18A; Tat, p. 538.

151 – Buddhism discusses two types of nirvāna: nirvāna–with–remainder and nirvāna–without–remainder. the former means that even after attaining nirvāna, though one has stopped producing and accumulating new karma, one still has not burned off all the karma acquired up to then; this residual karma is responsible for the continuance of the enlightened one's body, etc. To enter parinirvāna means that no residuals, no body, nothing remains.

152 – Ch.7:19B; Tat, p. 542.

153 – ***yu–fa*** 有法, ***saddharma.***

154 – ***Tai–chi–hsiang*** 帶已相, ***tadākāratā. Tai*** means 'to take, lead; close, connected with, carry with; girdle, zone.' VP, pp. ii.444f discusses this and a number of terms we will be discussing momentarily, since their usage here does not accord easily with their general Chinese meanings. The Index, once again, demonstrates the accuracy of VP's reconstructive efforts. For ***tai–chi–hsiang*** he offers ***qui naissent semblables à elle*** (which is born resembling it), and later renders ***tai*** alone as ***en s'attachant intimement*** (intimately connected). ***Tadākāratā,*** which he recognizes is the equivalent for ***tai–hsiang,*** means 'having such–and–such an appearance'.

155 – 'Cognized' = ***so–lü*** 所慮. In Chinese this literally means 'object of concern' or 'being anxious.' VP, ***ibid.,*** offers ***'qui est connue' ou 'perçue'*** (what is known or perceived). He writes:

> The image in the mirror is supported by (***s'appuie***) the thing reflected: this thing is the ***pratyaya,*** the condition of the image; but not its ālambana–pratyaya, because it isn't "known" or "perceived" by the mirror.

S'appuie translates ***t'o*** 託, which in this passage as ***so–t'o*** I translated as 'perceptually–grasped.' Index, p. 328, gives two correspondences for Hsüan–tsang, ***upalabhya*** (cognitively grasp) and ***adhīna*** (resting on or in, situated, depending on, subject to, subservient to), and several for Paramārtha: ***abhi–ni–viś–, avakram, pratisaṃdhi, praviś–.*** Apparently VP took it as ***adhīna.*** The preponderance of meanings, and the philosophical context of the ***Ch'eng wei–shih lun,*** however, dictate that the term carries important implications of 'attachment, grasping.' In Chinese ***t'o*** means 'entrust, request, to engage,' but it is associated with its homonym 托 which means 'to support, as with the hand; the length of one's two arms extended; and hence a fathom' (Giles #11,366).

156 – Cf. VP, p. ii.445.

157 – 'Adheres strictly' is VP's interpretation of K'uei-chi's understanding of the term *tai, ākāra*. Replacing it in my translation with 'gives the direct appearance of' offers some interesting, and perhaps more authentic readings.

158 – Ch.7:19B; Tat, p. 542.

159 – *Neng-yüan* 能緣, lit: active-subjective condition.

160 – *nei so lü t'o*

161 – *Chih* 質, an important term we will examine presently.

162 – Giles, #1892, p. 237f.

163 – Index, p. 291.

164 – Monier-Williams, p. 731.

165 – Ch.7:19B; Tat, p. 544.

166 – Ch.7:20A; Tat, p. 544.

167 – *Tzu-t'a sheng-t'u* 自他身土. Has Hsüan-tsang been reading Merleau-Ponty?

168 – In the *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* this category is used to establish milestones and events along the mārga, such as the darśana-mārga and bhāvana-mārga, etc. It is subdivided into twenty-two 'roots' reminiscent of the *Abhidharmakośa*: the five material sense organs, the two sexual organs, the *jivitendriya*, etc. Though important, this material is beyond the scope of the current discussion.

169 – Ch.8:5B-6A; Tat, p. 570.

170 – Ch.8:6B; Tat, p. 574.

171 – There are a few notable exceptions, such as Lyotard and Deleuze, but their ethical efforts only shine in contrast to the lacuna of competing formulations.

172 – Which is not to say that we lack efforts to bridge that gap. The

Neo-kantians tried to bridge it, as did Kant himself, and a number of current analytic philosophers have taken a stab at it (e.g., Morton White's *What Is and What Ought to Be Done,* NY: Oxford University Press, 1981), but none have managed to satisfactorily link epistemology with ethics. The Western philosophical predilection to do ontology and consider it the most important of the philosophical disciplines has effectively crippled the development of a coherent Western ethic. Epistemology becomes ontology's handmaiden, and ethics is castigated as a pathetic attempt at moral epistemology. Hegel's indirect 'solution,' collapsing what ought to be into his notion of what is, by declaring the 'idea' *qua* ideal to be the crux of reality led to Marxism, whose most famous indictment of Hegel and the style of philosophy it exemplified was given by Marx in the 11th thesis of his *Theses on Feuerbach:*

> The philosophers have only *interpreted* the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to *change* it.

The tension between ontological thinking and ethical engagement has been particularly haunting in the Twentieth Century. One thinks of the 'Heidegger question' (or Carl Jung, or Paul deMan); the crucial but uneasy Marxist supplement to French existentialism, structuralism and phenomenology; etc. The sheer wasted politico-ethical thought of so many of our leading philosophers, either neglecting to oppose Nazi fascism (unless directly assaulted by it) or embarrassingly supporting Stalinist totalitarianism, merely highlights the poor and misguided quality of contemporary ethical thought.

173 – Lyotard and Deleuze have led the effort in France that is attempting to unify these three parts of the Kantian system. Giles Deleuze's *Kant's Critical Philosophy: The Doctrine of the Faculties,* tr. by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984) is a particularly noteworthy effort at seeing all three critiques (pure reason, practical reason and judgement) from the Kantian corpus as a unified architectonic structure. As interesting as these efforts are, the three critiques remain largely incommensurate.

174 – Streng's translation, slightly modified.

175 – The *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* discusses the āśraya-parāvṛtti in numerous, intricate ways. We have neither time nor space to deal with them all here. Rather some salient portions will be extracted and highlighted. The criterion of saliency that I used, in part, considered the degree to which the context of a particular passage had been adequately established by our previous discussion. As a corollary, passages that clearly contributed to the arguments being made were of course included.

176 – On *fu* 伏 and *tuan* 斷, cf. Ch.10:4A–4B; Tat, p. 752; VP pp. 662ff. ***Viṣkambhaṇa*** carries the double meaning of 'holding back or impeding' (such as by bolting a door) ***and*** 'a means of tearing open.' ***Viṣkambh*** means to firmly fix, prop up, to support something (like a support beam) ***and*** to hurl, cast, come forth, escape. Thus it connotes at once holding back and thrusting forth. ***Fu*** means 'to fall down; humble; suffer; to lie in ambush; to sit, as a bird on eggs; to yield or give way.' ***Prahāṇa*** means to eradicate; ***tuan*** means to break or cut off. Together they imply a kind of cathartic crescendo: One holds back, building to a climax (***viṣkambhaṇa***), which culminates in a final release (***mokṣa***) that eliminates and resolves (***prahāṇa***) all the previous tensions. That this 'process' is amenable to a Freudian reading should be obvious.

177 – Ch.10:2B–3A; Tat, p. 746–748.

178 – ***Wu so-chi shu*** 無所繫屬. ***Shu*** can mean 'to belong, to be ranked, sorted, allied with, grouped with, classified as, depend on,' and implies being located somewhere in a family chain. It thus implies the classificatory principle behind such schema as phylogeny, ontogeny, morphology, taxonomy, etc.

179 – The example of the eye is not clear. Does it mean there are different types of eyes (brown, blue, etc.; human, cow, fly, etc.; round, slanted, etc.; open, closed; etc.)? Or that eyes differentiate by color, size, shape, etc.? The contrast between this ***chen-ju*** and the previous one seems to be that the other involves the family-hierarchy principle on which classes and their members are located, and this one concerns the actual placement of members within a class. Or, perhaps, that the previous ***chen-ju*** implies 'genus' and this ***chen-ju*** involves species.

180 – ***Hsiang-t'u tsu-tsai so-yi chen-ju*** 相土自在所依真如.

181 – This 'understanding', achieved in the ninth bhūmi, is thoroughly linguistic and hermeneutic. Earlier the text described the āvaraṇas which are cut off in the 9th stage. Tat translates this section thus (pp.739–741):

> ...the ninth Bhumi cuts off, with their ***dausthulya,*** two delusions:
>
> (1) A triple ***dharanivasitamoha*** ([sic; Tat never ends this parenthesis] delusion of impeding the first three Pratisamvids: (a) of ***artha*** (meaning, i.e., unhindered power of interpreting the meaning of the Dharma, the Law); (b) of ***dharma*** (the letter of the Law, i.e., unhindered power of interpreting the letter of the Law); and (c) of ***nirukti*** (language or form of expression, i.e., unlimited power of interpreting or understanding the language).
>
> a. By 'mastery of the innumerable dharmas preached by the

Buddha' is meant the Arthapratisamvid (unhindered power of interpretation with reference to the meaning of Dharma). In other words, it is the 'mastery of all that can be explained', which makes it possible for all meanings to appear in one Meaning.

b. By 'mastery of the innumerable names, sentences, clauses, phrases and words' is meant the Dharmapratisamvid (unhindered power of interpretation with reference to the letter of the Law). In other words, it is the 'mastery of all that can explain or express meanings', which makes it possible for all names–phrases–syllables to appear in one name–phrase–syllable.

c. By 'mastery of all methods or repeated and continuous explanation and exposition' is meant the Niruktipratisamvid (unhindered power of explaining and understanding languages and forms of expressions). In other words, it is the 'mastery of all methods of repeated and continuous exposition and elucidation of verbal expressions and vocal sounds', which renders it possible for all sounds–notes to appear in one sound–note, thus enabling one to understand in the language of one country the languages of all countries.

(2) The *pratibhanavasitamoha* (delusion impeding the mastery of the power of argumentation) which impedes the Pratisamvid of *pratibhana* (argument, i.e., unhindered power of argumentation), skilfulness in discourse which proceeds from a thorough knowledge of the natural qualifications of the sentient beings to be converted.

182 – "See through" = *ta* 達, which also means 'to open, inform.' 'See through' evokes the sense of transparency that the *Ch'eng wei–shih lun* associates with Awakened cognition.

183 – The other five are:

1. Destroying the power [of defiled seeds] and increasing the ability [of good seeds]–paravṛtti (gradually 'controlling' the seed's projectories).
2. Prativedha–paravṛtti (partial āśraya–paravṛtti during darśana–mārga, that sees through the gross aspects of the two āvaraṇas.
3. Bhīvana–paravṛtti (cultivational gradual progress, from practicing the ten pāramitās, etc.).
4. Full development of the fruit–paravṛtti (the fruition of three mahākalpas of practices, suddenly, in the *vajropama samādhi*, which occurs, according the *Ch'eng wei–shih lun* between the tenth stage and Buddhahood [other texts, such as the *Laṅkāvatāra* associate it with the eighth stage], one cuts off the two āvaraṇas, and henceforth always assists other sentient beings).
5. Inferior–paravṛtti (for śravakas and Pratyekabuddhas).

184 – Ch.10:4A; Tat, p. 752; VP pp. 662ff.

185 – A brief outline of the rest:
(1) the method which turns [the basis] around.
(1a) Suppresses or controls (*viṣkambhana*) the influential power of *anuśayas* (latent tendencies) to actualize the two āvaraṇas.
(1a.1) Preparatory knowledge (*prayoga–jñāna*);
(1a.2) Fundamental knowledge (*mūla–jñāna*);
(1a.3) Post–awakening knowledge (*pṛṣṭhalabdha–jñāna*).
(1b) Decisively extinguishing (*prahāṇa*) the two āvaraṇa's *anuśayas*. "The *anuśayas* which involve 'deluded theories' (*mi–li* 迷理) can only be extinguished by the fundamental knowledge *qua nirvikalpa–jñāna*. The remaining *anuśayas* which involve 'deluded praxis' (*mi–shih* 迷事) are extinguished by the preparatory and post–Awakening knowledges.
(2) The basis which is turned.
(2a) the basis which holds the seeds, viz. the ālaya–vijñāna.
(2b) the basis of delusion and awakening
(3) What is cut off in the turning.
(3a) cutting off (*she* 捨) what is extinguished (*fu*, *prahāṇa*), i.e, the antidote to the *āvaraṇas*, which stops the projection of parikalpita.
(3b) cutting off what is rejected (*so–chia* 所棄), i.e., at the moment of the *vajropama samādhi*, both contaminated and non–contaminated seeds are utterly rejected and cut off, having led to 'a supremely perfect, lucid, simple, pure mūla–vijñāna which won't 'support' (*āśraya*) them, though some traces of the seeds remain – enough to remain in saṃsāra.
(4) What is attained in the turning.

186 – Ch.10:6A; Tat, p. 758.

187 – Hsüan–tsang transliterates 'bodhi' here, rather than translating it.

188 – Ch.10:8B; Tat, p. 766.

189 – Tat, *ibid.*, translates:

> It carries all objects without failure of memory (because its objects are eternally present) and without error (because it is never troubled or obscured).

He adds this footnote: "This is why the Tathāgata is named *sarvajna* and *sarvakarajna* ('All–Wisdom' and 'All–Bija–Wisdom')."

190 – *Ying* = pratibimba or chāyā ('shadow, reflection') (Index. p. 478); *hsiang* = pratibimba (Index, p. 308).

191 – Ch.8:23B; Tat, p. 650.

192 – Burton Watson's translation, ***Chuang Tzu: Basic Writings,*** NY: Columbia UP, 1964, p. 95.

193 – Ch.10:9B–10A; Tat, p. 772. This is Tat's translation (virtually pirated from VP pp. 685f), diacriticals added.

194 – Ch.10:11A; Tat, p. 776.

195 – Ch.2:1B; Tat, p. 74–76.

196 – ***Chan t'ing chi*** 暫停即. ***Chan*** means 'briefly, shortly, temporarily;' ***t'ing*** means 'stop, settle, delay, rest;' ***chi*** means 'an instant.'

197 – ***T'ung tsai hsien tsai*** 同在現在.

198 – Ch2:2A; Tat, p. 76.

199 – ***Fei ning jan*** 非凝然. ***Ning*** means 'to congeal, freeze,' hence the dharma does not freeze in time or space

200 – ***Ibid.***

201 – Cf. Ch.1:15A–B, 1:16B–17A, 9:16B, etc.

202 – Ch.1:12A ff; Tat, pp. 46ff.

203 – Ch2:2A–2B; Tat, pp. 76–78.

204 – VP i.69 offers the following correspondences: ***yin yün*** = ***svara*** (sound, noise, ***tone***); ***Ch'ü ch'ü*** = ***ākuñcana*** (bending, e.g., a limb). It seems to me that retranslating ***Ch'ü ch'ü*** into Sanskrit misses the point.

205 – ***Op. cit.***

206 – Prior to modern instruments, there were only three basic types of instruments: (1) Stringed instruments, (2) instruments made from reeds or tubes, such as flutes, and (3) percussion (drums, etc.). The first two required a tonal theory, i.e., a theory or pramāṇa with which to determine which tones were 'valid' and which were to be suppressed. Once holes were carved in a reed the tones it could produce were fixed, unalterable. Stringed instruments, since they played varying tones, were scrupulously designed to produce just the right tones. Confucius' high regard for music reflects this use of tuning theory as the

criteriological means of access to the cosmic pattern, since musical ratios (the mathematics of tuning theory) made concrete the otherwise 'invisible' patterns that moved and roused men's hearts and minds, patterns isomorphic to the celestial, cosmological, cosmogonic, etc., patterns of the universe. They were the standards against which man and society were to be measured and 'tuned.' The instrument, person and society were to be tuned to the same ratios. The Pythagoreans and Plato (e.g., *The Republic*) explicitly shared this view, and it is likely that some form of musicological theory was widespread throughout the Ancient and Medieval worlds (e.g., the Music of the Spheres). Chuang Tzu's reflections on music (e.g., beginning of Ch. 2), the section on music in the *Li Chi* (Book of Rites), etc., all point to the vital role that tonal theory played in Chinese thought. This subject is much to complex to adequately address here, and nothing definitive has yet been written. A good first step is Kenneth DeWoskin's *A Song for One or Two: Music and the Concept of Art in Early China* (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, 1982). The centrality of music *qua* sound models of reality in other cultures has been more adequately addressed, though more needs to be done. Cf. the works of Ernest McClain, e.g. *The Myth of Invariance: the Origin of the Gods, Mathematics and Music from the* Ṛg Veda *to Plato* (NY: Nicolas Hays, 1976); *The Pythagorean Plato: Prelude to the Song Itself* (NY: Nicolas Hays, 1978); *Meditations through the Quran: Tonal Images in an Oral Culture* (NY: Nicolas Hays, 1981); also cf. Antonio DeNicolas, *Avatāra: The Humanization of Philosophy Through the Bhagavad Gītā* (NY: Nicolas Hays, 1976); also, for another perspective of how music, sound provides a different ontology, a different philosophy than that which sight models (which predominate in our culture) create, cf. Victor Zuckerkandl's *Sound and Symbol: Music and the External World* (Princeton: Bollingen, 1969) and *Man the Musician: Sound and Symbol, v. II* (Princeton: Bollingen, 1973).

207 – *Ibid.*

208 – Cf. ch.1:12A–14A; Tat, pp. 46–54. Buddhist texts offer many refutations of atomism; cf. e.g., Vasubandhu's *Twenty Verses*, etc.

209 – They are reduced to four basic theories, and these theories, and these are then refuted. Cf. *ibid.*

210 – Ch.1:14A–15A; Tat, p. 54–58.

211 – *Ibid.*

212 – According to K'uei-chi, this means Yogācārins.

213 – *Chia-hsiang* was sometimes used by Hsüan-tsang to translate *saṃjñā*, associative conceptual thinking.

214 – "Final limit" = ***pien–chi*** 邊際 . ***Pien*** means 'the side, bank, edge, margin, frontier'; ***chi*** means 'border, limit.' Index p. 427: ***Pien–chi*** = ***anta, anta–kṛiyā, kāla–niyama, paryanta, prānta–koṭika,*** which all signify some sort of edge, border, end, boundary, limit.

215 – Ch.1:14B; Tat, p. 56.

216 – Ch.1:15A; Tat, p. 58.

217 – Ch.2:3A–3B; Tat, pp. 80–82.

218 – Tat, ***ibid.*** translates K'uei–chi's comment to this passage as: "Dharmas known by evidence, like Rupa which is known by the five consciousnesses, and like mind and its caittas which are known by the 'knowledge of other minds."

219 – Ch.2:4A–B; Tat, p. 82–84.

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APPENDIX ONE

THE ONE HUNDRED DHARMAS

I – The Eight Consciousnesses — Citta-dharma 心法，八識

1. Seeing–consciousness	*cakṣur–vijñāna*	眼識
2. Hearing–consciousness	*śrotra–vijñāna*	耳識
3. Smelling–consciousness	*ghrāṇa–vijñāna*	鼻識
4. Tasting–consciousness	*jihvā–vijñāna*	舌識
5. Tactile/kinetic consciousness	*kāya–vijñāna*	身識
6. Empiric–consciousness	*mano–vijñāna*	意識
7. Focusing	*manas*	意
8. Consciousness–Warehouse	*ālaya–vijñāna*	阿賴耶識

II – Mental Associates — Caitasika–dharma 心所法

A

General — ***Sarvatraga*** 遍行

9. Sensation	*sparśa*	觸
10. Pain/Pleasure/Neutral	*vedanā*	受
11. Volition	*cetanā*	思
12. Conceptualization	*saṃjñā*	想
13. Attention	*manaskāra*	作意

B

Specific — ***Viniyata*** 別境

14. Desire	*chanda*	欲
15. Confident Resolve	*adhimokṣa*	勝解
16. Memory	*smṛti*	念
17. Meditative Concentration	*samādhi*	定
18. Discernment	*prajñā*	慧

C

Advantageous — ***Kuśala*** 善

19. Faith	*śraddhā*	信
20. [inner] Shame	*hrī*	慚
21. Embarrassment	*apatrāpya*	愧
22. Lack of Greed	*alobha*	無貪
23. Lack of Hatred	*adveṣa*	無瞋
24. Lack of Misconception	*amoha*	無癡
25. Vigor	*vīrya*	精進
26. Tranquility	*praśrabdhi*	輕安

27. Carefulness	***apramāda*** 不放逸
28. Equanimity	***upekṣā*** 行捨
29. Non-harmfulness	***ahiṃsā*** 不害

D

Mental Problems ***Kleśa*** 煩惱

30. Appropriational Intent	***rāga*** 貪
31. Aversion	***pratigha*** 瞋
32. Stupidity	***mūḍhi*** 痴
33. Arrogance	***māna*** 慢
34. Doubt	***vicikitsā*** 疑
35. Perspectivality	***dṛṣṭi*** 惡見

E

Secondary Mental Problems ***Upakleśa*** 隨煩惱

36. Anger	***krodha*** 忿
37. Enmity	***upanāha*** 恨
38. Resist recognizing own faults	***mrakṣa*** 覆
39. [verbal] maliciousness	***pradāsa*** 惱
40. Envy	***īrṣyā*** 嫉
41. Selfishness	***mātsarya*** 慳
42. Deceit	***māyā*** 誑
43. Guile	***śāṭhya*** 諂
44. Harmfulness	***vihiṃsā*** 害
45. Conceit	***mada*** 憍
46. Shamelessness	***āhrīkya*** 無慚
47. Non-embarrassment	***anapatrāpya*** 無愧
48. Restlessness	***auddhatya*** 掉舉
49. Mental fogginess	***styāna*** 惛沈
50. Lack of Faith	***āśraddhya*** 不信
51. Laziness	***kausīdya*** 懈怠
52. Carelessness	***pramāda*** 放逸
53. Forgetfulness	***muṣitasmṛtitā*** 失念
54. Distraction	***vikṣepa*** 散亂
55. Lack of [self-] Awareness	***asamprajanya*** 不正知

F

Indeterminate ***Aniyata*** 不定

56. Remorse	***kaukṛtya*** 悔
57. Torpor	***middha*** 隨眠
58. Initial Mental Application	***vitarka*** 尋
59. [subsequent] Discursive Thought	***vicāra*** 伺

III – Form   Rūpa-dharma 色法

60. Eye	***cakṣus*** 眼
61. Ear	***śrotra*** 耳

62. Nose *ghrāṇa* 鼻
63. Tongue *jihvā* 舌
64. Body *kāya* 身
65. [visible] form *rūpa* 色
66. Sound *śabda* 聲
67. Smell *gandha* 香
68. Taste *rasc* 味
69. Touch *spraṣṭavya* 觸
70. 'Formal' Thought-objects *dharmāyatanikāni rūpāni* 法處所攝色
   a. Concrete form analyzed to minutest extent (atoms) 極略色
   b. Non-concrete form (color, etc.) analyzed to grandest extent 極迥色
   c. Innermost impression of perceptual form 受所引色
   d. Forms arising through Imaginary-Construction 遍計所起色
   e. Forms produced and mastered in samādhi 定所生自在色

IV – Embodied-Conditioning Not Directly [perceived] by Citta

Citta-viprayukta-saṃskāra 心不相應行法

71. Accretion *prāpti* 得
72. Life-force *jīvitendriya* 命根
73. Sharing the same Species *nikāya-sabhāga* 衆同分
74. Differentiation of Species *visabhāga* 異生法
75. Non-conceptual meditative attainment *asaṃjñi-samāpatti* 無想定
76. Attaining Cessation [of conceptualisation and pain/pleasure] *nirodha-samāpatti* 滅盡定
77. Non-conceptual [mental] states *āsaṃjñika* 無想果
78. Nominal Body *nāma-kāya* 名身
79. Predication Body *pada-kāya* 句身
80. Syllabic [utterance] Body *vyañjana-kāya* 文身
81. Birth *jāti* 生
82. Continuity *sthiti* 住
83. Aging *jarā* 老
84. Impermanence *anityatā* 無常
85. Systematic Operation *pravṛtti* 流轉
86. Fixing of [karmic] Differences *pratiniyama* 定異
87. Union/Joining Together *yoga* 相應
88. Celerity *jāva* 勢速
89. Sequentiality *anukrama* 次第
90. Space *deśa* 方
91. Time *kāla* 時
92. Number/Calculation *saṃkhyā* 數
93. Totalization (Inclusionary) *sāmagrī* 和合性
94. Otherwise-ness (Exclusionary) *anyathātva* 不和合性

V – Unconditioned Dharmas	Asaṃskṛta-dharma 無為法
95. Spatiality	***ākāśa*** 虛空
96. Cessation through Understanding	***pratisaṃkyā–nirodha*** 擇滅
97. Cessation not through Understanding	***apratisaṃkyā–nirodha*** 非擇滅
98. Immovable Cessation	***āniñjya*** 不動滅
99. Cessation of Conceptualization and Pain/Pleasure	***saṃjñā–vedayita–nirodha***, 想受滅
100. As–it–is–ness	***tathatā*** 眞如

APPENDIX TWO

THE SEVENTY FIVE DHARMAS

I – Form — Rūpāṇi

1. Eye — *cakṣus*
2. Ear — *śrotra*
3. Nose — *ghrāṇa*
4. Tongue — *jihvā*
5. Body — *kāya*
6. [visible] form — *rūpa*
7. Sound — *śabda*
8. Smell — *gandha*
9. Taste — *rasa*
10. Touch — *spraṣṭavya*
11. Not-intersubjective — *avijñapti*

II – Mind — Citta

12. Citta — *citta*

III – Mental Associates — Caitasika

A

Great Groundings — ***Mahā-Bhūmika***

13. Pain/Pleasure/Neutral — *vedanā*
14. Conceptualization — *saṃjñā*
15. Volition — *cetanā*
16. Sensation — *sparśa*
17. Desire — *chanda*
18. Discernment — *mati* [= *dhī* = *prajñā*]
19. Memory — *smṛti*
20. Attention — *manaskāra*
21. Confident Resolve — *adhimukti* [= *adhimokṣa*]
22. Meditative Concentration — *samādhi*

B

Advantageous Groundings — ***Kuśala-mahābhūmika***

23. Faith — *śraddhā*
24. Vigor — *vīrya*
25. Equanimity — *upekṣā*
26. [inner] Shame — *hrī*
27. Embarrassment — *apatrāpya*
28. Lack of Greed — *alobha*

29. Lack of Hatred	*adveṣa*
30. Non-harmfulness	*ahiṃsā*
31. Tranquility	*prasrabdhi*
32. Carefulness	*apramāda*

C

Grounding for Mental Disturbances ***Kleśa-mahābhūmika***

33. Misconception	*moha* [= *mūḍhi*]
34. Carelessness	*pramāda*
35. Laziness	*kausīdya*
36. Mental fogginess	*styāna*
37. Lack of Faith	*āśraddhya*
38. Restlessness	*auddhatya*

D

Grounding for the Disadvantageous ***Akuśala-mahābhūmika***

39. Shamelessness	*āhrīkya*
40. Non-embarrassment	*anapatrāpya*

E

Grounding for Minor Mental Disturbances ***Paritta-kleśa-mahābhūmika***

41. Anger	*krodha*
42. Resist recognizing own faults	*mrakṣa*
43. Selfishness	*mātsarya*
44. Envy	*īrṣyā*
45. [verbal] maliciousness	*pradāsa*
46. Harmfulness	*vihiṃsā*
47. Enmity	*upanāha*
48. Deceit	*māyā*
49. Guile	*śāṭhya*
50. Conceit	*mada*

F

Indeterminate Groundings ***Aniyata-mahābhūmika***

51. Remorse	*kaukṛtya*
52. Torpor	*middha*
53. Initial Mental Application	*vitarka*
54. [subsequent] Discursive Thought	*vicāra*
55. Appropriational Intent	*rāga*
56. Aversion	*pratigha*
57. Arrogance	*māna*
58. Doubt	*vicikitsā*

IV – Embodied–Conditioning Not Directly [perceived] by Citta

Citta–viprayukta–saṃskāra

59. Accretion — *prāpti*
60. Divestment — *aprāpti*
61. Sharing the same Species — *sabhāga* [= *nikāya–sabhāga*]
62. Non–conceptual [mental] states — *āsaṃjñika*
63. Non–conceptual meditative attainment — *asaṃjñi–samāpatti*
64. Attaining Cessation [of conceptualization and pain/pleasure] — *nirodha–samāpatti*

65. Life — *jīvita* [cf. *jīvitendriya*]

66. Birth — *jāti*
67. Continuity — *sthiti*
68. Aging — *jarā*
69. Impermanence — *anityatā*

70. Nominal Body — *nāma–kāya*
71. Predication Body — *pada–kāya*
72. Syllabic [utterance] Body — *vyañjana–kāya*

V – Unconditioned Dharmas — Asaṃskṛta–dharma

73. Spatiality — *ākāśa*
74. Cessation through Understanding — *pratisaṃkyā–nirodha*
75. Cessation not through Understanding — *apratisaṃkyā–nirodha*

APPENDIX THREE

Madhyānta Vibhāga: Chapter One

The *Madhyānta Vibhāga* is a root Yogācāra text, consisting of five chapters of verses (the Chinese translations divide the text into seven parts). Written by Asaṅga and/or his spiritual mentor 'Maitreya,' it is accompanied by a verse by verse commentary (*bhāṣya*) written by Vasubandhu and a sub-commentary (*ṭīka*) written by Sthiramati. The following translation is based on the Sanskrit text of the verses of the first chapter. I used the Devanagri edition found as an appendix to Stefan Anacker's *Seven Works of Vasubandhu*, pp. 424–431 (his translation is on pp. 211–222), and the transliteration accompanying Thomas Kochumuttom's translation in his *A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience*. Both translations were extremely helpful.

I have also consulted the two Chinese versions, Paramārtha's (T.1559) and Hsüan-tsang's (T.1600). The latter's is much closer to the Sanskrit than the former. Paramārtha's version is extremely misleading in many places, and K'uei-chi's commentary takes him to task for it. These issues go unremarked in the current translation.

I have provided a running commentary drawn from the *bhāṣyā* and *ṭīka*, sections of which I have paraphrased.

v. 1

The topics are:

1. definitions (*lakṣaṇa*);

2. obstacles/coverings (*hi–āvṛtis*);

3. basic-factors (*tattva*);

4. cultivation of antidotes (*pratipakṣaya bhāvanā*);

5. its stages/one's situation there (*tatra–avasthā*);

6. attainment of the fruit (*phala–praptir*);

7. preeminence/supremacy of the 'method' (*yāna–ānuttaryam–eva*)

Vasubandhu clearly defines #2 as *āvaraṇa*, and #5 as situtations or stages which arise in practicing #4.

The first chapter roughly concerns two dialectically antidotal perspectives, viz. abhūta-parikalpa and śūnyatā. In other words it redefines

pratītya-samutpāda (= paratantra) in terms of the dialectical opposition and complimentarity of parikalpita and pariniṣpanna. Imaginary fullness vs. relational emptiness; and yet both empty and reify each other. Abhūta-parikalpa is unreal only insofar as it is empty; it is real insofar as it can be emptied. Conversely, śūnyatā is empty only insofar as it is (parikalpita) devoid of grasper and grasped; it is real insofar as it can empty parikalpita. Hence the first half of this chapter will define and describe this from the perspective of parikalpita and the second half of the chapter will describe it from the perspective of pariniṣpanna. Paratantra, which is the madhyānta (middle way between extremes) is the tacit, emergent perspective consequent on the supplanting of these two extreme perspectives.

v. 2

[Though] abhūta-parikalpa (mental construction of the non-real) (m) exists (*'sti*),

no duality is found.

But śūnyatā (f) is found there, even in this (m), there is that (f).

Vasubandhu defines abhūta-parikalpa as 'discriminating noesis from noema' (***grāhya-grahāka-vikalpaḥ***). Śūnyatā is defined as the state of abhūta-parikalpa devoid of noema and noesis (***śūnyatā tasya-abhūta parikalpasya grāhya-grāhaka-bhāvena virahitatā***). 'Even in (śūnyatā) there is abhūta-parikalpa.' He compares it to looking at a receptacle, and seeing that a certain something is not in it; one then sees the receptacle as it is (***yathābhūtam***), that is, as 'something remaining' (*il se reste*) which is actually existing there (***tat sad-iha-asti-iti***).

The point is the inseparability of abhūta-parikalpa from śūnyatā and vice versa. There is mental construction, which though it falsely constructs noemic-noetic experience, is actually devoid of such duality. Removing this excess imposition is the ***function*** of śūnyatā (therefore, śūnyatā is always used as a functional term is these texts, never as a substantive!). It merely removes excess from parikalpita, and thus only arises (functionally) through abhūta-parikalpa ***in which*** it is found ***non-dualistically***. Thus it is not other to abhūta-parikalpa, but dependent on it; moreover parikalpa cannot be properly understood ***as the constructor*** (i.e., ***vijñapti-mātra***) unless it is emptied of the noetic-noemic dualism though which it constructs.

While Kochumuttom interprets this passage to mean that since abhūta-parikalpa means the noemic-noetic split, and śūnyatā is the absence of this split, therefore realizing abhūta-parikalpa through śūnyatā must mean that abhūta-parikalpa is eliminated; Vasubandhu seems to have interpreted it differently. He has indicated that the construction is unreal ***only insofar as it is a construction mistaken for the non-constructed*** – recognition of this, i.e., overcoming the error of mistaking parikalpa to be a noetic-noemic enterprise

(epistemologically meaning that the object is neither subjectively nor objectively constructed; psychologically meaning that mental-movement becomes utterly neutral of appropriational force or motivation) is itself the correct mental construction, 'correct' signifying the constructive activity cleansed through the śūnyatic rectifier.

v. 3,4

Neither śūnya nor aśūnya, thus is everything described;

due to its existence (*sat*), its non-existence (*asat*) and again its existence (*sat*),

this is called the Middle Way. /3

Imaged as (*pratibhāsa*) [1] intentional-objects (*artha*), [2] living-beings (*sattva*), [3]

self (*ātman*) and [4] psychosophical-activity (*vijñapti*)

is born consciousness (*vijñāna*).

(Since) no intentional-object (*artha*) exists (*nāsti*) for it (i.e., consciousness), that

being inexistent (*abhāvāt*), it too is non-existent (*asat*) /4

The last part of the fourth verse uses three different terms which are hard to distinguish from each other in English. Even in Sanskrit their differential nuances are difficult to pinpoint. ***Nāsti, abhāva*** and ***asat*** all mean 'non-existent.' ***Nāsti*** implies existential status, i.e., simply whether a thing 'is.' ***Bhāva*** implies something which has come to be through some process, a concrescence, or something essentialistic that has concretized from a process (***bhava***). ***Abhāva*** would then mean 'nothing has come to be' or 'what should have been is absent.' ***Asat,*** as discussed above in Chapter Three, implies 'non-actual' (= inexistent, potential).

Verse 3, of course, becomes critically important for East Asian Buddhism. Emphasizing the śūnya/aśūnya indeterminacy which also forms the crux of *The Awakening of Faith* and some Tathāgatagarbha thought (e.g., Śrimala-devi Sūtra), etc.; following the Diamond Sutra logic in the three-fold dialectic of is, isn't, is (in Zen, restated: mountains are mountains and rivers are rivers; then mountains aren't mountains and rivers aren't rivers; finally, again, mountains are mountains and rivers are rivers"), this also underlies Chih-I's reading of ***Mūla Madhyamaka kārikā*** 24:18. It is a concise and accurate chrystallization of the ***Prajñā-pāramitā*** literature. It also is our first explicit clue to the method to be adopted for analysing the ***trisvabhāva,*** viz. first parikalpita (provisionally) is (***sat***), then parinispanna deletes it (***asat***), then paratantra truly is (***sat***), not as an absolutistic ***aufhebung,*** but as the dialectical margin between the two, i.e., as ***madhyamā pratipad,*** as the middle way.

While this chapter makes the most sense if one takes parinispanna to

be transitional to a 'purified' paratantra, other chapters of *Madhyānta Vibhāga* suggest that paratantra is transitional to a 'fully realized' pariniṣpanna. This methodological aporia also recurs, with schismatic force, throughout East Asian Buddhism.

Verse 4 begins to apply it to the psychosophic realm. Consciousness is that which arises *as* referents (*artha*), *as* living beings (*sattva*), *as* an appropriating self (*ātman*), and through and *as* the spectrum of psychosophic dynamics (*vijñapti*). It is not other to them, but insofar as it is consciousness of, the 'of' not only signifies that they are of it (i.e., that these things belong to consciousness), but that it is of them as well (consciousness is constituted through referents, selves, etc.). These are its pratibhāsa, the images and experiential modalities through which it constitutes and is constituted by experience. That the artha (referents -- here decisively signifying all referents of intentionality, i.e., becoming inclusive of the other three modalities; "...[Since] no intentional-object [*artha*] exists [*nāsti*] for it [i.e., consciousness]...") are radically non-existent (*abhāva, nāsti*), consciousness as something over and against its objectifications also is unreal (*asat*).

Notice, the fact that consciousness is as dependent on its referents as they are on it, such that both are unreal if assumed to exist independently of each other, clearly and decisively refutes the claim that Yogācāra is a form of idealism. Moreover, consciousness (*vijñāna*) becomes subsumed in the function of *referentiality*. To turn a component of referentiality, viz. consciousness, into the ultimate referent or source of referentiality, is to entirely distort the Yogācāric enterprise. Its pivotal role, both in the construction of reference and as its own object of reference, is to be understood as an epistemological and existential, not metaphysical, concern by Yogācāra.

Vasubandhu adds: The pratibhāsa of artha and sattva is devoid of ākāra (*anākāratvāt*); the pratibhāsa of self and vijñapti also are not as they are imaged (*ca vitatha-pratibhāsatvāt*). [The verse] says there is nothing (*tad-abhāvāt tadapi-asad-iti*) [as its artha] because the (four) graspables (*grāhyam*) - [viz.] visibles (*rūpādi*), the five senses (*pañca-indriyam*), 'intentional-focusing' (*manaḥ*), and the sixfold consciousness which thinks associatively (*ṣaḍ-vijñāna-sañjñakam*) - all four are non-existent. The noema being inexistent (*abhāvāt*), the noesis, i.e., consciousness, also is absent, non-actual (*asat*).

Notice, again, *he does not deny objects while reifying consciousness;* since they are mutually dependent, the denial of objects *also denies a real substantial idealistic consciousness.*

Sthiramati adds: Ākāra is the cognitive-mode (*prakāra*) in which an *ālambana* is grasped (*grāhaka-prakāra*), for example, in the form of (*rūpeṇa*) [something] impermanent, etc. Neither (artha nor sattva has such a mode), since they 'announce themselves to perception' (*prakhyānāt*) in the form of [something] grasped (*grāhya-rūpeṇa*). Therefore [Vasubandhu's] phrase 'devoid of ākāra' means 'they have no graspability.' (*Ākāro hi-ālambanasya anityādi-rūpeṇa*

grāhaka-prakāraḥ. Sa anayor-nāsti grāhya-rūpena prakhyānāt. Ato-anākāratvād agrāhakatvād-iti arthaḥ)

The exact meaning of this passage is not completely clear. Why should a 'cognitive mode' be treated as different from an 'announcing to perception' or 'presenting' in this way?

He states further: ākāra is reflectively-experiencing (*saṃvedanā*) an ālambana. But since they [i.e., artha or sattva] are 'inexistent' (*nāsti*), therefore they are anākāra ('non-ākāra) in the sense that there is no perceptual-apprehension (*upalabdhi abhāvād*) of them. (*ālambana-saṃvedanaṃ vā ākāraḥ. Tac-ca tayor nāsti iti upalabdhi-abhāvād anākāraḥ*)

In other words, ākāra, if understood as how an ālambana (objective support of a sense-cognition) is subjectively cognized (*saṃvedanā*), cannot be of a thing, but of consciousness; hence the objective pole of the imaged-form (*ākāra*) is inexistent (= not external to consciousness) and hence not an ākāra (of an ālambana) at all!

In the next verse Sthiramati claims that what is ultimately refuted is not ākāra, but the notion that ākāra has a (material) essence. Cf. also Vasubandhu's comments to v. 8.

v. 5

Therefore (*ataḥ*) its

[(*asya*), i.e. the four graspable modes of consciousness; accord. to Sthiramati]

being the abhūta-parikalpa is established (*siddham*),

since it is not just-as-it-is (*tathā*), and it is not totally inexistent (*abhāvāt*)

either.

There is liberation through its cessation.

Notice that if one moves the punctuation, so that the period follows "siddham", and the period after "either" is replaced with a comma, v. 5 reads differently. It would then say: 'Therefore that the four graspables are actually abhūta-parikalpa is established. Since it is not just-as-it-is and it is not totally inexistent either, thus there is liberation through its cessation.' In this reading liberation is conditional upon the cessation of the abhūta-parikalpa. The implication would be that then it would be just-as-it-is.

Vasubandhu adds: Its existence arises not in the way it is imaged to be. It is not totally absent either, since there is the arising of nothing but (*mātra*) erroneous-cognitions (*bhrānti*). (*Yasmān-na tathā-asya bhāvo yathā pratibhāsa utpadyate. Na ca sarvathā abhāvo bhrānti-mātrasya-utpādāt*)

Sthiramati points out that bhrānti does not mean the absence of a pratibhāsa of this or that ākāra, but it means the absence of its essence

(*ātmavena–abhāva*). (*ātmatvena–abhāvo na tu yad–ākāreṇa pratibhāsate tena bhrāntir–ucyate māyā–vat*)

Imaging, especially as bhrānti, cannot be utterly denied as unreal, elsewise the soteric distinction between bondage and liberation will become unmaintainable. Defilement and purity, then, according to Vasubandhu are to be understood as the arising and ceasing of erroneous cognitions. To see things as they are, or as he has said previously, through the śūnyatic rectifier, is to have cleansed the imagination of the noetic–noemic fallacy.

Saṃsāra/bandha qua *kleśa* vs. *nirvāṇa/mukti* qua *vyavadāna* (= *viśuddhi*, purification, clarification). Are the terms on each side of the formula mere equivalences, or do they displace each other? Are these pairs, particularly as an attempt to answer the question of why should these bifurcations be admitted at all, actually deferals of the question, only re–stating that certain bifurcations are always already presupposed and privileged, beyond where they may be questioned, only to be reinstated, reiterated through new, sublational terms? Later the text will try to explain why *some* distinctions, these in particular, are soterically necessary (cf. vs. 21–22).

What is interesting is the influence this passage may have had on the debate between Dignāga and Dharmakīrti on the definition of true cognition (i.e., is the absence of bhrānti sufficient to make a cognition 'true', or must it fulfil further criteria?).

v. 6

Parikalpita, paratantra and pariniṣpanna are indicated by

intentional–objects (*artha*),

abhūta–kalpa (cognitive construction of inexistents)

and the absence of the [noemic–noetic] duality.

Parikalpita is to be known through its objectifications (*artha*), i.e., the referents of each intentional act insofar as it has become objectified, viewed as referring to something outside or external to the act of reference (i.e., the naive realist position which attributes svabhāvic nature to whatever can be cognized). Pariniṣpanna, again is defined as the absence of the noetic–noemic dualism.

What is of interest here is the definition of paratantra. It is defined as abhūta–parikalpita itself. First, let us note that according to Vasubandhu abhūta–parikalpita truly exists, even when filtered through śūnyatā, though obviously in a purified condition. Next, the key to what paratantra means here comes when we remember that the first half of this chapter looks at its subject from the parikalpic viewpoint; thus, all three of these definitions are from the perspective of parikalpita. This implies that the three svabhāvas are to be understood as perspectives through which they can view each other. Paratantra,

as a synonym for pratītya-samutpāda, signifies that abhūta-parikalpita arises through a confluence of conditions, that it is not self-creating but dependent on conditions other than itself, though this process is its own mark (a precursor perhaps to the notion of *svalakṣaṇa*). The false construction of experientials, or better put, the false interpretation of mental constructions, is itself the paratantric process. Thus paratantra is abhūta-parikalpa. This helps emphasize again that paratantra is the bridge between parikalpita and pariniṣpanna. It is this 'betweenness' which allows paratantra to act both as the transition between parikalpita and pariniṣpanna and as the 'middle-way' culmination of their antidotal mutual cancellation.

As Sthiramati points out, that the abhūta-parikalpa depends on causes and conditions means that the saṃskāras (*vāsanās*, etc.) are its productive causes. Again this signifies that the imagined realm of experience is none other than the operation of pratītya-samutpāda. He also clarifies that the abhūta-parikalpa as parikalpita is abhūta-parikalpa with the noetic-noemic dyad. Abhūta parikalpa understood as a matter of conditionality is paratantra, and the remedial perspective which views abhūta-parikalpita devoid of the dyad is pariniṣpanna.

v. 7

Totally on the basis of (*samāśritya*) perceptual-apprehension (*upalabdhi*)

non-perceptual-apprehension (*nopalabdhi*) arises (*prajāyate*);

and totally on the basis on non-perceptual-apprehension,

non-perceptual-apprehension arises.

While this seems to be saying that nothing comes from something, but nothing also comes from nothing, Vasubandhu explains further what the phrases actually refer to.

He writes: On the basis of perceptually-apprehending the psychosophy of closure, the non-cognitive-perception of referent-objects (artha) arises. On the basis of the non-(perceptual)-apprehension of referent-objects, the non-perceptual-apprehension of the psychosophy of closure also arises. Thus one enters into the negative characteristic/definition (*asallakṣaṇa*) of noema and noesis. (*Vijñapti-mātra-upalabdhim niśritya artha anupalabdhirjāyate. Artha-anupalabdhim niśritya vijñapti-mātrasya api-anupalabdhirajāyate. Evam asallakṣaṇam grāhya-grāhakayoḥ praviśati*)

Sthiramati explains that this process involves first cancelling the ontological status of objects by way of realizing that graspables are merely imagined. With the objective pole erased, the subjective pole, which he calls *vijñapti-mātra,* also is erased, since without a noema there can be no noesis, and thus the entire process of grasperhood (noetic constitution) becomes absurd. He also says that one enters into the negative definition/characteristics of 'mentally

constructed forms' (***parikalpita rūpayoḥ***), not the abhūta-parikalpa itself. These rūpa are the noemic-noetic dyad.

Note that for both Vasubandhu and Sthiramati vijñapti-mātra is a ***passing phase*** through which one passes, a phase marked by its being non-perceptually-apprehended. The Ten Oxherding pictures used by Zen reiterate this. The realization of ***vijñapti-mātra,*** i.e., the psychosophic epistemological trap in which each one is enveloped (pictures #1-7), leads to a translucence in which all appropriational intent is absent (#8). Then the 'world' as it is reappears (#9-10). Yogācāra deals with the same idea in terms of ***prayoga, nirvikalpa-jñāna, pṛṣṭhalabdha-jñāna*** (cf. Chapter Five). Thus, ***vijñapti-mātra*** is not the final culmination, but rather a crucial transition point.

I have translated ***upalabdhi*** and ***nopalabdhi*** (which literally mean 'seize, possess, attain, perceive, understand' and their inverse) as 'perceptual-apprehension' and 'non-perceptual-apprehension' respectively in order to echo the notion that 'perception' is not seen by Yogācāra as a passive state, but rather as a fully active going out and grasping of the experiential world. Perception involves intentionally chasing something and then 'apprehending' it, i.e., a successful and valid cognitive act is one which 'attains' its goal (***artha***), or in other words, apprehends its referent. ***Nopalabdhi*** is an unsuccessful cognition, and not necessarily the utter absence of any awareness whatsoever.

Could these three steps be equivalent to the tri-svabhāva, in the order parikalpita, pariniṣpanna and finally paratantra? Might there be a different order (ending with pariniṣpanna)?

v. **8**

Therefore it is established that perceptual-apprehension is of the same nature

(***svabhāvatā***) as non-perceptual-apprehension;

Thus it is known (***jñeya***) that non-perceptual-apprehension and

perceptual-apprehension are the same (***samatā***).

The point, according to Vasubandhu, is that 'perception', as commonly defined as the cognitive grasping of an actual object (note that even Frege who eschewed psychologisms used this definition), is never attained (***upalabdhir-upalabdhitvena-asiddhā***). Though he does not deny that we sense, this sensing is not 'perception' properly speaking, since the objects perceived within the consciousness closure are not actual objects ***outside of consciousness,*** but the appropriational images mentally constructed as noema-noesis (***abhūta artha pratibhāsa***). He allows that this too may be called 'perception,' since these images do arise, but the inference that they refer to objects must be bracketed. The ***Ch'eng wei-shih lun*** takes the identical stance.

Sthiramati drives the point home: to say that one does not

perceptually-apprehend referent-objects (*artha*) is to say perceptual-apprehension is a case of psychosophical closure (*vijñapti-mātra*). (*Artha-anupalambhasya vijñapti-mātratā upalambhasya ca-satvād-aviśeṣataḥ*)

Hence, for Vasubandhu and Sthiramati, the self-sameness of perceptual-apprehension and non-perceptual-apprehension, i.e., their mutual dependence and mutual cancellation, results in a 'middle', a margin, which both call *vijñapti-mātra*.

v. 9

The abhūta-parikalpa is citta and caittas in the three-worlds;

There, seeing objects (*artha-dṛṣṭir*) is vijñāna, and their qualities (*viśeṣa*) are the

caittas.

Here the text makes clear that abhūta-parikalpa is not only coextensive with the psychosophic closure, but moreover it emphasizes the cognitive dynamics within that closure, namely the perceptual dimension signified by citta and caittas. Consciousness is defined as referential perspectivality. This means that a citta is always a 'citta of', or in other words, this line clearly offers a Husserlian definition of consciousness. The caittas are defined as those referents' qualities. When we look at the Abhidharmic and Yogācāric dharma lists (see appendices One and Two), we see that caittas are usually conative and valuative experiential components, such as slothfulness, anger, lack of shame, etc. Thus 'qualities' (*viśeṣa*) here means affective milieu. This will be made clearer in the next verse. To restate this, vijñāna is a structural term (denoting the structure of referentiality) and caitta is an evaluative term (denoting the felt-texture of the structure).

Vasubandhu calls the first part of the verse the 'classification-definition' (*prabheda-lakṣaṇa*) and the second part of the verse the 'synonym-definition' (*paryāya-lakṣaṇa*).

v. 10

One is the condition-consiousness (*pratyata-vijñāna*),

the second relates to enjoyability (*aupabhogikam*).

In the latter are the caittas (i) enjoyment (*upabhoga*), (ii) distinguishing

(*pariccheda*) and (iii) impulsion (*prerakas*).

As in the previous verse, the structure is the basic condition. The caittas are the affective qualities, which here are distinguished into three types: Those which concern enjoyability (pain, pleasure, etc.); those concerned with

discriminating and distinguishing, i.e., drawing cognitive lines; and those which impel or motivate.

Vasubandhu equates these three with the skandhas, so that enjoyability signifies vedanā, distinguishing signifies saṃjña, and the impulsions signify saṃskāra. He also draws a distinction between the condition-consciousness, which he identifies with ālaya-vijñāna, and enjoyability-consciousness, which he identifies with pravṛtti-vijñāna.

Sthiramati sees pravṛtti as movement (a) from one moment to the next or (b) from one life to the next. He says this verse deals with (a) while the next verse deals with (b). Moreover, he argues that both the condition consciousness and the pravṛtti-vijñāna are the same abhūta-parikalpa, i.e., it stores and gives rise to its own enjoyments, it constitutes its own cause and effect.

Vasubandhu calls this verse the pravṛtti-lakṣaṇa (operational definition).

v. 11–12a

The world is disturbed (***kliśyate,*** oppressed, made impure) because of:

1– obscuration	(***chādanād***)	[avidyā]
2– sowing	(***ropaṇāc***)	[saṃskāra]
3– conducting (being led)	(***nayanāt***)	[vijñāna]
4– obsessional grasping	(***samparigrahāt***)	[nāma-rūpa]
5– filling up	(***pūraṇāt***)	[āyatana]
6– triple distinguishing	(***triparicchedād***)	[sparśa]
7– experiencing (enjoying)	(***upabhogāt***)	[vedanā]
8– being pulled along (being attracted)	(***karṣaṇāt***)	[tṛṣṇa]
9– binding (being bound)	(***nibandhanāt***)	[upādāna]
10– confronting	(***ābhimukhyād***)	[bhāva]
11–12– palpably suffering	(***duḥkhanāt***)	[jāti-maraṇa]

This begins the explicit reworking of pratītya-samutpāda. It is no accident that these are verses 11 and 12, coinciding with the number of nidānas in the pratītya-samutpāda model. Sthiramati points out that these verses explain the continuity of time from life to life, hence the ambivalence between 11 and 12,

i.e., jāti and maraṇam. Or put another way, the 'joining' of these two verses parallels the 'joining' of birth and death, the ***sandhi*** that creates seeming continuity by way of substitutions and displacements.

The parallelism also suggests that the other verses, too, may be intentionally numbered in a sequence corresponding to pratītya-samutpāda.

This suggestion in fact can be excavated from the verses themselves, with the following results:

v.1– general statement of parameters

v.2– ***avidyā*** = abhūta-parikalpa vis-à-vis śūnyatā. The partial obscuring or misting over (***chadana***), which like the eye's blind spot, conceals its own concealment or incompleteness by presenting itself as complete, i.e., constructing a seemingly full picture from incomplete cognitions. Nescience here implies the ***āvaraṇas,*** the enveloping covering obstructions, the 'closure.'

v.3– ***saṃskāra*** = 'it is, it isn't, it is' (from experiential presence to latent seed to re-experiential presence) qua śūnya-aśūnya as the Middle way; i.e., the temporal and subconscious flipping of gestalts. The seed in the ground is invisible until the plant emerges.

v.4– ***vijñāna*** = vijñāna is born as the pratibhāsa of artha, sattva, atman and vijñapti. The commentaries point out that this is vijñāna without any external ālambana. It locates and moves itself (***nayana*** = pupil of the eye; managing, conducting,; carrying, bringing, drawing, moving a game piece = 'purveying,' 'overseeing,' 'being manipulated') through its own activity.

v.5– ***nāma–rūpa*** = the mind-body as the ground of bondage and liberation; it is neither totally inexistent, nor does it exist just-as-it-is (***tathā***). It is the established (***siddha***) abhūta-parikalpa, i.e., embodied imagination.

v.6– ***āyatana*** = the three natures are indicated by artha, abhūta-kalpa, and the absence of the dyad; i.e., the 12 āyatanas and 18 dhātus are simultaneously affirmed and denied.

v.7– ***sparśa*** = upalabdhi to nopalabdhi to further nopalabdhi; i.e., perception in the moment it diversifies into (i) a referent (artha = upalabdhi), (ii) a cognitive faculty (indriya = nopalabdhi) and (iii) the relational contact between them (sparśa = vijñāna = nopalabdhi)! Etymologically only artha can be upalabdhi, since the term means 'taking up what is there'; the eye cannot see itself, nor is there a consciousness which links an object to a sensory faculty when the object is absent. Hence only an object can be 'there', though the gist of this verse is that actually the 'thereness' of the object (the ākāra of the pratibhāsa, cf. infra) is a projection of consciousness. As Sthiramati's comm. would indicate, this irony is intentional.

v.8– ***vedanā*** = the ***sameness*** (svabhāvatā, samatā) of upalabdhi and nopalabdhi; i.e., the sublation of pain/pleasure into upekṣa.

v.9– ***tṛṣṇa*** = the affective extension of the citta-caitta in the three worlds structure; desire as the affective excess of the cognitive-existential structure.

v.10– ***upādāna*** = the pratyata-vijñāna and the bhoga (enjoyer) as 'enjoyer', 'discriminator' and 'motivator'.

The next verse, v. 11, connects *bhāva* to *jāti* (they together constitute the 'bounding' horizon (*nibandha*), and v. 12 collapses *jāti* and *maraṇam* (duḥkha = saṃsāra).

Vasubandhu adds:

1– concealed = being hindered (*avabandhanāt*) by avidyā from seeing (*darśana*) things–as–they–are (*yathābhūta*).

2– sowing = instituting (*pratiṣṭhāpanāt*) karma–vāsanās by saṃskāra–vijñāna.

3– conducting = being taken by vijñāna to a birth–place (*upapatti–sthāna*).

4– being seized = [appropriating] self–existence (*ātmabhāvasya*) through nāma–rūpa.

5– filling up = the six–sense–organs.

6– triple–distinguishing = by sparśa.

7– enjoying/experiencing = by vedanā.

8– being attracted/pulled along = thirsting (*tṛṣṇayā*) for new existence (*punar–bhavasya*) projected by [previous] actions (*karma–ākṣiptasya*).

9– being bound = desire for experience (*kāmādiṣu*) arising through the kleśic appropriational consciousness (*upādānair–vijñānasya utpatti–anukūleṣu*).

10– confronting = the tendency (*bhāvena*) of past acts to act towards (*kṛtasya karmaṇaḥ*) new existence (*punar–bhave*) given by the orientation of past retributively–maturing deeds (*vipākadānāya–abhimukhī–karaṇāt*).

11–12– palpably suffering = through birth, old age and death. The world (*jagat*) is afflicted/disturbed (*parikliśyate*) by these.

Sthiramati points out that *jagat* means 'that which keeps going' (*gacchati–iti–jagat*), i.e., saṃsāra.

v. 12b

Threefold, twofold, this mental–disturbance (*saṃkleśa*);

Sevenfold, because of the abhūta–kalpa.

According to Vasubandhu's commentary, this is meant to distinguish the structural, subconscious functionings – as causal – from the perceptual, bodily functionings – as effects. He writes:

The threefold *saṃkleśa* – (i) the 'kleśa' saṃkleśa, (ii) 'karma' saṃkleśa and (iii) 'janma' (what one is born with) saṃkleśa. The *kleśa–saṃkleśa* (involves) avidyā, tṛṣṇa and upādāna. The *karma–saṃkleśa* (involves) saṃskāra and bhāva. *Janma–saṃkleśa* are the remaining aṅgi [viz. vijñāna, nāma–rūpa, āyatana, sparśa, vedanā, jāti and maraṇam].

The twofold saṃkleśa – (i) causal (*hetu*) saṃkleśa and (ii) resultant (*phala*) saṃkleśa. Causal saṃkleśa (involves) those aṅga whose self–nature (*svabhāvair*) is kleśa and karma [i.e., groups (i) and (ii) above, viz. avidyā, saṃskāra, tṛṣṇa, upādāna and bhāva]. The resultant saṃkleśa are the rest [see (iii) above].

The sevenfold are the seven kinds of causes – (i) the cause of [the

four radical] reversals (*viparyāsa–hetuḥ*) [seeing the permanent in the impermanent, self in not–self, etc.]; (ii) the cause of sowing (*ākṣepa–hetuḥ*); (iii) cause of being led (*upanaya–hetuḥ*); (iv) cause of compulsive grasping (*parigrāha–hetuḥ*); (v) cause of enjoyment (*upabhoga*); (vi) cause of attraction/being pulled along (*ākarṣana–hetuḥ*); (vii) cause of agitation (*udvega–hetuḥ*).

(i) the cause of the reversals is avidyā.
(ii) the cause of sowing is saṃskāra.
(iii) the cause of being led is vijñāna.
(iv) the cause of compulsive grasping is nāma–rūpa and ṣaḍ–āyatana.
(v) the cause of enjoyment is sparśa and vedanā.
(vi) the cause of attraction is tṛṣṇa, upādāna, and bhāva.
(vii) the cause of agitation is birth, old age and death.

Sthiramati emphasizes that all the saṃkleśa are due to the abhūta–parikalpa, since it constitutes all the cittas and caittas in the three worlds.

As an interesting aside, the association of saṃskāras with 'planting' or 'sowing' recurs again in Nietzsche (*Daybreak* #382):

> Out of damp and gloomy days, out of solitude, out of loveless words directed at us, *conclusions* grow up in us like fungus: one morning they are there, we know not how, and they gaze upon us, morose and gray. Woe to the thinker who is not the gardener but only the soil of the plants that grow in him!

Notice that 3 + 2 + 7 = 12. Hence the first group, the threefold, already subdivides into its own 3 + 2 + 7. The second group, the twofold, merely collapses the first group's subdivisions of 3 and 2 into a single group. The third group collects tṛṣṇa, upādāna and bhāva into one subsection (i.e., 3) and jāti and maraṇam (i.e., 2) into another. Vasubandhu here sums up that nine definitions have been given of the abhūta–parikalpa:

1– *sat–lakṣaṇa* (positive definition)
2– *asat–lakṣaṇa* (negative definition)
3– *sva–lakṣaṇa* (own–definition)
4– *saṃgrāha–lakṣaṇa* (inclusive definition)
5– *asallakṣaṇa–anupraveśa–upāya–lakṣaṇa* (instrumental definition; or entering into the function of the negative definition)
6– *prabheda–lakṣaṇa* (classification or differential definition)
7– *paryāya–lakṣaṇa* (synonym definition)
8– *pravṛtti–lakṣaṇa* (operational definition)
9– *saṃkleśa–lakṣaṇa* (psychotic definition)

v. 13

One should concisely know (*vijñeyam*) about the definitions, synonyms, meanings (*artha*), classifications and demonstrations of śunyatā.

Here begins the śūnyatic antidote. While the first twelve verses expounded abhūta-parikalpa, the following verses will expound parinispanna as śūnyatā.

v. 14a

The inexistence (*abhāva*) of the [noemic-noetic] dyad and this inexistence's

existence (*abhāvasya bhāvaḥ*) is the definition of śūnya.

Śūnya is defined or characterized as (i) the negation of the noemic-noetic dyad, (ii) that negation's (iii) affirmation. While we saw that abhūta-parikalpa was described as a positive leading to a double negative (upalabdhih to two nopalabdhih), śūnyatā is characterized as two negatives leading to a positive (*abhāva, abhāva, bhāva*). The dialectical balancing act begins in earnest. This move Vasubandhu calls the negative definition, since what is affirmed is negation itself. However, it is crucial to keep in mind here and in what is to follow that for Yogācāra negation is always 'negation of.' Just as abhūta-parikalpa cannot escape its falsity (its capacity to undergo śūnyatic correction), śūnyatā cannot escape abhūta-parikalpa, i.e., it can only empty that which was falsely filled.

v. 14b

Neither existent (*bhāvo*) nor inexistent (*abhāve*);

neither different nor the same (in) character (*lakṣaṇa*).

Vasubandhu writes:

Why not bhāva? Because it (refers to) the dyad's abhāva. Why not abhāva? Because the dyad's abhāva is bhāva. This is śūnyatā's lakṣaṇa, therefore from abhūta parikalpa, śūnyatā is neither different nor the same.

If different, that would mean that *dharmatā* is different from [actual] *dharmas,* which is unacceptable; [this is] just like taking 'impermanence' and 'duḥkha' to be different from impermanent and duḥkhic things. [This is unacceptable because it posits universals independent of particulars, whereas according to Buddhism, the opposite should be asserted.]

If the same, then there would be no knowledge (*jñānam*) [that could arise through] clarifying (*viśuddhi*) [one's cognitive grasp of an] ālambana, since śśūnyatā and abhūta-parikalpita would be] in the same universal class (*syāt sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*).

Thus [śūnyatā] is defined as 'free from being other to just-that' (*etena tattva-anyatva-vinirmuktam lakṣaṇam paridīpitam bhavati*).

While abhūta-parikalpa utilized the dialectical bracketing of identity and difference, śūnyatā is now being shown as the ground of that bracketing. On the one hand, things cannot be reduced to abstract general categories, nor do

those categories carry any significance apart from the particulars from which they are abstracted. Yet what constitutes categories is the similarity within particulars, or shared lakṣaṇa (*sva-lakṣaṇa* = 'self-defining').

Epistemologically the most curious notion is the distinction between *viśuddhi-ālambana* (clearly [cognizing] that on which a cognition hangs) and 'universal characteristics' (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*). With śūnyatā understood as the tattvic base of saṃsāra that is capable of turning either towards nirvāṇa or further nibandha (bondage), dependent *on the manner of cognitive object* it takes for a referent, it becomes the condition, or rather the field of conditions, in which saṃsāric direction (toward nibandha or toward nirvāṇa) can be existentially determined.

v. 15

Tathatā, bhūta-koṭi, animitta, paramārthatā, dharma-dhātu;

these, in brief, are the synonyms of śūnyatā.

Tathatā is 'just-as-it-is-ness,' correct cognition. Bhūta-koṭi signifies the ultimate horizonal limit. Animitta means both to be without sensorial characteristics, and to be causative. On paramārtha-tā, see Chapter Three, above. Dharma-dhātu is the field of dharmas as cognized by someone Awakened, i.e., the world as it is and as we would see it if we weren't trapped in our psychosophic closures. This verse is self-explanatory, though the following verse adds some details.

v. 16

Never-otherwise (*ananyathā*), without-radical-reversal (*aviparyāsa*), the cessation

of the ārya-gocara (lit.: Noble sense-field), the cause (*hetuvāc*) of ārya-dharmas,

these are the synonym's referents (*paryāyārtha*) respectively.

Vasubandhu explains:

[Śūnyatā is called] 'tathatā' as 'never-otherwise' in the sense of its always functioning just-so (*nitya tathā-iti kṛtvā*). [It's called] 'bhūta-koṭi' (existential limit) as 'without-the-radical-reversals' because of the radical-reversal's insubstantiality (*viparyāsa-avastutvāt*). [It is called] 'signless' (*animitta*) as 'cessation of referential signs' (*nimitta nirodhārthena*), because all the signs are inexistent (*sarva-nimitta-abhāva*). [It is called] 'ultimate-referent' (*paramārtha*) due to 'the horizonal-field of noble knowing' (*ārya-jñāna-gocaratvāt*) because it is the sense-object (*viṣayatvāt*) of ultimate knowing (*parama-jñāna*). [It is called] 'dharma-dhātu' (dharma realm) because it is the 'cause of noble dharmas' (*ārya-dharma-hetuvād*), since the noble dharmas have this ālambana as their producer (*ārya-dharmāṇām*

tadālambana prabhavatvāt). Here the referent of hetu (cause) is also the referent of dhātu (i.e., dhātu, which means 'realm, element, basic factor, domain' is here to be understood as 'cause').

As Kochumuttom points out, śūnyatā is not being directly equated with vijñāna. However several of these terms are cognitive or affective (e.g., animitta, paramārtha, dharma-dhātu, etc.). What is more important, contrary to the claims of Wayman and others, śūnyatā is not treated as a Reality in a substantive sense, and the irony of calling it a gocara, an ālambana or viṣaya, etc., is sharply mediated by the qualification on dhātu, i.e., sensorial or cognitive aspects are to be understood in these synonyms as ***contextual conditions,*** not substantive referents.

What remains when something is emptied is not emptiness itself, but the thing that was emptied (see v. 2, ***bhāṣya***). Emptiness is the contextual condition for such seeing, not the object of seeing. As such it is never entirely free of 'other' objects, but intimately dependent on what is other than itself. Hence, understood in this dialectical light, it is never purely empty unless it empties itself. Since emptiness can only empty itself if it has become substantialized or objectified to some degree, emptiness remains an invisible though efficacious function. This dialectical tension is given existential direction in the next verse.

v. 17

It is mentally-disturbed (***saṃkliṣṭa***), it is clarified (***viśuddha***);

it is with and without flaws (***samalā nirmalā***);

[However] its clarity (***śuddhi***) is understood [to be] like the clarity of the water

element (***abdhātuka***), gold and ethereal-space (***ākāśa***).

Though śūnyatā can be seen as ***kliṣṭa*** or ***viśuddha, samalā*** or ***nirmalā,*** nonetheless the parity is disrupted predictably and the purity side becomes privileged. This is what I have called elsewhere "di-symmetric" opposition. (also see v. 5, comments; and cf. v. 23)

Vasubandhu organizes this as follows:

> When is [śūnyatā] considered saṃkleśa and when is it considered viśuddha?...When it is with malā, then it is saṃkleśa; when it has discarded malā (***prahīṇamalā***) then it is viśuddha.

The di-symmetry erupts when in spite of the claim that śūnyatā straddles both sides of the fence, he wishes to argue that śūnyatā is more authentically comprehended when seen as pure and removed from the psychological (saṃkleśa) and cognitive (***samalā***) obstructions. Note, of course, that these terms are synonyms for ***kleśa-*** and ***jñeya-āvaraṇa***. He rhetorically asks:

If, having been samalā, it becomes nirmalā, how is it that it is not impermanent, since it would thereby be undergoing change?

He answers with the last part of the verse, which he takes to be claiming that the undesired properties of śūnyatā are merely contingent (*āgantuka*), they do not affect its svabhāva (lit. 'its svabhāva does not become otherwise')!

This can only survive critical refutation if we remember that the point attempted here is the inseparability of śūnyatā and abhūta-parikalpa. He must argue that they are not mutually exclusive, which entails arguing that śūnya is not radically separated from the impurities it empties or negates. Again it depends on those impurities in order to function (and 'functioning' is the criterion of validity and existence for Buddhism). However insofar as its 'nature' is the emptying of impurities, it never loses its nature when immersed within them. On the contrary it should be considered most fully functional when engaging kleśa and malā; those are its fields of operation. The substantialistic metaphor of the verse, along with Vasubandhu's recourse to svabhāvic language unfortunately only clouds the issue.

v. 18

The Enjoyer (*bhoktṛ*), the enjoyed (*bhojana*),

the body (*deha*), the experiential-ground (*vastu*),

these are śūnyatā;

that through which just this (*yathā*) is seen (*dṛṣṭam*), and that to which it refers

(*artha*),

these are śūnyatā.

The enjoyer and the enjoyed; the sensate body and perceptual ground – the lived-body and its perceptual field. The intentional arc *is* śūnyatā.

The text now begins to enumerate types of śūnyatā. Prior to this verse Vasubandhu lists 16 types. (As an aside, there exists a Chinese translation of this portion of this text by Kumārajīva, in which he takes it as a separate, independent text, entitled the '16 emptinesses' that he falsely attributed to Nāgārjuna). Vasubandhu enumerates:

1- emptiness of the internal (*adhyātma-śūnyatā*);
2- emptiness of the external (*bahirdhā-śūnyatā*);
3- emptiness of the internal and external (*adhyātma-bahirdhā-śūnyatā*);
4- emptiness of the great (*mahā-śūnyatā*);
5- emptiness of emptiness (*śūnyatā-śūnyatā*);
6- emptiness of paramārtha (*paramārtha-śūnyatā*);
7- emptiness of saṃskṛta (*saṃskṛta-śūnyatā*);
8- emptiness of asaṃskṛta (*asaṃskṛta-śūnyatā*);
9- emptiness of the superlative (*atyanta-śūnyatā*);

10– emptiness of inferior and superior (*anavcrāgra–śūnyatā*);
11– emptiness of non-rejection (*anavakāra–śūnyatā*);
12– emptiness of nature (*prakṛti–śūnyatā*);
13– emptiness of lakṣaṇa (*lakṣaṇa–śūnyatā*);
14– emptiness of all dharmas (*sarva–dharma–śūnyatā*);
15– emptiness of inexistence (*abhāva–śūnyatā*);
16– emptiness of the inexistence of svabhāva (*abhāva–svabhāva–śūnyatā*).

After the verse he correlates the six listed in the verse with the first six of his list. Enjoyer is internal; enjoyed, external. Both internal and external (enjoyer–enjoyed) is the body (*deha*) which he equates with śarira.

Vastu means the inhabited world (*bhājana–loka*) [which is the perceptual ground for enjoyer, enjoyed and their relation], and because of its vastness, it is called 'great emptiness'. The emptiness of the internal sense-fields, etc., when seen and known to be empty, that is called the emptiness of emptiness. And paramārtha–śūnyatā is the emptiness of all this as seen (*dṛṣṭam*) through the ākāra of paramārtha (*paramārtha–ākāreṇa*).

This last is meant to cover the last ten śūnyatās on Vasubandhu's list of sixteen, ten signifying the advancement through the ten bhūmis. Hence he equates this with 'what the bodhisattva attains' (*yadartham–ca bodhisatvaḥ prapadyate*).

Note this reverses the order of the kleśas, in that one begins with the affective, conative caittas, and progresses gradually through more and more abstractive, intellective śūnyatic domains, rather than the other way around. While kleśa functions as an abstraction which concretizes itself out of a structural dynamic, śūnyatā begins with an embodied appropriator who step by step divests himself of the self-identification which obstructs his view of the structure and its own self-cancellation.

v. 19

In order to accrete the intended (*prāptyartham*) pure dyad (*śubha–dvayasya*);

for the continual welfare of all beings;

and in order to intend (*artha*) not to leave saṃsāra;

and for the non-cessation of the beneficial.

Here artha opens up to its base meaning as 'that towards which an intentionality intends'. When used in a linguistic or epistemological context, it should be rendered 'referent'. Here it involves orienting one's entire intentional structure toward the compassionate increasing of kuśala *in this world*.

According to Vasubandhu, the pure dyad refers to the saṃskṛta and asaṃskṛta śūnyatās. It is pure because it is kuśala. Benefitting all beings corresponds to the superlative emptiness. Staying in saṃsāra counteracts the

nihilistic or futilistic tendency.

If one doesn't see the emptiness of saṃsāra and the emptiness of an inferior and superior [life position, then] oppressed and depressed, one would abandon saṃsāra.

Preventing the beneficial (***kuśala***) from perishing refers to:

Even in a 'Nirvāṇa-with-no-remainder' (***nirupadhiśeṣe nirvāṇe'pi***), one does not reject, does not throw off anything, and the emptiness of this is called the emptiness of non-rejection.

This is a clear attempt to ground the bodhisattva project in the notion of śūnyatā.

v. 20

For the [mental] clarification (***viśudhyartham***) of the lineage (***gotra***),

for attaining the [primary and secondary] marks [of great persons],

and for [mentally] clarifying (***śuddhaye***) the Buddha-dharmas,

the Bodhisattva has recourse to cognitive-aims (***prapadyate***).

Vasubandhu states: gotra means svabhāva, since it belongs to one's own being. The marks are those of great persons (***mahāpuruṣa***) (corresponding to lakṣaṇa-śūnyatā). The Buddha-dharmas correspond to sarva-dharma-śūnyatā. This covers 14 of the 16 śūnyatās.

Notice that artha (goals) are all upāyic, not actually ends in themselves. They are śūnyatic consequences.

v. 21

The inexistence of pudgala [person] and dharmas is one kind of śūnyatā;

the actual existence (***sad-bhāva***) of this inexistence (***abhāva***) is the other kind of śūnyatā.

The point here, besides filling in the last two emptinesses, is to again reiterate that abhūta-parikalpa and śūnyatā are inseparable; without śūnyatā the noemic-noetic dyad cannot be emptied, and without affirming this negational function, negation itself cannot operate, hence the emptying of pudgala and dharma would be impossible.

v. 22

If it wasn't disturbed (***saṃkliṣṭa***),

then all beings would be [already] liberated;

If it wasn't clarifiable (*viśuddhi*),

then all efforts would be fruitless (*niṣphala*).

This phrase reiterates the dialectic tension involved in defining śūnyatā, particularly in reference to the abhūta-parikalpa. Only two questions remain unanswered: (1) what are the conditions, and/or causes of either the liberated or disturbed condition, i.e., what conditions (definitional, actual, processional, etc.) differentiate them and how does one move from one to the other? (2) Is this model to be taken ontologically or epistemologically, i.e., is it a description of the way things are (defiled and/or clarified) or a model of shifting perspectives on something non-ontological?

The remainder of the text will address the first question. As to the second, Vasubandhu's *bhāṣyā* tends toward the ontological (*saṃkliṣṭa* are considered contingent, secondary kleśa -- upakleśa -- which disturb śūnyatā), while Sthiramati's *ṭīka* tends toward the epistemological ('neither saṃkleśa nor viśuddhi issue directly from śūnyatā, since the dharmatā depends on its dharmas;' *dharma-paratantratvād-dharmatāyāḥ*).

The undecidability of the ontological vs. epistemological reading continues into the next verse, which begins epistemologically and slips, in its last line, into the ontological position.

v. 23

Neither kliṣṭa nor akliṣṭa,

as well as neither śuddha nor aśuddha,

because of citta's transluscence and the contingency of the kleśas in it.

Sthiramati defines citta as citta-dharmatā, implying the solution involves abstracting citta to its structural or formal function, thereby voiding its appropriational or existential activity. Kochumuttom cleverly interprets this passage to mean that śūnyatā is neither disturbed nor pure since those properties are only projections which cittas reflect on the objects they encounter; they are not properties of things themselves. These projections however are taken by cittas to be of the objects and not its own constitutive act.

In this light, the contingent can be understood in a non-ontological sense as signifying the impermanent, unreal status of the reflections, while śūnyatā, by definition, signifies the absence of misleading projections. Hence the kleśic projections into it are never it itself; the activity of negating is never reducible to a theory of negation but 'exists' in and only in an actual act of negation. What is finally negated are the citta's appropriational projections along with the propensities which impel it toward projecting.